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WITH NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS

BY

Cornelia

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VOLUME II

ARISTOTLE, THE EARLY PERIPATETIC
SCHOOL AND THE EARLY ACADEMY

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PREFACE

To this volume I have few things to add. Those who take the trouble of reading it will easily understand the purpose of the book. I altered my first project so far as to think it better to divide Greek philosophy after Plato into two volumes, so that after this one there will be a third containing the Hellenistic systems and Neoplatonism with its preparation.

I wish to express my gratitude to Professor A. Mansion at Louvain, who kindly read the manuscript of the chapter dealing with Aristotle's philosophy of nature, and to Professor Fr. Wehrli of Zürich, who was so kind as to give me the opportunity of reading his manuscript on Lycon and the two Aristons before it was published, in September 1951, and of discussing certain points with him¹.

I thank also Dr. W. Vollgraff and Dr. L. M. de Rijk, who read the proofs with me, and two English ladies, Mrs. Paap and Mrs. Breuning, who purified the barbarisms of my English text.

Perfection is a thing not easily attained in earthly life. A few misprints are rectified in the Errata. I hope that, for the rest, very few mistakes have crept in.

C. J. d. V.

¹ The references to Prof. Wehrli's edition of the fragments of Heraclides Ponticus in ch. XIX, 3, were added by himself to the proofs of this work.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

As to the text of Aristotle, I did not follow exclusively one edition. Generally speaking, I used the editions of Sir David Ross of the *Physics*, *Metaphysics* and *Analytica*, that of Minio-Paluello of the *Categories* and *De interpretatione*, Rackham's of the *Ethica Nicomachea*, Immisch for the *Politica*. For the *De anima* I used P. Siwek's edition, of the *Rhetoric* those of M. Dufour and J. H. Freese, of the *Poetics* those of Bywater and of Hardy. Of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* I used, as is indicated, the edition of Ross-Fobes; where newer editions are lacking, the fragments are taken from Wimmer. For the other Peripatetics I used Wehrli's *Schule des Aristoteles*; for the Academy the indicated sources and the existing collections of the fragments of Speusippus (Lang) and Xenocrates (Heinze).

BOOK III

ARISTOTLE

TENTH CHAPTER

LIFE AND WORKS

1—PROLEGOMENA: THE ARISTOTELIAN QUESTION

395—Concerning Plato we had to ask the radical question whether we really know his doctrine; whether his own works do contain this doctrine, or whether we have to pay more attention to the indications of his disciples. This may be called the Platonic question. It dates from Trendelenburg's work on the ideal Numbers (1826). One might speak of an Aristotelian question too, in the sense of a radical problem of the tradition. Werner Jaeger was the first to raise this matter radically in his *Aristotle* of 1923. The problem is due to the following two points: 1. We have not the complete works of Aristotle at our disposal; 2. the writings which we possess contain older and younger parts, and it would not be difficult to make Aristotle contradict Aristotle. the problem

Ad 1. Of Plato we possess the complete literary works meant for publication. On the other hand, his school-teaching is not directly known to us. With Aristotle, the situation is exactly the reverse: his literary works, which were much read in Antiquity, are lost, while his school-writings are preserved to us. A scholar like Jaeger ascribed to this situation the seeming opposition of character between Plato and Aristotle. This view, however, is only partly justified: it leaves out of account the fact that the lost works of Aristotle all belonged to the period of his youth. This being so, the study of their fragments can teach us something of the development of their author and of the genesis of his philosophy; but they are not to be put on one level with his riper works. The true Aristotle remains for us the author of the School-writings, more especially of the ripest parts of them, the utility of the older fragments being precisely this, that they give us a standard by which to distinguish the older from the younger parts of his works.

Ad 2. The school-writings of Aristotle, as they are preserved to us, cannot be divided into three chronological periods, as may be done with Plato's works. The mixture of earlier and later parts runs through the whole of them. Now this creates a rather complicated situation. Werner Jaeger was the first to realize this problem clearly and to propose a solution which, although it may be corrected and completed on several points, has given a new approach and new *élan* to the studies of Aristotle.

what has
been reached

396—Three points have been established:

1. The existence of a Platonic period in the thinking of Aristotle has been proved by Jaeger ¹.
2. The period between the Academy and the Lyceum, which seemed to be a vacuum as long as the school-writings were all supposed to be written during the latest period ², has now been filled up with a large part of them.
3. Our idea of the latest period of Aristotle's activity as a teacher has been considerably changed.

a restriction

397—From the fact that many points in the chronology of the works of Aristotle are not definitely cleared up, it must not be concluded that we cannot yet form for ourselves an idea of the philosophy of Aristotle nor get a true knowledge of it. It must be noted first that the description, given by W. D. Ross in his *Aristotle* of 1923, was made before its author knew the work of Jaeger, which appeared in the same year. This fact is an interesting illustration of the remark which has been made by A. Mansion in his *Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne*: that, if one wishes to speak of Aristotle's philosophy of nature, or even of any other part of his philosophy, ethics excepted, the situation is not so unfavourable and problems not so complicated as they might seem to be ³.—Why? Mansion said it very clearly in his Introduction cited above: the reason could be this, that in the development of Aristotle's thinking after all the continuity is more important than the difference; which might be seen in the fact that Aristotle himself did little to eliminate all the traces of his earlier opinions that may be seen in the final form of his works ⁴.

¹ J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnis zu seinen übrigen Werken*, Berlin 1863, tries to confine the Platonic influence to the literary form of Aristotle's early writings. V. Rose, who collected all these platonizing passages from the Dialogues of Aristotle, went further and concluded that they were spurious (*Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, Lipsiis 1863).

² In fact this was the opinion of Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* II 2, ³ p. 155), and also of Bernays.

³ Mansion, *o.c.*, ²1946, p. 7.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 33/34: "Mais ce qu'il faut noter surtout c'est que, de façon générale, Aristote n'a pas jugé nécessaire de remanier profondément ces rédactions reprises à quelque cours antérieur et ainsi l'adaptation de la doctrine à des vues devenues plus tard classiques chez lui, apparaît par moments comme bien imparfaite. C'est, sans doute, qu'il avait davantage conscience de l'unité et de la continuité de sa pensée, que des étapes diverses et mêmes parfois contradictoires entre elles qu'elle avait parcourues, pour aboutir à son développement ultime."

2—LIFE AND WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

398—Dionys. Halic., *Ep. I ad Ammaeum* 5, p. 727 R.:

life

Ἀριστοτέλης πατὴρ * μὲν ἦν Νικομάχου τὸ γένος καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἀναφέροντος εἰς Μαχάονα τὸν Ἀσκληπιοῦ ¹, μητρὸς δὲ Φαιστίδος, ἀπογόνου τινὸς τῶν ἐκ Χαλκίδος τὴν ἀποικίαν ἀγαγόντων εἰς Στάγειρα· ἐγεννήθη δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνενηκοστὴν καὶ ἐνάτην Ὀλυμπιάδα Διοτρεφοῦς Ἀθήνησιν ἄρχοντος 5 (ol. 99, 1; a. 384) ² ... ἐπὶ δὲ Πολυζήλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 103, 2; a. 366/7) τελευτήσαντος τοῦ πατρὸς ὀκτωκαιδέκατον ἔτος ἔχων εἰς Ἀθήνας ἦλθεν, καὶ συσταθεὶς Πλάτῳ χρόνον εἰκοσαετῇ διέτριψε σὺν αὐτῷ. ἀποθανόντος δὲ Πλάτωνος ἐπὶ Θεοφίλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 108, 1; a. 348/7) ἀπῆρε πρὸς Ἑρμίαν τὸν Ἀταρνέως τύραννον ³ καὶ τριετῇ χρόνον παρ' αὐτῷ διατρίψας ** ἐπ' 10 Εὐβούλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 108, 4; a. 345/4) εἰς Μυτιλήνην ἐχωρίσθη ⁴. ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πρὸς Φίλιππον ὤχετο *** κατὰ Πυθόδοτον ἄρχοντα (ol. 109, 2; a. 343/2),

¹ Aristotle's father was the court-physician of Amyntas II, king of Macedonia and father of Philippos.

² Diog. Laert. V 9 gives the same chronology and traces it back to the Chronicle of Apollodorus.

³ Hermias is known to us as one of the addressees of the Sixth Letter of Plato. The two others, Erastus and Coriscus, disciples of Plato and his Academy, doubtless tried to introduce in their native town Scepsis certain political reforms that had been suggested in the Academy. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, ²1948, p. 113, sums up the tendency of Plato's Letter in the following words: "Presumably Plato wished to institute a friendship between the two companions and their "neighbour" Hermias, because, while he recognized their noble disposition, he was afraid they might be somewhat doctrinaire. The letter that we possess is the solemn record of this peculiar pact between *Realpolitik* and theoretical schemes of reform."

At the request of this Hermias, who possessed a formidable military power and was practically independent of the Persian Empire, Ar. and Xenocrates established themselves at Assos after the death of Plato, and stayed there for three years. For Aristotle these years were a period of intense work. An important part of his works on logic, physics and metaphysics was written here. Surely Erastus, Coriscus and Hermias attended his lectures. We find the name of Coriscus frequently cited in the *Organon* to illustrate an individual case as opposed to the καθόλου.

⁴ That Aristotle left Assos and settled at Mytilene was probably due to the influence of Theophrastus, who was a native of Lesbos and also an ancient disciple of Plato and the Academy. That, during the years of Assos and Mytilene, Aristotle was already occupied with biological research, may be inferred from the fact that in his biological works localities in Asia Minor and Lesbos are rather frequently mentioned. Consult: Thompson, Translation of the *Historia animalium*, p. VII, and the same, *Aristotle as a biologist*, p. 12.

* πατὴρ is a correction of Van Herwerden. The Mss have υἱός.

** διατρίψας Wolf; Mss τριψας.

*** ὤχετο Usener; others read ἔχετο.

καὶ διέτριψε χρόνον ὀκταετῇ παρ' αὐτῷ καθηγούμενος Ἀλεξάνδρου ¹. μετὰ δὲ τὴν Φιλίππου τελευτὴν ἐπ' Εὐαινέτου ἄρχοντος (ol. III, 2; a. 335/4) ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐσχόλαζεν ἐν Λυκείῳ χρόνον ἐτῶν δώδεκα. τῷ δὲ τρισκαίδεκάτῳ, μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν ἐπὶ Κηφισοδώρου ἄρχοντος (ol. II4, 15 2; a. 322) ἀπάρας εἰς Χαλκίδα νόσω τελευτᾷ, τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἐξήκοντα βιώσας ἔτη.

three poems
of Aristotle

399—a. Olympiodorus in his Commentary on Plato's *Gorgias* has preserved for us the following poem of Aristotle in commemoration of Plato (Fr. 673 Rose):

on Plato

ἐλθὼν δ' ἐς κλεινὸν Κεκροπίης δάπεδον
εὐσεβέως σεμνῆς φιλῆς ἰδρύσατο βωμὸν
ἄνδρὸς ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις·
ὃς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς
οἰκίῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων,
ὥς ἀγαθὸς τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνὴρ·
οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ ταῦτα ποτέ.

5

The poem has been interpreted by Wilamowitz in *Aristoteles und Athen* II, p. 412-416. He declares the construction βωμὸν φιλίας to be a metaphor that would be tolerable "für backfische, aber nicht für Hellenen", and is most inclined to explain φιλίας as a genitivus causae. "In any case Ar. means that the man about whom he speaks, i.e. Eudemos, founded an altar for Plato for the sake of his friendship" ("um seiner Freundschaft willen dem Platon einen Altar gestiftet hat"). Jaeger protests against the assumption that Plato was formally venerated as a god by his disciples, and I think he is right. Having stated that the dedicator of the altar is unknown to us, he remarks: "a Greek would surely have assumed without question that what was meant was that he set up an altar to most honourable Philia, in honour of the friendship of the man whom bad men may not even praise" (*Aristotle*, p. 108).

¹ Hermias had friendly relations with the Macedonian court (an anti-Persian coalition). It is probable that on his recommendation Philip invited Aristotle to be the preceptor of the young Alexander.

Of his years at the Macedonian court are doubtless Aristotle's six books on philological problems in Homer (*Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά*), brought to Alexandria by Demetrius of Phaleron. Here they became the foundation of philological studies of the Alexandrian scholars.

For Alexander Aristotle wrote a work *Περὶ μοναρχίας* and another about colonization.

According to a decree of the Delphians, found by Homolle in 1895, Aristotle and his nephew Callisthenes were praised and honoured for having made a list of the Pythonikai (Dittenberger, *Syll.*³, 275). This list, which was a valuable document for the history of Greek literature, must have been made by Ar. in the very last years of his stay at the Macedonian court or during the first year of his second stay at Athens, Callisthenes having gone to Asia in 334. Other similar lists of the victors of the great Dionysia and of those at Olympia are mentioned among the works of Ar.

As to the last four lines of this elegy, cp. the mss. 275a, b and 374a of our first volume.

b. Fr. 674 Rose (Diog. Laert. V 6), an epigramma dedicated to Hermias of Atarneus, who had been treacherously arrested at a conference, and sent captive to the Great King. The latter, having vainly tried to coerce him into revealing Philip's plans, finally executed him by a *servile supplicium* (crucifixion).

τόνδε ποτ' οὐχ ὁσίως παραβάς μακάρων θέμιν ἄγνην
ἔκτεινεν Περσῶν τοξοφόρων βασιλεὺς,
οὐ φανερῶς λόγχῃ φονίοις ἐν ἀγῶσι κρατήσας,
ἀλλ' ἀνδρὸς πίστει χρησάμενος δολίου.

on Hermias

c. Fr. 675 Rose (Athenaeus XV, p. 696 A; also Diog. L. V 7). Hymn to Virtue, in honour of Hermias, who died as a martyr for the sake of philosophy.

Hymn to
Virtue

Ἄρετά, πολύμοχθε γένει βροτείῳ,
θήραμα κάλλιστον βίῳ,
σᾶς πέρι, παρθένε, μορφᾶς
καὶ θανεῖν ζαλωτὸς ἐν Ἑλλάδι πότμος
καὶ πόνους τλῆναι μαλεροὺς ἀκάμαντας·
τοῖον ἐπὶ φρένα βάλλεις
καρπὸν ἰσαθάνατον χρυσοῦ τε κρείσσω
καὶ γονέων μαλακαυγήτοιό θ' ὕπνου·
σεῦ δ' ἔνεχ' οἱ Διὸς Ἡρακλέης Λήδας τε κοῦροι
πολλ' ἀνέτλασαν ἔργοις
σὺν ἀγρευόντες δύναμιν.
σοῖς δὲ πόθοις Ἀχιλεὺς Αἴας τ' Αἰδαο δόμους ἦλθον·
σᾶς δ' ἔνεκεν φιλοῦ μορφᾶς καὶ Ἀταρνέος ἔντροφος ἀελίου
χῆρωσεν αὐγᾶς·
τοιγὰρ αἰδιδίμος ἔργοις, ἀθάνατόν τέ μιν αὐξήσουσι Μοῦσαι
Μναμοσύνας θύγατρεις, Διὸς ξενίου σέβας αὖξουσιν φιλίας
τε γέρας βεβαίου.

Wilamowitz explained this poem in *Ar. u. Athen* II, p. 405-412; Jaeger in *Aristotle*, p. 117 ff.

πόνους μαλεροὺς ἀκάμαντας - unceasing labours, wearing out.

καρπὸν ἰσαθάνατον. I have adopted the correction of Wilamowitz: ἰσαθάνατον.

Athenaeus has τ' ἀθάνατον, Diog. L. εἰς ἀθάνατον.

The meaning is: ἵσον τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ.

χρυσοῦ τε κρείσσω καὶ γονέων - better than gold and ancestors.

σοῖς δὲ πόθοις - not so much "through longing for thee" as "by enthusiasm for thee" (cp. Gorgias' *Epitaphios*, Diels VS⁵ II 81 B 6, the end, where the orator

says that, "though they have died themselves, ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν"; which does not mean "the longing for them"—for this can hardly be called ἀθάνατος —, but "the enthusiasm for noble deeds" ¹).

Διὸς Ξενίου σέβας and γέρας φιλίας may be paraphrased as follows: ὅτι καὶ Δία Ξένιον ἐσέβετο καὶ φιλίαν βέβαιον ἐγέραιρεν.

two kinds
of lectures

400—Ar. used to lecture during the morning hours for a selected group of more advanced disciples, while in the evening he lectured for a larger, non-selected circle of students.

Gellius, *Noct. Att.* XX 5, 1:

Commentationum suarum artiumque, quas discipulis tradebat, Aristoteles philosophus ... duas species habuisse dicitur: alia erant quae nominabat ἐξωτερικά, alia quae appellabat ἀκροατικά. ἐξωτερικά dicebantur quae ad rhetoricas meditationes facultatemque argutiarum civiliumque rerum notitiam conducebant, ἀκροατικά autem vocabantur in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur quaeque ad naturae contemplationes disceptationesve dialecticas pertinebant. huic disciplinae, quam dixi, ἀκροατικῇ tempus exercendae dabat in Lycio matutinum nec ad eam quemquam temere admittebat, nisi quorum ante ingenium et eruditionis elementa atque in discendo studium laborumque explorasset. illas vero exotericas auditiones exercitiumque dicendi eodem in loco vesperi faciebat easque vulgo iuvenibus sine delectu praebebat; atque eum δειλινὸν περίπατον appellabat, illum alterum supra ἑωθινόν; utroque enim tempore ambulans disserebat. libros quoque suos, earum omnium rerum commentarios, seorsum divisit, ut alii exoterici dicerentur, partim acroatici.

Cp. Cic., *De fin.* V 12; *Ep. ad Att.* IV 16, 2; Strabo XIII 1, 54, p. 609; Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 14, 4, p. 1115.

the fate of
Ar.'s library

401—The library of Aristotle had a highly remarkable fate.

a. Strabo XIII 1, 54, p. 608:

told by
Strabo

Ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ (βιβλιοθήκην) Θεοφράστῳ παρέδωκεν, ὅπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε, πρῶτος ὢν ἴσμεν συναγαγὼν βιβλία καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν. Θεόφραστος δὲ Νηλεῖ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' εἰς Σκῆψιν κομίσας τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν παρέδωκεν, ἰδιώταις ἀνθρώποις, οἱ κατὰ κλειστα εἶχον τὰ βιβλία οὐδ' ἐπιμελῶς κείμενα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἥσθοντο τὴν σπουδὴν τῶν Ἀτταλικῶν βασιλέων, ὑφ' οἷς ἦν ἡ πόλις, ζητούντων βιβλία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς ἐν Περγάμῳ βιβλιοθήκης, κατὰ γῆς ἔκρυψαν ἐν διώρυγί

¹ See the remarkable study of C. W. Vollgraff on the *Epitaphios: L'oraison funèbre de Gorgias*, Leiden 1952, p. 85-87, and the following section (p. 87-169).

τινι ¹· ὑπὸ δὲ νοτίας καὶ σητῶν ² κακωθέντα ὁψέ ποτε ἀπέδοντο οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ
γένους Ἀπελλικῶντι τῷ Τητίῳ πολλῶν ἀργυρίων τὰ τε Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τὰ
10 τοῦ Θεοφράστου βιβλία· ἦν δὲ ὁ Ἀπελλικῶν φιλόβιβλος μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόσοφος·
διὸ καὶ ζητῶν ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν διαβρωμάτων ³ εἰς ἀντίγραφα καινὰ μετήνεγκε
τὴν γραφὴν ἀναπληρῶν οὐκ εὖ καὶ ἐξέδωκεν ἀμαρτάδων πλήρη τὰ βιβλία.
συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων, τοῖς μὲν πάλαι τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον, οὐκ
ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ⁴, μὴδὲν
15 ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν ⁵, τοῖς δ' ὕστερον,
ἀφ' οὗ τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα προήλθεν, ἄμεινον μὲν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀριστο-
τελίζειν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι μέντοι τὰ πολλὰ εἰκότα λέγειν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
ἀμαρτιῶν. πολὺ δὲ εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ἡ Ῥώμη προσελάβετο· εὐθὺς γὰρ μετὰ τὴν
Ἀπελλικῶντος τελευτὴν Σύλλας ἤρε τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος βιβλιοθήκην ὁ τὰς
20 Ἀθήνας ἐλὼν· δεῦρο δὲ (εἰς Ῥώμην) κομισθεῖσαν Τυραννίων τε ὁ γραμματικὸς
διεχειρίσατο φιλαριστοτέλης ὦν, θεραπεύσας τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς βιβλιοθήκης, καὶ
βιβλιοπῶλαι τινες γραφεῦσι φαύλοις χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιβάλλοντες, ὅπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει τῶν εἰς πρᾶσιν γραφομένων βιβλίων καὶ ἐνθάδε
καὶ ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ.

b. Plut. *Sulla* 26, 1-2 tells the same story:

and by
Plutarchus

Ἀναχθεῖς δὲ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἐφέσου, τριταῖος ἐν Πειραιεῖ καθωρ-
μίσθη· καὶ μυθεῖς ἐξεῖλεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶνος τοῦ Τητίου βιβλιοθήκην,
ἐν ἣ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου βιβλίων ἦν, οὕτω τότε
σαφῶν γνωριζόμενα τοῖς πολλοῖς. λέγεται δὲ κομισθείσης αὐτῆς εἰς Ῥώμην
Τυραννίωνα τὸν γραμματικὸν ἐνσκευάσασθαι τὰ πολλὰ, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸν
Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσον θεῖναι καὶ ἀνα-
γράψαι τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας.

¹ "in a cave". Athenaeus I 3 a tells us that, before the arranging of the library at Pergamum, Neleus sold books of Aristotle to Ptolemaeus Philadelphus for the library at Alexandria.

² Moths or worms.

³ διαβρώματα — worm-eaten parchments.

⁴ If this account is true, we must note that the school-writings of Aristotle came very near to being lost for ever, and that the full knowledge of his philosophy barely escaped being confined to the first generation of the School. Up to Cicero Antiquity would have known Aristotle almost exclusively from his exoteric writings. We have some reason to doubt this. Zeller II 2, ³ 138-154. Interesting from this point of view is the list, given by Diog. Laert. V, 22-27, which is probably based on a list made by Hermippus c. 200 B.C. Many of the school-writings of Ar., or parts of them, are mentioned here under other titles.

⁵ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν — declaim commonplaces.

Works of
Aristotle

402—Aristotle's literary work is divided by Ross into three main sections:

- (1) Works of a more or less popular order, which were published by himself;
- (2) Memoranda and collections of material, which may have been made by disciples;
- (3) scientific works, written by himself.

Nearly the whole existing Corpus Aristotelicum, so far as it is authentic, belongs to the third group.

First group The list of Diog. begins with 19 works which seem to have been all more or less popular and belonged to the Platonic period of Ar. The greater part were dialogues; some of them bore the same titles as certain dialogues of Plato: *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Menexenus*, *Symposion*. The dialogue *Eudemus* or *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, written shortly after 354, was modelled closely on the *Phaedo*. The *Protrepticus*, addressed to Themison, the prince of Cyprus, also belonged to the period of the Academy. The *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, still written in the form of a dialogue, was a work of Platonic style but with marked differences in doctrine. It dates from the years of Assos.

Second group Of the second group a large number of titles is mentioned. Of the extant works of Aristotle only book K of the *Metaph.*, and probably the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* may be classed among this group.

Third group The so-called school-writings of Ar. Systematically classified the Corpus Aristotelicum contains the following works:

I. On logic, brought together in the *Organon*.

1. *Κατηγορίαι* (*Categoriae*). Probably authentic ¹.

2. *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* (*De interpretatione*). There is no reason to doubt the authenticity.

3-4. *Ἀναλυτικά πρότερα* and *ὕστερα* (*Analytica priora and posteriora*).

5. *Τοπικά* (*Topica*).

6. *Περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων* (*De sophisticis elenchis*).

II. Philosophy of nature.

1. *Φυσικά* or *Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις* (*Physica*), 8 books.

2. *Περὶ οὐρανοῦ* (*De caelo*), 4 books.

3. *Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς*, *De generatione et corruptione*, 2 books.

4. *Μετεωρολογικά* (*Meteorologica*), 4 books, of which the fourth is generally considered as not genuine ².

In the Corpus follows the short book *Περὶ κόσμου* (*De mundo*). It is surely not a work of Aristotle. Probably it dates from the first century B.C. Its philosophy bears the traces of Posidonius.

¹ In modern times the authenticity has been doubted, because the idea of substance in this work differs from that of *Metaph.* ZH. Suzanne Mansion pleaded against the authenticity (*Proceedings of the tenth International Congress of Phil.*, Amsterdam 1949, pp. 1097-1100), L. M. de Rijk defends it (in *Mnemosyne* 1951, pp. 129-159).

² A. Mansion, *Introd.* p. 16, judges the unauthenticity not sufficiently proved.

If we follow the order of the Corpus Aristotelicum, we have to mention first the psychological works, and then the biological.

III. Psychology.

1. Περὶ ψυχῆς (*De anima*), 3 books.
2. The so-called *Parva naturalia*, containing
 - (1) Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν (*De sensu et sensibili*)
 - (2) Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως (*De memoria et reminiscencia*)
 - (3) Περὶ ὕπνου (*De somno*)
 - (4) Περὶ ἐνυπνίων (*De insomniis*)
 - (5) Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς (*De divinatione per somnum*)
 - (6) Περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος (*De longitudine et brevitate vitae*)
 - (7) Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου (*De vita et morte*)¹
 - (8) Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς (*De respiratione*).

In the Corpus follows here the short treatise Περὶ πνεύματος (*de spiritu*), which may have been written ± 250 . It contains a later doctrine than was known to Aristotle².

IV. Biological works.

1. Περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαι (*Historia animalium*), 10 books, of which the tenth is not of Ar. Probably also b. VII, a part of VIII, and b. IX are spurious. A large collection of facts.

The following 4 works give the author's theories based on them.

2. Περὶ ζώων μορίων (*De partibus animalium*), 4 books.
3. Περὶ ζώων κινήσεως (*De motu animalium*).
4. Περὶ πορείας ζώων (*De incessu animalium*).
5. Περὶ ζώων γενέσεως (*De generatione animalium*), 5 books.

In the Corpus these authentic works of Aristotle are succeeded by a series of treatises which all originate from the Peripatetic School, but not from the Master himself. Among them are the *Problemata*, a large collection of all kinds of problems—mathematical, optical, musical, physiological, medical—; partly they reach back to Ar. himself.

V. Metaphysics.

Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, 14 books, first collected by Andronicus and placed by him after the Physics, whence they were called by this name. The science we call *metaphysics* is named by Ar. himself πρώτη φιλοσοφία, or also θεολογία.

VI. Ethics.

1. Next follow in the Corpus the 10 books of the Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια (*Ethica Nicomachea*).
2. The 2 books of the Ἠθικὰ μεγάλαι (*Magna moralia*).
3. Four books of the Ἠθικὰ Εὐδημια (*Ethica Eudemia*), namely the books A, B, Γ, H. The books Δ Ε Ζ have been left out, because they are the same as Ε Ζ Η of

¹ The first two chapters of this treatise are headed by the editors Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως. Ar. mentions this subject at the beginning of the first chapter, but he does not deal with it here.

² The distinction of veins and arteries, which was unknown to Ar.

the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The last three chapters of the *Eudemian Ethics* (H 13-15) are also separated and headed as a book VIII (Θ), e.g. by W. Jaeger.

These three works, of which only the *Nic. Ethics* are without doubt authentic¹, are followed in the Corpus by a small treatise *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν*, which dates probably from the first century B.C. or A.C.

VII. Politics and Economics.

1. *Πολιτικά*, 8 books.

2. *Οἰκονομικά*, 3 books, generally not accepted as authentic. The third exists only in a Latin translation.

Of the large collection of 158 politeiai, which was made in the School of Ar. and on his suggestion, only that of the Athenians has been preserved (found on a papyrus in 1890). This document being probably not written by Ar. himself but by a disciple, we had good reason to mention it as belonging to the second group.

VIII. Rhetoric and Poetics.

1. *Τέχνη ῥητορική*, 3 books, of which the third has been suspected, but is now generally believed to be authentic.

In the Corpus it is succeeded by the *Ῥητορική πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον*, an early Peripatetic work, but not of Ar. himself.

2. *Περὶ ποιητικῆς*, authentic but fragmentary.

3—DATE OF ARISTOTLE'S WORKS ACCORDING TO W. JAEGER

Concerning the chronology of the works of Ar. W. Jaeger has come to the following results:

First period 403—To the first Athenian period (the Academy) belong the *Dialogues* of Ar. (except the *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*) with the *Protrepticus*.—Jaeger fixed no special date either to the *logical treatises* of Ar. or to his *Rhetoric*. But he says somewhere more or less incidentally that Ar.'s logic was formed at an early date, probably still in the Academy². We have good reasons to put the *Rhetoric* in a later period.

In treating the *Metaphysics*, of which the older part must have been written at Assos, Jaeger remarks that at that date the fundamental principles of the *Physics*

¹ The *Magna moralia* are now generally considered as a work of a generation after Aristotle, and are in fact proved to be so by various arguments, lastly by an analysis of the style (K. O. Brink, *Stil und Form der ps. Aristotelischen MM.* Thesis of Berlin 1933). As to the *Eudemian Ethics*, since Jaeger they are generally believed to be an early work of Aristotle, from his platonizing period. In a recent study (*Studien zu den Ethiken des Corpus Ar.*, Paderborn 1940) E. J. Schächer tries to prove that they are not a work of Ar., but of his able disciple Eudemus of Rhodos. The arguments he gives in order to prove this thesis, are for the greater part not conclusive. Yet, in my opinion he has shaken the theory of Jaeger as to the early date of the work in question and opened a new perspective.

² Certainly it is not necessary to deduce that the six works of the *Organum* were all written during the first period, and we can hardly admit that this was the opinion of Jaeger. But he has left the task of stating this point more precisely to others.

were already fixed: the idea of teleology, the principles of form and matter, potency and act. Consequently J. admits that the first books of the *Physics* (*I and II*) were conceived, and probably written, at Athens, under the eyes of Plato. He assumes this explicitly for *De caelo I*, where the hypothesis of aether has been proposed for the first time as a new solution opposed to Platonism.

At Athens was also written the oldest part of the *Politics*, the criticism of Plato's *Republic: Pol. II*, 2-3. Ar. wrote it before having read the *Nomoi*. He must have received this work at Assos and, having read it hastily, have added a short review of it to the ch. 3 of *Pol. II*. "Perfectly Platonic" is, according to J., book *III* of the *De anima*, which contains the doctrine of the *noûs*. The actual form of this book may be of a more recent date, the substance of the thought originates from the Academy.

404—The years of Assos, Lesbos and the Macedonian court. At Assos was written the oldest part of the *Metaphysics* ("Urmetaphysik"): the books A (historical survey, Δ (a kind of encyclopaedia of philosophical terms), K 1-8 (treating the same subject-matter as the books B Γ E, but in an earlier form); next the book Λ, the so-called *Theology*, a short survey of the whole metaphysical system, except ch. 8, which is a later addition; finally chapters 9-10 of the book M¹ and the whole book N, in which the theory of the Ideas is shortly criticized and Speusippus' theory of numbers amply².

the middle
period

The books B and Γ are also of an early date, but posterior to K 1-8.

From the same time as *Metaph. A* dates the dialogue *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, which contains almost the same criticism of the theory of the Ideas as the first-mentioned book.

From the period of Assos also date the *Eudemian Ethics*. Jaeger characterizes this work as "reformplatonisch". He means by this term, that the author, having given up the theory of Ideas, wishes to found a new, reformed Platonism. The main argument for the early date of this work is that the term *φρόνησις* is used here in the Platonic meaning of philosophical insight into a transcendent reality, whereas later, in the *Nic. Eth.*, Aristotle uses it to indicate a *ἔξις πρακτική*, even for animals (a kind of instinct for what is or is not harmful to them).

According to J. a part of the *Politica* too was written at Assos, namely the last books, H Θ, containing the ideal state (*ἄριστη πολιτεία*), which is opposed to that of Plato. To this part of the work belong the books B³ and Γ⁴. On the other hand, the books Δ E Z are of a much later date: giving an empirical foundation to the best constitution, they belong to the third period of Ar.'s activity. Book A has then been put at the head of the whole, by way of introduction.

As to the *Physics*, we found that J. rather suggests that books I and II were written at Athens during the life of Plato. In this case book VII too, which

¹ These two chapters are an older introduction to the discussion of the theory of numbers.

² In the book N the name of Xenocrates is not mentioned. His theory is criticized by Ar. very sharply in the book M, which for this reason must have been written in a later period, namely in the Lyceum, when Xenocrates was the head of the Academy. During the years of Assos, while Speusippus directed the School of Plato at Athens, Xenocrates was in the company of Ar.

³ A survey of former theories of the state, partly written at Athens (the ch. 2-3) partly at Assos.

⁴ Book Γ treats the notion of *πόλις* and *πολίτης*.

belongs to the oldest parts of Ar.'s works, must be dated in the first period. Book Θ ¹ being a later addition (to be dated in the third period), we have the impression, though J. does not say so explicitly, that Books III-VI must be placed in the middle period, at Assos or later, but most probably at Assos, because in these years the author was occupied with what is called by J. *speculative physics*.

What he states explicitly is, that *the form in which we have the work De caelo* dates from these years (at least two years after the death of Plato, but not much later). The style is near to that of *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*; the theory of the movement of the celestial spheres in B 8 is later than that of the movement of the celestial bodies in II. *φύλ.*

Also the *Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς*, being a work of "speculative physics", is to be dated in this period, probably still at Assos. J. sees these works of physics as being of the same order of ideas as the politics of the ideal state, the ethics based on theology (the *Eudemian Eth.*) and that part of the *Metaphysics* which exhibits the same character ("Urmetaphysik").

the third
period

405—Ar.'s second stay at Athens: the years of the Lyceum. There is an important province in the works of Ar. which, according to J., originates without exception from the third period: the *research-work*, as well on the field of history as on that of nature. The only argument for this late dating which J. gives, is, that the expedition of Alexander furnished a great deal of material for zoology as well as for botany ².—According to this theory all the biological works of Ar. belong to the last period of his activity.

The *Meteorology* too is dated by J. in the last period. He does so with reference to the work on *the rising of the Nile*, which ends with the triumphant words:

Οὐκέτι πρόβλημα ἔστιν· ὥφθη γὰρ φανερῶς ὅτι ἐξ ὑετῶν αὐξεῖ.

J. cites these words as characteristic of the experimental method of Ar., as opposed to that of Plato and the Academy, which was still closely followed by Ar. himself in his early, Platonizing works ³.

To the third period J. also reckons the whole group of *anthropological-physiological treatises*: *De anima* I and II, the *Parva naturalia* without exception. (Not the doctrine of the *noûs* in *De anima* III, which harmonizes with the early ethics and metaphysics).

J. points especially to the method used in the treatise on *divination by dreams*, which being purely experimental differs *toto coelo* from the point of view in the middle period, in *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* ⁴.

Finally J. cites the fifth chapter of the *De partibus animalium I* in order to illustrate the purely empirical character of Ar.'s idea of science during this last period ⁵. We give the text of this famous chapter.

¹ This book contains a revision of the theory of the Prime Mover.

² In fact, J. opposes the method of research of Ar. and his successors to that of Plato and the Academy, Ar.'s purpose being to study the details, while Plato's was merely the division of notions.—The question is first whether this opposition is justified. We have to remark that, in order to make a division of notions, details must be studied. Secondly, we saw Ar. occupied in Mikrasia and on Lesbos with the collection of material for the *Historia Animalium*.

³ Jaeger, *Aristotle*, p. 331.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 162 ff., 333 f. In the *De divinatione per somnum* Ar. no longer explains the prevision of the future in the dream state as proceeding from metaphysical regions, but he explains it in a purely natural way, by means of psycho-physiology.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 337-340.

406—Aristotle, *De part. anim.* I 5, 644 b²²-645 a³⁶:

Τῶν οὐσιῶν ὅσαι φύσει συνεστᾶσι, τὰς μὲν ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους εἶναι
τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα, τὰς δὲ μετέχειν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Συμβέβηκε δὲ περὶ
μὲν ἐκείνας τιμίας οὐσας καὶ θείας ἐλάττους ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν θεωρίας (καὶ γὰρ
26 ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι ποθοῦμεν, παντελῶς
ἐστὶν ὀλίγα τὰ φανερά κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν), περὶ δὲ τῶν φθαρτῶν φυτῶν τε καὶ
ζώων εὐποροῦμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διὰ τὸ σύντροφον· πολλὰ γὰρ περὶ
30 ἕκαστον γένος λάβοι τις ἂν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων βουλόμενος διαπονεῖν ἱκανῶς.
Ἐχει δ' ἐκάτερα χάριν. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ εἰ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐφαπτόμεθα, ὅμως διὰ
τὴν τιμιότητα τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἥδιον ἢ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν
35 ἑρωμένων τὸ τυχὸν καὶ μικρὸν μόνον κατιδεῖν ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἢ πολλὰ ἕτερα καὶ
645 α μεγάλα δι' ἀκριβείας ἰδεῖν· τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ πλείω γνωρίζειν αὐτῶν
λαμβάνει τὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεροχὴν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ πλησιαίτερα ἡμῶν εἶναι
καὶ τῆς φύσεως οἰκειότερα ἀντικαταλλάττεται τι¹ πρὸς τὴν περὶ τὰ θεῖα
5 φιλοσοφίαν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων διήλθομεν λέγοντες τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν,
λοιπὸν περὶ τῆς ζωϊκῆς φύσεως εἰπεῖν, μὴδὲν παραλιπόντας εἰς δύναμιν μῆτε
ἀτιμότερον μῆτε τιμιώτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν πρὸς
τὴν αἴσθησιν κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὅμως ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις² ἀμηχάνους
10 ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφοις.
Καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντες
χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν
ἢ τὴν πλαστικὴν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶμεν τὴν
15 θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοι γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. Διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς
τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμωτέρων ζώων ἐπίσκεψιν. Ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί
τι θαυμαστόν· καὶ καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς ξένους εἰπεῖν τοὺς
βουλομένους ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ, οἳ ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες εἶδον αὐτὸν θερμόμενον πρὸς
20 τῷ ἵπνῳ ἑστησαν (ἐκέλευε γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰσιέναι θαρροῦντας· εἶναι γὰρ καὶ
ἐνταῦθα θεοῦς), οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ζώων προσιέναι
δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον³, ὥς ἐν ἅπασιν ὄντος τινὸς φυσικοῦ καὶ καλοῦ. Τὸ γὰρ
μὴ τυχόντως ἀλλ' ἐνεκά τινος ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἐστὶ καὶ μάλιστα·
25 οὗ δ' ἐνεκα συνέστηκεν ἢ γέγονε τέλους, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν εἴληφεν. Εἰ δὲ
τις τὴν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων θεωρίαν ἀτιμον εἶναι νενόμικε, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
οἴεσθαι χρὴ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἄνευ πολλῆς δυσχερείας ἰδεῖν ἐξ ὧν
συνέστηκε τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, οἷον αἷμα, σάρκες, ὅστ' α, φλέβες καὶ τὰ
30 τοιαῦτα μόνια. Ὅμοίως τε δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν περὶ οὐτινοσοῦν τῶν μορίων ἢ

¹ ἀντικαταλλάττεται τι - balances somewhat.

² ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις - "Nature that created them as an intelligent artist.
See on the meaning of this version our Ch. XIII, § 3, nrs. 499-501.

³ προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον - "we must not recoil with childish aversion".

τῶν σκευῶν διαλεγόμενον μὴ περὶ τῆς ὕλης ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μνήμην, μὴδὲ ταύτης χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὅλης μορφῆς, οἷον καὶ περὶ οἰκίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλίνθων καὶ πηλοῦ καὶ ξύλων· καὶ τὸν περὶ φύσεως περὶ τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ τῆς ὅλης 35 οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ τούτων ἀ μὴ συμβαίνει χωριζόμενά ποτε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν.

Jaeger, l.c., calls this "a programme for research and instruction in the Peripatetic School"¹, which explains to us the spirit that reigns in the works of Ar.'s followers. As to Ar. himself, J. describes the spirit of his later years as opposed to his former conception of metaphysics in the following words: "He no longer speaks of the world of appearances as more knowable to us but to be contrasted with the essence of reality, which is more knowable naturally². He justifies metaphysics now by means of the everlasting longing of the human heart to penetrate the mysteries of the imperishable and invisible world, and is ready to content himself with the merest corner of that hidden truth, while the precedence of real science (ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεροχή) is now clearly assigned to empirical research. This is the praise of devotion to the small, the confession of allegiance to the study that fulfills its highest achievements in the *History of Animals*, the collection of *Constitutions*, the history of the theatre, and the chronicle of the Pythian competitions."—"He (Ar.) organizes and overcomes the manifold (ἄπειρον) of appearances, which Plato simply passes over"³.

**the organi-
zation of
science**

407—To the third period of Ar.'s activity belongs also the organization of the writing of a complete *history of the sciences*. *Theophrastus* was charged with the writing of a detailed *History of philosophy* (the Φυσικῶν δόξαι in 18 books), from Thales up to his time. This work has been the basis for all later doxography.

Eudemus of Rhodes had to write a *History of the mathematical sciences* (arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy), probably also of *theology*.

Meno wrote the *History of Medicine*, the Ἱατρικά, known to us by a papyrus-fragment.

J. mentions here, too, the great illustrated work Ἀνατομαί, a collection which was regularly used in the medical lectures of the Lyceum. Ar. often refers to it in his treatises.

**the revision
of the theory
of the First
Mover**

408—To this last period belongs, finally, the revision of the theory of the First Mover in *Metaph.* Λ 8. This revision is based on new astronomic theories: Eudoxus admitted 26 celestial spheres, his (indirect) disciple Callippus assumed 33; Ar. himself comes in *Metaph.* Λ 8 to 47 or 55, and accordingly postulates the existence of the same number of Unmoved Movers. J. thinks this to be an innovation after the original theory, which admitted of only one Unmoved Mover, who alone governs the kosmos which is one, and is called therefore θεός. Thus in

¹ "ein Forschungs- und Unterrichtsprogramm der peripatetischen Schule".

² We shall find this view of Ar. directly at the beginning of his *Physics* (I 1) and of his *Metaphysics* (A 2). See our nrs. 470 and 519 (982a²³⁻²⁵); also *Eth. Nic.* I, 1095b²⁻⁴ (our nr. 566).

³ "Ar. organisiert und überwindet das Apeiron der Erscheinungen, das Platon überfliegt", Jaeger says. The truth of this statement, however, seems to me doubtful, because Plato in the *Philebus* designed as the especial task of philosophy the determining of "the intermediate stages" between the One and the Apeiron.

chapters A 7 and 9-10, which form a close unity. The 8th chapter is clearly a later addition.

Phys. VIII also gives a revised treatment of the question of the First Mover, and must be of a later date ¹.

409—To complete the image we have to make to ourselves of Ar.'s third period according to Jaeger, we must state the following points.

1. First the empirical books (Δ E Z) of the *Politics* must be reckoned to this last period, as they are based on the material of the 158 constitutions; then also book A, which is an introduction to the whole.

**Parts of the
Politics, Ethics
and Metaph.
to be placed
in the third
period**

2. J. does not say explicitly that the *Nic. Ethics* are to be placed in this period too. This seems, however, to be an almost inevitable conclusion. First by the character of the work. The empirical books of the *Politics* are characterized by J. as a *phaenomenology of real political life*. Now the *Nic. Ethics* give such a *phaenomenology of moral life*. And secondly, the relation to the *Eudemean Ethics*. We have seen that by J. this work was placed in the middle period. The *Nic. Ethics*, representing a later phasis of Ar.'s thought, then seem almost necessarily to have been written in the third period.

3. Finally the central books of the *Metaphysics*: Z H Θ , containing the doctrine of substance and that of potency and act, and with them the introductory book E. Are they to be placed in the third period?—Such seems to be the opinion of J., though he only says explicitly that book M, which criticizes Xenocrates, must have been written in the years of the Lyceum. The thesis of J., however, is not to say that Ar. *has abandoned metaphysics* during this period and has turned to merely empirical research, but rather that he *has changed his conception of metaphysics*, the object of this science having been first to him supra-sensible being, afterwards the $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \epsilon\nu$, which means: being in all its *nuances*, being in its multiplicity. Now this is in harmony with the spirit of empirical research. Thus it fits well to the third period.

4—REACTIONS AND CORRECTIONS

410—The work of Jaeger has been generally acknowledged as a study of fundamental importance. Its chronology has been adopted by Ross ², E. Bréhier ³ and Überweg-Praechter ⁴.

**the results
of Jaeger
generally
accepted**

E. Hoffmann wrote in the *Philologische Wochenschrift* of 1924 that J. "had resuscitated the living Aristotle in the flesh". He understands Jaeger in this way that a separation should be made between a metaphysical and an empirical period in the development of Ar.

J. Bidez in *Un singulier naufrage littéraire dans l'Antiquité: à la recherche des épaves de l'Aristote perdu* (Brussels 1938) is occupied with the early works of Ar. in the footsteps of Jaeger.

¹ We treat this question in our Ch. XIII, § 5.

² W. D. Ross remarks in the Introduction to his *Aristotle-Selections* (New-York 1938, p. XIV: "The attempt to trace the development of Ar.'s thought through his works is still in its infancy." Yet the main conclusions of J. are well established in his opinion, and he adopts almost J.'s whole chronology.

³ *Histoire de la Philosophie* I, 1926.

⁴ *Geschichte der Phil.* I, ¹²1926.

E. Bignone uses the traces of the lost works of Ar. for the study of Epicurus. Jaeger's theory of the revision of the doctrine of the First Mover has found an almost general agreement—up to the very last years ¹. So by *M. J. Lagrange* in his article *Comment s'est transformée la pensée religieuse d'Aristote d'après un livre récent* in *Revue Thomiste* 1926, p. 285 ff., and by *R. Mugnier*, *La théorie du premier Moteur et l'évolution de la pensée aristotélicienne*, Paris 1930.

With the same question deals *M. Bousset*, *Sur la théologie d'Aristote: monothéisme ou polythéisme?* in *Revue Thomiste* 1938, p. 798 ff.

serious
objections of
A. Mansion

411—a. *A. Mansion* of Louvain has been the first to criticize J.'s theories in a more radical way ².

He remarks first that *Metaph.* A must be of a much later date than J. thinks it is, so that the distance of time which lies between ch. 8 and the rest of this book can by no means be so great as J. assumes it to be. Secondly, Ar. has left his *Metaph.* unfinished. This fact implies that he worked at it till the end of his life. It is impossible to accept that the work we have was finished before 335 ³.

Mansion's final judgment on the work of J. is that, in general, his conclusions cannot be accepted as being definitive. "En somme son travail est en grande partie à refaire."

b. After Mansion *Von Ivanka* protested against the separation of a metaphysical and an empirical period, which would have succeeded one another in Ar.'s development ⁴.

Other
protests

412—The objections of Mansion and Von Ivanka were based on a purely historical method. Such is not the case of the protest of *M. de Corte* (in *La doctrine de l'intelligence chez Ar.*, Paris 1934) against the genetic method, applied by Jaeger to the study of Ar. De Corte starts from the Thomistic interpretation of Ar. as being the right one. Now the doctrine of Thomas on the *intellectus agens* as a part—or perhaps rather as a function—of the human soul may have been a real correction of Ar.'s doctrine of the *noûs*; it is, however, more a philosophical than a purely historical interpretation ⁵. But, if the method of W. Jaeger is to be criticized, it should be done on purely historical grounds, not on dogmatic assumptions.

The same remark applies to the work of *P. van Schilfgaarde*, *De zielkunde van Aristoteles* (Leiden 1938): the author pleads for a philosophizing interpretation of Ar.,—which means with him, an interpretation in the style of Hegel ⁶.

¹ Since the interesting study of *Ph. Merlan* on Ar.'s Unmoved Movers in *Traditio* of 1946, others too find traces of a plurality of Unmoved Movers in Ar.'s early works. See our nr. 518.

² In the *Revue Néoscholastique de Louvain*, 1927, pp. 307 ff. and 423 ff.

³ In fact, I do not think this to have been the opinion of J. Vid. supra (nr. 409).

⁴ *Scholastik* VII, p. 27 ff.

⁵ *F. Nuyens* remarks rightly that the texts of Ar. point rather to the Averroistic interpretation of the *noûs* as a *substantia separata*.

⁶ Dr. Nuyens wrote a review of this work in *Studiën* 1939, p. 66 f.; I did the same for the *Museum* 1940, p. 149 ff.

413—F. Nuyens, *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles* (thesis of the University of Amsterdam, 1939), French translation at Louvain 1948 (*L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote*) has found in the development of the psychology of Ar. a criterion which enables him to a more exact determination of the chronology of Ar.'s works, and so to an important correction of the results of Jaeger. the work of
Nuyens

Standard is: the conception of the soul as entelechy of a body in *De anima*. the leading
principle
Soul and body are then essentially joined. The soul is not a substance, as it was with Plato and in the *Eudemus* of Ar. The question is: what are the intermediate stages between the *Eudemus* and the *De anima*? A special treatise on the soul, dating from the middle period, does not exist. But Ar. speaks repeatedly on the subject more or less incidentally, often in the *Ethics* and *Politics*, less frequently but still in a sufficient measure in the *Metaph.* and in his biological works. Three periods can be distinguished:

(I) The first is that of an *antagonistic dualism*, in which body and soul are opposed to each other as hostile powers (the *Eudemus*);

(II) A *natural collaboration* of soul and body. The soul does not directly lose its independence. It is a vital power which, being joined to a special organ, lives in the body. It dominates the body and uses it as its instrument (*vitalistic instrumentism*). This conception is characteristic of the middle period. Biological study has influenced the author: in the *Eudemus* psychology was restricted to man, in *De anima* it has become "general", i.e. extending to all living beings;

(III) In the third period the soul is the entelechy of the body. Soul and body are essentially joined; whence follows that the soul comes into being and perishes with the body. It is no longer deemed immortal, as it was in (I).

The problem of the *noûs* is necessarily linked up with that of the soul. In the first period the *noûs* belongs to the soul and is immortal with it; in the second *noûs* and soul are separated, *noûs* is what is not bodily. In the third the *noûs* comes *θώραθεν*: it is immaterial and immortal. It does not belong to the soul. the problem
of the *noûs*

This criterion leads its author to the following results:

Results

1. *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* does not belong to the middle period (Assos), as it was dated by Jaeger, but to the first. It is of the same time as the *Protrepticus*¹. In this last work too the theory of Ideas is already criticized.

2. This statement has a further consequence: if *Π. φιλ.* was written in the Academy, then also *De caelo*, *Phys.* I-VII, and *De generatione et corruptione*.

3. The *Categories*, *Topica* and *Π. σοφ. ἐλ.* prove to belong to the first period; *De interpr.*, *Anal. pr.* and *post.* to the second.

4. To the middle period belongs, as it appears from the local references (to the region of Assos and Lesbos) the *Historia Animalium*. Ross had already remarked this. N. concludes: but with this fact the whole construction of Jaeger that the biological works of Ar. all belong to the third period and there mark a new phase in their author's development, collapses.

To the *Hist. anim.* succeeds the *De partibus anim.* In this work the dualism of body and soul is replaced by collaboration. The soul is localized in the heart.

The same view is represented by the *De motu anim.*, and some of the *Parva naturalia*, namely the *De iuv. et sen.*, *De vita et morte* and the *De resp.*

¹ We shall see in our next chapter that this conclusion of Dr. Nuyens cannot be right. This fact surely must exhort us to a certain prudence as to the application of his criterion.

The 6th treatise of the *Parva Nat.* however, the *De long. et brev. vitae*, is nearer to the *De anima*. It forms a transition to the third period. As to the rest of the biological works, only the *De gener. anim.* represents the same view as the *De anima*, and therefore belongs to the final period.

5. Concerning the *Metaph.* N. confirms the early date of the book A, B, K 1-8, M 9-10 and N; also that M 1-9 belongs to the final period. Book Γ has no texts relative to the soul, but E has. The view of the soul in this book is near to that of *De anima*. It must be dated shortly before this work.

N.'s criterion leads to an exact determination of the date of books Z H Θ. These books presuppose the definition of soul in *De anima*. Consequently they belong to the last years of Ar.'s activity. In book Θ, however, are also older traces. So this book, as we have it, is probably a later redaction of an earlier treatise.

Book I gives no indications as to its date.

Concerning A Nuyens confirms the objection of Mansion against Jaeger. Soul and body are considered in this book as form and matter of the living being. This must have been written *after De anima*, i.e. *very late*. Chapter 8 is a later addition, but as to time it is not far removed from the rest.

6. N. determines also the date of the *Nic. Ethics*. Whether this work belongs to the third period, to the beginning of it or to the end, is a question which was left open by Jaeger. Both Mansion and Ross date the work very late. N. comes to other conclusions: the psychology which is presupposed here, is not that of *De anima*; it is much nearer to Plato. For this reason the work must be dated surely ten years before the *De anima*: it may have been written towards the end of the middle period or at the beginning of the third.

7. Also regarding the *Politics* N. comes to an important conclusion. We saw that books IV-VI were reckoned by Jaeger to the third period, and that the first book was added, according to him, afterwards as an introduction to the whole. Now the relation of body and soul appears to be conceived in this book in a clearly mechanical way, and soul is divided into parts as was done by Plato but not in Ar.'s *De anima*. So this first book may have been written *early in the third period*, but by no means very late.

8. N. too cites the fifth chapter of the *De part. anim.* I and comments on it in a somewhat different way from Jaeger: we cannot cite this beautiful chapter as a document in illustration of a "positivistic" period in Ar.'s development. This author never cultivated science at the cost of speculative philosophy. Both go together, up to the end of his activity. The science which he defends here, is according to himself the prerogative of the φύσει φιλόσοφοι.

9. Finally the *De anima*. The third book is not of an early date, as it was in the opinion of Jaeger, and also of Ross. Its doctrine of the *noûs* is not Platonic; it is no remainder of a former period, but just the result of the psychology of the final period. The work shows a unity of composition; the problem of the *noûs* pervades the whole.

A part of the *Parva naturalia* is closely connected with the *De anima*: *De sensu et sensato*, *De memoria et reminiscencia*, *De somno et vigilia*, *De insomniis* and *De divinatione*. Together with the *De gener. anim.* they belong to the last years.

These then are the results of the work of Dr. Nuyens. The fact that they in their turn must be corrected on several points, does not take away the importance of the work.

Further
results of
this method

414—The chronology of the biological works has been determined more precisely by I. Döring in *Aristotle's De partibus animalium*, Göte-

borg 1943; that of certain treatises of the *Parva naturalia* by H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *Aristotelis De insomniis et de divinatione per somnum*, Leiden 1947. Both authors know the book of Nuyens and make use of his results.

Some objections against the method of Nuyens have been made by **Objections** G. Verbeke, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*, in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 1948, pp. 335-351.

Verbeke remarks first that it is impossible to date whole works of Ar. on the ground of a few texts in which the relation soul-body is touched upon. In the same treatise may be earlier and later parts (as Döring proved that the first book of the *De partibus* is of a much earlier date than the following books of this treatise, and Drossaart Lulofs that both in the *De Somno* and in the *De insomniis* there are sections of an earlier and a more advanced date). Secondly he points out that the arguments adduced by N. for the early date of the *Topics* are not conclusive; thirdly that there are serious difficulties as to the chronology of the *Nic. Ethics*, the doctrine of the *noûs* in this last work being much nearer to Plato than is supposed by N.

I myself had to make an objection to N. regarding the early date he attributes to the *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*. Now, because the chronology of the physical treatises is based by N. on that of this dialogue, this point too must be revised.

The main result of the work of N. remains that the biological works of Ar. are of a much earlier date than Jaeger had admitted; that the later books of the *Metaphysics* are of the author's latest years, and consequently that neither the "research"-work of Ar. is to be attributed as a whole to his latest period, nor the metaphysical speculation to a former phase of his development¹.

¹ I have to remark here again that in my opinion Jaeger's theory does not necessarily imply that the last books of the *Metaph.* were written before 335, and that, consequently, the results of Dr. Nuyens on this point are rather a precision than a contradiction of Jaeger's views.

I had the opportunity, after having written the above chapter, to ask Prof. Jaeger himself, when he visited our country in July 1950, whether my impression on this point was right. He confirmed to me that it has never been his intention to make a radical separation between a metaphysical and a "positivistic" period in Ar.'s development. He did not think it possible to date books Z H Θ of the *Metaph.* more precisely, but he did not intend to exclude the possibility that they might have been written very late.

ELEVENTH CHAPTER THE EXOTERIC WRITINGS

I—THE EUDEMUS OR ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ

the theme 415—Ar. wrote this dialogue shortly after the death of Eudemus of Cyprus, a companion of his in the Academy of Plato, who died in Sicily under the standard of Dio (354). The story of his death is told by Cicero.

a. Cic., *De div.* I 25 (Fr. 37 R.):

Quid? singulari vir ingenio Aristoteles et paene divino ipse errat an alios vult errare, cum scribit Eudemum Cyprium familiarem suum iter in Macedoniam facientem Pheras venisse, quae erat urbs in Thessalia tum admodum nobilis, ab Alexandro autem tyranno crudeli dominatu tenebatur. in eo igitur oppido ita graviter aegrum Eudemum 5 fuisse ut omnes medici diffiderent. ei visum in quiete egregia facie iuvenem dicere fore ut perbrevis convalesceret paucisque diebus interitum Alexandrum tyrannum, ipsum autem Eudemum quinquennio post domum esse rediturum. atque ita quidem prima statim scribit Aristoteles consecuta et convaluisse Eudemum et ab uxoris 10 fratribus interfectum tyrannum. quinto autem anno exeunte cum esset spes ex illo somnio in Cyprum illum ex Sicilia esse rediturum, proeliantem eum ad Syracusas occidisse. ex quo ita illud somnium esse interpretatum ut cum animus Eudemi e corpore excesserit, tum domum revertisse videatur.

15

b. Cp. Plut., *Life of Dio*, 22:

Συνέπραττον δὲ (τῷ Δίῳ) καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὃ τε Κύπριος Εὐδήμος, εἰς ὃν Ἀριστοτέλης ἀποθανόντα τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς διάλογον ἐποίησε, καὶ Τιμωνίδης ὁ Λευκάδιος.

the soul no harmony 416—In this dialogue Ar. defends the immortality of the soul and attacks the doctrine that the soul is the harmony of the body. Philoponus, in his commentary of the *De anima*, mentions the following two arguments, used by Ar. in the *Eudemus*.

a. Fr. 45 R., p. 50:

Τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ, φησίν, ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ἡ ἀναρμοστία· τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ οὐδὲν ἐναντίον. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρμονία ἐστίν.

First argument

Jaeger, *Ar.* 41, points to the corresponding logical formula in the *Categ.* 3 b²⁴ ff.: 'Υπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. "Substances never have contraries".—Soul, then, is a substance, as is said directly by Plotinus, *Enn.* IV 7, 8: τὸ μὲν (sc. πρότερον, ἡ ψυχὴ) οὐσία, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία οὐκ οὐσία.

Jaeger, though he does not think the *Categ.* authentic¹, cites another parallel between a Platonic argument (*Phaedo* 93 b-d) why the soul is no harmony, and a formula in the *Categ.* Plato says: the soul is either good, moral and rational, or the opposite. Now these opposed constitutions are a sort of harmony and disharmony of the soul. But the attributes "good" etc. and their opposites admit of a μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. Consequently, if harmony = soul, the soul would admit of degrees,—which is impossible. Cp. *Categ.* 3 b³³-4 a⁹: Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχασθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. E.q.s. "Substance does not admit of degrees".

b. Fr. 45 R., ib.:

Τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ, φησί, τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀναρμοστία τοῦ σώματος, ἀναρμοστία δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ αἰσχος· ὦν τὸ μὲν ἀσυμμετρία τῶν στοιχείων ἡ νόσος, τὸ δὲ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἡ ἀσθένεια, τὸ δὲ τῶν ὁργανικῶν τὸ αἰσχος. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἀναρμοστία νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ αἰσχος, ἡ ἀρμονία ἄρα ὑγίεια καὶ ἰσχυς καὶ κάλλος· ψυχὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τούτων οὔτε ὑγίεια φημι οὔτε ἰσχυς οὔτε κάλλος· ψυχὴν γὰρ εἶχε καὶ ὁ Θεορίτης αἰσχιστος ὢν. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρμονία.

Second argument

c. Simplicius in *Ar.*, *De anima* I 3, says that, according to *Ar.* in the *Eudemus*, the soul is an *eidos*.

the soul
an *eidos*

Fr. 46 R.:

Καὶ ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῷ γεγραμμένῳ διαλόγῳ εἰδός τι ἀποφαίνεται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

J., i.e., remarks that in this period the young *Ar.* was still dependent on Plato in metaphysics, but completely independent of him in the sphere of logic and methodology. "The fundamental attitude embodied in the doctrine of the categories, and the main portions of the doctrine itself, had been developed before *Ar.* dared to shake the metaphysical foundation of Plato's philosophy".

417—a. The story of Midas and Silenus, cited by Plutarch in the *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 27: Silenus, captured by Midas, answers to the question of the king what is the highest good to man (τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ

the immor-
tality of
the soul

¹ *Ar.* p. 46, with note 3. I think the arguments adduced by J. on this point not decisive. I am rather inclined to accept the authenticity of the *Categ.* and to explain the doctrine of the πρώτη οὐσία in this treatise as a strong reaction of the author against the theory of the Ideas, which may be placed at the beginning of the years of Assos.

βέλτιστον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τί τὸ πάντων αἰρετώτατον);—he answers after a long silence, μόλις and ἀνακαγχάζων (fr. 44 R., p. 49):

Δαίμονος ἐπιπόνου καὶ τύχης χαλεπῆς ἐφήμερον σπέρμα, τί με βιάζεσθε λέγειν ἃ ὑμῖν ἄρειον μὴ γινῶναι; μετ' ἀγνοίας γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων κακῶν ἀλυπότατος ὁ βίος. ἀνθρώποις δὲ πάμπαν οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι τὸ πάντων ἄριστον οὐδὲ μετασχεῖν τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου φύσεως· ἄριστον γὰρ πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι, τὸ μέντοι μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνυστῶν τὸ γενομένου ἀποθανεῖν ὡς τάχιστα. δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὕσης κρείττονος τῆς ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι διαγωγῆς ἢ τῆς ἐν τῷ ζῆν, οὕτως ἀπεφάνατο.

J., *Ar.* p. 48, rightly pointed to the Platonic style and spirit of this answer: Τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι is not merely "not to be born"; it also means "not to enter into Becoming".

the doctrine
of the Ideas
accepted by
Ar.

b. Proclus in Plat. *Remph.*; *Ar.* fr. 41 R.:

Λέγει δὲ καὶ ὁ δαιμόνιος Ἀριστοτέλης αἰτίαν δι' ἣν ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἰοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ δεῦρο ἐπιλανθάνεται τῶν ἐκεῖ θεαμάτων, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἐξιοῦσα μέμνηται ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνταῦθα παθημάτων.

The ἐκεῖ θεάματα are doubtless the Ideas.

c. The same fr.

the life of the
soul without
body normal

Ar. concludes from the above-cited fact that the life of the soul without body is normal and like a state of health, whereas the life in the body is to be considered as abnormal and a state of disease.

Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ μὲν ὑγείας εἰς νόσον ὁδεύοντας λήθην ἴσχειν τινὰς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραμμάτων ὧν ἐμεμαθήκεισαν, ἐκ νόσου δὲ εἰς ὑγίαν ἰόντα μηδένα πώποτε τοῦτο πάσχειν· εἰοκέναι δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀνευ σώματος ζῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατὰ φύσιν οὔσαν <ὑγείᾳ, νόσῳ δὲ τὴν ἐν σώματι>.

the noûs
a part of
the soul

418—a. That the noûs was considered by *Ar.* during this period as a part of the soul (unlike the later doctrine of the *De anima*), appears from the passage of *Simpl.* cited supra (416c: the soul an *eidos*), Fr. 46 R., where he continues (after the words εἰδός τι ἀποφαίνεται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι):

καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπαινεῖ τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν δεκτικὴν λέγοντας τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐχ ὅλην ἀλλὰ τὴν νοητικὴν ὡς τῶν ἀληθῶν δευτέρως εἰδῶν γνωστικὴν· τῷ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττονι νῶ τὰ ἀληθῆ εἶδη σύστοιχα.

The question might be asked here whether the words οὐχ ὅλην e.q.s. are still a report of *Ar.*'s view in the *Eudemus*, or whether they rather contain an explanation of *Simplicius*. In the first case—which seems to be the right one—this fragment would prove that the doctrine of the noûs as the highest part of the human soul, which therefore alone is divine and immortal, originates in the very first period

of Ar.'s thought¹. This doctrine differs from that of *De anima*, where the *noûs* no longer is regarded as a *part* of the soul, but as a "separated substance" which comes from the outside. We find it explicitly in the *Protr.* (fr. 61 R.), in *Metaph.* A 3 and in the *Nic. Ethics*.

b. Ar., fr. 61 R. (from Iamblichus, *Protr.* ch. 8, p. 48 ed. Pistelli): **noûs alone immortal**

Οὐδὲν οὖν θεῖον ἢ μακάριον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πλὴν ἐκεῖνό γε μόνον ἄξιον σπουδῆς ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως. τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον ἔοικεν εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀθάνατον καὶ μόνον θεῖον. καὶ παρὰ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως δύνασθαι κοινωνεῖν, καίπερ ὧν ὁ βίος ἄθλιος φύσει καὶ χαλεπός, ὅμως οὕτως ὀκονόμηται χαριέντως ὥστε δοκεῖν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον. ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός, εἴτε Ἑρμότιμος εἴτε Ἀναξαγόρας εἶπε τοῦτο, καὶ ὅτι ὁ θνητὸς αἰὼν μέρος ἔχει θεοῦ τινός.

c. Ar., *Metaph.* A 3, 1070 a²⁴⁻²⁶.

Ar. is speaking here about pre-existing and non pre-existing causes. He says: Motive causes (τὰ μὲν κινοῦντα αἷτια) precede, formal causes (τὰ δὲ ὡς ὁ λόγος) are simultaneous with the thing they produce. It is a further question whether the form survives the thing. In certain cases this is certainly possible, e.g. the *noûs*.

Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς· πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως.

d. Cp. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* X 7, 1177 b²⁶⁻³¹.

In the preceding lines the author has spoken of the advantages of the βίος θεωρητικός, being that of the activity of the mind (ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια). He then continues:

Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν οὕτως βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσα δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτω καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. Εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

Now this *noûs* is not only *in* man, but it is a *part* of him, and his chief and best part. So we could even say that man is his *noûs*. 1178 a²⁻⁴:

Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἀτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου.

¹ I do not think it is already explicitly present in the *Eudemus*, but it is very near. Certainly Dr. Nuyens is not right in admitting that the limitation of immortality to the *noûs* is a characteristic of the last period of Ar.'s development. Ross and Mansion have rightly pointed out that this doctrine is of very early date.

2—THE PROTREPTICUS

the theme 419—The *Protrepticus* was an exhortation to the philosophic life, the βίος θεωρητικός, such as it was understood in the Academy. It was addressed to Themiso, the prince of Cyprus. Against the pragmatistic conception of knowledge in the school of Isocrates Ar. here fervently defends the beauty and the happiness of the purely contemplative life, which is exercised solely for its own sake. We have the answer from the school of Isocr. in the anonymous *Protrept. ad Demonium*.

a. Ar., fr. 52 R., p. 59. The pragmatists speak:

Δεῖ δὴ μὴ λελθῆναι τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων ἐξετάζειν ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι καὶ πράττειν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ γινώσκειν μόνον· οὔτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνομεν τῷ γνωρίζειν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὑγείας ἀλλὰ τῷ προφέρεισθαι τοῖς σώμασιν οὔτε πλουτοῦμεν τῷ γινώσκειν πλοῦτον ἀλλὰ τῷ κεκτηῆσθαι πολλὰ οὐσίαν, οὐδὲ τὸ πάντων μέ- 5 γιστον εὖ ζῶμεν τῷ γινώσκειν ἅττα τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ τῷ πράττειν εὖ· τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτ' ἐστίν. ὥστε προσήκει καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἶπερ ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος ἥτοι πράξιν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ χρήσιμον εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις.

Ar.'s defence
of the com-
templative
life

b. Ar., fr. 58 R. (Iamblichus, *Protr.* c. 9). The answer of Ar.:

Τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ πάσης ἐπιστήμης ἕτερόν τι γενέσθαι καὶ δεῖν χρησίμην αὐτὴν εἶναι παντάπασιν ἀγνοοῦντός τινός ἐστιν ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· διαφέρει γὰρ πλεῖστον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἕτερον ἀγαπώ- 5 μενα τῶν πραγμάτων ὧν ἀνευ ζῆν ἀδύνατον, ἀναγκαῖα καὶ συναίτια λεκτέον, ὅσα δὲ δι' αὐτά, καὶ ἀποβαίνῃ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἀγαθὰ κυρίως. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τόδε 5 μὲν αἰρετόν διὰ τόδε, τόδε δὲ δι' ἄλλο, τοῦτό τε εἰς ἄπειρον οἴχεται προίον, ἀλλ' ἴσταται που. γελοῖον οὖν ἤδη παντελῶς τὸ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ παντός ὠφέλειαν ἐτέραν παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τί οὖν ὑμῖν ὄφελος καὶ τί χρήσιμον ἐρωτᾶν. ὥς ἀληθῶς γὰρ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, εἴ τις ἡμᾶς οἶον εἰς μακάρων νήσους τῇ διανοίᾳ κομίσσειεν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐδενὸς χρεῖα οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὸς ὄφελος 10 ἂν γένοιτο, μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅνπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλεύθερόν φαμεν βίον εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύ- νοιτο δικαίως ὅστις ἡμῶν ἐξουσίας γενομένης ἐν μακάρων οἰκῆσαι νήσοις, ἀδύνατος εἶη δι' ἑαυτόν. οὐκοῦν οὐ μεμπτός ὁ μισθός ἐστι τῆς ἐπιστήμης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐδὲ μικρόν τὸ γινόμενον ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀγαθόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς 15 δικαιοσύνης, ὥς φασι οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐν ἄδου κομιζόμεθα τὰς δωρεάς, οὕτω τῆς φρονήσεως ἐν μακάρων νήσοις, ὥς ἔοικεν. οὐδὲν οὖν δεινόν, ἂν μὴ φαίνεται χρησίμη οὕσα μηδ' ὠφέλιμος· οὐ γὰρ ὠφέλιμον ἀλλ' ἀγαθὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φαμεν, οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτὴν αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὴν προσήκει. ὥσπερ

20 γὰρ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν αὐτῆς ἔνκα τῆς θεᾶς ἀποδρῆμιόν μιν, καὶ εἰ τι γέδεν
 πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔσονται, αὐτῇ γὰρ ἡ θεοπρία κρείττων πολλαὶ ἐστί χροηταῖς,
 καὶ τὰ Διονυσία δὲ θεωποῖεν οὐχ ὥς ἀνθρώποις εἰσι τι παρὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἀλλὰ
 καὶ προσηύει, πολλαὶ θεᾶς ἐνομιθεῖαι ἀνὲρ πολλαὶ χροηταῖς,
 οὐτὼ καὶ τὴν θεοπρίαν τοῦ παντός προσηύει, πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γινώσκουσιν εἶναι
 25 χροηταῖς. οὐ γὰρ θῆτο ἐπὶ μὲν ἀποδρῆμιόν τοῖς μὲν μισοῦσιν, πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
 εἶναι τοῦ θεοσώματος ἀνθρώποις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄντων φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἀληθείαν οὐκ
 ὁρᾶται δὲν θεωπεῖν ἀνθρώποις.

In *Metaph.* A 2, 982 a¹¹⁻²⁸ we shall again find the theme that philosophy alone
 is exercised for its own sake and not χροῆς ἕνεκα (our nr. 519).

420—2. Ar., fr. 52 R., p. 61 f. (Iamb., *Protr.* c. 6).

Phronesis is the highest good; therefore philosophy is to be striven after.

II ἄνθρωποι γὰρ φιλοσοφούμενοι οὐτὶ μὲν τὸν σπουδαϊστῶν ἀρχαίαν καὶ τὴν τὴν
 φύσιν κρείττων, τὸν δὲ νόμον ἀρχοντα καὶ νόμον εἶναι μόνον. οὐτος δὲ
 ἀκριβέστερος τῶν ἀγαθῶν πᾶν ὁ φρόνιμος; ὅσα γὰρ ἀνὲρ οὐτος ἐλαττω κατὰ
 5 τὴν ἐπιστημὴν ἀποδρῆμιον, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, καὶ κακὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τοῖς
 ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι ἀποδρῆμιον. κατὰ τὰς οὐκ ἐλαττω, τὸ μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνη
 ἔν τῷ δικαιοῦ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ὁ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἔχων, ὁ δὲ σὺφφον τὸ
 σὺφφον, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ὁ φρόνιμος ἀκρίβηται πᾶσι τοῖς
 10 πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. οὐτος γὰρ ἐξοντα τῆς διδασκαλίας, ὅτε φανερόν οὐ κατὰ
 τὴν φύσιν κρείττων κρείττων κρείττων ἐστὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ φρόνιμος.

Two remarks must be made here.

I. The sentence that the φρόνιμος is the highest standard of what is good,
 at once reminds us of the Aristotelian definition of virtue as it is given in the
Eth. Nic. II 6, 15 (1106 b³⁶-1107 a³): "Virtue is a state of character, concerned with
 choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a
 rational principle, and as the φρόνιμος would determine it" (our nr. 571b).

Here again the φρόνιμος has the arbitrium of what is good.
 II. W. Jaeger has pointed out that the meaning of the term φρόνιμος as it is
 used here differs from that in the *Nic. Eth.*: in the *Protr.*, as in the *Eud. Eth.*,
 φρόνιμος is used in the Platonic sense of the word, which means philosophical
 insight, based on the knowledge of a transcendent reality, whereas in the *Nic.*
Eth. it means simply *practical wisdom*, which has nothing to do with a transcendent
 reality, and may be predicated even of animals (*Eth. Nic.* VI 5, 1140 b²⁰). It is
 no longer directed towards the general, but towards the concrete. In *Eth. Nic.*
 VI 7, 1141 b³, it is therefore said explicitly that men like Anaxagoras and Thales
 were not φρόνιμοι, but σοφοί, because they were indifferent to their own advantage,
 but strove after knowledge of the eternal laws of the universe (our nr. 590a
 and 591b).
 In the following passage of the *Protr.* we shall see that φρόνιμος and σοφός are
 here almost identical.

Therefore
philosophy
to be striven
after

b. The same fr. continued.

Οὐ δὴ δεῖ φεύγειν φιλοσοφίαν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν φιλοσοφία καθάπερ οἴομεθα κτησίς τε καὶ χρῆσις σοφίας, ἡ δὲ σοφία τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν, οὐ δὲ δεῖ χρημάτων μὲν ἕνεκα πλεῖν ἐφ' Ἑρακλέους στήλας καὶ πολλάκις κινδυνεύειν, διὰ δὲ φρόνησιν μηδὲν πονεῖν μηδὲ δαπανᾶν. ἢ μὴν ἀνδραποδῶδες γε τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ζῆν εὖ γλίχεσθαι, καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν αὐτὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δόξαις ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀξιοῦν ταῖς αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήματα ζητεῖν τῶν δὲ καλῶν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν.

The formula εὖ ζῆν is used by Ar. in the *Nic. Eth.* I 4, 1095 a¹⁹, as a general and preliminary definition of happiness: both οἱ πολλοὶ and οἱ χαρίεντες (more civilized persons) agree on this point, that they identify happiness (τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν) with τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν.

Again we find the term used thrice in the eleventh chapter of the *Magna Moralia* II.

the theory
of the Ideas
still accepted

421—That the author of the *Protr.* still accepts the metaphysical basis of the theory of the Ideas, appears from the following passage.

a. Ar., *Protr.* 13 Walzer (Iambl., *Protr.* p. 54 and 55 Pistelli):

Τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τά τε ὄργανα καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους οὐκ ἂν αὐτῶν τῶν πρώτων λαβόντες σχεδὸν ἴσασιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων καὶ πολλοστῶν, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἐξ ἐμπειρίας λαμβάνουσι. τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἀκριβῶν ἡ μίμησις ἐστίν. αὐτῶν γὰρ ἐστὶ θεατής, ἀλλ' οὐ μιμημάτων. — Μόνος γὰρ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν βλέπων ζῆν καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, καὶ καθάπερ ἂν εἰ κυβερνήτης τις ἀγαθὸς ἐξ αἰδίδων καὶ μονίμων ἀναψάμενος τοῦ βίου τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁρμαῖ καὶ ζῆν καθ' ἑαυτόν.

Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 91, rightly remarks that in *Metaph.* A 2, 982 a²⁵ the author no longer speaks of αὐτὰ τὰ πρώτα, but simply of τὰ πρώτα:

Ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν.

The omission is not fortuitous: it is a consequence of the rejection of the Ideas, which makes the opposition to μιμήματα disappear.

terminology
compared
with
π. ιδεῶν

b. The expression αὐτὰ τὰ ἀκριβῆ in the *Protr.* is explained by the following passage from the *Περὶ ιδεῶν*.

Ar., fr. 187 R., p. 149 (Alex. Aphr. in Ar. *Metaph.* I, 9, 990 b¹⁰):

Ἄλλων δὲ τινῶν παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστά εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ταῦτα γὰρ ἀπειρά τε καὶ ἀόριστα, αἱ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι ὡρισμέναι. ἐστὶν ἄρα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δὲ αἱ ιδέαι.

Concrete things are ἀπειρα and therefore not knowable; science has as its object "the determinate": τὰ ὡρισμένα. Cp. Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 93. The same term is used in *Protr.* c. 6 (fr. 52 R., p. 60, l. 21 ff.).

422—In this Platonically-minded work Ar. speaks in a tone of great disdain about earthly things.

a. Ar., fr. 59 R. (Iambl., *Protr.* c. 8, p. 132 Kiessling):

Disdain of
earthly
things

Γνοίη δ' ἂν τις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων, εἰ θεωρήσειεν ὑπ' αὐγᾶς¹ τὸν ἀνθρώ-
πειον βίον. εὐρήσει γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι μεγάλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντα ὄντα
σκιαγραφίαν. ὅθεν καὶ λέγεται καλῶς τὸ μὴδὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ
μὴδὲν εἶναι βέβαιον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἰσχύς τε γὰρ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος
5 γέλως ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια. κάλλος γε παρὰ τὸ μὴδὲν ὄρᾶν ἀκριβὲς δοκεῖ
εἶναι τοιοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐδύνατο βλέπειν καθάπερ τὸν Λυγκέα φασίν, ὃς διὰ
τῶν τοίχων ἐώρα καὶ τῶν δένδρων, πότ' ἂν ἔδοξεν εἶναι τινα τὴν ὄψιν ἀνεκτὸν
ὄρᾶν ἐξ οἴων συνέστηκε κακῶν; τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ δόξαι τὰ ζηλούμενα μᾶλλον τῶν
λοιπῶν ἀδιηγήτου γέμει φλυαρίας. τῷ γὰρ καθορῶντι τῶν αἰδίων τι ἡλίθιον
10 περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζειν. τί δ' ἐστὶ μακρὸν ἢ πολυχρόνιον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων;
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν οἶμαι καὶ βίου βραχύτητα καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται
πολύ.

b. In this spiritual climate life in a body becomes the death of the soul, and death the escape into a higher life. As we saw in the *Eudemus* (fr. 41 R.), the life of the soul without body seemed normal to the author and life with a body abnormal and like a disease (our nr. 417a). Here the imprisonment of the soul in the body is painted in horrible colours as an unnatural state full of awful suffering.

Ar., fr. 60 R. (Iambl., *Protr.* 8, p. 134 K.):

the im-
prisonment
of the soul
in a body

Τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖον οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι λέγουσι τὸ φάναι διδόναι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμωρίαν
καὶ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει μεγάλων τινῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. πάνυ γὰρ ἡ σύζευξις
τοιούτῳ τινι ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ
φασὶ βασανίζειν πολλάκις τοὺς ἀλισκομένους προσδεσμεύοντας πρὸς ἀντικρὺ
τοῖς ζῶσι νεκροὺς ἀντιπροσώπους ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος προσαρμότ-
τοντας, οὕτως ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ διατετάσθαι καὶ προσκεκολληθῆσαι πᾶσι τοῖς
αἰσθητικοῖς τοῦ σώματος μέλεσιν.

c. Next follows the fr. 61 R. on the divine character of the *noûs*, which alone is immortal. Our nr. 418b.

Noûs alone
divine and
immortal

423—Dr. Nuyens, Fr. ed. p. 93 ff., has pointed to what seems to him to be some later elements in the *Protr.* of Ar., namely firstly the idea of teleology in nature, and secondly what he calls the instrumental conception of the relation soul-body.

¹ After ὑπ' αὐγᾶς a word has probably dropped out: τοῦ αἰῶνος is possible (after *Tim.* 37 d).

**The principle
of teleology**

a. Ar., *Protr.*, 11 Walzer (Iambl., *Protr.* 9, p. 49 Pist.):

Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τύχης γινομένων οὐδὲν ἐνεκά του γίγνεται, οὐδ' ἔστι τι τέλος αὐτοῖς· τοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τέχνης γιγνομένοις ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα —, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ κατὰ γε φύσιν ἐνεκά του γίγνεται, καὶ βελτίονος ἔνεκεν αἰεὶ συνίσταται ἢ καθάπερ τὸ διὰ τέχνης· μιμεῖται γάρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἢ φύσιν ἀλλὰ αὐτὴ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῷ βοηθεῖν καὶ τὰ παραλειπόμενα τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν.

b. Ar., *Protr.* 6 Walzer (Iambl., *Protr.* 7, p. 41 Pist.):

Ἔτι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν ἔστι ψυχὴ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ δὲ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δὲ ἄρχεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν χρῆται τὸ δ' ὑποκεῖται ὡς ὄργανον. Ἀεὶ τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ χρώμενον συντάττεται ἢ τοῦ ἀρχομένου καὶ τοῦ ὀργάνου χρεῖα.

This is, according to Dr. N., a conception of the relation soul-body different from that of antagonism, as it was seen in the *Phaedo* and in the *Eudemus*: in principle it is just that instrumentism which is characteristic of the middle period of Ar.'s development, and therefore points to a later date of this work.

In fact, this argument of N. is not conclusive. We have to remark that Plato's psychology in the *Republic*, where the rational part of the soul is called the leading part or ἡγεμονικόν, implied this kind of instrumentism; so that the differences, arranged by N. in periods of Ar.'s development, were present at the same time in the thought of Plato. Why could they not be present at the same time in the thought of Aristotle too without there marking a different period?

In the next paragraph we shall find decisive reasons for upholding the early date of the *Protr.*

3—ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

**the first
book**

424—In the first book of his Π. φιλ. Ar. seems to have treated of the history of philosophy, including the Orient.

a. In fr. 6 R. he mentions the magi and the dualism of Zarathustra (Diog. Laert. I 8).

**the magi and
Zarathustra
mentioned**

Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι (τοὺς μάγους) τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν δαίμονα, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὄνομα εἶναι Ζεὺς καὶ Ὡρομάσδης, τῷ δὲ Ἀιδης καὶ Ἀρειμάνιος.

We know that, in Plato's later years, the Academy was keenly interested in oriental wisdom. The doctrine of Zarathustra was mentioned also in the *Alcib. Mai.*,

which is certainly not a work of Plato but a product of his school in its early years ¹.

See: J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l'Orient*, Brussels 1945. Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 131 ff.

b. The fr. 7 R. mentions the Orphic poems. Ar. distinguishes their doctrine, which is old, from their literary form, which is of a much later date (Philoponus in Ar. *De anima* I 5). the Orphic poems

— αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ εἰσι τὰ δόγματα, ταῦτα δὲ φησιν Ὀνομάκριτον ἐν ἔπεσι κατατεῖναι.

Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 129 f., explains this as an instance of the author's view that the same truths reappear in human history several times. Thus in *De caelo* I 3, 270 b¹⁹, where he says, speaking of the name of the "first body" (aether): "It seems too that the name of this first body has been passed down to the present time by the ancients, who thought of it in the same way as we do" ² οὐ γὰρ ἀπαξ οὐδὲ δις ἀλλ' ἀπειράκις δεῖ νομίζειν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀφικνεῖσθαι δόξας εἰς ἡμᾶς.

See also *Metaph.* Λ 8, at the end (1074 b¹⁰): κατὰ τὸ εἶδος πολλάκις εὐρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας (sc. that the first principles are regarded as gods) ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισεσῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν.

"While probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure" ³.

425—a. In the second book Plato's doctrine of the ideal Numbers was criticized. Fr. 9 R. (Syrianus in Ar. *Metaph.* 12, 9): Second book

Ὁμολογεῖ μηδὲν εἶρηχέναι πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων (sc. the Platonics before Xenocrates) ὑποθέσεις μηδ' ὅλως παρακολουθεῖν τοῖς εἰδητικοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, εἴπερ ἕτεροι τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἶεν, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ β' τῶν περὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον „ὥστε εἰ ἄλλος ἀριθμὸς αἱ ἰδέαι, μὴ μαθηματικὸς δέ, οὐδεμίαν περὶ αὐτοῦ σύνεσιν ἔχοιμεν ἄν. τίς γὰρ τῶν γε πλείστων ἡμῶν συνίστησιν ἄλλον ἀριθμόν”;

b. Probably this passage belonged to a general criticism of the doctrine of the Ideas. We know, both from Proclus and from Plutarchus, that Ar. criticized this doctrine sharply in his *Dialogues*. the theory of Ideas criticized

Fr. 8 R. (Proclus ap. Ioann. gramm., *de mundi aetern.* II, 2):

Καὶ κινδυνεύει μηδὲν οὕτως ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος (ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης) ἀποποιήσασθαι τῶν Πλάτωνος ὡς τῇ τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑπόθεσιν, οὐ μόνον ἐν λογικοῖς . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἡθικοῖς . . . καὶ ἐν φυσικοῖς . . . καὶ ἐν τῇ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πολλῶ πλέον . . . καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα κεκραγῶς μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθεῖν κἂν τις αὐτὸν οἴηται διὰ φιλονεικίαν ἀντιλέγειν.

¹ The arguments adduced by E. de Strycker in *Les Etudes Classiques* of 1942 are decisive.

² Transl. of W. K. C. Guthrie.

³ Transl. of W. D. Ross.

c. Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 14 (same fr. R.).

Τὰς γε μὴν ιδέας περὶ ὧν ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Πλάτῳ πανταχοῦ κινῶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπάγων ἀπορίαν αὐταῖς ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, ἐν τοῖς <μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, ἐν τοῖς> φυσικοῖς, διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν διαλόγων, φιλονεικότερον ἐνίοις ἔδοξεν ἢ φιλοσοφώτερον ἔχειν τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ, ὡς προθέμενος τὴν Πλάτωνος ὑπεριδεῖν φιλοσοφίαν· οὕτω μακρὰν ἦν τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν.

I think Jaeger is right in referring this criticism of Platonism exclusively to the Π. φιλ. Dr. Nuyens defends the thesis that in the *Protr.* too Platonism was criticized. We shall see in one of our next numbers that this opinion of N. is erroneous.

426—This book contained further what is called by Jaeger Ar.'s philosophy of religion.

Two sources
of religious
beliefa. Ar., fr. 10 R. (Sextus, *Adv. dogm.* III, 20-22):

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἀρχῶν ἔννοιαν θεῶν ἔλεγε γεγονέναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀπὸ τε τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων διὰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γινομένους ταύτης ἐνθουσιασμοὺς καὶ τὰς μαντείας. ὅταν γάρ, φησὶν, ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ καθ' ἑαυτὴν γένηται ἡ ψυχὴ, τότε τὴν ἴδιον ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προμαντεύεται τε καὶ 5 προαγορεύει τὰ μέλλοντα. τοιαύτη δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον χωρίζεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων. ἀποδέχεται γοῦν καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν Ὀμηρον ὡς τοῦτο παρατηρήσαντα· πεποίθηκε γάρ τὸν μὲν Πάτροκλον ἐν τῷ ἀναιρεῖσθαι προαγορεύοντα περὶ τῆς Ἑκτορος ἀναιρέσεως, τὸν δ' Ἑκτορα περὶ τῆς Ἀχιλλέως τελευτῆς. ἐκ τούτων οὖν, φησὶν, ὑπενόησαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τι θεόν, τὸ οἱ καθ' ἑαυτὸ εἰκοὸς τῇ ψυχῇ πάντων ἐπιστημονικώτατον. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων· θεασάμενοι γὰρ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἥλιον περιπολοῦντα, νύκτωρ δὲ τὴν εὐτακτον τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων κίνησιν, ἐνόμισαν εἶναι τινα θεὸν τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως καὶ εὐταξίας αἴτιον. τοιοῦτος μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης.

The thought is of Plato and the Academy. Cp. *Laws* XII 966 d: our nr. 394a.

Cosmic order
a proof for
the existence
of God(s)

b. Fr. 11 R. Sextus (ib. 26-27) expresses this last view in rather picturesque colours. The passage may be taken quite well from Ar.'s Π. φιλ. II.

Ἐνιοὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπαράβατον καὶ εὐτακτον τῶν οὐρανίων κίνησιν παραγενόμενοι φασι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπινοαίαις ἀπὸ ταύτης γεγονέναι πρῶτον· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις ἐπὶ τῆς Τρωικῆς καθεζόμενος Ἰδῆς ἑώρα τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατείαν μετὰ πολλοῦ κόσμου καὶ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιούσαν, ἵππηας μὲν πρῶτα σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν, πεζοὺς δ' ἐξόπιθεν, πάντως ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος 5 εἰς ἔννοιαν ἦλθε τοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶ τις ὁ διατάσσων τὴν τοιαύτην τάξιν καὶ ἐγκλευόμενος τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸν κοσμουμένοις στρατιώταις, οἷον Νέστωρ ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν

ἡρώων ὃς ἤδει „κοσμήσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας”· καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ
 ἔμπειρος νεὼς ἅμα τῷ θεάσασθαι πόρρωθεν ναῦν οὐρίῳ διωκομένην πνεύματι
 10 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἰστίοις εὐτρεπιζομένην συνίησιν ὅτι ἔστι τις ὁ κατευθύνων ταύτην
 καὶ εἰς τοὺς προκειμένους λιμένας καταντῶν, οὕτως οἱ πρῶτον εἰς οὐρανὸν
 ἀναβλέψαντες καὶ θεασάμενοι ἥλιον μὲν τοὺς ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς μέχρι δύσεως
 δρόμους σταδιέοντα, ἀστέρων δὲ εὐτάκτους τινὰς χορείας, ἐπεζήτουν τὸν
 δημιουργὸν τῆς περικαλλοῦς ταύτης διακοσμήσεως, οὐκ ἐκ ταῦτομάτου στοχα-
 15 ζόμενοι συμβαίνειν αὐτὴν ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τινος κρείττονος καὶ ἀφθάρτου φύσεως,
 ἥτις ἦν θεός.

427—The same view occurs in the following interesting passage, which shows us Ar.’s transposition of Plato’s allegory of the den.

Cicero, *De Nat. deorum* II 37, 95 (Ar., fr. 12 R.):

Ar.’s trans-
 position of
 the allegory
 of the den

Praeclare ergo Aristoteles si essent, inquit, qui sub terra semper
 habitavissent bonis et inlustribus domiciliis quae essent ornata signis
 atque picturis instructaque rebus iis omnibus quibus abundant ii qui
 beati putantur, nec tamen exissent unquam supra terram, acceperissent
 5 autem fama et auditione esse quoddam numen et vim deorum, deinde
 aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus evadere
 in haec loca quae nos incolimus atque exire potuissent, cum repente
 terram et maria caelumque vidissent, nubium magnitudinem vento-
 rumque vim cognovissent aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magni-
 10 tudinem pulchritudinemque tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent quod
 is diem efficeret tot caelo luce diffusa, cum autem terras nox opacasset
 tum caelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum lunaeque
 luminum varietatem tum crescentis tum senescentis eorumque omnium
 ortus et occasus atque in omni aeternitate ratos inmutabilesque cursus:
 15 quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum
 esse arbitrantur. atque haec quidem ille.

We have to state that the rupture with Platonism has become a fact here: the ideal World—a transcendent Reality which alone is truly real and of which sensible things are images—the ideal World of Plato has disappeared. There is just one reality: the sensible world in which we live. Its beauty and order point the philosopher to a divine Maker¹. Surely this is a Platonic thought. But in the later philosophy of Ar. it has disappeared completely: the Prime Mover of *Phys.* VIII and *Metaph.* A is not the Maker of the kosmos as it is said in π. φιλ. II.

the rupture
 with
 Platonism
 a fact

Two conclusions must be drawn from this fact:

I. As in this work of Ar. the theory of the Ideas has been abandoned, while

¹ Surely not in the biblical sense of a Creator, but in the sense all Greeks gave to the term: the “Builder of the Universe” who “made the kosmos”, i.e. who arranged formless matter into a kosmos.

it is still accepted in the *Protr.* (our nr. 421a), it is impossible that the dialogue π. φιλ. would be anterior to the *Protr.* Hence the chronology of Jaeger must be right on this point, and it must be stated that the criterion of Nuyens has failed here ¹.

2. As in this work, π. φιλ., Ar. admits of a Demiourgos, who "made the kosmos" in the Greek sense of the term, while in the so-called "theology" of *Metaph. A* no trace of this view can be found, it is impossible that this last book was written by its author at a rather early date, such as during the years of Assos or even before them. On the contrary, the chapters *A* 7, 9 and 10 represent a very different mind, and we must suppose that a considerable space of time elapsed between the half-Platonic view of Π. φιλ. and the full-grown Aristotelian view of *Metaph. A*. So on this point A. Mansion appears to be right when he dates this book of the *Metaph.* much later than Jaeger does.

On the other hand, on the well-known words of *De caelo* I 4, 271 a³³: „Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν" a great light is poured by the present fr. from Π. φιλ. It has been supposed ² that these words are a mere literary form, an expression without any real meaning, because they do not fit in with Ar.'s view of the Prime Mover in *Phys.* VIII and *Metaph. A*. True,—but they do fit in excellently with the belief of the young Ar. in Π. φιλ., who, having rejected the theory of the Ideas, still keeps the religious principle of Plato that a divine Mind must be the cause of order in the visible world.

428—The spirit of the *Timaeus* still speaks in the following fragments of Π. φιλ.

the spirit of
the *Timaeus*

a. Fr. 14 R. (Seneca, *Quaest. nat.* VII 30, 1):

Egredie Aristoteles ait numquam nos verecundiores esse debere quam cum de dis agitur. si intramus templa compositi . . . quanto hoc magis facere debemus, cum de sideribus, de eorum natura, de stellis disputamus, ne quid temere, ne quid imprudenter aut ignorantes adfirmemus aut scientes mentiamur.

b. Fr. 18 R. (Ps. Philo, π: ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου, p. 222, 12, Bernays):

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ μήποτ' εὐσεβῶς καὶ ὁσίως ἐνιστάμενος ἀγένητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον ἔφη τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, δεινὴν δὲ ἀθεότητα κατεγίνωσκε τῶν τὰ ἐναντία διεξιόντων, οἳ τῶν χειροκμήτων οὐδὲν ᾗθησαν διαφέρειν τοσοῦτον ὁρατὸν θεὸν ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τῶν πλανήτων καὶ ἀπλανῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς περιέχοντα πάνθειον.

This fr. belonged to the third book π. φιλ.

A dialectical
proof of the
existence of
God

429—a. A formal proof of the existence of God seems to have been given by Ar. in the so-called *argumentum ex gradibus*.

¹ It is far from me to pretend that this criterion is altogether useless. No, but it should be applied with greater prudence and controlled from other points of view.

² By Mansion in his *Introd. à la Phys. Ar.*

Ar., fr. 16 R. (Simpl. in Ar., *De caelo* I 9):

Καθόλου γὰρ ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ τι βέλτιον, ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τι καὶ ἄριστον. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἄλλο ἄλλου βέλτιον, ἔστιν ἄρα τι καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ εἴη ἂν τὸ θεῖον.

b. Another proof is given in the fr. 17 R.:

A second
proof

Ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ μία ἢ πολλαί. καὶ εἰ μὲν μία, ἔχομεν τὸ ζητούμενον· εἰ δὲ πολλαί, ἢ τεταγμέναι ἢ ἀτακτοί. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀτακτοί, ἀτακτότερα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ κόσμος ὁ κόσμος ἀλλ' ἀκοσμία, καὶ ἔστι τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μὴ ὄντος. εἰ δὲ τεταγμέναι, ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐτάχθησαν ἢ ὑπὸ ἑξῶθεν τινὸς αἰτίας. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἐτάχθησαν, ἔχουσί τι κοινὸν τὸ συνάπτον αὐτὰς κάκεῖνο ἢ ἀρχή.

This text reminds us of the final passage of *Metaph.* A 8: τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς· “οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη” etc.

430—The fragments 18-26 concern the eternity of the kosmos and the doctrine that the celestial bodies have souls. With the first thesis Ar. is against Plato's doctrine in the *Tim.* (at least as he took it); with the latter he showed himself to be still closely connected with the doctrine of the Academy.

Third book

Cic., *De nat. deorum* I 13, 33 (Ar. fr. 26 R.). The Epicurean Velleius is speaking.

difficulties
in Ar.'s
doctrine
of God

Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone non dissentiens. modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam¹ mundi motum regat atque tueatur. tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse, non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse designarit deum. quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus in celeritate tanta

¹ I do not think, after all, that by the words *replicatione quadam* Cic. means a *retrograde movement*, such as is meant by Plato in *Politicus* 270 d (τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἀνελίξει), and by Ar. in *Metaph.* A 8, 1074 a² (σφαίρας . . . ἀνελιτούσας). Since the chief aspect of Aristotle's theory of the movement of the celestial bodies is that they move by a motion *returning on itself*, i.e. by a circular movement, I think that the plain and obvious sense of Cicero's words is to state that, sometimes, Ar. admitted a God to whom he attributed the rôle of governing and maintaining the movement of the universe by a *motion returning on itself*.—Festugière, *Le Dieu cosmique* p. 245 f., adopts the interpretation of J. Moreau who suggests that by *replicatione quadam* Cicero meant the movement of the first heaven which turns round in the opposite sense to that of the planets. In fact, since the motion of the first heaven is considered by Ar. as the *πρώτη φορά* (*De caelo* II 12), one could hardly qualify this as “retrograde” or “reacting”, such as the movement of the planets presents itself to us when we compare it with the fixed stars.

conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot dii, si numeramus etiam caelum deum? cum autem sine corpore idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. quo porro modo moveri carens corpore, aut 10 quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest?

That Velleius found some difficulties in Ar.'s theories about the first principle or God, is comprehensible and not without reason. When he says that Ar. called now "Mind" God, now the Universe, or "Someone else" whom he put at the head of it, or even aether (caeli ardorem), we can understand what is behind it. In fact, Ar. admitted one ἀρχή (fr. 17). He called it God and seems to have conceived his idea of an Unmoved Mover at an early date: even if *Metaph.* A 6 and 7 are much later, we have a proof for the existence of a Prime Mover in *Phys.* VII 1, and we see Ar. occupied with the problem of motion in the *De caelo* and *De gen. et corr.* In *De Caelo* II 3 he calls "the heaven" a θεῖον σῶμα which as such must be in eternal movement, i.e. in circular movement. For θεοῦ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζωὴ αἰδίου. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τῷ θεῷ κίνησιν αἰδίου ὑπάρχειν. Now, this being so, it is contradictory to admit of a Prime Mover with the purpose of excluding a regressus ad infinitum, as is argued in *Phys.* I. This contradiction remains even when the celestial bodies are no longer regarded as animated beings having a θεῖον σῶμα which consists of aether, as was taught by Ar. in II. φιλ. III (see our next nr.).

In *Metaph.* A 8 we find Ar.'s final doctrine of the celestial spheres which have each an unmoved Mover, the "first heaven" being moved by the First Unmoved Mover, who is placed as the first principle above the others. In the same way we have to imagine that the star gods of II. φιλ. were considered by the author as inferior to the first principle. The inconsequence, also of the final doctrine, is that, the circular movement of heaven being considered as a necessary consequence of its divine character, the relation to a Prime Mover becomes problematic.

the divinity
of the celest-
ial bodies

431—a. Cic., *De nat. deorum* II 15, 42 (Ar., fr. 23 R.).

That the stars are animated beings, was proved by Ar. first by the following argument.

Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra sit, aliorum in aqua, in aere aliorum, absurdum esse Aristoteli videtur in ea parte quae sit ad gignenda animantia aptissima, animal gigni nullum putare. sidera autem aetherium locum obtinent. qui quoniam tenuissimus est et semper agitur et viget, necesse est quod animal in eo gignatur id et 5 sensu acerrimo et mobilitate celerrima esse. quare cum in aethere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse et intelligentiam. ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda.

Plato, *Tim.* 39 e, spoke of the four elements as peopled by living beings. Cp. *Epin.* 984 d, where the fifth element (aether) is mentioned,—an argument for the later date of this dialogue.

We find the argument again in *Philo*, who interprets the inhabitants of the air as angels¹, and finally in *Apuleius*, in the *De deo Socratis* (on the daemonium) VIII 137. He too makes "daemons" out of the inhabitants of the air.

¹ *De gig.* 2, 7-8; *De plantat.* 3, 12; *De somn.* I 22, 135.

Consult: Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 144 ff.

b. Cic. ib. 16, 42-43. The stars must have a superior intellect, because they feed themselves on aether, the finest and lightest of elements. they feed themselves on aether

Etenim licet videre acutiora ingenia et ad intellegendum aptiora eorum qui terras incolant eas in quibus aer sit purus ac tenuis quam illorum qui utantur crasso caelo atque concreto. quin etiam cibo quo utare interesse aliquid ad mentis aciem putant. probabile est igitur
5 praestantem intelligentiam in sideribus esse, quae et aetheriam partem mundi incolant et marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis alantur.

The same doctrine occurs in Plato, *Laws* V 747 d, and in the *Epin.* 981 e.

c. Cic. ib. (16, 43-44). The divinity of the celestial bodies proved by their order and by their movement. their order proves that they are animated beings

Sensum autem astrorum atque intelligentiam maxime declarat ordo eorum atque constantia (nihil est enim quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio), in quo nihil est temerarium nihil varium nihil fortuitum. ordo autem siderum et in omni aeternitate constantia neque
5 naturam significat (est enim plena rationis) neque fortunam, quae amica varietati constantiam respuit. sequitur ergo ut ipsa sua sponte suo sensu ac divinitate moveantur. Nec vero Aristoteles non laudandus in eo quod omnia quae moventur aut natura moveri censuit aut vi aut voluntate; moveri autem solem et lunam et sidera omnia; quae autem
10 natura moverentur, haec aut pondere deorsum aut levitate in sublime ferri, quorum neutrum astris contingeret propterea quod eorum motus in orbem circumque ferretur; nec vero dici potest vi quadam maiore fieri ut contra naturam astra moveantur (quae enim potest maior esse?); restat igitur ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius.
15 Quae qui videat non indocte solum verum etiam impie faciat si deos esse neget.

Cp. Plato, *Laws* X, 888 e sqq. and the *Epin.* 982 a sqq., where is spoken of an ἀρίστη βούλευσις of the stars, by which they accomplish their circular movement. Later *Ar.* denies this point explicitly, e.g. in the *Nic. Eth.* Γ 5, 1112 a²¹: περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰθέριων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται.

d. Also the doctrine that noûs is of the same substance as the heavenly bodies, viz. aether, appears to have been taught by Aristotle, probably in Π. φιλ. Noûs of the same substance as the heavenly bodies

Cic., *Acad. post.* I, 7, 26:

Quintum genus, eo quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque

quattuor (sc. elementorum) quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur.

History of the doctrine This doctrine, which appears first with Alcmaeon of Croton (our nr. 46b; cp. also Socr. in Xen., *Mem.* I 4, our nr. 216, vol. I p. 145, n. 1, and Plato in *Tim.* 40 b-c, 42 b-d; our nrs. 352 and 354b) had a remarkable history. It revived in the Arabian doctrine of the *intelligences of the spheres*, the last of which is the "active intellect" of man (*intellectus agens separatus*). Hence the disputations of Western philosophers of the 13th century: *de unitate intellectus* (Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura, Thomas, and again Duns Scotus). In the 16th century we find the doctrine of the consubstantiality of mind with the stars in Jacob Boehme. By his influence it appears again in certain poems of the Dutch 17th century poet Jan Luyken¹.

e. On the influence of Ar.'s Π. φιλ. in later Antiquity, in particular the doctrine of the heavenly bodies, see the volume of A. J. Festugière, *Le dieu cosmique* (*La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* II), Paris 1949, ch. VIII ff. Also E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, Firenze 1937; J. Moreau, *L'Ame du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens*, Paris 1939; A. J. Festugière, *Epicure et ses Dieux*, Paris 1946, ch. V.

¹ Vid. A. C. M. Meeuwesse, *Jan Luyken als dichter van de Duytse Liev*, diss. Utrecht 1952, p. 234/5 and 271 (the modern author did not understand the doctrine).

TWELFTH CHAPTER

LOGIC

1—THE SCHOOL-WRITINGS. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

432—Strictly speaking Ar.'s logic does not belong to the system of philosophy according to his own intention. Ar. made a systematical division of all human thinking. There is no place for logic in this scheme.

a. Ar., *Metaph.* E 1, 1025 b²⁵:

Ar.'s division
of all human
thinking

πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητικὴ.

The *πράττειν* is the province of ethics; it depends on free choice (*προαί-σεσις*). The *ποιεῖν* aims at the realization of a concrete *ἔργον*, technical or artistic. Theoretical thinking has "a kind of being" as its object (*περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστίν*). Now, as this genus may have three different species, theoretical thinking contains three main provinces: *physics*, which deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable; *mathematics*, which has to do with things which are immovable but do not exist separately, and the *first philosophy* (called *metaphysics* by a post-aristotelian term) which deals with things which are both immovable and exist separately.

Ar. expresses this view in the following passage.

b. Ar., *ib.*, 1026 a¹³⁻¹⁸; 18¹⁹:

the three
provinces of
theoretical
thinking

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἕνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως ἄλλ' ὥς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. — "Ὡστε τρεῖς ἂν εἴεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματικὴ, φυσικὴ, θεολογικὴ.

As to the object of mathematics, Ar.'s formula betrays a certain hesitation: in fact, he is rather inclined to regard mathematical objects as an accident of physical things; and it is clear that, in this case, mathematics are rather near to physics. We have to treat this point in our ch. XIII, § 3.

c. Ar., *ib.*, 1026 a¹⁹⁻²³. Ar. continues after the lines cited sub b: a hierarchy of sciences

Ὁὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἰρετώταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν.

the object of
the first
philosophy

d. Ar., *ib.* 1026 a²⁷⁻³²:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δ' ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη ¹· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἥ ὃν ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι, καὶ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ² ἥ ὄν.

We shall consider this conception of metaphysics more closely in our ch. XIV, § 1.

The place
of logic

433—According to Ar. logic has the character of a propaedeusis to all sciences. He calls it τὰ ἀναλυτικά (the term "logic" is of a later date; it is generally used by Stoic writers in the first century), and Ar. thinks it necessary to study this discipline before exercising any science at all.

a. Ar., *Metaph.* Γ 3, 1005 b²⁻⁵:

"Ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν· δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἥκειν προεπισταμένους ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν.

"As to the attempts of some of those who discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted"—

Ar. means that the inquiry into the conditions under which beliefs are to be accepted as true, should not be mixed up with questions about the nature of reality. It belongs to logic, which should be studied before one approaches the questions of being, which belong to metaphysics. Ross supposes that with the τινες τῶν λεγόντων Antisthenes and his school are referred to ³.

ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν - One should not inquire into the formal principles of knowledge which belong to logic while attending lectures on metaphysics.

b. The same principle is displayed in *Metaph.* α 3, 995 a¹²⁻¹⁴:

Διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὥς ἄτοπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης.

Later
division
of phil.

c. Directly after Ar. we find a different division of philosophy. The Stoics take logic as a part of it, dividing philosophy into these three parts: logic, physics (including metaphysics), ethics. See our vol. III.

Logic an
"instrument"

434—Because then logic had the character of an "instrument" for all philosophy and science, the Ancients gave to it the name of *organon*. We find this term used in the following instructive passage of Philoponus.

Philoponus in Ar. *Anal. pr.* 6, 19 Wallies:

Ζητητέον, πότερον μέρος ἐστὶν ἡ ὄργανον ἢ λογικὴ τε καὶ διαλεκτικὴ πραγματεία τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐπεὶ περ ἐναντίως καὶ διαφόρως δοκεῖ τοῖς παλαιοῖς

¹ "And it must be universal in this way, because it is first".

² "And the attributes which belong to it".

³ See the commentary of Ross on this place, *Metaph.* I, p. 263.

περὶ αὐτῆς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωικοὶ ἀντικρὺς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνονται, τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ δύο μέρεσι τῆς φιλοσοφίας αὐτὴν ἀντιδιαίρουσιν· οἱ δὲ Περιπατητικοὶ τουτέστιν οἱ ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους ὄργανον· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ὧν ἔστι καὶ Πλάτων, καὶ μέρος καὶ ὄργανον φαίνονται λέγοντες.

We may see from this fragment, that the author does not consider logic as the *proprium* of Ar. and the Aristotelian spirit: Plato too was a logician, and Ar. built on the foundations which were laid by him.—This view is confirmed by modern scholars.

See: E. Kapp, *Greek Foundations of traditional Logic*, New-York 1942.

Cp. also the interesting study of R. Schaerer, *La dialectique platonicienne dans ses rapports avec le syllogisme et la méthode cartésienne* in *Revue de Théol. et de Phil.* N.S. t. XXXVI, 1948, p. 24-40.

435—a. The centre of Ar.'s logic is his doctrine of the syllogism. The *Organon*
of Ar.
the doctrine
of the
syllogism This term occurs in Plato's *Theaet.* 186 d, our nr. **319b**, in the general sense of *thought* or *reflexion*. Ar. uses it technically in the sense of drawing a conclusion from two theses which have been admitted (premisses). He gives his definition in *An. pr.* I 1, 24 b¹⁸:

Συλλογισμὸς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.

Three of the six works of the *Organon* deal with the syllogism: the prior and posterior *Analytics*, the *Topics*, and as a fourth may be joined to them the *Π. σοφ. ἐλ.*, which is closely connected with the *Topics*.

The interrelation of these works is as follows:

In the *pr. Anal.* the syllogism is defined and its various forms are treated. Abstraction is made of the truth of the premisses, so that the conclusion ought not to be true (This is what Ar. calls the *dialectical syllogism*).

The *post. Anal.* give the doctrine of demonstration: they deal with the apodeictic or scientific syllogism, of which the premisses are true.

The *Topics* are a large collection of arguments, not limited at all to the three main forms of the syllogism, but displaying a great multiplicity of forms. The *Π. σοφ. ἐλ.* is often considered as a part of the *Topics* and cited as the IXth book of them.

b. Brandis¹ already remarked that the *Topics* would have been written very differently, if their author had had in his mind a clear conception of the syllogism. The greater part of this work must be anterior to the doctrine of the *Analytics*. the *Topics*
anterior to
the *Anal.*

This remark has been confirmed by modern critics, such as Fr. Solmsen², P. Gohlke³ and E. Kapp⁴.

¹ Über die Reihenfolge der Bücher des Aristotelischen Organons. Abh. der Berl. Akad. 1833.

² Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik u. Rhetorik, 1929.

³ Die Entstehung der ar. Logik, Berlin 1936.

⁴ Greek Foundations of traditional Logic, New-York 1942.

The latter cites the opening phrase of the *Topics* in order to prove that here the doctrine of the syllogism is not presupposed.

Ar., *Top.* I 1, 100 a¹⁸⁻²¹:

‘Ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὔρεϊν, ἀφ’ ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων, καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες μηθὲν ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον.

Next follows: Πρῶτον οὖν ῥητέον τί ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ τίνες αὐτοῦ διαφοραί, e.q.s. Kapp thinks that this has been added later. It is more probable perhaps that this introductory chapter has been added later by the author and has been adapted by him to the character of the whole work.

the *Categ.* and
π. ‘Ερμ.

c. In the Corpus the *Analytics* are preceded by the *Categories* and the *De interpr.*

The *Categ.* begin with an explanation of the terms *homonymous*, *synonymous* and *paronymous*. Chapters 2 and 3 contain more grammatical than philosophical remarks. Ch. 4 gives the list of the ten categories, which are explained in the following chapters.

The *De interpr.* begins with a definition of nouns and verbs, gives remarks upon simple and compound nouns, on indefinites, on declension and conjugation; next on sentences or propositions (general, particular and indefinite; affirmative or negative, and the like).

Now in traditional logic the doctrine of the syllogism is preceded by a first chapter on terms and a second on propositions. Modern historians of philosophy, however, have pointed out that in Ar.’s *Analytics* the doctrine of the *Categories* and *De interpr.* is not presupposed¹. These works may have been added later.

2—THE CATEGORIES: TERMS

aequivocal

436—a. Ar., *Categ.* I a¹⁻³:

‘Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον.

univocal

b. Ib., I a⁶⁻⁸:

Συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινόν, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς.

derivatively
named

c. Ib., I a¹²⁻¹⁵:

Παρώνομα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπὸ τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοῦ-

¹ Thus E. Kapp in *Gr. Foundations* etc. It seems to me very doubtful whether this thesis is right. W. D. Ross says (*Ar.*, p. 21 f.): “The categories—some or all of them—appear in almost every one of Aristotle’s works, and the doctrine is everywhere treated as something already established”.

νομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

437—*a.* *Ar., Categ. 2, 1 a¹⁶⁻¹⁹:*

Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

uncombined
and
combined
words

b. *Ib. 4, 1 b²⁵⁻² a⁴:*

the ten
categories

Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἦτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρὸς τι ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν· πρὸς τι δὲ οἷον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μεῖζον· ποῦ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ¹, ἐν ἀγορᾷ· ποτὲ δὲ οἷον ἐχθές, πέρυσιν· κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται, κάθεται· ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται· ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνει, καίει· πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεται, καίεται.

The same list occurs in *Top. I 9, 103 b²⁰⁻²³*.

In other places *κεῖσθαι* and *ἔχειν* are omitted; the other eight are cited as forming a complete list. So in *An. post. I 22, 83 b¹⁵⁻¹⁸*. Cp. *Phys. V 1, 225 b⁵⁻⁹*; 2, 226 a²³⁻²⁵.

Ross (*Ar.*, p. 22) remarks: "It seems as if he had later come to the conclusion that posture and possession are not ultimate, unanalysable notions".

In *Top. I 9* instead of *οὐσία* the term *τί ἐστι* is used, both in the sense of *substance* and in that of *essence*. In other places *Ar.* uses in the latter sense the term *τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι*, e.g. *Top. 8, 103 b⁹⁻¹⁰*, where he speaks about the "conversion" or interchange of terms:

Ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ περί τινος κατηγορούμενον ἦτοι ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ πράγματος ἢ μὴ· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, ὅρος ἢ ἴδιον ἂν εἴη· εἰ μὲν γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι, ὅρος, εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει, ἴδιον.

438—*a.* *Ar., Categ. 5, 2 a¹¹⁻¹⁹:*

Substance

Οὐσία δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἢ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινὶ ἐστὶν, οἷον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τις ἵππος. δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσῖαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδουσιν αἱ πρώτως οὐσῖαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσι, ταῦτά τι καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη, οἷον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἵδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῷον· δεύτεραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσῖαι, οἷον ὁ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον.

According to this passage *οὐσία* in its first and proper sense means: *the concrete, individual being*.

Now according to book Z of the *Metaph.* substance is not the individual, but the *τί ἐστι*, i.e. the *essence* or *quiddity*, which is neither purely individual—for it is the intelligible "form" of the concrete being—nor purely universal—for it is bound up with matter. See: A. M. de Vos, *La vraie substance d'après la Métaphysique*

¹ The fact that the Lykeion is mentioned, is used by Jaeger as an argument for the later date of the treatise (*Aristotle*, p 46 n. 3). But cp. Plato, *Euthyd.* 271 a.

d'Aristote (in *Proceedings of the tenth internat. Congress of Phil.*, Amsterdam 1949, p. 1094 ff.). For this reason, S. Mansion (ib., p. 1097 ff.) stating that the doctrine of the *Categ.* is the farthest removed from Plato, infers that this treatise is not authentic, as there is no period in Ar.'s development in which we could place it.

L. M. de Rijk argues against this (in *Mnem.* 1951, p. 148 ff. and in *The Categories of being*, p. 51 f.).

Definitions
of substance
in *Metaph.* Δ

b. Both senses are mentioned in Ar.'s book of definitions: *Metaph.* Δ 8, 1017 b^{10, 21}.

Οὐσία λέγεται τὰ τε ἀπλᾶ σώματα . . . καὶ ὅλως σώματα . . . ὅτι οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται ἀλλὰ κατὰ τούτων τὰ ἄλλα. . . ἔτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὗ ὁ λόγος ὁρισμός, καὶ τοῦτο οὐσία λέγεται ἐκάστου.

the first
sense in two
other places

c. The first sense is also found in *Metaph.* B 6, 1003 a⁷⁻⁹:

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, οὐκ ἔσονται οὐσίαι· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν τόδε τι σημαίνει ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, ἢ δ' οὐσία τόδε τι.

d. It seems to occur again in *Metaph.* Z 13, 1038 b³⁴-1039 a²:

Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων¹ οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων² τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε.

Ar. is proving here that universals are no substances. Yet it would be too rash to conclude that substances are in his final opinion individual things, even when he gives us some reason to make this inference. He is not yet at his final conclusion.

We have to face the question again in dealing with the metaphysics.

Other char-
acteristics
of substance

439—Besides by the definitions, given under 438a, the author characterizes substance by the following three points.

a. Substances never have contraries. *Categ.* 5, 3 b^{24, 25}:

Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μὴδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι.

b. No substance admits of degrees. *Ib.*, 3 b^{33, 34}:

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον.

c. Opposite qualifications can be predicated of it. *Ib.*, 4 a^{10, 11}:

Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταυτὸν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὃν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν.

3—ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ: PROPOSITIONS

440—Ar., *De interpr.* I, 16 a¹⁻⁸:

Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι τί ὄνομα καὶ τί ῥῆμα, ἔπειτα τί ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφανσις καὶ λόγος.

¹ οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων - no universal attribute.

² οὐδὲν τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων - no common predicate.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρῶτως, ταῦτά πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη ταῦτά.

Words are
symbols of
παθήματα

these are
images of
things

In this case a declaration or statement (ἀπόφανσις) does not consist of grasping combinations in reality, but of making combinations of "impressions" (παθήματα) of the soul. These then may be called "notions". But they are ὁμοιώματα of things. A statement will be true when it combines two notions which are an image of two combined elements in reality; it will be untrue in the opposite case. So this passage does not contradict the famous passage in *Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b³ (our nr. 557):

Ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον οἰόμενος διηρηθῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσταὶ δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα.

In the same way ἀληθής and ψευδής λόγος are defined by Plato, *Soph.* 263 b-d (our nr. 343). Ar. builds on the foundation which has been laid by Plato.

441—His definitions of *nomen* and *verbum* are new.

a. Ar., *De interpr.* 2, 16 a¹⁹⁻²¹:

definition
of *noun*

Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ »Κάλλιππος« τὸ »ἵππος« οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ »καλὸς ἵππος«.

According to the definition of λόγος (see our next nr.) in ch. 4, this word does not only indicate a phrase or sentence; it can also indicate a part of it, an "expression" consisting of words which have a meaning separately. Consequently the τῷ before καλὸς ἵππος ought not to be dropped.

b. Ib. 3, 16 b⁶⁻⁸:

verb

Ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς, καὶ ἔστιν αἰ τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον.

442—a. Definition of *logos*. Ib. 4, 16 b²⁶⁻³⁰; 17 a¹⁻⁷.

phrase or
sentence

Λόγος δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικὸν ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις. λέγω δέ, οἶον »ἄνθρωπος« σημαίνει μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐάν τι προστεθῇ. —

Ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, ... ἀποφαντικός δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐν propositions ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει. οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἶον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μὲν, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειότερα ἢ σκέψις· ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικός τῆς νῦν θεωρίας.

b. Ib. 5, 17 a⁸⁻¹².

simple
propositions

Ἔστι δὲ εἷς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικός κατάφασις, εἴτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ'

ἄλλοι πάντες συνδέσμων εἷς. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικὸν ἐκ ῥήματος εἶναι ἢ πτώσεως ῥήματος· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται ἢ τοιοῦτον προστεθῇ, οὕτω λόγος ἀποφαντικός.

affirmation,
negation

c. Ib. 6, 17 a²⁵⁻²⁶:

Κατάφασις δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόφανσις τινος κατὰ τινος, ἀπόφασις δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόφανσις τινος ἀπὸ τινος.

4—THE PRIOR ANALYTICS: THE DOCTRINE OF THE SYLLOGISM

Division of
propositions:
universal,
particular

443—a. Ar., *An. pr.* I 1, 24 a¹⁶⁻²²:

Πρότασις μὲν οὖν ἔστι λόγος καταφατικός ἢ ἀποφατικός τινος κατὰ τινος. οὗτος δὲ ἢ καθόλου ἢ ἐν μέρει ἢ ἀδιόριστος. λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν τὸ παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ τινὶ ἢ μὴ τινὶ ἢ μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἀδιόριστον δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ τὸ τὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν.

I. „Πρότασις est propositio ad conclusionem inde efficiendam praemissa”.

II. The division of propositions into universal and particular is called a division according to quantity. Ar. makes it first in *De interpr.* 7, where he gives the following examples:

(a) Universal propositions:

Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός. — Οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός.

(b) Particular propositions:

Τίς ἄνθρωπος λευκός. } — Οὐκ ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός.
Ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός. }

The division into affirmative and negative propositions, which has been made in *De interpr.* 6, is called in traditional logic a division according to quality.

Traditional scheme:

a. All x is y — Universal affirmative — S a P
e. No x is y — Universal negative — S e P
i. Some x is y — Particular affirmative — S i P
o. Some x is not y — Particular negative — S o P

modality

b. Ar. distinguishes also what is called in traditional logic the modality of propositions. In *De interpr.* 12 (beginning) he mentions:

δυνατὸν καὶ μὴ δυνατὸν

ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον

(what may and may not happen: contingent)

ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.

The same distinction is made in *An. pr.* I 2, 25 a¹⁻²:

assertoric,
apodeictic,
problematic


Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πρότασις ἔστιν ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐνδέχασθαι ὑπάρχειν, —

Again in *An. pr.* I 8, 29 b²⁹⁻³⁰:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, —

c. Between the four kinds of propositions which are mentioned sub a the following relations are possible.

relations
between
propositions



tessara
logica

1. From the truth of the general proposition follows the truth of the subaltern particular ("All men are mortal"—"Some men are mortal"), but not inversely.

In modern terminology the general proposition is also called *superimplicant* to the subaltern particular, while the latter is called *subimplicant* to the former¹.

2. From the untruth of the particular follows the untruth of the subaltern general ("Some Romans are not brave"—"All Romans are not brave"), but not inversely.

3. *Contradictory propositions cannot be both true or both untrue.*

4. *Contrary propositions cannot both be true; they can both be untrue.*

5. *Subcontrary propositions cannot both be untrue; they can both be true.*

The third rule is the fundamental law of thinking, on which all reasoning is built: the *principium contradictionis*.

Principium
contra-
dictionis

Ar. does not formulate it in his *De interpr.*, nor at the beginning of his *Anal.* But the principle itself is presupposed in his whole doctrine of the syllogism. It is mentioned as such in *An. post.* I 11, a chapter which deals with axioms (fundamental theses, which are presupposed without any proof).

444—a. The classical formula of the principium contradictionis is found in *Metaph.* Γ 3, 1005 b¹⁹, ³²:

Τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό. — αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν. — ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὄν-
τινοῦν ταύτῳ ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. — διὸ πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικνύντες
εἰς ταύτην ἀνάγουσιν ἐσχάτην δόξαν.

b. Cp. *An. post.* I 11, 77 a¹⁰⁻¹¹:

Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι οὐδεμία λαμβάνει ἀπόδειξις.

c. *Ib.*, 77 a²²⁻²⁴:

principium
exclusi tertii

Τὸ δ' ἅπαν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξις λαμβάνει. καὶ
ταῦτα οὐδ' αἰεὶ καθόλου, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἱκανόν, ἱκανὸν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ γένους.

¹ Consult: S. Stebbing, *A modern introduction to logic*, London 1948, p. 58 f.

For instance, a mathematician will not say in general that either the affirmation or the negation is true, but that this or that line is straight or not straight.

This is the so-called *principium exclusi tertii*, another formulation of the princ. contradictionis.

apodeictical and dialectical premisses 445—a. *Anal. pr. I 1* continued (24 a²²⁻²⁵):

Διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ἀποδεικτικὴ πρότασις τῆς διαλεκτικῆς, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀποδεικτικὴ λῆψις θατέρου μορίου τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἐστίν (οὐ γὰρ ἐρωτᾷ, ἀλλὰ λαμβάνει ὁ ἀποδεικνύων), ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεως ἐστίν.

This passage shows us which method of reasoning was exercised in the Academy and was called *dialectical* by Ar. A dialogue is carried on by two persons. One of them has the part of questioner, the other that of respondent and opponent. The question dealt with is called πρόβλημα. Every proposition can become a "problem": you have just to give the form of an ἀντίφασις to it: "Is it in this or in that way?" E.g.: "Is two-footed animal the definition of man, or not?" Or: "Is animal the genus of (the species) man, or not?"¹—The simple question "Is two-footed animal the definition of man?" is a proposition. The ἀντίφασις makes a "problem" out of it. Now the questioner makes his partner choose his position: the responder says yes or no. That is: he "grasps one part of the ἀντίφασις". Then the questioner takes the other position. He continues asking. The responder has to see that he does not contradict himself; the questioner tries to get from the answers of his opponent a syllogism for his own thesis.

This, then, is the "reasoning from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us" (συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντός τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων), as it was said in *Tor.* I 1 (cited supra, nr. 435b), for which the author said that he was seeking the right method in that work—a method which, in fact, has been found later in the *An. pr.*

b. The same passage continued (24 a²⁵-b¹²):

Οὐδὲν δὲ διοίσει πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸν ἐκατέρου συλλογισμόν· καὶ γὰρ 25 ὁ ἀποδεικνύων καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν συλλογίζεται² λαβὼν τι κατὰ τινος ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν³. ὥστε ἔσται συλλογιστικὴ μὲν πρότασις⁴ ἀπλῶς κατὰφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις τινος κατὰ τινος τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, ἀποδεικτικὴ δέ, ἐὰν ἀληθὴς 30 ᾖ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεων εἰλημμένη⁵, διαλεκτικὴ δὲ πυνθανομένῳ 24 b μὲν ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεως⁶, συλλογιζομένῳ δὲ λῆψις τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς εἴρηται.

¹ Examples taken from *Tor.* I 4, 101 b²⁸⁻³⁷.

² συλλογίζεται - draws a conclusion.

³ λαβὼν e.g.s. - "by first assuming that some predicate applies or does not apply to some subject" (H. Tredennick).

⁴ συλλογιστικὴ μὲν πρότασις - the premiss of a syllogism.

⁵ διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεων εἰλημμένη - "if it is based on fundamental postulates".—ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεις are unprovable first principles, which are assumed in science: axioms or postulates. Ar. defines them in *An. post.* I 2, 72 a¹⁴.

⁶ ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεως - a question to his partner, which of the two possibilities propounded to him the latter will accept.

A definition of *proof* and *dialectical syllogism* is given in *Top.* I 1, directly after the definition of *syllogism*. We have to cite it later.

446—*An. pr.* I 1, 24 b₁₈₋₁₈:

"Ὅρον δὲ καὶ εἰς δὲ διακρίβεται ἢ πρότασις, ὅλον τὸ τε κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸ καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται, ἢ προστιθεμένου ἢ διαρπουμένου τοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.

447—*a.* Ib., 24 b₁₈₋₂₂:

Συλλογισμὸς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἔτερον τι τῶν κεκλιμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν τὸ μηδὲν ἔξωθεν ὅπου προσεῖν πρός τὸ γέεσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

Nearly the same definition occurs in *Top.* I 1.

b. Ib., 24 b₂₂₋₂₆:


Τέλειον μὲν οὖν καλῶ συλλογισμὸν τὸν μηδὲν ἄλλου προσδεόμενον παρὰ εἰρημμένα πρός τὸ φανῆναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀτελὴ δὲ τὸν προσδεόμενον ἢ ἐνός ἢ πλείων, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ἀναγκαῖα διὰ τῶν υποκειμένων ὅρων, οὐ μὴν εἰληπτὰ διὰ ποσάων.

I.e.: when the premisses have been formulated incompletely, so that something must be added in order to make the form of the syllogism complete.

c. Ib., 14 b₂₆₋₃₀:

Τὸ δὲ ἐν ὅῳ εἶναι ἔτερον ἔτερόν καὶ τὸ κατὰ πᾶντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι ὁύτεον ὅατερον ταῦτόν ἐστιν. λέγωμεν δὲ τὸ κατὰ πᾶντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι, ὅταν μὴδὲν ἢ λαβεῖν τῶν τοῦ υποκειμένου, καθ' οὗ ὁύτερον οὐ λέχθησεται. καὶ τὸ κατὰ μὴδὲν ὅς.

An example of τὸ ἐν ὅῳ εἶναι: All men are mortal. Represented in a diagram:



448—*An. pr.* I 2, 25 a₁₋₁₃:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πρότασις ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, τοῦτων δὲ αἱ μὲν καταφατικαὶ αἱ δὲ ἀποφατικαὶ καθ' ἐκαστὴν πρόσρρησιν, πάλιν δὲ τῶν καταφατικῶν καὶ ἀποφατικῶν αἱ μὲν καὶ ἀνάγκη τοῖς ὅροις ἀντιστρέφειν, ὅλον εἰ μὴδεμία ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἄγαθόν οὐδὲν ἔσται ἡδονή. τὴν δὲ κατηγορικὴν ἀντιστρέφειν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον,

Conversion
of terms

Perfect and
imperfect
syllogisms

Syllogism
defined

term defined

"To be wholly
contained in"

οὐ μὴν καθόλου ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἷον εἰ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι ἡδονήν· τῶν δὲ ἐν μέρει τὴν μὲν καταφατικὴν ἀντιστρέφειν ἀνάγκη κατὰ μέρος 10 (εἰ γὰρ ἡδονὴ τις ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν τι ἔσται ἡδονή), τὴν δὲ στερητικὴν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ὑπάρχει τινὶ ζῳῳ, καὶ ζῳον οὐχ ὑπάρχει τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.

On the modal, qualitative and quantitative division of premisses, see *supra*, 443a, b.

τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν καθόλου etc. - "It is necessary that in universal attribution the negative premiss should be convertible in its terms".—In these and the following lines rules are given for the conversion of terms in assertoric premisses (ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν) ¹.

τὴν δὲ κατηγορικὴν - the (assertoric) affirmative premiss.

In ch. 3 rules are given for the conversion of terms in apodeictic and problematic premisses.

Figures and
moods of
syllogism

449—*An. pr.* I 4, 25 b²⁶-26 a².

Kapp ² writes on this passage:

"It is one of the most impressive passages in Aristotle's writings, unsurpassed in its proud objectivity, when after careful preparation he introduces his syllogistical principle, which has predetermined the history of logic for more than two thousand years".

Syllogism
and proof

a. 25 b²⁶⁻³⁰:

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγομεν ἤδη διὰ τίνων καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς γίνεται 26 πᾶς συλλογισμός· ὕστερον δὲ λεκτέον περὶ ἀποδείξεως. πρότερον δὲ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ λεκτέον ἢ περὶ ἀποδείξεως διὰ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον εἶναι τὸν συλλογισμὸν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδείξεις συλλογισμός τις, ὁ συλλογισμός δὲ οὐ πᾶς 30 ἀπόδειξις.

Cp. *Top.* I 1, 100 a²²⁻³³: 'Απόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ³ ὁ συλλογισμός ᾗ, — διαλεκτικός δὲ συλλογισμός ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογισζόμενος ("which draws its conclusion from probable premisses").

We shall see proof more precisely defined in the *An. post.*

The first
Figure

b. 25 b³²-26 a²:

"Ὅταν οὖν ὅροι τρεῖς οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥστε τὸν ἔσχατον ἐν 32 ὅλῳ εἶναι τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸν μέσον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πρώτῳ ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἄκρων εἶναι συλλογισμὸν τέλειον. καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν δ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ 35 καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν, δ καὶ τῇ θέσει γίνεται μέσον· ἄκρα δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὅν καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἄλλο ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Β καὶ τὸ Β κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ κατηγορεῖσθαι· πρότερον

Barbara

¹ The above sentence might be translated also as: "The assertoric universal negative premiss is necessarily convertible in its terms".

² *Gr. Foundations* etc., p. 66.

³ πρώτων is defined in *An. post.* I 2 as ἐξ ἀρχῶν οἰκείων.

40 γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς τὸ κατὰ παντὸς λέγομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν A κατὰ μη- *Celarent*
 26 a δενὸς τοῦ B, τὸ δὲ B κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ὅτι τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει.

Instance of a syllogism of the first Figure:

Example

All men are mortal — (propositio) maior — πρότασις μείζων.
 Kings are men — " minor — " ἐλάττων.
 Therefore Kings are mortal — conclusio — συμπεράσμα.

Each syllogism contains three terms:

the 3 terms

τὰ ἄκρα (the extremes), namely

τὸ πρῶτον (ἄκρον), which is called τὸ μείζων (terminus maior),

τὸ ἔσχατον (ἄκρον), which is called τὸ ἐλάττων (terminus minor),

and τὸ μέσον (middle term, terminus medius), which occurs in both premisses but not in the conclusion.

The minor extreme (kings) is the subject of the conclusion (S),


the major extreme (mortal) is the predicate (P).

The middle term is indicated by M.

So S must be wholly contained in M, and M must be wholly contained in P. **First mood:**

Scheme: $\begin{array}{l} M a P \\ S a M \\ \hline S a P \end{array}$

Diagram:



Barbara

Or M must be excluded from P.


Second mood:

Instance: No man is sincere
 Philosophers are men
 Therefore etc.

Celarent

Scheme: $\begin{array}{l} M e P \\ S a M \\ \hline S e P \end{array}$

Diagram:



c. Two other modes are possible, namely *aii* and *eio* (second premiss particular), which are called by the names *Darii* and *Ferio*.

d. Ar. concludes his exposition of the First Figure thus (ib. 26 b²⁸⁻³³):

8, 29 Δῆλον δὲ . . . ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ συλλογισμοὶ τέλειοί εἰσι. — καὶ ὅτι
 31 πάντα τὰ προβλήματα δείκνυται διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος· καὶ γὰρ τὸ παντὶ
 καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ καὶ τὸ τινὶ καὶ τὸ μὴ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν. καλῶ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα
 33 πρῶτον.

Second
Figure450—a. *An. pr.* I 5, 26 b³⁴-27 a³:


"Όταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ μὲν παντὶ τῷ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχη, ἢ ἑκατέρῳ παντὶ ἢ μηδενί, τὸ μὲν σχῆμα τὸ τοιοῦτον καλῶ δεῦτερον, μέσον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ λέγω τὸ 35 κατηγορούμενον ἀμφοῖν, ἄκρα δὲ καθ' ὧν λέγεται τοῦτο, μεῖζον δὲ ἄκρον τὸ πρὸς τῷ μέσῳ κείμενον, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ πορρωτέρω τοῦ μέσου. τίθεται δὲ τὸ μέσον ἔξω μὲν τῶν ἄκρων, πρῶτον δὲ τῇ θέσει. τέλειος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔσται 27 a συλλογισμὸς οὐδαμῶς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, δυνατὸς δ' ἔσται καὶ καθόλου καὶ μὴ καθόλου τῶν ὄρων ὄντων.

Instance of this figure:
(*camestres*)

Every living being moves	<i>a</i>
No stone moves	<i>e</i>
No stone is a living being	<i>e</i>

Scheme: $\begin{array}{c} P M \\ S M \\ \hline S P \end{array}$

Diagram:

b. In this figure there will be only negative syllogisms. *Ib.* 28 a⁷⁻⁹:

Δῆλον δὲ . . . ὅτι οὐ γίνεται καταφατικὸς συλλογισμὸς διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος, ἀλλὰ πάντες στερητικοί, καὶ οἱ καθόλου καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος.

Third
Figure451—a. *An. pr.* I 6, 28 a¹⁰⁻²⁰:

Ἐὰν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν παντὶ τὸ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχη, ἢ ἄμφω παντὶ ἢ μηδενί, 10 τὸ μὲν σχῆμα τὸ τοιοῦτον καλῶ τρίτον, μέσον δ' ἐν αὐτῷ λέγω καθ' οὗ ἄμφω τὰ κατηγορούμενα, ἄκρα δὲ τὰ κατηγορούμενα, μεῖζον δ' ἄκρον τὸ πορρωτέρω τοῦ μέσου, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἐγγύτερον. τίθεται δὲ τὸ μέσον ἔξω μὲν τῶν ἄκρων, ἔσχατον δὲ τῇ θέσει. τέλειος μὲν οὖν οὐ γίνεται συλλογισμὸς οὐδ' ἐν 15 τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, δυνατὸς δ' ἔσται καὶ καθόλου καὶ μὴ καθόλου τῶν ὄρων ὄντων πρὸς τὸ μέσον. καθόλου μὲν οὖν ὄντων, ὅταν καὶ τὸ Π καὶ τὸ P παντὶ τῷ Σ ὑπάρχη, ὅτι τινὲς τῷ P τὸ Π ὑπάρξει ἐξ ἀνάγκης.


Darapti

Instance of this figure:

Every seal is a marine animal	<i>a</i>
Every seal has lungs	<i>a</i>
Some marine animals have lungs	<i>i</i>

Scheme: $\begin{array}{c} M P \\ M S \\ \hline S P \end{array}$

Diagram:



b. In this figure will occur only particular syllogisms. Ib., 29 a¹⁴⁻¹⁸:

Φανερόν δὲ . . . ὅτι συλλογίσασθαι τὸ καθόλου διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος οὐκ ἔσται, οὔτε στερητικὸν οὔτε καταφατικόν.

452—The principal rules of the syllogism have been formulated explicitly by Ar. in the later chapters of the same book. Rules of the syllogism

a. *An. pr.* I 25, 41 b³⁶⁻³⁷:

Δήλον δὲ . . . ὅτι πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις ἔσται διὰ τριῶν ὅρων καὶ οὐ πλειόνων. three terms
required for
demonstration

b. Ib., 42 a³²⁻³³:

Τούτου δ' ὄντος φανεροῦ δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐκ δύο προτάσεων καὶ οὐ πλειόνων· οἱ γὰρ τρεῖς ὅροι δύο προτάσεις. two
premisses
required

c. *An. pr.* I 32, 47 a³⁹-b⁶:

the middle
term in both
premisses

39 Ἀνάγκη . . . τὸ μέσον ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ὑπάρχειν (sc. ταῖς προτάσεσιν) ἐν
ἀπασι τοῖς σχήμασιν. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν κατηγορῇ¹ καὶ κατηγορῇται τὸ μέσον,
47 b ἢ αὐτὸ μὲν κατηγορῇ, ἄλλο δ' ἐκείνου ἀπαρνῇται, τὸ πρῶτον ἔσται σχῆμα·
ἐὰν δὲ καὶ κατηγορῇ καὶ ἀπαρνῇται ἀπὸ τινος, τὸ μέσον². ἐὰν δ' ἄλλα ἐκείνου
κατηγορῇται, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀπαρνῇται τὸ δὲ κατηγορῇται, τὸ ἔσχατον³. οὕτω
5, 6 γὰρ εἶχεν ἐν ἐκάστῳ σχήματι τὸ μέσον.

d. *An. pr.* I 24, 41 b⁶⁻¹³:

In every
syllogism
one premiss
must be
affirmative,
and one
universal

6 Ἐτι τε ἐν ἅπαντι (sc. συλλογισμῶ) δεῖ κατηγορικόν⁴ τινὰ τῶν ὅρων εἶναι
καὶ τὸ καθόλου ὑπάρχειν· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός, ἢ
οὐ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον⁵ ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτήσεται⁶. Κεῖσθω γὰρ τὴν μουσικὴν
10 ἡδονὴν εἶναι σπουδαίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀξιώσειεν⁷ ἡδονὴν εἶναι σπουδαίαν, μὴ
προσθεῖς τὸ »πᾶσαν«, οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός· εἰ δὲ »τινὰ ἡδονήν«, εἰ μὲν
ἄλλην, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ κείμενον, εἰ δ' αὐτὴν ταύτην, τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει⁸.

453—Syllogisms of the second and third figures are to be controlled by reducing them to the first.

¹ ἐὰν κατηγορῇ - if it is a predicate.

² τὸ μέσον - you have the middle figure.

³ τὸ ἔσχατον - then you will have the third figure.

⁴ κατηγορικόν - affirmative.

⁵ οὐ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον - the conclusion will be unrelated to the assumption.

⁶ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖσθαι - *petere id quod ab initio ad demonstrandum propositum est*; what is called a *petitio principii*. See our nr. 454.

⁷ ἀξιώσειεν - If we postulate or assume.

⁸ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει - there is a *petitio principii*.

All imperfect
syllogisms
are validated
in the first
figure

a. *An. pr.* I 7, 29 a³⁰⁻³⁹:

Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἀτελεῖς συλλογισμοὶ τελειοῦνται διὰ τοῦ 30
πρώτου σχήματος. ἡ γὰρ δεικτικῶς ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου περαίνονται πάντες ¹.
ἀμφοτέρως δὲ γίνεται τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα, δεικτικῶς μὲν τελειουμένων, ὅτι
διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς ² ἐπεραίνοντο πάντες, ἢ δ' ἀντιστροφή τὸ πρῶτον ἐποίει
σχῆμα, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου δεικνυμένων, ὅτι τεθέντος τοῦ ψευδοῦς ὁ συλλο- 35
γισμὸς γίνεται διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος, οἷον ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ σχήματι,
εἰ τὸ A καὶ τὸ B παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει, ὅτι ³ τὸ A τινὶ τῷ B ὑπάρχει. εἰ γὰρ
μηδενί, τὸ δὲ B παντὶ τῷ Γ, οὐδενί τῷ Γ τὸ A. ἀλλ' ἦν παντί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

39

In the second and third figures syllogisms are reduced to the first "by means of conversion", i.e. by transposing the terms of one of the premisses. E.g. in a syllogism of the form

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} M P \\ M S \end{array} \right.$ (third figure) the terms of the second premiss should be converted.

We then get a syllogism of the form $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} M P \\ S M \end{array} \right.$ (first figure).

Every de-
monstration
reducible to
the first
figure

b. *An. pr.* I 23, 41 b¹⁻⁵.

In the preceding passage Ar. has spoken of the procedure of hypothetical proof. Now in this case too a demonstration is to be reached by proving some proposition syllogistically. Ar. continues:

Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ πάντα συλλογισμὸν ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι b
διὰ τριῶν τῶν προειρημένων σχημάτων. τούτου δὲ δειχθέντος δῆλον ὡς ἅπας
τε συλλογισμὸς ἐπιτελεῖται διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος καὶ ἀνάγεται εἰς τοὺς
ἐν τούτῳ καθόλου συλλογισμούς.

5

Petito
principii

454—*An. pr.* II 16, 64 b²⁸⁻⁶⁵ a⁴:

Τὸ δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἔστι μὲν, ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν ⁴, ἐν 28
τῷ μὴ ἀποδεικνύναι τὸ προκείμενον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐπισυμβαίνει πολλαχῶς· καὶ
γὰρ εἰ ὅλως μὴ συλλογίζεται, καὶ εἰ δι' ἀγνωστοτέρων ἢ ὁμοίως ἀγνώστων, 31
καὶ εἰ διὰ τῶν ὑστέρων τὸ πρότερον· ἡ γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἐκ πιστοτέρων τε καὶ
προτέρων ἐστίν. τούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἀλλ'
ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν δι' αὐτῶν πέφυκε γνωρίζεσθαι τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλων (αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ 35
δι' αὐτῶν, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς δι' ἄλλων), ὅταν μὴ τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ γνωστὸν
δι' αὐτοῦ τις ἐπιχειρῇ δεικνύναι, τότε αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι μὲν

¹ περαίνονται πάντες - all the conclusions are reached.

δεικτικῶς - by demonstration.

ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου - or by reduction ad impossibile.

² διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς - by means of conversion.

³ ὅτι - we get a syllogism to the effect that —.

⁴ ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν - to take the expression in its widest sense.

οὕτω ποιεῖν ὥστ' εὐθὺς ἀξιῶσαι τὸ προκείμενον, ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ μεταβάνας
 40 ἐπ' ἄλλα ἅττα τῶν πεφυκότων δι' ἐκείνου δεικνυσθαι διὰ τούτων ἀποδεικνύναι
 65 α τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον εἰ τὸ Α δεικνύοιτο διὰ τοῦ Β τὸ δὲ Β διὰ τοῦ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ
 πεφυκὸς εἶη δεικνυσθαι διὰ τοῦ Α· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτὸ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ Α δεικνύναι
 4 τοὺς οὕτω συλλογιζομένους.

Strictly speaking there is *petitio principii* when the conclusion is included in one of the premisses.

455—*a*. *Top.* I 12, 105 a¹³⁻¹⁹:

Induction

Ἐπαγωγή δ' (ἐστίν) ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος, οἷον
 εἰ ἔστι κυβερνήτης ὁ ἐπιστάμενος κράτιστος καὶ ἡνίοχος, καὶ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁ
 ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ἕκαστον ἄριστος. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγή πιθανώτερον καὶ
 σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν¹,
 ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον² καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον.

b. It is clear from the preceding passage, that induction, by which we conclude a general law from a number of particular cases, is no syllogism. Yet *Ar.* treats it as a kind of syllogism in the following passage.

An. pr. I 23, 68 b¹⁵⁻³⁷:

15 Ἐπαγωγή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου³ dealt with
 θάτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ συλλογίσασθαι⁴, οἷον εἰ τῶν ΑΓ μέσον τὸ Β, διὰ τοῦ by *Ar.* as a
 Γ δεῖξαι τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ ποιούμεθα τὰς ἐπαγωγάς. οἷον ἔστω kind of
 20 τὸ Α μακρόβιον, τὸ δ' ἐφ' ᾧ Β τὸ χολὴν μὴ ἔχον, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ Γ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον syllogism
 μακρόβιον, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος καὶ ἡμίονος. τῷ δὲ Γ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ
 Α· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἄχολον μακρόβιον⁵. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Β, τὸ μὴ ἔχον χολὴν, παντὶ
 ὑπάρχει τῷ Γ. εἰ οὖν ἀντιστρέφει τὸ Γ τῷ Β καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνει τὸ μέσον⁶,
 25 ἀνάγκη τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν· δέδεικται γὰρ πρότερον ὅτι ἂν δύο ἅττα τῷ αὐτῷ
 ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πρὸς θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀντιστρέφῃ τὸ ἄκρον, ὅτι τῷ ἀντιστρέφοντι
 καὶ θάτερον ὑπάρξει τῶν κατηγορουμένων⁷. δεῖ δὲ νοεῖν τὸ Γ τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων
 29 τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον συγκείμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπαγωγή διὰ πάντων.

¹ κοινόν - accessible.

² βιαστικώτερον - has more force to overcome opposition.

³ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου - by one extreme term, sc. the minor extreme, namely concrete cases.

⁴ συλλογίσασθαι - establishing a relation between the other extreme and the middle term.

⁵ This remark is a *petitio principii*. Tredennick has seen rightly that these words cannot be attributed to *Ar.* Ross explains them by suggesting that a copyist has substituted ἄχολον for Γ.

⁶ εἰ μὴ ὑπερτείνει τὸ μέσον - if the middle term is not wider in extension.

⁷ Constr. θάτερον τῶν κατηγορουμένων - the other predicate.

"Ἔστι δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος συλλογισμὸς τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀμέσου προτάσεως· ὦν μὲν 30 γὰρ ἔστι μέσον διὰ τοῦ μέσου ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὦν δὲ μὴ ἔστι, δι' ἐπαγωγῆς. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀντίκειται ἡ ἐπαγωγή τῷ συλλογισμῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἄκρον τῷ τρίτῳ δείκνυσιν, ἡ δὲ διὰ τοῦ τρίτου τὸ ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ. φύσει μὲν οὖν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συλλογισμὸς, 35 ἡμῖν δ' ἐναργέστερος ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.

"This kind of syllogism is concerned with the first or immediate premiss" (I. 30).

Ar. means to say that induction supplies, without the aid of a middle term, the universal proposition which may stand as major premiss of a demonstrative syllogism. Concretely speaking: by means of some special cases (man, horse and mule) the universal proposition is established.:

Every bileless animal is long-lived.

Now this proposition might be used as the major of the following demonstrative syllogism:

Every bileless animal is long-lived

Man, horse and mule have no bile

Therefore: man, horse and mule are long-lived.

Induction is clearer for us, Ar. says, because it starts from observation; but objectively speaking—φύσει—the syllogism, which proceeds deductively, from the universal to the particular, is clearer and "more knowable".

By his theory of induction Ar. has given an answer to the question which has been left open in the *Pr. Anal.*: How do we get our first premisses?—Consequently we might expect that he would introduce induction as another means of getting knowledge next to the syllogism. In fact, induction has this meaning in *An. post.* I 18 and 31 (vid. infra). Cp. also *An. post.* II 19.—On the other hand, if induction is treated as a syllogism, it is a bad kind of syllogism, and therefore its conclusions cannot be true. For this reason then only the syllogism is treated by Ar. in his doctrine of demonstration, while induction is dealt with in the book on *dialectical* syllogism.

Induction
non-demon-
strative but
dialectical

c. In this sense we have to understand Ar. when he says, in *An. pr.* II 23, 68 b¹⁴:

"Ἀπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἡ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς.

5—THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS: THE DOCTRINE OF DEMONSTRATION

The student's
need of
pre-existing
knowledge

456—a. *An. post.* I 1, 71a¹⁻¹¹:

Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ¹ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται α γνώσεως. φανερόν δὲ τοῦτο θεωροῦσιν ἐπὶ πασῶν· αἱ τε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου παραγίνονται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τεχνῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οἱ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' 5 ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν,

¹ διανοητική - "by means of discursive thinking", as opposed to the intuitive "seeing" of the νοῦς.

οἱ μὲν ¹ λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ ² δεικνύοντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συμπεύθουσιν·
 10 ἢ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων ³, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐπαγωγή, ἢ δι' ἐνθυμημάτων ⁴, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός.

b. Ib., 71 a¹¹⁻¹⁶:

Its nature

Διχῶς δ' ἀναγκαῖον προγινώσκειν· τὰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι ἐστὶ ⁵, προὑπολαμβάνειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ τί τὸ λεγόμενον ἐστὶ ⁶, ξυνιέναι δεῖ, τὰ δ' ἄμφω, οἷον ὅτι μὲν ἅπαν ἢ φῆσαι ἢ ἀποφῆσαι ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἐστὶ ⁷, τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον, ὅτι τοδὶ σημαίνει ⁸, τὴν δὲ μονάδα ἄμφω, καὶ τί σημαίνει καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶν.

457—a. *An. post.*, I 2, 71 b⁹⁻¹²:

Knowledge

Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἴομεθ' ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἴωμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐστὶν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστὶ, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν.

Real knowledge is according to Ar.: (1) knowledge of the causes; (2) knowledge of the necessary, where we can see that it cannot be otherwise. So also in *Metaph.* A 1-2.

In *An. post.* II 1 Ar. says: We can ask ourselves four kinds of questions, namely: τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἐστὶ καὶ τί ἐστὶν. Now the knowledge of the simple fact (τὸ ὅτι) is, according to Ar., not yet true knowledge. We then have to know the διότι, and in such a way, that we see that the thing cannot be otherwise.

The last point means that knowledge in the strict sense of the word is only possible of what is necessary, not of the contingent. See our next cited passage.

b. Ib., I 33, 88 b³⁰⁻³⁵:

Τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν. ἐστὶ δὲ τινα ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ ὄντα, ἐνδεχόμενα δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι περὶ μὲν ταῦτα ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἐστὶν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν τὰ δυνατὰ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

¹ οἱ μὲν e.q.s. - "In the first case (i.e. with syllogism) we take premisses supposing that they are known and accepted by our opponent".

² οἱ δὲ - "In the other case (i.e. with induction) the universal is exhibited through the fact that the particular is clear".

³ The instance infers the particular from the particular, and therefore is called by Ar. an imperfect form of induction, by which the universal is inferred from the particular (See *An. pr.* II 24).

⁴ In *An. pr.* II 27 enthymema is defined as a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs.

⁵ ὅτι ἐστὶ - "that the matter in question exists", i.e.: the fact must be assumed.

⁶ τί τὸ λεγόμενον ἐστὶ - "the meaning of the term used".

⁷ "E.g. to say that in every question truth lies in the affirmation or negation, that is to assume the fact" (First case).

⁸ Second case: the meaning of the term.

458—a. Ib. I 2, 71 b¹⁶⁻²⁵:

demonstration

Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τρόπος, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν ¹, φημὲν ¹⁶ δὲ καὶ δι' ἀποδείξεως εἰδέναι. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ λέγω συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστημονικόν. ἐπιστημονικὸν δὲ λέγω καθ' ὃν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα. εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν ²⁰ τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου ². συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ τούτων, ἀπόδειξις δ' οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην.

25

Its conditions examined

b. The same passage continued (71 b²⁵-72 a⁵):

1. The premisses must be true.

Ἀληθῆ μὲν οὖν δεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὃν ἐπίστασθαι, οἷον ὅτι ἡ διά- ²⁵ μετρος σύμμετρος ³.

2. They must be primary and indemonstrable.

Ἐκ πρώτων δ' ἀναποδείκτων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιστήσεται μὴ ἔχων ἀπόδειξιν αὐ- ²⁶ τῶν· τὸ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ὧν ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὸ ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν ἐστίν.

3. They must be the causes of the conclusion, better known than it, and prior to it.

Αἰτία τε καὶ γνωριμώτερα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ πρότερα, αἰτία μὲν ὅτι τότε ἐπι- ²⁹ στάμεθα ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδῶμεν, καὶ πρότερα, εἴπερ αἰτία, καὶ προγινωσκόμενα οὐ μόνον τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον τῷ ξυνιέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ εἰδέναι ⁴ ὅτι ἔστιν.

What is meant by "prior" and "better known".

Πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμώτερα διχῶς· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν πρότερον τῇ φύσει ³³ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον, οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον. λέγω ^{72 a} δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ πορρώτερον. ἐστὶ δὲ πορρωτάτα μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα· καὶ ἀντίκειται ταῦτ' ⁵ ἀλλήλοις.

Cp. *Metaph.* Δ II, 1018 b³²⁻³⁴: Κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν λόγον τὰ καθόλου πρότερα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

¹ He means: knowledge of the first, non-demonstrated principles. The question is dealt with in I 3, I 10, and most of all in II 19. See our nrs. 459, 460 and 465.

² "Unless these conditions are satisfied, the basic truths will not be appropriate to the conclusion" (G. R. G. Mure).

³ "that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its side" would be a μὴ ὄν, and as such it cannot be the object of demonstration.

⁴ Not only in the second sense mentioned in 456b, namely that of understanding the term used, but also in the first sense: that of knowledge of the fact.

459—"The premisses must be primary and immediate", i.e. not deducible from other premisses. This leads directly to the question how we can know our first premisses and whether there is another kind of knowledge which does not depend on demonstration. Ar. states first that we have to start necessarily from indemonstrable first principles.

First
principles
indemon-
strable

An. post. I 3, 72 b⁵⁻⁷, 18-25:

- 5 Ἐνίοις μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ δεῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπίστασθαι οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, τοῖς δ' εἶναι μὲν, πάντων μέντοι ἀποδείξεις εἶναι. —
18 Ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμεν οὔτε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν
20 ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον. καὶ τοῦθ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, φανερόν· εἰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἵσταται δὲ ποτε τὰ ἄμεσα, ταῦτ' ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ταῦτά τ' οὖν οὕτω λέγομεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον
25 ἐπιστήμην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τινὰ φαμεν, ἥ τοὺς ὅρους γνωρίζομεν.

Ar. means that beside demonstrative science there exists a higher and more fundamental science, which precedes demonstration, namely the intuitive knowledge of the first principles (*ἀρχαί*) by the *noûs*.

460—Ar. deals with first principles in chapters 10 and 11 of *An. post.* I.

a. *An. post.* I 10, 76 a³¹⁻³²:

Λέγω δ' ἀρχὰς ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει¹ ταύτας ἃς ὅτι ἔστι μὴ ἐνδέχεται δεῖξαι.

First
principles
defined

b. *Ib.*, 76 a^{37-b16}:

Ἔστι δ' ὧν χρῶνται ἐν ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις τὰ μὲν ἴδια ἐκάστης ἐπιστήμης τὰ δὲ κοινά, κοινὰ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ἐπεὶ χρήσιμόν γε ὅσον ἐν τῷ
40 ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γένει². ἴδια μὲν οἷον γραμμὴν εἶναι τοιανδί, καὶ τὸ εὐθύ³, κοινὰ δὲ οἷον τὸ ἴσα ἀπὸ ἴσων ἂν ἀφέλῃ, ὅτι ἴσα τὰ λοιπά. ἱκανὸν δ' ἕκαστον
76 b τούτων ὅσον ἐν τῷ γένει· ταῦτό γὰρ ποιήσει, κἂν μὴ κατὰ πάντων λάβῃ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν μόνον, τῷ δ' ἀριθμητικῷ ἐπ' ἀριθμῶν.

What are
special
ἀρχαί?

Ἔστι δ' ἴδια μὲν καὶ ἃ λαμβάνεται εἶναι⁴, περὶ ἃ ἡ ἐπιστήμη θεωρεῖ τὰ

¹ ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει - in every branch of science.

² What Ar. means by the analogous character of the κοινά, is clear from the example given *infra*: "Take equals from equals and equals remain". This rule can only be applied "in the genus which constitutes the province of the science in question"; e.g. geometrical magnitudes cannot be subtracted from numbers, nor numbers from geometrical magnitudes. But "the geometer may apply it to magnitudes and the arithmetician to numbers"; i.e. magnitudes can be subtracted from magnitudes, and numbers from numbers.

³ γραμμὴν εἶναι τοιανδί κ. τὸ εὐθύ - the definitions of line and straight.

⁴ ἃ λαμβάνεται εἶναι - sc. by the special sciences.

ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτά ¹, οἷον μονάδας ἢ ἀριθμητική, ἢ δὲ γεωμετρία σημεῖα καὶ 5
 γραμμάς. ταῦτα γὰρ λαμβάνουσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοδὶ εἶναι. τὰ δὲ τούτων πάθη ¹
 καθ' αὐτά, τί μὲν σημαίνει ἕκαστον, λαμβάνουσιν, οἷον ἢ μὲν ἀριθμητικὴ τί
 περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον ἢ τετράγωνον ἢ κύβος, ἢ δὲ γεωμετρία τί τὸ ἄλογον ἢ τὸ
 κεκλᾶσθαι ἢ νεύειν ², ὅτι δ' ἔστί, δεικνύουσι διὰ τε τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν 10
 ἀποδεδειγμένων. καὶ ἡ ἀστρολογία ὡσαύτως. πᾶσα γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη
 περὶ τρία ἐστίν, ὅσα τι εἶναι τίθεται (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ γένος, οὗ τῶν καθ'
 αὐτὰ παθημάτων ἐστὶ θεωρητική), καὶ τὰ κοινὰ λεγόμενα ἀξιώματα, ἐξ ὧν
 πρώτων ³ ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ τρίτον τὰ πάθη, ὧν τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον λαμβάνει. 15

In the next paragraph Ar. qualifies these three elements shortly as *περὶ ὅ τε δείκ-*
νυσι καὶ ἃ δεικνύσι καὶ ἐξ ὧν, i.e. the subject of the demonstration (*περὶ ὅ*), its
 object (*ἃ*), and its basis or starting-point (*ἐξ ὧν*).

Thesis,
 hypothesis
 and axiomata

461—Not all things which are assumed without demonstration are
 called by Ar. *axiomata*. He speaks of *θέσεις*, *ὑποθέσεις* and *ἀξιώματα*.

Thesis is what is accepted without proof as basis of a demonstration.
Theseis are of two kinds: (1) those which posit the meaning of a term
 (τί σημαίνει). These are definitions (*ὀρισμοί*). (2) Those which posit also
 the existence of the matter. These are *hypotheses*.

Axioms are truths which intrude upon the mind. They include existence,
 but differ from hypotheses by being known from themselves and by
 being absolutely necessary for whomsoever wishes to learn anything.

An. post. I 2, 72 a¹⁴⁻¹⁷:

Ἀμέσου δ' ἀρχῆς συλλογιστικῆς θέσιν μὲν λέγω ἣν μὴ ἔστι δεῖξαι μηδ'
 ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν μαθησόμενόν τι. ἣν δ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν μαθησόμενον,
 ἀξίωμα.

From this definition of axiom appears clearly that Ar. does not only think of
 mathematical axioms, such as "Take equals from equals" etc., but also of the
 universal laws of logic: the *principium contradictionis* and *exclusi tertii*. We found
 supra (nr. **444b, c**) that they are mentioned in *Ar. post.* I 11.

See on Ar.'s doctrine of first principles: Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 43 ff.

¹ *περὶ ἃ ἡ ἐπιστήμη θεωρεῖ* - the subjects, the existence as well as the meaning
 of which the science in question assumes, and the essential attributes (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα
 καθ' αὐτά) of which it investigates. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are called later in the same
 passage τὰ πάθη.

² τὸ κεκλᾶσθαι ἢ νεύειν - "deflection or verging of lines". "κλᾶσθαι is used of
 a straight line deflected at a line or surface; νεύειν is used of a straight line tending
 to pass through a given point when produced" (W. D. Ross, *Comm. in An. post.*,
 p. 539).

³ ἐξ ὧν πρώτων ἀποδείκνυσι - "which are the primary premisses of its demon-
 stration".

462—According to Ar. strict science knows not only the fact, but also the cause. Now practically a science often does not know the causes. In this case the science which knows both the facts and the causes is “more precise and prior” to that which only knows the facts. And generally the more abstract science is to be ranked higher than that which studies a more concrete object.

A hierarchy
of sciences

An. post. I 27, 87 a³¹⁻³⁷:

Ἀκριβεστέρα δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα ἢ τε τοῦ ὅτι καὶ διότι ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι, καὶ ἡ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου¹, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ ἀρμονικῆς, καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως², οἷον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητικῆς. λέγω δ' ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον μονὰς οὐσία ἄθετος, στιγμὴ δὲ οὐσία θετός³. ταύτην ἐκ προσθέσεως.

We shall find the same ideas again in the opening chapters of *Metaph.* A.

463—In ch. 31 of the same book Ar. deals with the question whether science can be reached by sense-perception. As we might expect from his treatment of induction in *An. pr.* II 23, he answers this question in the negative. Strictly speaking the syllogism is in his opinion the only means by which knowledge can be acquired by man. This chapter, however, must be compared with *An. post.* I 18, if we want to understand rightly the author's view of the function of sense-perception with regard to knowledge.

Science and
sense-
perception

a. *An. post.* I 18, 81 a^{38-b} 9:

Sense-
perception
a necessary
condition to
acquiring
knowledge

38 Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλελοιπέναι, ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει. 40 ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος. 81 b ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως

¹ A science is μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου when it studies νοητά and ψυλά (e.g. arithmetic); it is καθ' ὑποκειμένου when it is concerned with concrete objects (αἰσθητά καὶ ὕλικά). Thus harmonics consider numerical relations ἐν ταῖς χορδαῖς.

² ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων is a science which starts from less undemonstrated principles; i.e. which studies simpler entities. Such a science is, Ar. says, more exact and therefore prior to those sciences which study more complex entities and therefore have to assume more “theses” or “hypotheses”. E.g. arithmetic is prior to geometry, which adds the principles of extension to those of number.

³ The unit is οὐσία ἄθετος: “substance without position”, while the point is οὐσία θετός: “substance with position”.

λεγόμενα ¹ ἔσται δι' ἐπαγωγῆς ὑπόκριμα ποιεῖν, ὅτι ὑπάρχει ἐκαστῷ ῥέλει ² εἶνα ³, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἡχοριστῶ ἔσται, ἢ τοιονδὶ ἕκαστον. ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας ⁴ αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστημὴν. οὕτε ῥὰ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἀνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, οὕτε δι' ἐπαγωγῆς ἀνευ τῆς αἰσθησεως.

"It is also clear that the loss of any of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge".—"This sentence indicates the existence of a certain necessary relation between sense-perception and knowledge: the former is a necessary condition to acquiring the latter, for it procures (indirectly) the universals by induction. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*. Cp. the larger exposition of II 19 (our nr. 465). The position of *An. pr.* II 23 is sustained: knowledge of the particular is not possible. Therefore, science is only of the universal and by demonstration. But to the question "How do we come to knowledge of the universal?" Ar. answers clearly: by induction. And this is only possible by sense-perception.

b. *An. post.* I 31, 87 b²⁸-88 a⁸.

In the preceding chapter the author has stated that no science can be acquired by chance conjunctions. He now continues:

No
knowledge
through
sense-
perception

Οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθησεως ἔστιν ἐπιστασθαι, εἰ ῥὰ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ αἰσθησις τοῦ τοιονδὲ ²⁸ καὶ μὴ τοῦδὲ τινος, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαι γε ἀναγκαῖον τοδὲ τι καὶ πῶν καὶ πῶν. ³⁰ τὸ δὲ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι. οὐ ῥὰρ τοδὲ οὐδὲ πῶν. ³⁵ οὐ ῥὰρ ἀν ἡν καθόλου. τὸ ῥὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καθόλου φαμέν εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὐν αἰ μὲν ἀποδείξεῖς καθόλου, ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι, φανερόν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐπιστασθαι δι' αἰσθησεως ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἡν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ ³⁵ ἑρμῶν ὅτι διὐν ὁρθαῖς ῥσας ἔχει τὰς ῥωνας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἀν ἀποδείξιν καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ φασὶ τινας ἡπιστάμεθα. αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν ῥὰρ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἕκαστον, ⁴⁰ ἡ δ' ἐπιστημὴ τῷ τὸ καθόλου ῥωρῖξιν ἔσται. διὸ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ σεληνῆς ὄντας ἐρωτῶμεν ἀντιφρόδῃτουςαν τὴν ῥῆν, οὐκ ἀν ἡδέμεν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐκείσεως. ⁴⁵ ἡσθάνεμεθα ῥὰρ ἀν ὅτι πῶν ἐκλείπει, καὶ οὐ διότι ῥσας. οὐ ῥὰρ ἡν τοῦ καθόλου ⁴⁸ αἰσθησις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ θεωρεῖν τοῦτο πολλαῖς συβῆσιν τοῦ καθόλου ἀν ἡρεσάντας ἀποδείξιν ἐλχοῦμεν. ἐκ ῥὰρ τῶν καὶ ἕκαστα παλαιοῦν τοῦ καθόλου δῆλον. τὸ δὲ καθόλου τίμιον, ὅτι δῆλόν τὸ αἰτίον. ὥστε περὶ τῶν τοιοντῶν ἡ ⁵

¹ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα - By these "products of abstraction" the objects of mathematics are meant. In opposition to Plato and the Pythagoreans Ar. considers them not as existing καὶ ἄντλ (separate entities), but as properties of sensible objects. They can be isolated only by abstraction and thus constitute the subjects of mathematical demonstration. Cp. *De anima* III 7, 431 b¹²⁻¹⁹.
² E.g. line or solid.
³ εἶνα - certain properties which can be treated as separate though they are not χωριστά.

καθόλου τιμιωτέρα τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς νοήσεως ¹, ὅσων ἕτερον τὸ αἷτιον ².
περὶ δὲ τῶν πρώτων ἄλλος λόγος.

The end of the passage refers to II 19, where knowledge of non-demonstrated first principles is dealt with.

See on Ar.'s theory of induction: L. Robin, *Aristote*, p. 56 ff., where the instance of the eclipse is cited in order to prove that in Ar.'s opinion "induction is alien to science" (*L'induction est étrangère à la Science*);—a thesis which is right in this sense that induction in itself is no demonstration and therefore does not lead *in itself* to science. It would be wrong, however, if it were taken in the sense that induction has *nothing to do with* science. The above-cited passage clearly shows that such was not the opinion of Ar., and so does the final chapter of the *An. post.* (II 19), with which we have to deal in our nr. 465.

464—The second book of the *An. post.* is concerned with definition. As we found before, of the four questions man can ask himself that of the ὅτι is preliminary to that of the διότι. In the same way that of the εἰ ἔστι leads on to that of the τί ἔστι.

Answering the last question is defining a thing. But true definition is not only nominal (e.g. eclipse is στέρησις φωτός); it has to mention also the cause (στέρησις φωτός ἀπὸ σελήνης ὑπὸ γῆς ἀντιφράξεως). In this sense then A. can say that the τί ἔστι and the διὰ τί are one and the same (*An. post.* II 2, 90 a¹⁵).

a. As we have seen supra, definitions belong, according to Ar., to the first principles, which are assumed in the sciences without proof. Definitions
first
principles

An. post. II 3, 90 b²⁴⁻²⁵, 30-33:

Αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ὀρισμοί, ὧν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται ἀποδείξεις δέδεικται πρότερον ³. —

Ὅρισμός μὲν γὰρ τοῦ τί ἔστι καὶ οὐσίας· αἱ δ' ἀποδείξεις φαίνονται πᾶσαι ὑποτιθέμεναι καὶ λαμβάνουσιν τὸ τί ἔστιν, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τί μόνας καὶ τί τὸ περιττόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ὁμοίως.

b. Nominal and causal definitions distinguished. Nominal and
causal
definitions

Ib. II 10, 93 b²⁹⁻³², b³⁸⁻⁹⁴ a⁷:

29 Ὅρισμός δ' ἐπειδὴ λέγεται εἶναι λόγος τοῦ τί ἔστι, φανερόν ὅτι ὁ μὲν τις
ἔσται λόγος τοῦ τί σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος ἕτερος ὀνοματώδης ⁴, οἷον τί
32 σημαίνει [τί ἔστιν] τρίγωνον.

¹ What is called here νόησις anticipates the exposition of II 19, where grasping the universal from a multiplicity of concrete *data* is attributed to the *noûs*, a faculty which surpasses discursive thinking.

² περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὅσων - in the case of facts like these which have a cause other than themselves.

³ Our nr. 459.

⁴ λόγος ἕτερος ὀνοματώδης - an equivalent nominal formula.

"Ἄλλος δ' ἐστὶν ὁρος λόγος ὁ δηλῶν διὰ τί ἐστίν. ὥστε ὁ μὲν πρότερος σημαί- 38
νει μὲν, δείκνυσσι δ' οὐ, ὁ δ' ὕστερος φανερόν ὅτι ἔσται οἷον ἀπόδειξις τοῦ τί 94 a
ἐστίν, τῇ θέσει¹ διαφέρων τῆς ἀποδείξεως. διαφέρει γὰρ εἰπεῖν διὰ τί βροντᾶ
καὶ τί ἐστὶ βροντή· ἐρεῖ γὰρ οὕτω μὲν² διότι ἀποσβέννυται τὸ πῦρ ἐν τοῖς
νέφεσι· τί δ' ἐστὶ βροντή; ψόφος ἀποσβεννυμένου πυρὸς ἐν νέφεσιν. ὥστε ὁ 5
αὐτὸς λόγος ἄλλον τρόπον λέγεται, καὶ ὧδὲ μὲν ἀπόδειξις συνεχῆς³, ὧδὲ δὲ
ὀρισμός.

Parts of the
definition

c. The formula that definition proceeds *per genus et differentiam* (*specificam*) is not in the *Analytics*, but in the *Topica*.

Top. I 8, 103 b¹⁵:

Ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν ἐστίν.

465—The final chapter of the *An. post.* deals with the question of how we come to the apprehension of first principles.

the
apprehension
of first
principles

An. post. II 19, 99 b¹⁷-100 b¹⁷:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν, πῶς τε γίνονται γνῶριμοὶ καὶ τίς ἡ γνῶρίζουσα ἕξις,
ἐντεῦθεν ἐστὶ δῆλον προαπορήσασιν πρῶτον⁴.

Difficulties

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπίστασθαι δι' ἀποδείξεως μὴ γινώσκοντι τὰς 99 b³
πρώτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀμέσους, εἰρηται πρότερον. τῶν δ' ἀμέσων τὴν γνῶσιν,
καὶ πότερον ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστίν ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ, διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, καὶ πότερον ἐπι-
στήμη ἐκατέρου⁵ ἢ οὐ, ἢ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δ' ἕτερόν τι γένος, καὶ πότερον
οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι αἱ ἕξεις ἐγγίνονται ἢ ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἔχομεν αὐτάς, 25
ἄτοπον⁶. συμβαίνει γὰρ ἀκριβεστέρας ἔχοντας γνώσεις ἀποδείξεως λανθάνειν.
εἰ δὲ λαμβάνομεν μὴ ἔχοντες πρότερον, πῶς ἂν γνῶρίζοιμεν καὶ μανθάνοιμεν
ἐκ μὴ προϋπαρχούσης γνώσεως; ἀδύνατον γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως 30
ἐλέγομεν. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐτ' ἔχειν οἷον τε, οὐτ' ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ μηδεμίαν
ἔχουσιν ἕξιν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μὲν τινα δύναμιν, μὴ τοιαύτην δ'
ἔχειν ἢ ἔσται τούτων τιμιωτέρα κατ' ἀκρίβειαν. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο γε πᾶσιν
ὑπάρχον τοῖς ζώοις. ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικὴν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἰσθησιν. 35
Ἐνούσης δ' αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζώων ἐγγίνεται μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθημάτος,

Solution

First stage:
αἰσθησις

¹ τῇ θέσει - in the arrangement of its terms.

² οὕτω μὲν - in the first case.

³ "Demonstration, like a line, is continuous, because its premisses are parts which are conterminous (as linked by middle terms), and there is a movement from premisses to conclusion. Definition resembles rather the indivisible simplicity of a point" (G. R. G. Mure).

⁴ προαπορήσασιν πρῶτον - by raising some preliminary problems.

⁵ πότερον ἐπιστήμη ἐκατέρου - whether there is scientific knowledge of both, sc. as well of the primary premisses as of demonstrative knowledge.

⁶ ἄτοπον - it leads to impossible consequences.

- τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἐγγίνεται. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίνεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ περὶ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐγγίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γνώσις ἕξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς δ', ἔνεστιν αἰσθανομένοις
- 00 a ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γινομένων ἡδὴ διαφορά τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μὴ.
- 3 Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν.
- 6 Ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἡ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.
- 10 Οὕτε δὴ ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀφωρισμένοι¹ αἱ ἕξεις, οὐτ' ἀπ' ἄλλων ἕξεων γίνονται γνωστικωτέρων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, οἷον ἐν μάχῃ τροπῆς γενομένης ἐνὸς στάντος ἕτερος ἔσται, εἴθ' ἕτερος, ἕως ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν ἤλθεν². ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὕσα οἷα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο.
- 15 "Ὁ δ' ἐλέχθη μὲν πάλαι, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη, πάλιν εἴπωμεν. στάντος γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἐνός³, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου (καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' αἰσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὐ καλλίου ἀνθρώπου) πάλιν ἐν τούτοις ἵσταται, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀμερῇ στῇ καὶ τὰ καθόλου⁴, οἷον τοιονδὶ ζῶον, ἕως ζῶον· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως⁵. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ.
- 00 b Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν αἰεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ δ' αἰεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ⁶, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἕκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν
- 15 ἄλλο παρ' ἐπιστήμην γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. καὶ

Second
stage:
μνήμη

Third stage:
ἐμπειρία

Fourth stage:
τέχνη
and
ἐπιστήμη

Knowledge
of primary
premisses
by induction

Intuition
apprehends
the primary
premisses

¹ οὕτε - ἀφωρισμένοι: these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor —.

² ἕως - ἤλθεν: until the original formation has been restored.

³ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἐνός - one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars.

⁴ τὰ ἀμερῇ - καὶ τὰ καθόλου: "the indivisible concepts, the true universals", i.e. the categories, which are *par excellence* universal and are indivisible because not constituted of genus and differentia. Cp. *Metaph.* M 8, 1084 b¹⁴; Δ 25, 1023 b²⁴ (Note of G. R. G. Mure).

⁵ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως - "which by the same process is a step towards a further generalization" (Mure).

⁶ μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ: "and all scientific knowledge is discursive" —.

ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν, ἡ δὲ πᾶσα ὁμοίως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα¹.

From this passage it is clear, (1) that indeed in Ar.'s opinion sense-perception is at the basis of all human knowledge (the scholastic adagium: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*. Cp. Kant, the opening sentence of the Kr. d. r. V.: "Dass alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfangt, daran ist gar kein Zweifel";

(2) that knowledge is reached only by the function of a higher intellectual faculty, which he calls *noûs* (the *intellectus agens* of the scholastics). This faculty grasps directly the intelligible, which is one, out of the multiplicity of sense data.

Two remarks must be made in this place.

I. When we ask the question how the *noûs* can do this, Ar. answers: *The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process*. Which means: he traces this function back to the organization of the human mind. Now by this acknowledgement what is called an *apriori*-element is introduced in Ar.'s theory of knowledge.

II. It is not sufficiently clear from the above passage that, according to Ar.'s doctrine, the intelligible appears only at the fourth stage of the process of knowledge. Between *μνήμη* and *ἐμπειρία* he speaks of a *logos* which arises out of the persistence of sense-impressions. By no means could this term be translated here by "notion", a notion being reached, according to Ar.'s account, only after experience, "when the universal has come to rest within the soul", being "one beside the many", and "residing as an identity in all the particular subjects".

Instead of the word *logos*, which is used by Ar. somewhat vaguely in 100 a², he uses later (in the *De anima*) the term *phantasma*, which indicates the sensible image resulting from sense-perception by memory. In this way Thomas Aquinas says: "Phantasma est intelligibile in potentia", and: "Abstrahit intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus"².

III. A third remark must be added. In 100 b¹⁻³ Ar. speaks very shortly of that process of generalization, which he calls elsewhere *ἀφαίρεσις*. Mathematical abstraction, which is called "abstraction of the second degree" by scholastics, is dealt with in two passages of the *De anima*, namely II 6, 418 a⁷⁻²⁵ and III 1, 425 a¹³⁻²⁰. See our chapter XVI, § 2, nr. 641.

6—THE TOPICS AND DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS

Topica **466**—We had to cite the *Topics* several times in dealing with the *Analytics*. On the general character of the work see our nr. 435a, b.

De soph. el. **467**—The Π. σοφ. ἐλ. deals with fallacies.

a—*De soph. el.* I 1, 164 a²⁰⁻²²:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων μὲν ἐλέγχων ὄντων δὲ παραλογισμῶν ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐλέγχων λέγωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων.

¹ ἡ δὲ πᾶσα - πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα: "while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact" (Mure).

² S. Th. I 85, 1, ad 4.

Καὶ adds a defining expression.

b. Ib., 164 b²⁷-165 a⁴:

What are
ἐλεγχοί

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστὶ τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἕτερόν τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων, ἔλεγχος δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ' ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος. οἱ δὲ ¹ τοῦτο ποιοῦσι μὲν οὐ, δοκοῦσι δὲ διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας.

468—Ar. divides them into two main groups: (1) the *sophismata in dictione* (παρὰ ² τὴν λέξιν), where the deceitfulness appears in the form; (2) *sophismata extra lectionem* (ἔξω τῆς λέξεως), where the fallacy can be seen only when the contents is regarded.

a. *De soph. el.* I 4, 165 b²³⁻²⁴:

Two main
groups

Τρόποι δ' εἰσὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐλέγχειν δύο· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἱ δ' ἔξω τῆς λέξεως.

b. Ib., b ²⁴⁻²⁷:

Sophismata
in dictione

Ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ² ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν φαντασίαν ἐξ τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία, ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσωδία, σχῆμα λέξεως.

Ar. explains them in the following pages (165 b³⁰-166 b²⁰).

(1) *Equivocation*: ambiguity in a word. When a term is used in a double sense in a syllogism, this syllogism has not three but four terms (*quaternio terminorum*), which is a breach of one of the first rules of the syllogism.

(2) *Amphiboly*: ambiguity in a sentence, e.g. when we cannot see which word is subject and which is object.

(3) *Composition*: when words are wrongly combined, e.g. "A man can walk while sitting, and can write while not writing".

(4) *Division*: by wrong separation of the words. E.g. 5 is 2 and 3.

(5) *Accent*: wrong interpretation of written words by changing the accent, e.g. pronouncing οὐ in stead of οὔ.

(6) *Figura dictionis*: misunderstanding caused by the grammatical form of a word, e.g. a masculine word with a female ending, etc.

c. Ib., 166 b²¹⁻²⁷:

Extra
dictionem

Τῶν δ' ἔξω τῆς λέξεως παραλογισμῶν εἶδη ἐστὶν ἑπτὰ, ἐν μὲν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἢ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρὸς τι λέγεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, πέμπτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸ μὴ αἷτιον ὡς αἷτιον τιθεῖναι, ἑβδομον δὲ τὸ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν.

¹ sc. the sophists.

² An analogy with the expression σοφίσματα παρὰ τὴν λέξιν might be found in *Metaph.* E 4, 1027 b¹⁹: τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν καὶ μὴ ὂν ὡς ψεῦδος, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ σύνθεσιν ἐστὶ καὶ διαίρεσιν,—("since they depend upon"—).

These fallacies are explained in ch. 5.

(1) *Accidens*: whenever any attribute is claimed to belong in a like manner to a thing and to its accident. E.g.: "If Coriscus be different from "man", he is different from himself: for he is a man".

(2) *A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*: whenever an expression used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely. E.g.: "If what is not is the object of an opinion, then what is not is".

(3) *Ignoratio elenchi*: to give a merely apparent refutation, e.g. by contradicting not really the same attribute but merely the name, or by proving that the attribute cannot be predicated of the subject, but not in the same respect and in the same way in which it was asserted.

(4) *Consequens*: whenever people suppose that the relation of consequens is convertible. E.g. bile is supposed to be honey because honey is attended by a yellow colour; also, since after rain the ground is wet in consequence, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has been raining.

(5) *Petitio principii*: assumption of the original point to be proved.

(6) *Non causa pro causa*: whenever what is not a cause is inserted in the argument as though the refutation depended on it. I.e.: people try to refute a thesis by refuting a premiss which had not been assumed as such.

(7) *Facere ex pluribus interrogationibus unam*: whenever the plurality is undetected and a single answer is returned as if to a single question. E.g., when part is good and part bad, "Is the whole good or bad?"

Some instances of σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι may be found in our nr. 197.

THIRTEENTH CHAPTER

ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

I—INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

469—Ar.'s philosophy of nature is not only found in his physical treatises (*Phys.*, *De caelo*, *De gen. et corr.*, *Meteor.*), in which anorganic nature is treated of, but also in those which deal with organic nature, the biological works. Nature is, according to Ar., principle of motion. Now the theory of motion is expounded by Ar. in his *Phys.*, and books I and II of this work, forming a general introduction to this theory, are at the same time a philosophical introduction to the whole of Ar.'s physical and biological works. On the other hand, the general philosophical principles, which have been expounded in the introductory books of the *Physics*, can be illustrated not only by the cosmological theory of the *De caelo*, by the theory of generation and passing away of beings and their qualities in *De gen. et corr.* and by that of atmospheric phenomena in the *Meteor.*; they can as well be commented on by numerous passages from the biological works. As A. Mansion put it in his excellent *Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne*: "Aristote se commente excellemment lui-même".

Philosophical
unity of
Ar.'s works
on nature

That this whole group of treatises was conceived by Ar. as a unity, can be seen from the introduction to the *Meteorologica*:

Meteor. I 1, 338 a²⁰-b²², 339 a⁵-10.

20 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ πάσης κινήσεως
φυσικῆς, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄνω φορὰν διακεκοσμημένων ἄστρον καὶ
περὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν σωματικῶν, πόσα τε καὶ ποῖα, καὶ τῆς εἰς ἄλληλα
μεταβολῆς, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς κοινῆς εἴρηται πρότερον. λοιπὸν
25 δ' ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης ἔτι θεωρητέον, ὃ πάντες οἱ πρότερον μετεωρο-
λογίαν ἐκάλουν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ἀτακτοτέραν
μέντοι τῆς τοῦ πρώτου στοιχείου τῶν σωμάτων, περὶ τὸν γειννιῶντα μάλιστα
τόπον τῇ φορᾷ τῶν ἄστρον. — (Follows an enumeration of this kind of pheno-
mena: the Milky Way, comets and shooting stars, ἀέρος κοινὰ πάθη καὶ ὕδατος,
9a5 winds and earthquakes etc.). Διελθόντες δὲ περὶ τούτων, θεωρήσωμεν εἴ τι
δυνάμεθα κατὰ τὸν ὑψηλῆς τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι περὶ ζῳῶν καὶ φυτῶν,

καθόλου τε καὶ χωρὶς· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ῥηθέντων τέλος ἂν εἴη γεγονὸς τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν προαιρέσεως πάσης. ὧδ' οὖν ἀρξάμενοι λέγωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν πρώτων.

10

**Division of
the Physics**

The opening sentence of this passage (Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς — εἴρηται πρότερον) points to a division of the *Phys.* into two parts: (1) *on the causes* (bb. I and II), (2) *on motion* (bb. III-VIII). The distinction is not so clearly made by the ancient commentators. It has been re-established by A. Mansion.

2—THE FIRST BOOK OF THE PHYSICS

**Introductory
chapter**

470—*Phys.* I 1, 184 a¹⁰-b¹⁴:

Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὡς εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἰτίαι ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόμεθα γινώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἰτία γνωρίσωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς¹.

15

Πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἀπλῶς². Διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφέστερων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. Ἔστι δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα³. Διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα δεῖ προῖέναι. Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστίν· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου⁴.

Πέπονθε δὲ ταῦτό τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ὅλον γὰρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἶον ὁ κύκλος· ὁ δὲ ὀρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Καὶ τὰ παιδιά τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἄνδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὕστερον δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἑκάτερον.

**One ἀρχή
or many?**

471—a. *Phys.* I 2, 184 b¹⁵⁻²²:

Ἀνάγκη δ' ἥτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ πλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἥτοι ἀκίνητον, ὡς φησι Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος, ἢ κινουμένην, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοί, οἱ μὲν ἀέρα φάσκοντες εἶναι οἱ δ' ὕδωρ τὴν πρώτην ἀρχὴν· εἰ δὲ πλείους, ἢ πεπερασ-

¹ The principle that we can only be said to have knowledge if we know the causes of a phenomenon, is more than once repeated by Ar. Cp. *Metaph.* A 1, where the difference between ἐμπειρία and τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη is marked in this way, that the first knows only the ὅτι, the latter also the διότι.

² ἀπλῶς - absolutely.

³ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα - "if we analyse them".

⁴ "For the universal comprehends many things within it, like parts".

μένας ἢ ἀπείρους, καὶ εἰ πεπερασμένους πλείους δὲ μιᾶς, ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ τέ-
20 ταρας ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ ἀριθμόν, καὶ εἰ ἀπείρους, ἢ οὕτως ὥστερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ
γένος ἓν, σχήματι δὲ ἢ εἶδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας.

b. Ib., 184 b²⁵-185 a⁵; ib., a¹²⁻¹⁴:

The Eleatic
thesis
excluded

Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἐν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὃν σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι σκοπεῖν.
185 a ὥστερ γὰρ καὶ τῷ γεωμέτρῃ οὐκέτι λόγος ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀνελόντα τὰς ἀρχάς,
ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἐτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν κοινῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ περὶ ἀρχῶν· οὐ
γὰρ ἔτι ἀρχὴ ἐστίν, εἰ ἐν μόνον καὶ οὕτως ἓν ἐστίν. Ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν ¹.—

Ἡμῖν δ' ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δ' ἐκ
τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ².

472—a. Ib., 185 a²⁰-b⁵:

Refutation
of the Eleatic
thesis ex
parte entis

20, 21 Ἀρχὴ δὲ οἰκειοτάτη πασῶν, ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὃν, ἰδεῖν πῶς
λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἶναι ἐν τὰ πάντα, πότερον οὐσίαν τὰ πάντα ἢ ποσὰ ἢ
ποιά, καὶ πάλιν πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἓνα ἢ ἵππον
25 ἓνα ἢ ψυχὴν μίαν, ἢ ποιὸν ἐν δὲ τοῦτο, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι
τῶν τοιούτων. Ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα διαφέρει τε πολὺ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγειν. Εἰ μὲν
γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιόν, καὶ ταῦτα εἴτ' ἀπολελυμένα ἀπ'
30 ἀλλήλων εἴτε μὴ, πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα. Εἰ δὲ πάντα ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, εἴτ' οὐσης οὐσίας
εἴτε μὴ οὐσης, ἄτοπον, εἰ δεῖ ἄτοπον λέγειν τὸ ἀδύνατον. Οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων
χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· πάντα γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς οὐσίας
λέγεται. Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ ὃν ἄπειρον εἶναι φησιν. Ποσὸν ἄρα τι τὸ ὃν· τὸ γὰρ
185 b ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, οὐσίαν δὲ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἢ ποιότητα ἢ πάθος οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ ἅμα καὶ ποσὰ ἅττα εἶεν· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀπείρου λόγος
τῷ ποσῷ προσχρῆται, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν καὶ οὐσία
5 ἐστὶ καὶ ποσόν, δύο καὶ οὐχ ἐν τὸ ὃν· εἰ δ' οὐσία μόνον, οὐκ ἄπειρον, οὐδὲ
μέγεθος ἔξει οὐδέν· ποσὸν γὰρ τι ἔσται.

b. Ib., 185 b⁵⁻²⁵:

Refutation
ex parte
unius

5, 6 Ἐτι ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν πολλαχῶς λέγεται ὥστερ καὶ τὸ ὃν, σκεπτέον τίνα
τρόπον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἐν τὸ πᾶν. Λέγεται δ' ἐν ἢ τὸ συνεχές ἢ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ
ὦν ὁ λόγος ³ ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἷς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὥστερ μέθυ καὶ οἶνος. Εἰ μὲν
10 τοίνυν συνεχές, πολλὰ τὸ ἐν· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ διαιρετὸν τὸ συνεχές.

Ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἴσως δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ⁴

¹ I.e.: an inquiry into principles—or into *the* first principle—always presupposes
a multiplicity.

² Which means: Ar. starts from the concrete reality of movement. A hypothesis
which destroys this elementary fact has no sense.

³ λόγος - definition, essence.

⁴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον - relevant to the present argument.

ἀλλ' αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν, πότερον ἐν ἡ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ πῶς ἐν ἡ πλείω, καὶ εἰ πλείω, πῶς πλείω, καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῶν μὴ συνεχῶν· καὶ εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ ἐν ἐκάτερον ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. 15

Ἄλλὰ μὴν εἰ ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, οὐθὲν ἔσται ποσὸν οὐδὲ ποιόν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἄπειρον τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ Μελισσός φησιν, οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης· τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀδιαίρετον, οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν εἰ τῷ λόγῳ ἐν τὰ ὄντα πάντα ὡς λώπιον¹ καὶ ἱμάτιον, τὸν Ἡρα- 20 κλείτου λόγον συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς· ταῦτόν γὰρ ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀκαθόν, ὥστε ταῦτόν ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀκαθόν καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, καὶ οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ὁ λόγος ἔσται αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μηδέν, καὶ τὸ τοιῶδι εἶναι καὶ τοσῶδι ταῦτόν². 25

Anaxagoras
criticized

473—Having refuted the Eleatic hypothesis, Ar. examines the opinions of older physicists about the principles of physical bodies. Anaxagoras is discussed rather amply (ch. 4). He too admits, as Democritus did, an infinite number of first principles. To this thesis Ar. opposes the remark that the infinite cannot be known. There are several difficulties with the doctrine of Anaxagoras. Ar. concludes that it is better to assume

A finite
number of
principles
should be
assumed

Phys. I 4, 188 a¹⁷⁻¹⁸:

Βέλτιόν τε ἐλάττω καὶ πεπερασμένα λαβεῖν, ὅπερ ποιεῖ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

474—Another correct view of the ancient physicist is, that opposites should be assumed as ἀρχαί. This is done e.g. by those who explained the genesis of the elements by rarefaction and condensation (we know this of Anaximenes, and it is said of Heraclitus too), even by Parm., who assumed two principles relative to the world of doxa, and by Democr. in his doctrine of the πλήρες καὶ κενόν.

Opposite
principles
should be
assumed

Phys. I 5, 188 a²⁶⁻³⁰:

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τάναντία πως πάντες ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς, δῆλον. Καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως· δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχάς μῆτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι μῆτε ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πάντα· τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, διὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτα εἶναι μὴ ἐξ ἄλλων, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐναντία μὴ ἐξ ἀλλήλων.

How many
ἀρχαί?

475—A pair of opposites, however, is not sufficient. A third principle should be added, namely a subject, somewhat as the substratum of the contraries.

¹ λώπιον - raiment.

² "There will be no difference between quality and quantity".

a. *Phys.* I 6, 189 a²¹-b³:Three
principles
necessary

- 21 'Επει δὲ πεπερασμένοι, τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· ἀπορήσειε
γὰρ ἂν τις πῶς ἢ ἡ πυκνότης τὴν μανότητα ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν ἢ αὕτη τὴν
πυκνότητα. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὅποια οὖν ἐναντιότης· οὐ γὰρ ἡ φιλία τὸ
25 νεῖκος συνάγει καὶ ποιεῖ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ νεῖκος ἐξ ἐκείνης, ἀλλ' ἄμφω
ἕτερόν τι τρίτον. Ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ πλείω λαμβάνουσιν ἐξ ὧν κατασκευάζουσιν
τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι καὶ τόδε τις ἀπορήσειεν, εἰ μὴ τις
ἐτέραν ὑποτίθῃσι τοῖς ἐναντίοις φύσιν· οὐθενὸς γὰρ ὀρῶμεν τῶν ὄντων οὐσίαν
30 τάναντία¹. Τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου δεῖ λέγεσθαι τινος. Ἔσται
γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἀρχή, καὶ πρότερον δοκεῖ τοῦ κατη-
γορουμένου εἶναι. Ἐτι οὐκ εἶναι φαμεν οὐσίαν ἐναντίαν οὐσίᾳ². πῶς οὖν ἐκ
μὴ οὐσίῶν οὐσία ἂν εἴη; ἢ πῶς ἂν πρότερον μὴ οὐσία οὐσίας εἴη;
- 35 Διόπερ εἰ τις τὸν τε πρότερον ἀληθεῖ νομίσειεν εἶναι λόγον καὶ τοῦτον, ἀναγ-
189 b καῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασώσειν ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς, ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον, ὥσπερ
φασὶν οἱ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι λέγοντες τὸ πᾶν, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ
τούτων.

Ar. seems here to come near to the conception of the older physicists—*not* Emped.—who admitted some primary element and then differentiated it by rarefaction and condensation. We shall see, however, in the following chapters that his own theory is elaborated in a very different way.

b. Rejection of any theory of four elements.

Ib., 189b¹⁹⁻²⁷:

- 19, 20 Εἰ δὲ τεττάρων ὄντων δύο ἔσονται ἐναντιώσεις, δεήσει χωρὶς ἐκατέρας
ὑπάρχειν ἐτέραν τινὰ μεταξὺ φύσιν· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀλλήλων δύνανται γεννᾶν δύο οὔσαι,
περίεργος ἂν ἢ ἐτέρα τῶν ἐναντιώσεων εἴη. Ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον πλείους
εἶναι ἐναντιώσεις τὰς πρώτας. Ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἓν τι γένος ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε
25 τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ γένει·
ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ γένει μία ἐναντιώσις ἐστίν, πᾶσαι τε αἱ ἐναντιώσεις ἀνάγεσθαι
δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν.

Not four

476—Ar. now begins to expound his own theory of the principles of “becoming” in the broadest sense. He introduces three principles: *the form* (εἶδος), *privation of the form* (στέρησις), and a *subject* (ὑποκείμενον) or matter (ὕλη). These three principles occur in every form of production.

The three
principles

¹ See the definition of οὐσία in *Categ.* 5, 2 a¹¹⁻¹³ (our nr. 438a).

² *Categ.* 5, 3 b²⁵ (439a).

First the distinction is made between "becoming" in the absolute sense (ἀπλῶς) and "becoming this or that". The first is the coming-into-being of substances, e.g. ἄνθρωπος γίγνεται or τὸ μὴ μουσικόν (what is called in scholastic terminology *generatio simpliciter*), the latter the arising of a certain determination of a subject which already existed (*generatio secundum quid*), e.g. τὸν μὴ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον γίγνεσθαι μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον. Now in all these cases, Ar. says, there is always some pre-existing subject.

1. The
ὑποκείμενον

a. *Phys.* I 7, 190 a³¹-b¹⁰:

Πολλαχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τόδε 31
τι γίγνεσθαι, ἀπλῶς δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν οὐσιῶν μόνων, κατὰ μὲν τὰλλα φανερόν
ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑποκεῖσθαι τι τὸ γιγνόμενον· καὶ γὰρ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν καὶ πρὸς
ἕτερον καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ποῦ γίνεται ὑποκειμένου τινὸς διὰ τὸ μόνην τὴν οὐσίαν 35
μηθενὸς κατ' ἄλλου λέγεσθαι ὑποκειμένου, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας·
ὅτι δὲ καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀπλῶς ὄντα ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς γίνεται, 190 b
ἐπισκοποῦντι γένοιτ' ἂν φανερόν. 'Αεὶ γὰρ ἔστι τι ὃ ὑποκεῖται, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται
τὸ γιγνόμενον, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐκ σπέρματος. Γίγνεται δὲ τὰ γιγνό-
μενα ἀπλῶς τὰ μὲν μετασχηματίζει, οἷον ἀνδριάς ἐκ χαλκοῦ, τὰ δὲ προσθέσει, 5
οἷον τὰ αὐξανόμενα, τὰ δ' ἀφαιρέσει, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ λίθου ὃ 'Ερμῆς, τὰ δὲ συνθέσει,
οἷον οἰκία, τὰ δ' ἁλλοιώσει, οἷον τὰ τρεπόμενα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Πάντα δὲ τὰ
οὕτω γινόμενα φανερόν ὅτι ἐξ ὑποκειμένων γίνεται. 10

It can not
always be
directly
known

b. We may not conclude from this passage that, according to Ar., the ὑποκείμενον can always be directly stated. At the end of the same chapter he tells us that, sometimes, it can be known only κατ' ἀναλογίαν.

Ib., 191 a⁷⁻¹²:

'Η δ' ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατ' ἀναλογίαν. 'Ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸς ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφήν ἢ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν, οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὅν.

As he himself will explain later: the substratum, being undetermined, is not yet a "being" in the full sense: it is only *potentially* a being. It must be brought to being in the full sense by the determining form.

The term
ὕλη

c. The term ὕλη is not used in this passage. Ar. here speaks of the ὑποκείμενον or ὑποκειμένη φύσις. In the *Metaph.* the term ὕλη is generally used. E.g.:

Metaph. Z 3, 1029 a²⁰⁻²¹:

Λέγω δ' ὕλην ἢ καθ' αὐτὴν μήτε τι μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν.

d. The classical definition of ὕλη occurs in *Phys.* I 9, 192 a³¹⁻³²: Its classical definition

Λέγω γὰρ ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ἐκάστω, ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

"The primary substratum of each thing, an immanent principle from which a thing comes into being in a non-accidental way" (i.e. so that matter persists in the object which comes into being).

See further sub 496.

477. Ar. continues, *Phys.* I 7, 190 b¹⁰⁻²³:

10 "Ὡστε δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ γινόμενον ἅπαν ἀεὶ σύνθετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἔστι μὲν τι γινόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τι ὃ τοῦτο γίνεται, καὶ τοῦτο διττόν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι μὲν τὸ ἄμουσον, ὑπο-
15 κεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀσχημοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἀμορφίαν καὶ τὴν ἀταξίαν τὸ ἀντικείμενον, τὸν δὲ χαλκὸν ἢ τὸν λίθον ἢ τὸν χρυσὸν τὸν ὑποκείμενον.

Φανερόν οὖν ὥς, εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων 2. the form:
μορφή
or εἶδος
εἰσὶ καὶ γεγόνασιν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀλλ' ἕκαστον ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν,
20 ὅτι γίγνεται πᾶν ἐκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς· σύγκειται γὰρ ὁ μου-
σικός ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου καὶ μουσικοῦ τρόπου τινά· διαλύσεις γὰρ [τοὺς λόγους] εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων¹. Δῆλον οὖν ὥς γίνονται ἂν τὰ γινόμενα ἐκ τούτων.

For a definition of the different meanings of εἶδος Ar. refers at the end of this book (*Phys.* I 9, 192 a^{34-b1}) to the *Metaph.* Cp. our nr. 497.

478—a. The same passage continued, 190 b²³⁻²⁹:

"Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἓν, εἶδει δὲ δύο. 'Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρω-
25 πος καὶ ὁ χρυσὸς καὶ ὅλως ἡ ὕλη ἀριθμητὴ· τόδε γὰρ τι μᾶλλον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον· ἢ δὲ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἐναντίωσις
συμβεβηκός· ἐν δὲ τὸ εἶδος, οἷον ἡ τάξις ἢ ἡ μουσικὴ ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν
οὕτω κατηγορουμένων.

3. The negative aspect of the subject: στέρησις

The third principle is introduced here in very concise terms. The meaning of the passage might be paraphrased as follows.

Things come to be, as it seems, by two principles: form and matter. The subject, however, has two succeeding states, which might be called the terms of the process of becoming: (1) the original state, from which it comes to be, e.g. μὴ μουσικός;

¹ "You can analyze it into the definitions of its elements" (Hardie). About the omission of the first τοὺς λόγους see the commentary of W. D. Ross on this place (p. 493).

(2) the opposite state, that which is to become, namely *μουσικός*. The first or negative state is called *στέρησις* (*privatio*), the privation of the form. The subject is in this state; it is identical with it, but *accidentally* (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*), for it makes way for the form and thus it does not enter as a constituent element into the being which comes to be. So, in a certain sense, the *στέρησις* is no real principle of the generated being. E.g. a man is generated. Before there is "something unqualified", which is not-man.

In metaphysics the *στέρησις* means hardly anything; but in physics, for the explanation of coming to be, it takes a very important place, as important as that of the two other principles.

b. Ar. continues, *ib.* 190 b²⁹-191 a³:

Διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δύο λεκτέον εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἔστι δ' ὡς τρεῖς· καὶ ἔστι μὲν 30
ὡς τάναντία, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄμουσον ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ
τὸ ψυχρὸν ἢ τὸ ἡρμοσμένον καὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ· ὑπ' ἀλλήλων
γὰρ πάσχειν τάναντία ἀδύνατον. Λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ ἄλλο εἶναι τὸ
ὑποκείμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐναντίον. "Ὡστε οὔτε πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ 35
ἀρχαὶ τρόπον τινά, ἀλλὰ δύο ὡς εἰπεῖν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, οὔτ' αὖ παντελῶς δύο διὰ
τὸ ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ 191 a
τὸ ἀμούσῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἀσχηματίστῳ καὶ χαλκῷ.

479—In the next chapter Ar. states that his theory is the true solution of the difficulties, which his predecessors were unable to solve.

Difficulties
of predeces-
sors solved
by this
theory

a. *Phys.* I 8, 191 a²³⁻³⁴:

"Ὅτι δὲ μοναχῶς οὕτω λύεται καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπορία, λέγωμεν μετὰ
ταῦτα. Ζητοῦντες γὰρ οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν 25
τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐξετράπησαν οἷον ὁδὸν τινα ἄλλην ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας,
καὶ φασὶν οὔτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθεῖρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον
μὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων
ἀμφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄν γίνεσθαι (εἶναι γὰρ ἤδη) ἐκ τε μὴ 30
ὄντος οὐδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι· ὑποκεῖσθαι γὰρ τι δεῖ. Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμ-
βαῖνον αὖξοντες¹ οὐδ' εἶναι πολλὰ φασὶν ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν. Ἐκεῖνοι
μὲν οὖν ταύτην ἔλαβον τὴν δόξαν διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.

This is the Eleatic aporia: what comes to be must come forth either from being or from non-being. Both are impossible. Ergo —.

Ar. replies: it is possible, namely if both are admitted at the same time and in a special sense. If it is taken in the absolute sense, then, surely, nothing springs from non-being; but *accidentally* it does. For a being springs from *στέρησις*, which in itself is non-being. It springs from privation accidentally, because the pre-existing non-being is not admitted into the being that becomes.

And in the same way being springs from being, not essentially, but accidentally. For it is not the pre-existing being which is generated in that which comes to be.

¹ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὖξοντες - they exaggerated the consequence of this.

But the new being springs from the pre-existing, as far as the latter contained a non-being in itself, which is now filled with a new determination.

This is expressed by Ar. in the following text.

b. Ib., 191 b¹³⁻²³:

Solution of
the Eleatic
aporia

Ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ φαμεν γίνεσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπλῶς ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ὅμως
15 μέντοι γίνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς στέρησεως,
ὅ ἐστι καθ' αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος ¹ γίγνεται τι. Θαυμάζεται δὲ τοῦτο
καὶ ἀδύνατον οὕτω δοκεῖ, γίνεσθαι τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. Ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ὄντος
οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν γίνεσθαι, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, οἷον εἰ ἐκ ζῶου ζῶον γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ τινός ζῶου τι ζῶον,
20 οἷον εἰ κύων <ἐκ κυνός ἢ ἵππος> ἐξ ἵππου γίγνεται ². Γίγνεται μὲν γὰρ ἂν οὐ
μόνον ἐκ τινός ζῶου ὁ κύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ ζῶου, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧ ζῶον· ὑπάρχει γὰρ
ἡδὲ τοῦτο·

The above solution borrows its terms from logic: the distinction between using a term *essentially* and *accidentally* is referred to in this chapter and illustrated by the instance "The doctor builds a house, not *qua* doctor, but *qua* housebuilder, and turns grey, not *qua* doctor, but *qua* dark-haired" (191 b⁴⁻⁵).

c. Beside this solution Ar. gives a metaphysical one: in his theory of potency and act, which is explained at length in *Metaph.* Θ. The theory is referred to here, perhaps with reference to some older treatise.

Metaphysical
solution

Ib., 191 b²⁷⁻²⁹:

Εἷς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος, ἄλλος δ' ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ταυτὰ λέγειν κατὰ τὴν
δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται δι' ἀκριβείας μᾶλλον.

480—In his last chapter of this book Ar. compares his own theory of becoming with that of Plato in the *Timaeus* and shows the superiority of his own theory. He reproaches Plato for not having acknowledged the principle of *στέρησις*: relative non-being, which is *accidentally* identical with matter, but *essentially* different. Because Plato neglected this distinction, he could not solve the difficulties of Eleatic philosophy: he formally attributed to matter a kind of non-being which does not belong to it and seems to reduce it to absolute non-being.

This theory
compared
with Plato's

Phys. I 9, 192 a³⁻¹²:

Ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ὕλην καὶ στέρησιν ἕτερόν φαμεν εἶναι, καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν
5 οὐκ ὄν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν καθ' αὐτήν, καὶ τὴν

¹ οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος - "this not surviving as a constituent of the result".

² About the insertion of the words ἐκ κυνός ἢ ἵππος see the comment of Ross on these lines (p. 495 f.).

μὲν ἐγγύς καὶ οὐσίαν πως, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν οὐδαμῶς. Οἱ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ὁμοίως, ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἢ τὸ χωρὶς ἐκάτερον. Ὡστε παντελῶς ἕτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος ἀντικεινός. Μέχρι μὲν γὰρ δεῦρο προῆλθον, ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ ὑποκεῖσθαι φύσιν, ταύτην μέντοι μίαν ποιοῦσιν· 10 καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις δυάδα ποιεῖ, λέγων μέγα καὶ μικρὸν αὐτήν, οὐθὲν ἥττον ταῦτό ποιεῖ· τὴν γὰρ ἑτέραν παρειῖδεν.

The meaning of Ar. is clear: by introducing his third principle (the *χώρα*) in *Tim.* 48 e-50 d, Plato did assume a substratum, but he did not make any distinction between the substratum as a real principle *in* things (see Ar.'s definition of ὕλη sub 476 d), a potential being, which *can* be in the full sense and only *per accidens* does not do so now, and, on the other hand, a second principle, which is in itself a non-being, namely the privation of the form which is still to be realized.

To this we might reply, that by Plato *χώρα* is not introduced at all as "matter" in the sense of a substratum, which is an immanent principle; but only as *space*, wherein coming to be happens to take place. Consequently, Ar. does not introduce a second principle next to Plato's principle of the Great-and-small. He introduces two totally different principles.

It should be granted, certainly, that Plato's description of becoming is difficult to understand and far from clear. On the other hand, Ar.'s hypothesis of a totally unqualified substratum contains certain difficulties. It is, finally, a purely logically construed hypothesis: a theory, which can serve as a basis for the explanation of becoming. But what corresponds with it in the order of reality, remains problematical.

3—THE SECOND BOOK OF THE PHYSICS

481—Ar. now begins to define "physis".

Phys. II 1, 192 b^{8,23}:

What is
φύσει
and what
is not

Τῶν γὰρ ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲν τὰ τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ 10 πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ ὕδωρ· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν. Πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥηθέντα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ὄντα πάντα φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ' αὐξήσιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν· κλίνη 15 δὲ καὶ ἱμάτιον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ἐστίν, ἢ μὲν τετύχηκε τῆς κατηγορίας ἐκάστης καὶ καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, οὐδεμίαν ὁρμὴν ἔχει μεταβολῆς ἔμφυτον, ἢ δὲ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς εἶναι λιθίνους ἢ γητίνους ἢ μικτοῖς ἐκ τούτων, ἔχει, καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον, ὥς οὐσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας 20 τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρῶτως καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

Definition of
φύσις

"Nature is a principle of motion and rest for the thing in which it is immediately present, in virtue of itself (i.e. *essentially*) and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute" (i.e. *per accidens*).

The latter restriction excludes certain cases where nature comes very near to art. With art namely the cause works from without, with nature from within. But there are some cases where art works from within, e.g. the physician who treats himself. Yet these cases do not come within the definition of nature, Ar. says, for here art does not belong to the subject essentially, but *per accidens*.

482—a. Ib., 192 b³²⁻³⁴:

Φύσις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ῥηθέν· φύσιν δὲ ἔχει ὅσα τοιαύτην ἔχει ἀρχήν. Καὶ ἐστὶ πάντα ταῦτα οὐσία· ὑποκειμενον γάρ τι καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αἰεί.

Natural things are always realized in a subject

"Each of them is a substance; for it is a subject, and nature is always realized in a subject".

Mansion¹ calls this "an expression of peripatetic realism, which indeed attributes a reality to abstract principles, but on condition of finding them in a material substratum, of which they can be separated only by thought".

b. These things, then, and their essential qualities are "according to nature".

What is called κατὰ φύσιν

Ib. 192 b³⁵⁻³⁷:

Κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὑπάρχει καθ' αὐτά, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ φέρεσθαι ἄνω· τοῦτο γὰρ φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει φύσιν, φύσει δὲ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν.

483—Ar. now proceeds to explain his theory of the *two aspects of nature*: (1) there is a lower nature, *matter*, which is undetermined and "potential" with relation to the form; (2) a higher nature, *form*, which is intelligible (because determinate) and, by its presence, brings matter to full being (see nr. 484).

Two aspects of nature

a. Ib., 193a¹⁰⁻²¹; 28-30:

Matter

10 Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἐνίοις εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἐκάστῳ ἀρρύθμιστον² <ὄν> καθ' αὐτό, οἷον κλίνης φύσις τὸ ξύλον, ἀνδριάντος δ' ὁ χαλκός. Σημεῖον δέ φησιν Ἀντιφῶν³ ὅτι, εἴ τις κατορύξει κλίνην καὶ λάβοι δύναμιν ἢ σηπεδῶν ὥστε ἀνεῖναι βλαστόν, οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι
15 κλίνην ἀλλὰ ξύλον, ὥς τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός ὑπάρχον, τὴν κατὰ νόμον διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν τέχνην, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν οὔσαν ἐκείνην ἢ καὶ διαμένει ταῦτα πάσχουσα συνεχῶς. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον πρὸς ἑτερόν τι ταῦτ' οὗτο πέπονθεν, οἷον ὁ μὲν χαλκός καὶ ὁ χρυσὸς πρὸς ὕδωρ, τὰ δ' ὅσα καὶ ξύλα πρὸς

¹ *Introd.*, p. 100.

² τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἐκάστῳ ἀρρύθμιστον <ὄν> καθ' αὐτό - "that immediate constituent of it which taken by itself is without arrangement" (Hardie & Gaye).

³ Diels, VS⁶ 87, B 15. Cf. Zeller I 2⁶, pp. 1324-28.

γῆν¹, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτιοῦν, ἐκεῖνα² τὴν φύσιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν 20 αὐτῶν. —

“Ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἐκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη 28 ὅλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς.

“The immediate material substratum of things which gave in themselves a principle of motion or change”.

Form

b. Ib., 193a³⁰⁻³¹:

“Ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

“The form and the type, sc. the definable form” (τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον: “which is specified in the definition of the thing”. Hardie and Gaye).

c. In the next passage Ar. explains what he means by this definition.

Ib. 193 a³¹-b⁵:

Matter with-
out form is
not yet
φύσει

“Ὡσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις 31 τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ φυσικόν. Οὕτε δὲ ἐκεῖ πῶ φαῖμεν ἂν ἔχειν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην οὐδέν, εἰ δυνάμει μόνον ἐστὶ κλίνη, μή πῶ δ’ ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τῆς κλίνης, οὐδ’ εἶναι τέχνην, οὐτ’ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνισταμένοις· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει 35 σὰρξ ἢ ὅστοῦν οὐτ’ ἔχει πῶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, πρὶν ἂν λάβῃ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ 193 b τὸν λόγον, ὃ ὀριζόμενοι λέγομεν τί ἐστὶ σὰρξ ἢ ὅστοῦν, οὕτε φύσει ἐστίν. “Ὡστε ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ φύσις ἂν εἴη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὐ χωριστὸν ὃν ἄλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. 5

“So, in another sense, nature is the form or type of things which have in themselves a principle of motion, a form not separable from them except in thought”.

484—Real things, then, are the composites of these two constituents.

Ib. 193 b⁵⁻⁸:

The
compositum

Τὸ δ’ ἐκ τούτων φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, φύσει δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ μᾶλλον αὕτη φύσις τῆς ὕλης· ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε λέγεται ὅταν ἐντελεχεία ᾗ, μᾶλλον ἢ ὅταν δυνάμει.

Relation to
Plato's doc-
trine of
nature

485—A. Mansion, *Introd.* pp. 82-92, explained excellently how this Aristotelian conception of nature is related to that of Plato, especially in his later works, the *Tim.* and *Laws*. Plato was deeply convinced that coming to be and passing away and the existence of things cannot be caused by matter. He sought a reasonable ground for them: “that it is best for things to be as they are” (*Ph.* 96 a ff.), and, seeking this, assumed his “hypothesis” of Ideas. In *Laws* X again Pl. delivers a severe verdict on materialistic philosophy of nature: the regularity of the celestial movement can only be caused by an intelligence, a soul. Therefore, if we mean by

³ Plato in the *Tim.* derived gold and bronze from water (59 b) and bones (64 c, 73 e) from earth.

² ἐκεῖνα - the stable element.

"nature" what is original and wants no further explanation, we should say that soul is "natural" (φύσει), not the material elements (981 c-892 c; our nr. 388). In *Tim.* 52 d-53 b Pl. describes the χῶρα before the creation of the kosmos as being filled with formless elements, in which irregular forces work and shocks occur. So there exists, according to Plato, some irrational element, next to soul and independent of it. But Pl. does not call this physis. As to Aristotle, he starts from such a physis and calls it by this name. But he does not adopt Plato's doctrine of soul. Instead of this he gives another explanation: above the irrational nature, called *hylē*, he superposed not soul, but a superior nature, *form*. This form is *not an intelligent principle*, not a thinking and deliberating being, but it is *intelligible*: the rational element in corporeal beings.

Thus it may be said in a certain sense that to Ar. nature is rational; only not in any personal sense.

486—Ar. now asks himself three questions:

Three questions

(1) Where is the border-line between physics and mathematics?
For physical bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines and points, and these are the subject-matter of mathematics.
(2) Where is the place of astronomy? Does it belong to physics, or not?
(3) Since nature has two senses, form and matter, with which is the physicist concerned?

a. *Phys.* II 2, 193 b²²⁻²⁵:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ διδραστὰι ποσυχῶς ἡ φύσις λέγεται, μετὰ τοῦτο θεωρητέον τίη διαφέρει ὁ μαθηματικὸς τοῦ φυσικοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπιτεθεὶς καὶ σπεσθεῖ ἔχει τὰ φυσικὰ σμάρματα καὶ μῆκη καὶ στυγμάς, περὶ ὧν σκοπεῖ ὁ μαθηματικὸς.

b. Ib., 193 b²⁵⁻²⁶:

"Ἐνι ἡ ἀστρονομία ἐτέρα ἡ μέρος τῆς φυσικῆς.

c. Ib., 194 a¹²⁻¹³, 15-11:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τὸ τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, — ἀπορήσκειν ἂν τις, — περὶ ποτέρας τοῦ φυσικοῦ, ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Ἀλλ' εἰ περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ περὶ ἐκατέρας. Πότερον οὖν τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἁλῆς ἐκατέραν γινώσκουσιν;

These questions are answered here by Ar. very shortly. They have been broadly treated by Mansion in his fifth chapter (*Introd.*, pp. 122-205).

487—The first question should be understood starting from Platonism.

First question

a. According to Ar. in *Metaph.* A 6 Plato distinguished three degrees of being: αἰσθητὰ — μαθηματικά — εἶδη, corresponding with three kinds of knowledge. As to the introduction of εἶδη — an imperishable and non-changing kind of being, on which the αἰσθητὰ depend by μέθεξις —, we

Plato's tripartition of being

gave the texts of A 6 and M 4 in our nr. 204a and b. In A 6 Ar. continues (987 b¹⁴⁻¹⁸):

Ἐτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἶδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φησι μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἄτδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλ' ἅττα ὅμοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἑκάστων μόνον.

We know this doctrine from Pl., *Rep.* VI, 509-511¹ and VII 533-534: dialectic is placed at the top; it reaches up to true Reality and the Good. Next follows mathematical knowledge, which does not extend to contemplation of the highest Reality, because it cannot render an account of its first principles ("hypotheses"). Finally there is *doxa*, which is no knowledge in the strictest sense and cannot be so, because its object is the ever-changing nature of the sensible things. Plato has come very near to a science of nature. The essential purpose of his theory of Ideas was to explain how rational knowledge of sensible things is possible. But in the strictest sense Pl. denied it up to the end².

b. Ar. gives to physics a place in the system of sciences. True knowledge of physical objects is possible, because they contain an intelligible element within them, which is their essence: the form.

In physical objects this form is essentially joined to matter. In his *Metaph.* we shall see Ar. occupied with the question whether there exists any purely intelligible being, not joined to matter (what Ar. called "separate", χωριστόν). He answers in the affirmative. This, then, is the object of metaphysics, which is called by Ar. "first philosophy" or "theology". So we get the following tripartition of sciences:

Metaph. E 1, 1026 a¹³⁻¹⁶:

Ar.'s tri-
partition of
sciences

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἕνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως ἄλλ' ὥς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα.

The tripartition itself is Platonic, but Ar. connects it with a different theory of knowledge, namely, his doctrine of abstraction. The objects of mathematics are the result of a further degree of abstraction than are those of physics. Physical objects, which are essentially joined to matter, cannot be separated from it, even in thought; mathematical objects, which are according to Ar. not "separate"

¹ Our nr. 294.

² *Phil.* 59 a-b. In my *Examen critique de l'interprétation traditionnelle du platonisme* (*Revue de Métaph.* 1951, pp. 249-268) I argued that in later platonism the opposition of an unchanging and immovable ideal World to that of ever-changing sensible things has been essentially broken down. If it is true that in *Parm.* and *Soph.* motion was introduced by Plato in the ideal World—as I think it was—this statement should be accepted. It does not take away the fact that, on the point in question, sc. the establishing of the possibility of natural science, Ar. has completed what Plato had begun.

(as Plato thought they are), but "somehow connected with matter", can be separated from it *in abstracto*.

This is what Ar. explains in the next passage of *Phys. II*, ch. 2.

c. *Phys. II* 2, 194 a¹⁻⁷:

Γίγνοιτο δ' ἂν τοῦτο δῆλον, εἴ τις ἐκατέρων πειρῶτο λέγειν τοὺς ὄρους, καὶ αὐτῶν ¹ καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν ἔσται ² καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμὸς καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἄνευ κινήσεως, σάρξ δὲ καὶ ὁστοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ῥίς σιμὴ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς τὸ καμπύλον λέγεται.

Difference
between
phys. and
math. objects

The latter are defined like "snub nose", not like "curved". σιμόν is with Ar. a classical instance of an accident, and at the same time of a form which is realized in matter. E.g. the next passage.

d. *Metaph. E* 1, 1025 b³⁰⁻³⁴:

Ἔστι δὲ τῶν ὀριζομένων καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι τὰ μὲν ὥς τὸ σιμόν τὰ δ' ὥς τὸ κοῦλον. διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν σιμόν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σιμόν κοίλη ρίς), ἡ δὲ κοιλότης ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητῆς.

488—What is the place of applied mathematics: of astronomy, optics, harmonics? In other places mechanics, too, are mentioned.

Second
question

These sciences have to do with natural bodies; they also treat the accidents of them. Therefore Ar. calls them τὰ φυσικώτερα τῶν μαθημάτων. E.g. his work *De caelo* is a truly physical treatise. Yet the method of these sciences is a mathematical one. Where, then, are they to be placed?

Ar. answers: The position of astronomy is similar to that of geometry. Both deal with bodies, but from a special point of view, namely, making abstraction of corporeal reality. In the same way optics are a system of geometrical relations, harmonics of arithmetical propositions, mechanics an application of stereometry. But the method of astronomy is in a certain sense the inverse of that of geometry.

Ar. explains this in the passage following that which has been cited sub 487c.

a. *Phys. II* 2, 194 a⁷⁻¹²:

Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ φυσικώτερα τῶν μαθημάτων, οἷον ὀπτική καὶ ἀρμονική καὶ ἀστρολογία· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ τρόπον τιν' ἔχουσι τῇ γεωμετρίας. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρία περὶ γραμμῆς φυσικῆς σκοπεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ φυσική, ἡ δ' ὀπτική μαθηματικὴν μὲν γραμμὴν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ μαθηματικὴ ἀλλ' ἡ φυσική.

The method
of applied
mathematics

What he means to say is: astronomy etc. follow a mathematical method, but they have to return to physical reality and there apply the mathematical relations found by abstraction. Cp. *Metaph. B* 2, 997 b¹⁴⁻³⁵, where Ar. argues (against the platonic hypothesis of an intermediate world of mathematical objects, existing separately) that astronomy has to deal with the actual heavens of our world.

¹ αὐτῶν - the subjects.

² ἔσται - to be linked with ἄνευ κινήσεως.

b. On the other hand, Ar. repeatedly teaches that sciences, the object of which is realized in phenomena and which therefore have to do directly with concrete things, are by this very reason less accurate, because the object is more complicated. E.g.

Metaph. A 2, 982 a²⁶⁻²⁸:

Ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσὶν (αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ¹ ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων ², οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας).

Nearly the same is said in *An. post.* I 27, 87 a³¹.

Third
question

489—Which “nature” is the object of physics: form or matter?
Ar. answers: both.

Both matter
and form
are the
object of
physics

Phys. II 2, 194 a¹²⁻¹⁵:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὥς ἂν εἰ περὶ σιμότητος σκοποῖμεν τί ἐστίν, οὕτω θεωρητέον. Ὡστ' ὄντ' ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ὕλην.

Pre-socratic philosophers dealt almost exclusively with matter, e.g. Empedocles and Democritus. To their view Ar. opposes the subordination of matter to form. Hence follows that for the physicist form is of primary importance.

Matter and
form are
they object
of the same
science?

490—Ar. also asks the question whether the two aspects of nature belong to one and the same science or to a different one. He answers that both belong to the same, and illustrates this by the analogy of art; e.g. the building of a house.

First
argument:
the analogy
of art

a. *Phys.* II 2, 194 a²¹⁻²⁷:

Εἰ δὲ ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν, τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ὕλην μέχρι τοῦ (οἷον ἱατροῦ ὑγίειαν καὶ χολὴν καὶ φλέγμα, ἐν οἷς ἡ ὑγίεια, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμου τό τε εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ὅτι πλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀμφοτέρως τὰς φύσεις.

Second
argument:
teleology in
nature

b. *Ib.*, 194 a²⁷⁻³⁶; 194 b⁷⁻⁸:

Ἦτι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἔνεκα ³. Ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα· ὦν γὰρ συνεχοῦς τῆς κινήσεως οὕσης ἔστι τι τέλος τῆς κινήσεως, τοῦτο ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. Διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς ⁴ γελοῖως

¹ αἱ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων - those which involve fewer principles.

² αἱ ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγόμεναι - those which involve additional principles (Ross).

³ τῆς αὐτῆς (sc. ἐπιστήμης) καὶ - eiusdem ac.

⁴ ὁ ποιητὴς - sc. Euripides, in a play unknown to us.

προήχθη εἰπεῖν »ἔχει τελευτήν, ἥσπερ οὐνεκ' ἐγένετο«. Βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον· ἐπεὶ καὶ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὕλην αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς αἱ δὲ εὐεργόν¹, καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν ἔνεκα πάντων ὑπαρχόντων. Ἐσμὲν γὰρ πῶς καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα². — Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἡμεῖς ποιούμεεν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ ἔργου ἔνεκα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει οὐσα.

c. Ib., 194 b⁸⁻⁹:

Ἔτι τῶν πρὸς τι ἡ ὕλη· ἄλλω γὰρ εἶδει ἄλλη ὕλη.

Which means: Form and matter are correlatives. They claim each other mutually. But form can exist without matter (not in physical objects, but as object of metaphysics), matter cannot without form. Therefore Ar. says that matter belongs to the πρὸς τι.

Third
argument:
matter and
form are
correlatives

491—Hence, in the final passage of our chapter the author speaks about metaphysics, as it should be distinguished from physics.

The border-
line between
phys. and
metaph.

Phys. II 2, 194 b⁹⁻¹⁵:

Μέχρι δὴ πόσου τὸν φυσικὸν δεῖ εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἐστίν; ἢ ὥσπερ ἱατρὸν νεῦρον ἢ χαλκία χαλκόν, μέχρι του. Τινὸς γὰρ ἔνεκα ἕκαστον, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ ἐστὶ χωριστὰ μὲν εἶδει, ἐν ὕλῃ δέ. Ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος. Πῶς δ' ἔχει τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τί ἐστίν, φιλοσοφίας τῆς πρώτης διορίσαι ἔργον.

The meaning of this passage is: physics have to do with the *eidōs* up to a certain point, namely, until the physicist understands the purpose of each thing. He has not to do with the *eidōs* as far as this can exist in itself, not joined to matter. For in that sense the *eidōs* is the object of a different science: metaphysics. Physical objects, however, are always form joined to matter. "Man is begotten by man, and by the sun as well".—The author means to say: physical generation can be explained from itself. A metaphysical man-in-himself is of no use to it. Organic beings generate themselves, "together with the sun"—because the heavenly bodies, especially the sun, have an important part in the physical process of generation.

492—The next chapter (3) deals with the four causes, a subject which is continued in ch. 7 and 8, where the author argues that form is properly the cause of things. Having treated the questions of *τύχη* and *αὐτόματον*, which are also considered as causes of things, in chapters 4-6, he applies in his last chapter (9) the principle of the final cause to the problem of

Chapters
3-9

¹ Some arts make the matter (from something different), others make it more serviceable (e.g. when iron is melted).

² From *De anima* 415 b² we know what Ar. means by this distinction: τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα διττόν· τὸ μὲν οὐ, τὸ δὲ φ. E.g. in one sense health is the οὐ ἔνεκα of the medical art; in another sense the patient is.

the necessity of physical phenomena. This necessity does not proceed from antecedents to consequences, but inversely: the final cause is of primary importance.

This is the main thesis of Ar.'s natural philosophy.

the four causes 493—*Phys.* II 3, 194 b²³-195 a³:

- causa materialis** "Ένα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἷτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη. 25
- c. formalis** "Άλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη, οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἓν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ¹.
- c. efficiens** "Έτι ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡρεμῆσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας 30 αἷτιος, καὶ ὁ πατήρ τοῦ τέκνου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου.
- c. finalis** "Έτι ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμέν ἵνα ὑγιαίνει, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἷτιον. Καὶ ὅσα δὴ κινήσαντος ἄλλου μεταξὺ γίνεταί τοῦ τέλους, 35 οἷον τῆς ὑγείας ἡ ἰσχυασία ἢ ἡ κάθαρσις ἢ τὰ φάρμακα ἢ τὰ ὄργανα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῦ τέλους ἕνεκά ἐστι, διαφέρει δ' ἀλλήλων ὡς ὄντα τὰ μὲν ἔργα τὰ δ' ὄργανα.

Instances 494—**a.** *Metaph.* H 4, 1044 a³²-1044 b¹:

"Όταν δὴ τις ζητῇ τὸ αἷτιον, ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς τὰ αἷτια λέγεται, πάσας δεῖ λέγειν τὰς ἐνδεχομένας αἷτίας. οἷον ἀνθρώπου τίς αἷτία ὡς ὕλη; ἄρα τὰ καταμήνια; τί δ' ὡς κινεῶν; ἄρα τὸ σπέρμα; τί δ' ὡς τὸ εἶδος; τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. τί δ' ὡς οὗ ἕνεκα; τὸ τέλος.

b. *Metaph.* B 2, 996 b⁵⁻⁸:

Ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς τῶν αἷτίων ὑπάρχειν, οἷον οἰκίας ὅθεν μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἡ τέχνη καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος, οὗ δ' ἕνεκα τὸ ἔργον ², ὕλη δὲ γῆ καὶ λίθοι, τὸ δ' εἶδος ³ ὁ λόγος.

In the last example it is clear that the formal cause is identical with the final, only seen from a different point of view. In a sense the form is the efficient cause, too. For the notion of "house" *works* as an idea which is present in the mind of the architect and directs his activity.—The

¹ τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ - the parts in the definition.

² Final cause is the ἔργον, i.e. the *function* of the house: "giving shelter to things and bodies", as is said in the definition of *Metaph.* H 2, 1043 a¹⁶ (ἀγγεῖον σκεπαστικὸν χρημάτων καὶ σωμάτων), and again in *De anima* I 1, 403 b³.

³ Formal cause is the notion "house", the definition.

same might be remarked as to the first instance, and so it is generally with natural beings. For the form, which is within them, is the cause of their motion (growth), and it is at the same time the end.

This is expressed by Ar. in the next passage.

495—*Phys.* II 7, 198 a²²⁻²⁹:

The three
non-material
causes often
coincide

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ αἰτίαι τέτταρες, περὶ πασῶν τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰς πάσας
ἀνάγων τὸ διὰ τί ἀποδώσει φυσικῶς, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ κινῆσαν, τὸ οὐ
25 ἔνεκα. Ἐρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς ἓν πολλάκις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα
ἐν ἐστὶ, τὸ δ' ὅθεν ἢ κίνησις πρῶτον τῷ εἶδει ταῦτο τούτοις· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ
ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. Καὶ ὅλως ὅσα κινούμενα κινεῖ· ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐκέτι φυσικῆς·
οὐ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα κίνησιν οὐδ' ἀρχὴν κινήσεως κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀκίνητα ὄντα.

496—We saw the definitions of matter sub 476c, d. Matter there appeared as a perfectly undetermined substratum, which has to receive its determination from the form. So matter is potential, form the actualizing principle.

In other places Ar. makes a distinction between matter in the absolute sense, which is called by the scholastics *materia prima*, and matter on a higher level, called δευτέρα ὕλη by the commentators. The first is perfectly undetermined and potential; the second, though it received a certain (elementary) determination, is still potential in relation to a higher form.

Relative
character of
matter

Thus, prime matter is the substratum of elementary bodies (fire, air, water, earth). In a second stage these elementary substances become in their turn "matter" for some more complicated substance of a superior determination: homogeneous parts are formed (ἢ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις) in organic beings, e.g. bone and flesh. Then, in the third and last stage, heterogeneous parts are formed (ἢ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν), such as face and hand.

a. *De part. anim.* II 1, 646 a¹²⁻²⁴:

Τριῶν δ' οὐσῶν τῶν συνθέσεων πρώτην μὲν ἂν τις θείη τὴν ἐκ τῶν κα-
15 λουμένων ὑπὸ τινων στοιχείων, οἷον γῆς ἀέρος ὕδατος πυρός. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον
ἴσως ἐκ τῶν δυνάμεων λέγειν, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐξ ἀπασῶν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἐτέροις
εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ὕγρὸν γὰρ καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὕλη τῶν
συνθέτων σωμάτων ἐστίν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ταύταις ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἷον
20 βάρος καὶ κουφότης καὶ πυκνότης καὶ μαλότης καὶ τραχύτης καὶ λειότης
καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῶν σωμάτων. δευτέρα δὲ σύστασις ἐκ τῶν
πρώτων ἢ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἐστίν, οἷον ὁστοῦ σαρκὸς
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. τρίτη δὲ καὶ τελευταία κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἢ τῶν
ἀνομοιομερῶν, οἷον προσώπου καὶ χειρὸς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων μορίων.

Therefore, matter is called by Ar. something relative (490 c: τῶν πρὸς τι ἢ ὕλη).

Reaction
of matter
against
form

b. Though matter is essentially passive, it does possess a certain activity. This might be inferred from the existence of monstrosities. In a sense these are natural beings, because they are generated by living beings according to a natural process. Yet they deviate from the normal type. Why?—Ar. replies: Because matter offers resistance to form and prevents it from realizing itself perfectly.

De gen. anim. IV 4, 770 b⁹⁻¹⁷:

"Ἔστι γὰρ τὸ τέρας τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τι, παρὰ φύσιν δ' οὐ πᾶσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἰο
ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· περὶ γὰρ τὴν αἰεὶ καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐθὲν γίνεται παρὰ φύσιν,
ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μὲν οὕτω γινομένοις, ἐνδεχομένοις δὲ καὶ ἄλλως,
ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτων ἐν ὅσοις συμβαίνει παρὰ τὴν τάξιν μὲν ταύτην, αἰεὶ μέντοι
μὴ τυχόντως, ἥττον εἶναι δοκεῖ τέρας διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τρόπον 15
τινὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὅταν μὴ κρατήσῃ τὴν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος φύσις.

See Mansion, *Introd.* pp. 114-116.

Matter
a limiting
element
in nature

c. Generally speaking, matter sets bounds to the possibility of production of nature; for not every matter can adopt every determination.

Metaph. H 4, 1044 a¹⁷:

"Ἔστι τις οἰκεία — sc. ὕλη — ἐκάστου.

Form
parallel to
matter

497—Form is used in parallel senses to matter.

Now, "matter" is sometimes used by Ar. to indicate the corporeal object, as our senses can grasp it. Form, then, is *the intelligible type*, which is, opposite to the sensible substratum, the determining element in the order of knowledge.

the essence

Form, therefore, is *the essence*. Ar. often speaks of it with the terms τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὐσία and λόγος (notion, definition). Cp. the passage about the four causes (493).

a. Cf. *Metaph.* Δ 2, 1013 a²⁶:

Τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη etc.

Exactly the same words as in *Phys.* II 3.

b. *De gen. et corr.* II 9, 335 b⁶:

ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ἐκάστου οὐσίας.

In general μορφή indicates a visible form, εἶδος an intelligible form or structure.

498—a. *Nature acts for the sake of an end, and it is itself an end.* teleology
This is Ar.'s main thesis as to his doctrine on nature.

Phys. II 2, 194 a²⁸:

Ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα.

This view of nature is closely connected with that of Plato in *Nom.* X and is directed against pre-socratic materialism, especially against Empedocles' doctrine on the forming of organisms (our nr. **111a-d**).

b. Not every thing can claim to be an end, but only that which is best. We saw this in **490b** (194 a³²: Βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον). The end is what is best

Again in *Phys.* II 3, 195 a²³⁻²⁵:

Τὰ δ' ὥς τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων (sc. αἰτία ἐστίν)· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι.

The same in *Metaph.* Δ 2, 1013 b²⁵⁻²⁷.

c. An ἀγαθόν is to Ar. always a certain plenitude of being, never a non-being. always a plenitude of being

De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b²⁸⁻²⁹:

Βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι.

d. Hence a being never can strive after its own extinction, nature striving always for "what is best", i.e. a fuller development. Ar. therefore finds fault with Platonism, which would lead up to the impossible consequence that "the contrary would strive after its own extinction". never non-being

Phys. I 9, 192 a¹⁹⁻²⁰:

Τοῖς δὲ (sc. Πλατωνικοῖς) συμβαίνει τὸ ἐναντίον ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φθορᾶς.

e. Passing-away of individuals should be positively valued, as keeping up the universal order. Positive value of passing-away

De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b¹⁰:

— ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ ἡ γένεσις ἡ κατὰ φύσιν.

"The natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy equal periods of time" (Joachim).

499—Ar. gives four arguments for the finality of nature. First argument for finality

a. The first stands against Empedocles' theory of the forming of organisms. Ar. argues: natural facts happen regularly; but what happens regularly, cannot be ascribed to chance.

Phys. II 8, 198 b³⁵-199 a⁸:

Πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ αἰεὶ οὕτω γίνονται ἢ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ' ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν 199 a
πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὑπὸ κύνᾳ· οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνᾳ, ἀλλ' ἂν
χειμῶνος. Εἰ οὖν ἢ ὥς ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ἢ ἕνεκά του εἶναι, εἰ μὴ οἶόν
τε ταῦτ' εἶναι μήτε ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μήτ' ἀπὸ αὐτομάτου, ἕνεκά του ἂν 5
εἴη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φύσει γ' ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα¹, ὥς κἂν αὐτοὶ φαῖεν οἱ ταῦτα
λέγοντες. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.

Second
argument

b. *Ib.*, 199 a⁸⁻¹⁵:

Ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις τέλος ἐστὶ τι, τούτου ἕνεκα πράττεται τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ
ἑφεξῆς. Οὐκοῦν ὥς πράττεται, οὕτω πέφυκε, καὶ ὥς πέφυκεν, οὕτω πράττεται 10
ἕκαστον, ἂν μὴ τι ἐμποδίῃ. Πράττεται δ' ἕνεκά του· καὶ πέφυκεν ἄρα τούτου
ἕνεκα. Οἶον εἰ οἰκία τῶν φύσει γινομένων ἦν, οὕτως ἂν ἐγίνετο ὥς νῦν ὑπὸ
τῆς τέχνης· εἰ δὲ τὰ φύσει μὴ μόνον φύσει ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνῃ γίγνοιτο, ὡσαύτως
ἂν γίνοιτο ἢ πέφυκεν. Ἔνεκα ἄρα θατέρου θάτερον. 15

Mansion paraphrases lines 8-12 as follows.

"With all things that have a final term which is their completion, the development leading to that final term is the result of an action which aims at that term as an end. With a natural action, however, corresponds a natural agents, and the nature of this agents shows itself in the character of the development. Therefore, if the development aims at an end, then the nature which is its agents, does too".

Third
argument

c. *Ib.*, 199 a¹⁵⁻²⁰:

Ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ
μιμεῖται. Εἰ οὖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἕνεκά του, δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν
φύσιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
φύσιν τὰ ὕστερα πρὸς τὰ πρότερα.

Fourth
argument

d. *Ib.*, 199 a²⁰⁻³⁰:

Μάλιστα δὲ φανερόν ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε ζητήσαντα
οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ· ὅθεν διαποροῦσί τινες πότερον νῶ ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ ἐργά-
ζονται οἱ τ' ἀράχνη καὶ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Κατὰ μικρόν δ' οὕτω
προϊόντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς φαίνεται τὰ συμφέροντα γινόμενα πρὸς τὸ τέλος,
οἶον τὰ φύλλα τῆς τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκα σκέπης. Ὡστ' εἰ φύσει τε ποιεῖ καὶ ἕνεκά 25
του ἢ χελιδὼν τὴν νεοττιάν καὶ ὁ ἀράχνης τὸ ἀράχνιον, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τὰ φύλλα

¹ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα - e.g. teeth (mentioned in the preceding passage) and other parts of the body, which seem manifestly to have been made for some special use.

ἐνεκα τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς ρίζας οὐκ ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω ἐνεκα τῆς τροφῆς, φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ αἰτία ἡ τοιαύτη ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.

Mansion remarks: It might seem from the third argument, that Ar. conceives of nature, on the analogy of art, as a deliberating and consciously acting being. If this were true, Ar.'s teleology would be anthropomorphist, as it is usually thought to be by modern critics. That it is not so, appears from the fourth argument: to Ar. finality implies neither deliberation nor intelligence. The cosmic order is *intelligible*, but *impersonal*. There is in nature *a coordination of certain activities and certain essences*, in such a manner, that those forms of activity assure to each species a regular development, repeated in innumerable individuals. This, and nothing else, appears to be the meaning of Ar.'s teleological explanation of nature.

Finality is impersonal according to Ar.

500—Nevertheless, a great number of passages might be cited in which Ar. speaks of nature as of an intelligent and consciously acting being¹. We give some instances.

Nature often represented by Ar. as an intelligent being

a. *De gen. anim.* II 6, 744 b¹⁶:

"Ὡςπερ γὰρ οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός, καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ἀποβάλλειν εἴωθεν ἐξ ὧν ἔστι ποιῆσαι τι χρηστόν.

b. *De part. anim.* IV 10, 686 a²⁰⁻²⁴:

Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐστὶ καμπτός καὶ σφονδύλους ἔχων², οἱ δὲ λύκοι καὶ λέοντες μονόστον τὸν αὐχένα ἔχουσιν· ἐβλεψε γὰρ ἡ φύσις ὅπως πρὸς τὴν ἰσχὺν χρήσιμον αὐτὸν ἔχωσι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας βοηθείας.

c. *Ib.*, III 8, 670 b^{33-671 a}⁹:

Κύστιν δ' οὐ πάντ' ἔχει τὰ ζῶα, ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις βουλομένη ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὸν πλεύμονα ἔναιμον μόνον, τούτοις δ' εὐλόγως. διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς φύσεως, ἣν ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τούτῳ, διψητικά τε ταῦτ' ἐστὶ μάλιστα τῶν ζῴων, καὶ δεῖται τροφῆς οὐ μόνον τῆς ξηρᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑγρᾶς πλείονος, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ περίττωμα γίνεσθαι πλεῖον καὶ μὴ τοσοῦτον μόνον ὅσον ὑπὸ τῆς κοιλίας πέττεσθαι καὶ ἐκκρίνεσθαι μετὰ τοῦ ταύτης περιττώματος. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν εἶναι τι δεκτικὸν καὶ τούτου τοῦ περιττώματος. διόπερ ὅσα πλεύμονα ἔχει τοιοῦτον, ἅπαντ' ἔχει κύστιν.

d. *Ib.*, IV 5, 682 a⁶⁻⁸.

Ar. is speaking here about insects which continue to live after they have been

¹ Mansion, p. 261, notes 31-36, cites 20 passages, and in addition the whole treatise on *The Parts of Animals*.

² Sc. αὐχὴν.

cut into pieces. The reason of this is, he says, that in such insects as have long bodies the central organ, which is the seat of perception, consists of several parts.

Βούλεται μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν πᾶσι μόνον ἐν ποιεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ¹, οὐ δυναμένη δ' ἐνεργεῖα ποιεῖ μόνον ἓν, δυνάμει δὲ πλείω· δῆλον δ' ἐν ἑτέροις ἑτέρων μᾶλλον.

e. *De gen. anim.* III 2, 753 a⁷⁻¹¹:

"Εοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις βούλεσθαι τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἰσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν ² παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν χείροσι τοῦτ' ἐμποιεῖ μέχρι τοῦ τεκεῖν μόνον, τοῖς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελέωσιν, ὅσα δὲ φρονιμώτερα, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτροφήν.

f. *Ib.*, IV 10, 778 a⁴⁻⁹.

In the preceding lines the author has spoken about the influence of the so-called natural periods (day and night, month and year) on the generation of living beings. He continues:

Βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῖς τούτων ἀριθμοῖς ³ ἀριθμεῖν τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς τελευτάς, οὐκ ἀκριβοῦς δὲ ⁴ διὰ τε τὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀοριστίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλὰς ἀρχάς, αἱ τὰς γενέσεις τὰς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς φθοράς ἐμποδίζουσαι πολλάκις αἵτιαι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν συμπιπτόντων εἰσίν.

Cp. *Phys.* II 8, 994 b⁴: καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἀμαρτήματα ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐνεκά του.

How to explain this

501—How, then, to explain this?—

Mansion ⁵ answers,—and we think he is right—: The theory, expounded in *Phys.* II, is not anthropomorphic, the application is. However, as all those passages are of a later date than *Phys.* II, so that it is not possible to explain them as expressing a more primitive stage in the thought of Ar., while, on the other hand, the author passes extremely severe judgment on Plato in the *Tim.*, we must conclude that the anthropomorphic version is with Ar. rather a form of expression, which should not be taken too literally.

Cp. *De caelo* II 9, 291 a²⁴:

—ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον ἔσσεσθαι προνοούσης τῆς φύσεως.

"As if nature foresaw the consequences".—Here it is explicitly indicated, that we have only to do with an image. Wherever, then, the ὥσπερ has not been added, we have yet to understand this kind of expressions metaphorically.

To this, M. adds the argument that anthropomorphic expressions are especially numerous in the fragments of Ar.'s literary works (those of Π. φιλ. in *De caelo*).

¹ The said organ.

² τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἰσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν - a special sense of care for their young.

³ "by the measure of these periods".

⁴ "but she does not bring this to pass accurately".

⁵ *Introd.*, p. 262-263.

Many instances of the same metaphorical use might be adduced from modern writers, and this not in popular works only.

Cp. in Bergson's *Evolution créatrice* the frequent use of terms like "nature has to triumph over resistances"; she "finds" or "tries different solutions for the same problem"¹; she "operates not in this, but in that way"²; etc.

502—*De caelo* I 4, 271 a³³:

Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσι.

'God and
nature" in
De caelo I

"God and nature"—almost as synonyms. What does this mean? Mansion answers: Not much, or rather *nothing*. It is just an expression, a metaphor. For it does not harmonize at all with Ar.'s conception of God in his scientific treatises on this subject (see § 5 of this chapter).

Now, certainly, M. is right. Only, when we remember that in the dialogue II. φιλ. the aspect of our visible world and of cosmic order seemed to Ar. a proof for the existence of gods³, it might become clear to us that the author of *De caelo* I, which is of an early date, still adhered to, or at least was not far away from, Plato's religious conviction that a god or a divine Mind must have created the order of the sensible world. We can imagine that, only a few years later, the same author detached himself from this conviction.

503—Chapters 4-6 deal with chance and spontaneity (τύχη and αὐτόματον), which are generally considered as causes of many things in nature.

First, they are said to be neither the cause of things which always come to pass in the same way, nor of those which mostly do so.

The next distinction made by Ar. is that between things which happen τινὸς ἕνεκα and others which do not. Chance and spontaneity occur in the first group. We cite the text.

a. *Phys.* II 5, 196 b¹⁷⁻³²:

Τῶν δὲ γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, τὰ δ' οὐ· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, τὰ δ' οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἄμφω δ' ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του, ὥστε 20 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἔστιν ἓνια περὶ ἃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. Ἔστι δ' ἕνεκά του ὅσα τε ἀπὸ διανοίας ἂν πραχθεῖη καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ φύσεως.

Τύχη
and
αὐτόματον

Τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ὅταν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γένηται, ἀπὸ τύχης φαμὲν εἶναι. 25 Ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὃν ἔστι τὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, οὕτω καὶ αἴτιον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, οἷον οἰκίας καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἴτιον τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μουσικόν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν καθ' αὐτὸ αἴτιον ὠρισμένον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀόριστον· ἅπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίῃ.

¹ Reason (in man) and instinct (in animals) are, according to Bergson, "different solutions for the same problem".

² Not by composition or construction, like a human artisan, but by division. The "method" of nature is put in opposition to the method of man. Yet, nature "operates" after some intelligible method!

³ Our nr. 427.

Καθάπερ οὖν ἐλέχθη, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ἔνεκά του γιγνομένοις τοῦτο γένηται, 30 τότε λέγεται ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης. Αὐτῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν διαφορὰν τούτων ὕστερον διοριστέον.

So both chance and spontaneity are in the sphere of things which happen ἔνεκά του. I.e.: chance is not against the finality of nature; it is subordinate to it, being an accidental cause.

Instance

b. Ib., 196 b³³-197 a³: an instance of chance.

Οἷον ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀπολαβεῖν τὸ ἀργύριον ἦλθεν ἄν, κομιζομένου τὸν ἔρανον, εἰ ἦδει ¹. ἦλθε δ' οὐ τοῦτου ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ συνέβη αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἔνεκα ². τοῦτο δὲ οὐθ' ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φοιτῶν εἰς τὸ χωρίον οὐτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἔστι δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἡ κομιδή, οὐ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ αἰτίων, ἀλλὰ τῶν προαιρετῶν καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας· καὶ λέγεται γε τότε ἀπὸ τύχης ἐλθεῖν.

Definition of chance

c. Ib., 197 a⁵⁻⁶:

Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἔνεκά του.

Automaton a larger notion than tyché

504—a. *Phys.* II 6, 197 a³⁶-b⁸; b^{13,18}:

Διαφέρει δ' ὅτι τὸ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἔστι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου, τοῦτο δ' οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ 197 b τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν ἂν ὑπάρξειεν καὶ ὅλως πράξις. Διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἦτοι ταῦτόν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἢ εὐτυχίᾳ ἢ ἐγγύς, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία πράξις τις· εὐπραξία γὰρ. 5 "Ὡσθ' ὅπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πράξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν· —

Τὸ δ' αὐτόματον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἀψύχων, οἷον ὁ ἵππος αὐτόματος, φαμέν, ἦλθεν, ὅτι ἐσώθη μὲν ἐλθὼν, οὐ τοῦ σωθῆναι δὲ 15 ἔνεκα ἦλθεν. Καὶ ὁ τρίπους αὐτόματος κατέπεσεν· ἔστη μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἔνεκα κατέπεσεν.

¹ If the reading κομιζομένου is right, we must render: "A man gets back his money from his debtor who (at the very moment the other enters the market) is receiving contributions for a feast. He could have gone to the spot for the purpose of getting back his money, but"—etc.

² If the words τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἔνεκα must be kept here, it is necessary to put a comma after ἐλθεῖν: "But he went for some other reason, and now, (in fact), he has done it for the sake of receiving his money".—The expression of this idea might seem to us rather strange. Bonitz simply ejected τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἔνεκα, and this might appear to the modern reader a highly attractive solution. Yet, I do think it possible that Ar. wrote these words. Cf. 197 b¹⁷ (our next nr.), where he says of the tripod that it "came to stand there so as to serve for a seat", though it did not fall for that use.

b. *Ib.*, 197 b¹⁸⁻²²:

Definition

"Ὡστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἕνεκά του γινομένοις, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἕνεκα γένηται οὐ ἕξω τὸ αἴτιον, τότε ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου λέγομεν· ἀπὸ τύχης δέ, τούτων ὅσα ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου γίνεται τῶν προαιρετῶν τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν.

505—Finally, is necessity in nature absolute, or is it hypothetical?—
Ar. answers: the material cause is ὦν οὐκ ἄνευ, but the final cause is the real and decisive cause.

Necessity
in nature

a. *Phys.* II 9, 199 b^{34-200 a}¹⁰:

Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἀπλῶς; νῦν μὲν
200 a γὰρ οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ
ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ
κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς, διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ τὰ θεμέλια, ἢ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ κου-
φότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· κουφότατα γάρ.

5 Ἄλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τούτων γέγονεν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα πλὴν ὥς δι'
ὑλὴν, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τοῦ κρύπτειν ἅττα καὶ σώζειν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
πᾶσιν, ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐστίν, οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν
10 φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἢ ὥς ὑλὴν, ἀλλ' ἕνεκά του.

b. *Ib.*, 200 a³⁰⁻³⁴:

Φανερόν δὴ ὅτι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ ὥς ὑλὴ λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ
κινήσεις αἱ ταύτης. Καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ
τινὸς ἕνεκα· αἴτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὑλῆς, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους.

Mansion ¹ concludes: Finality, then, is according to Ar. the normal rule of nature, a necessity of an intelligible character. What is not governed by this law is what we call contingent, and is ascribed to accidental causes. But Ar. is not so much interested in the accidental and contingent as in the regular order of normal phaenomena, by which the universe is sustained in that being which is its agathon.

4—DEFINITIONS OF MOTION, SPACE AND TIME

506—Ar. now tries to define motion. The definition is preceded by some preliminary remarks.

Motion

a. *Phys.* III 1, 200 b¹⁶⁻²¹:

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ κινήσεις εἶναι τῶν συνεχῶν, τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἐμφαίνεται πρῶτον ἐν
τῷ συνεχεῖ· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀρίζομένοις τὸ συνεχὲς συμβαίνει προσχρήσασθαι
πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὥς τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν συνεχὲς ὂν.
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄνευ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ καὶ χρόνου κίνησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

¹ *Introd.*, p. 327.

b. Ib., b²⁶⁻²⁸:

"Ἔστι δὴ [τι] τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχεία μόνον¹, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχεία, τὸ μὲν τότε τι, τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοῦ ὄντος κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως.

Definition

c. Ib., 201 a¹⁰⁻¹¹:

ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἥ τοιοῦτον, κίνησις ἐστίν.

the definition explained

d. Ib., 201 a¹¹⁻¹⁵:

Οἷον τοῦ μὲν ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ἥ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἀλλοιώσεις, τοῦ δὲ αὐξητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου φθιτοῦ (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄνομα κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν) αὔξεις καὶ φθίσεις, τοῦ δὲ γενητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά.

E.g.: something is actually x (stones, wood and mortar), potentially y (a house). Now motion is: actualizing the y-ness (the building of the house).

Space

507—a. *Phys.* IV 4, 212 a²¹⁻²²: definition.

τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὁ τόπος.

Space is motionless

b. Ib., 212 a¹⁴⁻²⁰:

"Ἔστι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τόπος μεταφορητός, οὕτω καὶ ὁ τόπος ἀγγεῖον ἀμετακίνητον. Διὸ ὅταν μὲν ἐν κινουμένῳ τι κινῆται καὶ μεταβάλλῃ τὸ ἐντός, οἷον ἐν ποταμῷ πλοῖον, ὡς ἀγγεῖῳ χρῆται μᾶλλον ἢ τόπῳ τῷ περιέχοντι. Βούλεται δ' ἀκίνητος εἶναι ὁ τόπος· διὸ ὁ πᾶς μᾶλλον ποταμὸς τόπος, ὅτι ἀκίνητος ὁ πᾶς.

Time

508—Preliminary remarks on time.

a. Time has to do with motion, but it is not motion.

Phys. IV 10, 218 b⁹⁻¹⁸:

not=motion

"Ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ μάλιστα κινήσεις εἶναι καὶ μεταβολή τις ὁ χρόνος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐκάστου μεταβολή καὶ κινήσεις ἐν αὐτῇ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἐστίν, ἥ οὐκ ἂν τύχη ὃν αὐτὸ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. "Ἐτι δὲ μεταβολή μὲν ἐστὶ πᾶσα θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δ' οὐκ ἐστίν· τὸ γὰρ βραδὺ καὶ ταχὺ¹⁵ χρόνῳ ὠρίσται, ταχὺ μὲν τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολὺ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ ὀλίγον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐκ ὠρίσται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός. "Οτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἐστὶ κίνησις, φανερόν.

¹ τι is bracketed by Ross; Spengel, Bonitz and Prantl inserted τὸ δὲ δυνάμει after μόνον, a correction which has been adopted by Hardie in his translation.

b. Ib., 218 b²¹⁻²³:

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ γε μεταβολῆς· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτοὶ μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ λάθωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, οὐ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι χρόνος.

yet not
without
change

509—a. Time, then, appears to be a certain aspect of motion.

Ib., 219 a²⁻⁴:

Ληπτέον δέ, ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν τί ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχομένοις, τί τῆς κινήσεως ἐστίν. Ἄμα γὰρ κινήσεως αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ χρόνου.

Time an
aspect of
motion

b. Ib., 219 a¹⁰⁻¹⁴:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται ἔκ τινος εἰς τι καὶ πᾶν μέγεθος συνεχές, ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεγέθει ἢ κίνησις· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι συνεχές καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἐστὶ συνεχής, διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὁ χρόνος· ὅση γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, τοσοῦτος καὶ ὁ χρόνος αἰεὶ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι.

Motion
goes with
magnitude

c. Ib., 219 a¹⁴⁻²¹:

15 Τὸ δὲ δὴ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τόπῳ πρῶτόν ἐστιν. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν δὴ τῇ θέσει· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῷ μεγέθει ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν αἰεὶ θατέρῳ θάτερον
20 αὐτῶν. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει, ὃ μὲν ποτε ὃν κινήσις ἐστίν¹. τὸ μέντοι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕτερον καὶ οὐ κίνησις.

πρότερον
and
ὑστερον

not identical
with motion

d. Ib., 219 a²²⁻²⁵:

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν, ὅταν ὀρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὀρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαιμέν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησιν λάβωμεν.

Yet connect-
ed with the
apprehension
of time

510—a. Ib., 219 b¹⁻²:

Τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

Definition

b. Ib., 219 b⁵⁻⁹:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὃ δὲ χρόνος ἐστὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν. Ἔστι δ' ἕτερον ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον.

the definition
explained

So time is "the countable aspect of movement". If an event comes to pass "in time", this means that it is measurable ("countable") by time.

¹ As to its substratum it is identical with motion; yet it differs from it in essence.

Existence
in time511—*a. Phys.* IV 12, 221 a⁴⁻⁹:

Καὶ ἐστὶ τῇ κινήσει τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι τὸ μετρεῖσθαι τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τούτ' ἐστὶ αὐτῇ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι, τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι. Δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς τούτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι, τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου.

Rest, too, is
in timec. Ib., 221 b⁷⁻¹²:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος μετрон κινήσεως, ἔσται καὶ ἡμεῖς μετρον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πᾶσα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἐν χρόνῳ. Ὅν γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν κινήσει ὁν ἀνέγκη κινεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ κίνησις ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως· ἐν ἀριθμῷ δὲ κινήσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἡμεῖον.

Would there
be time if
there were
no soul?

512—At the end of this book Ar. raises the important question whether there would be time if there were no soul, i.e. if there were no knowing subject which could "count" or measure. He replies by saying that, in this case, there would still be movement, which is the "sub-stratum" of time (τούτο δ' ποτε ὄν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος), but not its measurable aspect, which is "time".

Phys. IV 14, 223 a²¹⁻²⁸:

Πότερον δὲ μὴ οὐσίας ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος ἢ οὐ, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις· ἀδυνάτου γὰρ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ ἀριθμητικοῦτος ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀριθμητὸν τι εἶναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἡριθμητέον ἢ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν. Εἰ δὲ μὴδὲν ἀλλ' οὐ μετρεῖται ἀριθμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ καὶ ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ οὐσίας, ἀλλ' ἢ τούτο δ' ποτε ὄν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ὅλον εἰ ἐνδέχεται κίνησιν εἶναι ἀνεύ ψυχῆς. Τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὥστερον ἐν κινήσει ἐστὶν· χρόνος δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀριθμητὰ ἐστὶν.

513—Ar. starts from the fact of movement in the sensible world. Now whatever is in movement is moved by something else. This first Movement, then, be a First Movement, which is itself unmovable. This first Movement must be eternal, because movement is eternal—and such it is, in Aristotle's opinion, necessarily. It can have no parts nor magnitude, because

in a finite magnitude resides a finite force, and this could not be the cause of eternal motion. The first Movent, then, is incorporeal.

Ar. finally argues that the first Movent must be at the circumference of the world, because here the movement is quickest and therefore nearest to the Source.

We cite the end of Ar.'s exposition, where he resumes his main argument.

Phys. VIII 10, 267 a²¹-b⁹:

the theory of
the Prime
Mover in
Phys. VIII

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀνάγκη κίνησιν εἶναι συνεχῆ, αὕτη δὲ μία ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη
δὲ τὴν μίαν μεγέθους τέ τινος εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ κινεῖται τὸ ἀμέγεθες), καὶ ἐνός
καὶ ὕφ' ἐνός (οὐ γὰρ ἔσται συνεχής, ἀλλ' ἐχομένη ἐτέρα ἐτέρας καὶ διηρημένη),
25 τὸ δὴ κινεῖν εἰ ἐν, ἢ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἢ ἀκίνητον ὄν. Εἰ μὲν δὴ κινούμενον,
συνακολουθεῖν δεήσει¹ καὶ μεταβάλλειν αὐτό, ἅμα δὲ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τινος.
267b Ὡστε στήσεται² καὶ ἥξει εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ ἀκινήτου· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ
ἀνάγκη συμμεταβάλλειν, ἀλλ' αἰετὶ δυνήσεται κινεῖν (ἄπονον γὰρ τὸ οὕτω³
κινεῖν) καὶ ὁμαλῆς αὕτη ἡ κίνησις, ἢ μόνη ἢ μάλιστα· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει μεταβολὴν
5 τὸ κινεῖν οὐδεμίαν. Δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ κινούμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἔχει μεταβολήν,
ἵνα ὁμοία ᾖ ἡ κίνησις.

Ἀνάγκη δὴ ἢ ἐν μέσῳ ἢ ἐν κύκλῳ εἶναι⁴. αὗται γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαί⁵. Ἀλλὰ τά-
χιστα κινεῖται τὰ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ κινεῖντος, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ τοῦ ὅλου κίνησις·
9 ἐκεῖ ἄρα τὸ κινεῖν.

514—The conclusion of the preceding passage leaves us with two problems: (1) How can a non-corporeal First Movent have its place at the outside of the universe? (2) How can it impart a physical movement?

To these questions Ar. gives the answer himself in the famous words in *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b³:

It works as
a final cause

Κινεῖ δὴ ὥς ἐρώμενον.

"It produces motion as being loved" or striven after.

Now this again leaves some difficulties: (1) If there is eternal movement, i.e. circular movement, which is the first and most perfect of motions, why then a First Mover? (2) If this First Mover, whom Ar. calls God (in *Metaph.* Λ), produces motion "as being loved", than a soul must be attributed to the first heaven; and,

¹ συνακολουθεῖν δεήσει - "it will have to be subject to the same conditions as that which it moves".

² "So we have a series that must come to an end".

³ οὕτω - sc. μὴ συμμεταβάλλον.

⁴ sc. τὸ κινεῖν. ἐν κύκλῳ - at the circumference.

⁵ αἱ ἀρχαί - sc. the first principles from which a sphere is derived. In ch. 8 Ar. has argued that only circular movement can be continuous and infinite.

if more unmoved movers are admitted (as Ar. teaches in Λ 8), so for each heavenly sphere.

Now the first point is against logic, the second against the view of modern science.

the Prime
Mover in
Metaph. Λ

515—What Ar. says further in *Metaph.* Λ , must be seen in connection with his doctrine of matter and form and of potency and act, which is expounded in the books Z - Θ (see our next chapter). We met with these principles in *Phys.* I-II.

(1) Matter is the indefinite, form the determining. In the physical world form and matter are united in the physical objects. But form can exist by itself, not in physical, but in metaphysical reality. The highest being, which as prime cause is at the beginning of all motion, must be pure form without matter.

(2) In order to explain the fact of physical change, Ar. assumes a *potential being*. This is something real (e.g. an acorn can become an oak, never a beech), but it must be brought to full reality ($\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ or $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\alpha$) by an efficient cause. Therefore the definition of motion, given sub **506c**. God, then, as supreme being, must be full reality or completion, and therefore absolutely necessary.

God as the
absolutely
necessary
being

a. *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b⁴⁻¹¹:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ' εἰ [ἡ] φορὰ πρώτη 4, 5 ἢ ἐνέργεια ἐστίν, ἣ κινεῖται ταύτῃ γε ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατ' οὐσίαν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινουὺν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνέργεια ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλω· ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν· καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, 10 καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή.

b. As absolutely necessary being, then, it is the First Principle, on which the universe depends.

Ib., 1072 b¹³⁻¹⁴:

Ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἡρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.

On this
principle
the universe
depends

One might justifiably call this a monotheistic principle. We find it expressed again at the end of the same book:

c. *Metaph.* Λ 10, 1076 a³⁻⁴.

In the preceding lines Ar. rejects the theory of Speusippus, who assumed mathematical number as first principle, instead of the Platonic Ideas and ideal Numbers. He rejects it on the ground, that by this theory a multiplicity of $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\alpha\iota$ would be introduced.

Τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς.

»Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστωα.

516—Ar. now undertakes to describe the life and character of his Prime Mover.

a. *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b¹⁴⁻³⁰:

The life of
the Prime
Mover

4, 15 Διαγωγή δ' ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐκείνο
(ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
ἐγρήγορσις αἰσθησις νόησις ἡδιστον¹, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνημαὶ διὰ ταῦτα).
ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα.
20 αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγά-
νων² καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτον νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ
καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστ' ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο³ ὁ δοκεῖ
ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἡδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὔ
25 ἔχει, ὥς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον.
ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ⁴, ἐκείνος δὲ ἡ
ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδῖος. φαινέ-
ν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶν αἰδῖον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχῆς καὶ
30 αἰδῖος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

If the question is asked: what is the relation of this God of Ar. to the world, our answer must be: Certainly not that of Creator to creation. First, Ar. assumes eternal matter; so he does not know creation in the biblical sense of the word. Secondly, his God does not know the world. He only knows Himself, and to Ar. this knowledge does not include any knowledge of the world⁵; on the contrary, it excludes it.

b. Cp. *Metaph.* Λ 9, 1074 b³³⁻³⁵:

Νόησις
νοήσεως

Αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.

517—We could read chapters 7, 9 and 10 of *Metaph.* Λ as a unity, in which we find one line of thought: the establishment of the principle of the Prime Mover, who is the one ἀρχή on which depends the whole of the universe and nature. theory of
a multiplicity
of unmoved
movers

Ch. 8 introduces a theory, which might appear to us as harmonizing rather badly with the preceding, namely, that, as there are 47 or 55 celestial spheres, for each of them an unmoved mover should be assumed.

¹ On the value of knowledge and perception in itself cp. *Metaph.* Α 1.

² θιγγάνων - in coming into contact with its objects. Cp. nr. 559b (*Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b 24 f.).

³ τοῦτο - the actual possession of its object is rather the θεῖον which thought seems to contain in itself, than "that" (ἐκείνου),—sc. than the mere δεκτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ νοητοῦ.

⁴ These words have been chosen by Werner Jaeger as a motto for his *Aristotle*.

⁵ S. Thomas Aquinas, who explained Ar. with great benevolence, found the way to a larger interpretation: directly the divine Mind knows only itself, but in Himself God knows all things. ("Nec sequitur quod omnia alia a se ei sunt ignota; nam intelligendo se intellegit omnia alia.") So also in Brentano, who christianizes Ar. even far more than S. Thomas did.

a. *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1073 a¹⁴⁻¹⁵; a^{23-b1}:

Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ¹. — 15

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινουὶν δὲ τὴν πρώτην αἰτίδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινού- 25 μενον ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τινος κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινουὶν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ' αὐτό, καὶ τὴν αἰτίδιον κίνησιν ὑπὸ αἰδίου κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ὑφ' ἑνός, ὁρῶμεν δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ παντός τὴν ἀπλὴν φορὰν, ἣν κινεῖν φαμέν τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἄλλας φορὰς οὕσας τὰς τῶν πλανήτων αἰδέιους (αἰτίδιον γὰρ καὶ 30 ἄστατον τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα· δέδεικται δ' ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ¹ περὶ τούτων), ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτων ἐκάστην τῶν φορῶν ὑπ' ἀκινήτου τε κινεῖσθαι καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ αἰδίου οὐσίας. ἢ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄστρον φύσις αἰδέιος οὐσία τις οὕσα, καὶ τὸ κινουὶν 35 αἰτίδιον καὶ πρότερον τοῦ κινουμένου, καὶ τὸ πρότερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι τοσαύτας τε οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τε φύσιν αἰδέιους καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ἄνευ μεγέθους διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν πρότερον. b

b. The numbers of these substances, then, must be determined by astronomy.

Ib., 1073 b¹⁻⁸:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσαί, καὶ τούτων τις πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν ἄστρον, φανερόν· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἥδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης φιλοσοφίας τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς 5 ἀστρολογίας· αὕτη γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν αἰδέιος δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας ², οἷον ἢ τε περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν.

c. Astronomical calculation leads Ar. to the following result.

Ib., 1074 a¹⁰⁻¹⁶:

Ὅ δὲ ἀπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν τε φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν ³ ταύτας 10 πεντήκοντά τε καὶ πέντε. εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ μὴ προστιθεῖται τις ἄς εἴπομεν κινήσεις, αἱ πᾶσαι σφαῖραι ἔσονται ἑπτὰ τε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. — τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς 15 ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους [καὶ τὰς αἰσθητάς] τοσαύτας εὐλογον ὑπολαβεῖν.

¹ Cf. *Phys.* VIII 8, 9; *De caelo* I 2, II 3-8.

² Ar. states here without any hesitation, that mathematics have no οὐσαί as their object. In E 1 (cited sub 487b) the formula is by no means so categorical. Our passage, then, seems to have been written rather late, at any rate at some posterior date than E 1.

³ ἀπασῶν - sc. τῶν σφαιρῶν, both those which move the planets and those which "roll them back", counteracting the motion of certain spheres admitted by Eudoxus and Callippus, so that the first motion is restored. Vid. Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos*, p. 217 ff.

518—This chapter ¹ is generally considered as being of a later date than the rest of book *Λ*. Jaeger, who devotes a whole chapter to this question ², estimates the interval at some twenty years at least; Mansion does not think it so long.

Place of
this theory

The question has been treated lately in an original way by Ph. Merlan in *Traditio* IV (1946), pp. 1-30. The author argues that Ar. was not concerned with the question of monotheism or polytheism at all; that indications for the latter might be found in *Phys.* VIII 6 and in *De caelo* I 9 ³ as well, and that *Metaph.* *Λ* 8 harmonizes perfectly well with its surroundings. This chapter, therefore, should not be considered as a later addition. The unmoved movers of Ar. have taken the place of the ideal Numbers of Plato, as is clearly shown in the beginning of *Λ* 8, where Ar. finds fault with Pl. for not having determined the number of these beings with any satisfying argument.

Metaph. *Λ* 8, 1073 a¹⁴,²³:

Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ
 15 λανθάνειν ⁴ ἀλλὰ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλήθους
 οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς ἰδέας ὑπόληψις οὐδε-
 μίαν ἔχει σκέψιν ἰδίαν (ἀριθμοὺς γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς ἰδέας οἱ λέγοντες ἰδέας,
 20 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅτε μὲν ὥς περὶ ἀπείρων λέγουσιν ὅτε δὲ ὥς μέχρι τῆς
 δεκάδος ὠρισμένων ⁵· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν τοσοῦτον τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἀριθμῶν,
 οὐδὲν λέγεται μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς)· ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ
 διωρισμένων λεκτέον.

Then follows the rest of the text given sub **517a**.

Now there can be little doubt that, in *Phys.* VIII too, Ar. admitted of more *ἀκίνητα*. But (1) this book is not of an early date, and (2) chapter 8 of *Metaph.* *Λ* makes the impression of a later addition. So probably Mansion is right in supposing that there is some interval between this chapter and its surroundings, but not as long a one as Jaeger thought.

¹ Except the passage 1074 b³¹⁻³⁸ ("Ὅτι δὲ εἷς οὐρανός, φανερόν E.q.s."), which seems to be an early fragment, embedded in a chapter written rather late in Ar.'s life.

² *Aristotle*, p. 342-367.

³ The reference is to 279a¹⁹⁻²⁴, where Ar. speaks of *τάκεῖ*, i.e. that which is outside the heaven, as being above place and time, immutable and immovable.

⁴ This part of the opening sentence has been cited above, sub **517a**.

⁵ We dealt with this text in **366**.

FOURTEENTH CHAPTER THE METAPHYSICS

I—THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

519—What is the object of metaphysics (in *Metaph.* A indicated by the term σοφία)?—Ar. answers in the opening chapters of this book: Wisdom is knowledge of the first causes.

Metaph. A, 1 and 2, 980 a²¹-983 a²³:

Value of
knowledge

Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. σημεῖον δ' ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀγάπησις· καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται δι' αὐτάς, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἢ διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἵνα πράττωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ μηθὲν μέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ ὄραν αἰρούμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων. αἷτιον δ' ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν ἡμᾶς αὐτῇ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς.

Its genesis ¹

Φύσει μὲν οὖν αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ ζῷα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δ' ἐγγίγνεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστί, φρόνιμα μὲν ἄνευ τοῦ μαθάνειν ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν (οἷον μέλιττα κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζῶων ἐστί), μαθάνει δ' ὅσα πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν αἰσθησιν.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνη καὶ λογισμοῖς. γίγνεται δ' ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγμα-τος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ². ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τέχνην.

Difference
between
experience
and science

Γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων ³ μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν ὅτι Καλλιὰ κάμνοντι τῇ τὴν νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε καὶ Σωκράτει καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον οὕτω

¹ The following passage should be compared with *Anal. post.* II 19 (our nr. 465). See also 457a.

² ἀποβαίνει δὲ - τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: "but really science and art come to man *through* experience".

³ τ. ἐμπειρίας ἐννοήματα - empirical notions.

10 πολλοῖς, ἐμπειρίας ἐστίν· τὸ δ' ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ' εἶδος ἐν ἀφορισθεῖσι, κάμνουσι τὴν διὰ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώδεσιν ἢ χολώδεσι [ἢ] πυρέττουσι καύσῳ, τέχνης.

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυχάνουσιν¹ οἱ ἐμπειροὶ τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον² 15 ἔχόντων (αἷτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γινῶσις ἢ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἰατρεύων ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ 20 Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων ὧ συμβέβηκεν³) ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχη τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου μὲν γνωρίζῃ τὸ δ' ἐν τούτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις διαμαρτῆσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον)· ἀλλ' ὅμως τό γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ 25 ἐπαίειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἴομεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπειρῶν ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὥς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσι· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν οἱ δ' οὐ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασιν, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν 30 αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν.

Science
knows the
causes

Διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι 981b νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν (τοὺς δ', ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια ποιεῖ μὲν, οὐκ εἰδότες δὲ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ — τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα φύσει τινὲ ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον 5 τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνους δι' ἔθους), ὥς οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρακτικούς εἶναι σοφωτέρους ὄντας ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν. ὅλως τε 10 σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος καὶ μὴ εἰδότος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγοούμεθα μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι· δύνανται γάρ, οἱ δὲ οὐ δύνανται διδάσκειν.

He who
knows can
teach

10 "Ἐτι δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμίαν ἡγοούμεθα εἶναι σοφίαν· καίτοι κυριώταται γ' εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γνώσεις· ἀλλ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ διὰ τί περὶ οὐδενός, οἷον διὰ τί θερμὸν τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι θερμόν· τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν 15 ὁποιοαῶν εὐρόντα τέχνην παρὰ⁴ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θαυμάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναί τι τῶν εὐρεθέντων ἀλλ' ὥς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· πλειόνων δ' εὐρισκομένων τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν μὲν

¹ ἐπιτυχάνουσι - "hit the mark", succeed.

² λόγον - theory.

³ ὧ συμβέβηκεν - Ross rightly remarks that it is "of course not an accident of Callias, as opposed to his essence and his properties, that he is a man". The term is used simply to indicate that it is not directly "man" that the doctor cures, but directly Callias and indirectly man because C. is a man.

⁴ παρὰ - that went beyond the common perceptions of man.

Purely
theoretical
science was
invented
last

πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ¹ οὐσῶν, αἰετὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. 20
"Οθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὐπὲρ ἐσχόλασαν· διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος.

Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς ² τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν 25 ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οὐ δ' ἕνεκα νῦν ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅτι τὴν ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν ³ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἰτία καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες· ὥστε, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὁ μὲν ἔμπειρος τῶν ὁποιοῦν ἐχόντων αἰσθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοφώτερος, ὁ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἐμπείρων, χειρο- 30 τέχνου δὲ ἀρχιτέκτων, αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ⁴ μᾶλλον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ σοφία περὶ τινὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον.

With what
causes
wisdom is
concerned

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ζητοῦμεν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον, ἡ περὶ ποίας αἰτίας καὶ περὶ ποίας ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη σοφία ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ λάβοι τις τὰς 5 ὑπολήψεις ἃς ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ, τάχ' ἂν ἐκ τούτου φανερόν γενέοιτο μᾶλλον. ὑπολαμβάνομεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὡς ἐνδέχεται ⁵, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν· εἴτα τὸν τὰ χαλεπὰ γινῶναι δυνά- 10 μενον καὶ μὴ ῥάδια ἀνθρώπῳ γινώσκειν, τοῦτον σοφόν (τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάντων κοινόν, διὸ ῥάδιον καὶ οὐδὲν σοφόν)· ἔτι τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ τὸν διδασκαλικώτερον τῶν αἰτιῶν σοφώτερον εἶναι περὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δὲ τὴν αὐτῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν αἰρετὴν οὖσαν μᾶλλον 15 εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχικωτέραν τῆς ὑπηρετούσης μᾶλλον σοφίαν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτον ἐτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸν ἥττον σοφόν.

Τὰς μὲν οὖν ὑπολήψεις τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ 20 τῶν σοφῶν· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τῷ μάλιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν (οὗτος γὰρ οἶδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα) ⁶, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα ταῦτα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου (πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐστίν), ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπι- 25 στημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσὶν (αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων ⁷, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διδασκαλικὴ γε ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητικὴ μᾶλλον (οὗτοι γὰρ διδάσκουσιν,

¹ πρὸς διαγωγὴν - πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

² *Eth. Nic.* VI 3, 1139 b¹⁴-1141 b⁸.

³ τ. ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν - elsewhere called first philosophy.

⁴ τ. ποιητικῶν - those which produce concrete results.

⁵ ὡς ἐνδέχεται - as far as possible.

⁶ πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα - all the instances that fall under the universal.

⁷ We explained this sentence sub 488b.

30 οἱ τὰς αἰτίας λέγοντες περὶ ἐκάστου), τὸ δ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῶν
 ἔνεκα ¹ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει τῇ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ (ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἐπί-
 32b στασθαι δι' αὐτὸ αἰρούμενος τὴν μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην μάλιστα αἰρήσεται,
 τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ), μάλιστα δ' ἐπιστητὰ τὰ πρῶτα
 καὶ τὰ αἷτια (διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκ τούτων τᾶλλα γνωρίζεται ἄλλ' οὐ ταῦτα
 5 διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων), ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς
 ὑπηρετούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἔνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ'
 ἐστὶ τὰγαθὸν ἐκάστου, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ ².

Especially
with the
final cause

Ἐξ ἀπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητού-
 μενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν·
 10 καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἐν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν.

“Ὅτι δ' οὐ ποιητικὴ, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων· διὰ γὰρ
 τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν. ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων ³ θαυμάσαντες, εἴτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες
 15 καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἷον περὶ τε τῶν τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων
 καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως. ὁ δ'
 ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφος πῶς
 ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων)· ὥστ' εἴπερ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν
 20 ἀγνοίαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερόν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καὶ
 οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἔνεκεν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός ⁴. σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων
 ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν ἡ τοιαύτη φρο-
 νησις ἤρξατο ζητεῖσθαι ⁵. δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρεῖαν
 25 ἐτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλευθερός ὁ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου
 ὦν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς μόνην οὖσαν ἐλευθεράν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνῃ γὰρ
 αὕτη αὐτῆς ἔνεκέν ἐστίν.

Phil. no
science with
practical use

Διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις· πολλὰ γὰρ
 30 ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ὥστε κατὰ Σιμωνίδην »θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ'
 ἔχει γέρας«, ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον μὴ οὐ ζητεῖν τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐπιστήμην ⁶.

Therefore the
only free
science

¹ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα = pursued for their own sake.

² On the primary importance of the final cause see nrs. 492 ff., 498 ff.

³ τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων - Alexander of Aphrodisias cites the following examples: why amber attracts chaff-like substances (a question which interested Thales), the nature of the rainbow (discussed by Anaximenes and by other early thinkers), and other meteorological problems.

⁴ τὸ συμβεβηκός - what really has happened; "the course of events".

⁵ I think τῶν must be inserted: in 981 b²⁷ two groups are mentioned, namely (τέχναι) αἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα, αἱ δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὔσαι, the last being partly for the material, partly for the spiritual or mental εἰς ζῆν (καὶ πρὸς ῥαστόνην κ. διαγωγὴν).

⁶ ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον e.q.s. - The quotation, known to us by Plato's *Protagoras* 341 e, continues: ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι (Edmonds, *Lyrici* II, p. 284).— οὐκ ἄξιον - "it is unfitting". Ar. again refers to this question in *Eth. Nic.* X, at

the most
divine and
honourable

εἰ δὴ λέγουσί τι οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πέφυκε φθονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ τούτου συμβῆναι 983a
μάλιστα εἰκὸς καὶ δυστυχεῖς εἶναι πάντας τοὺς περιττοὺς ¹. ἀλλ' οὔτε τὸ θεῖον
φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄοιδοί,
οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζειν τιμιωτέραν. ἡ γὰρ θειοτάτη καὶ τιμιωτά- 5
τη· τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη μόνη· ἦν τε γὰρ μάλιστ' ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, θεία τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, καὶ εἴ τις τῶν θείων εἴη. μόνη δ' αὕτη τούτων ἀμφοτέρων
τετύχηκεν· ὃ τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τῶν αἰτίων πᾶσιν ² εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, καὶ
τὴν τοιαύτην ἢ μόνος ἢ μάλιστ' ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεός. ἀναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι 10
ταύτης, ἀμείνων δ' οὐδεμία.

Its final
result

Δεῖ μέντοι πῶς καταστῆναι ³ τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς εἰς τοῦναντίον ἡμῶν τῶν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ζητήσεων. ἄρχονται μὲν γάρ, ὥστερ εἵπομεν, ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν πάντες
εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, καθάπερ <περὶ> τῶν θαυμάτων ταυτόματα ⁴ [τοῖς μήπω τε-
θεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν] ἢ περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου τροπὰς ἢ τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσυμ- 15
μετρίαν ⁵ (θαυμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσι <τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν
αἰτίαν> εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται)· δεῖ δὲ εἰς τοῦναντίον καὶ τὸ ἄμεινον
κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἀποτελευτῆσαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅταν μάθωσιν·
οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως θαυμάσειεν ἀνὴρ γεωμετρικὸς ὥς εἰ γένοιτο ἡ διάμετρος 20
μετρητή. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης, εἴρηται, καὶ τίς
ὁ σκοπὸς οὗ δεῖ τυγχάνειν τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον.

520—After having given an account of earlier philosophy (the rest of book A), Ar. now proceeds to state the main problems of metaphysics.

Metaph. B 1, 995 a²⁴–996 a¹⁷:

List of
ἀπορίαι

Ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς πρῶτον περὶ 995a
ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ πρῶτον· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπειλήφασί 25
τινες, καὶ εἴ τι χωρὶς τούτων τυγχάνει παρεωραμένον. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι
βουλομένοις προὔργον τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις
τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύνει δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν, 30
ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος· ἡ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ,
ταύτη παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προσελ-

the end of ch. 7 (1177 b²⁸): 'Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον, where he answers to this objection: Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (nr. 606b).

¹ πάντας τοὺς περιττοὺς - "all those who occupy themselves with things which do not concern them".

² πᾶσιν - of all things.

³ δεῖ καταστῆναι - must end in.

⁴ ταυτόματα - marionettes.

⁵ The incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side.

θεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον,
 τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους
 35 εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητού-
 95b μενον εὔρηκεν ἢ μὴ γινώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον τῷ δὲ προ-
 ηπορηκότι δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρῖναι τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων
 καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκοότα πάντων. — ἔστι δ' ἀπορία πρώτη
 5 μὲν περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πεφρομισασμένοις διηπορήσαμεν, πρότερον μιᾶς ἢ πολλῶν
 ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας· καὶ πρότερον τὰς τῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας
 ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἰδεῖν μόνον ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐξ ὧν δεικνύουσι πάντες,
 οἷον πρότερον ἐνδέχεται ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ ἐν ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἢ οὐ, καὶ περὶ
 10 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων· εἴ τ' ἐστὶ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, πρότερον μία περὶ πάσας
 ἢ πλείονές εἰσι, καὶ εἰ πλείονες πρότερον ἅπασαι συγγενεῖς ἢ τὰς μὲν σοφίας
 τὰς δὲ ἄλλο τι λεκτέον αὐτῶν· καὶ τοῦτο δ' αὐτὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ ζητῆσαι,
 15 πρότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μόνον φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, καὶ
 πρότερον μοναχῶς ἢ πλείονα γένη τῶν οὐσιῶν, οἷον οἱ ποιοῦντες τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ
 τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεταξὺ τούτων τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. περὶ τε τούτων οὖν,
 καθάπερ φαμέν, ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ πρότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἢ θεωρία μόνον
 20 ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτὰ ταῖς οὐσίαις, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ
 ταυτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ἀνομοίου καὶ ἐναντιότητος, καὶ περὶ προτέρου
 καὶ ὑστέρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν τοιούτων περὶ ὧν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ
 πειρῶνται σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων μόνων ποιούμενοι τὴν σκέψιν, τίνας ἐστὶ
 25 θεωρῆσαι περὶ πάντων· ἔτι δὲ τούτοις αὐτοῖς ὅσα καθ' αὐτὰ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ
 μὴ μόνον τί ἐστὶ τούτων ἕκαστον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅρα ἐν ἐνὶ ἐναντίον· καὶ πρότερον αἱ
 ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἕκαστον·
 καὶ εἰ τὰ γένη, πρότερον ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις λέγεται τελευταῖα ἢ τὰ πρῶτα,
 30 οἷον πρότερον ζῶον ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἔστι παρὰ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον.
 μάλιστα δὲ ζητητέον καὶ πραγματευτέον πρότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὴν ὕλην αἴτιον
 καθ' αὐτὸ ἢ οὐ, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστὸν ἢ οὐ, καὶ πρότερον ἐν ἢ πλείω τὸν ἀριθμὸν,
 35 καὶ πρότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον (λέγω δὲ τὸ σύνολον, ὅταν κατηγορηθῇ
 τι τῆς ὕλης) ἢ οὐθέν, ἢ τῶν μὲν τῶν δ' οὐ, καὶ ποῖα τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων. ἔτι αἱ
 996a ἀρχαὶ πρότερον ἀριθμῷ ἢ εἴδει ὠρισμέναι, καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν ὑπο-
 κειμένῳ; καὶ πρότερον τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ ἀφθάρτων αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, καὶ
 5 πρότερον ἀφθαρτοὶ πᾶσαι ἢ τῶν φθαρτῶν φθαρταί; ἔτι δὲ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώ-
 τaton καὶ πλείστην ἀπορίαν ἔχον, πρότερον τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγό-
 ρειοι καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ἕτερόν τί ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐσία τῶν ὄντων, ἢ οὐ,
 ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησι φίλιαν ἄλλος δὲ τις
 πῦρ ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα· καὶ πρότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθόλου εἰσὶν ἢ ὥς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα
 10 τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔτι πρότερον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ κίνησιν·
 καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν ἂν παράσχοι πολλήν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πρότερον οἱ ἀριθμοὶ

the chief
problem

the most
difficult one

καὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ οὐσίαι τινές εἰσιν ἢ οὐ, καὶ εἰ οὐσίαι πότερον κεχωρισμένοι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τούτοις; περὶ 15 γὰρ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ ῥᾶδιον καλῶς.

These questions are dealt with throughout the following work.

521—There is a science which investigates being as being, and is different from the sciences that investigate special parts of being.

Metaph. Γ 1, 1003 a²¹⁻³²:

Philosophy
the science
of being
as such

Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτό. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾶ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἡ αὕτη· οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμώμεναι 25 περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀκροτάτας αἰτίας ζητοῦμεν, δῆλον ὡς φύσεώς τινος αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ' αὐτήν. εἰ οὖν καὶ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦν-τες ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μὴ 30 κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀλλ' ἢ ὄν· διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας λαπτέον.

522—Ar. continues speaking about the manifold senses of the term "to be". As, then, science everywhere deals chiefly with that which is primary, the philosopher has first to do with substances.

Ib. 2, 1003 b¹⁶⁻¹⁹:

Therefore
substances
the first
object of
phil.

Πανταχοῦ δὲ κυρίως τοῦ πρώτου ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα ἥρτηται, καὶ δι' ὃ λέγονται. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν δέοι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον.

523—a. The philosopher must also consider the things that are in mathematics called axioms, for these are true of all existing things, and therefore no special science inquires into their truth.

Metaph. Γ 3, 1005 a¹⁹-b²:

Phil. must
also study
the axioms

Λεκτέον δὲ πότερον μιᾶς ἢ ἐτέρας ἐπιστήμης περὶ τε τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι καλουμένων ἀξιωμαμάτων καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας. φανερόν δὴ ὅτι μιᾶς τε καὶ τῆς 20 τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶ σκέψις· ἀπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν ἀλλ' οὐ γένει τινὶ χωρὶς ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ χρῶνται μὲν πάντες, ὅτι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἢ ὄν, ἕκαστον δὲ τὸ γένος ὄν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ χρῶνται ἐφ' ὅσον αὐτοῖς 25 ἱκανόν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅσον ἐπέχει τὸ γένος περὶ οὗ φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις· ὥστ' ἐπεὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἢ ὄντα ὑπάρχει πᾶσι (τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κοινόν), τοῦ

περὶ τὸ ὄν γνωρίζοντος καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρία. διόπερ οὐθεις τῶν κατὰ
 30 μέρος ἐπισκοπούντων ἐγχειρεῖ λέγειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἀληθὴ ἢ μὴ, οὔτε γεω-
 μέτρης οὔτ' ἀριθμητικός, ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἔνιοι, εἰκότως τοῦτο δρῶντες·
 μόνοι γὰρ ὄντο περὶ τε τῆς ὅλης φύσεως σκοπεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. ἐπεὶ
 35 τοῦ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων
 ἂν εἴη σκέψις· ἐστὶ δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη.

b. He must also study the law of contradiction, which is the most fundamental principle of all.

Ib., 1005 b⁵⁻²³:

5, 6 "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, καὶ τοῦ περὶ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας θεωροῦντος and the law
 ἢ πέφυκεν, καὶ περὶ τῶν συλλογιστικῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι, δῆλον· of contra-
 προσήκει δὲ τὸν μάλιστα γνωρίζοντα περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἔχειν λέγειν τὰς diction
 10 βεβαιοτάτας ἀρχὰς τοῦ πράγματος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα τὰς
 πάντων βεβαιοτάτας. ἐστὶ δ' οὗτος ὁ φιλόσοφος. βεβαιοτάτη δ' ἀρχὴ πασῶν
 περὶ ἣν διαψευσθῆναι ἀδύνατον· γνωριμωτάτην τε γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν
 15 τοιαύτην (περὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ γνωρίζουσιν ἀπατῶνται πάντες) καὶ ἀνυπόθετον.
 ἣν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὸν ὅτιοῦν ξυνιέντα τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπόθεσις·
 20 δὲ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ὅτιοῦν γνωρίζοντι, καὶ ἦκειν ἔχοντα ἀναγκαῖον.
 ὅτι μὲν οὖν βεβαιοτάτη ἡ τοιαύτη πασῶν ἀρχή, δῆλον· τίς δ' ἐστὶν αὕτη,
 μετὰ ταῦτα λέγωμεν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον
 20 τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό· — αὕτη δὲ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν·
 ἔχει γὰρ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν.

In the following chapters of this book the law of contradiction is established by proofs, and objections to it are refuted.

524—In E I Ar., having first divided all intellectual work into three main groups—theoretical, practical and productive—¹, next divides the theoretical sciences into three other provinces: physics, mathematics and first philosophy or theology ², the last having the ἀκίνητος οὐσία as its object.

⊕ *Metaph.* I I, 1026 a¹⁸⁻³²:

20 "Ὡστε τρεῖς ἂν εἴεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική First phil.
 or theology
 has the im-
 mutable sub-
 stance as its
 object
 20 (οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει), καὶ
 τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἰρετώταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν

¹ Our nr. 432a.

² 432b.

τις πότερόν ποθ' ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία καθόλου ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τι γένος καὶ φύσιν
 τινὰ μίαν (οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν γεω- 25
 μετρία καὶ ἀστρολογία περὶ τινὰ φύσιν εἰσὶν, ἡ δὲ καθόλου πασῶν κοινή)·
 εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ
 ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δ' ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλο-
 σοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη ¹· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν ταύτης 30
 ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι, καὶ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ὄν.

There might seem to exist a contradiction between this definition of the object of metaphysics and that of Γ 1 (cited sub 521). Duns Scotus ², who had the interpretations of Avicenna and Averroës before him, regarded them as a dilemma: Avicenna, who follows Γ 1, says that *being as such* is the object of metaphysics,—Averroës, according to E 1, teaches that this object is *God and the intelligences*. Duns Scotus, after a long hesitation, takes the part of Avicenna. Aristotle himself, however, seems not to have considered the two views as contradictory: in Γ 2 (cited sub 522) he gives, if not a synthesis, yet a transition from the first to the second.

2—PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS CRITICIZED

Chapters
A 6 and 9

525—In *Metaph.* A 6 the author gives an outline of the theory of Ideas: the introduction of supra-sensible Forms as the true object of knowledge, because sensible things are always changing ³; the assumption of mathematical objects as existing between Forms and sensibles ⁴, and the theory of first principles, the One and the great-and-small, from which the Numbers were deduced ⁵. He compares this doctrine with that of the Pythagoreans, from which it is distinguished by a few features, and concludes that Plato knew only the material and the formal cause ⁶.

In ch. 9 of the same book he gives a more elaborate criticism of the theory.

First
objection

526—*Metaph.* A 9, 990 a³³-b⁸:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν (ικανὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἄψασθαι
 τοσοῦτον)· οἱ δὲ τὰς ἰδέας αἰτίας τιθέμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ζητοῦντες τῶνδ' ὄντων
 λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις

¹ "and it will be universal in this sense, because it is first".

² *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* I, qu. 1 (Ed. Wadding, t. IV, p. 510-518).

³ Our nr. 204a; cp. 204b and 268a.

⁴ Nr. 362b, with n. 1.

⁵ Nr. 365a.

⁶ 365b.

ἀριθμηῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἷοιτο μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοῖν (σχεδὸν γὰρ ἴσα — ἢ οὐκ ἐλάττω — ἐστὶ τὰ εἶδη τούτοις 5 περὶ ὧν ζητοῦντες τὰς αἰτίας ἐκ τούτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα προῆλθον· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ὁμώνυμόν τι ἔστι καὶ παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας, τῶν τε ἄλλων ¹ ἔστιν ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰδέοις ²).

527—Ib., 990 b⁸⁻¹⁷:

Ἔτι δὲ καθ' οὓς τρόπους δείκνυμεν ³ ὅτι ἔστι τὰ εἶδη, κατ' οὐθένα φαίνεται 10 τούτων· ἐξ ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι συλλογισμόν, ἐξ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὧν οἰόμεθα τούτων εἶδη γίγνεται ⁴. κατὰ τε γὰρ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ⁵ εἶδη ἔσται πάντων ὅσων ἐπιστῆμαι εἰσί, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ⁶ καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος ⁷ τῶν φθαρτῶν· 15 φάντασμα γὰρ τι τούτων ἔστιν. ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων ⁸ οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας ⁹, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον ¹⁰ λέγουσιν.

The proofs
of the theory
examined

528—Ib., 990 b²²⁻³⁴:

Ἔτι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὑπόληψιν καθ' ἣν εἶναι φαμεν τὰς ἰδέας οὐ μόνον τῶν οὐσιῶν ἔσται εἶδη ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων (καὶ γὰρ τὸ νόημα ἐν οὐ μόνον

There should
be only
Ideas of
substances

¹ τῶν τε ἄλλων - "so also in the case of all other groups", i.e. even for those things other than substances.

² τοῖς αἰδέοις - i.e. the heavenly bodies.

³ δείκνυμεν - "we", disciples of Plato.

⁴ "others would prove the existence of Ideas of things of which we Platonists think there are none" (Ross).

⁵ The argument "from the sciences" would imply the existence of Ideas of *artefacta*, which were probably not recognized by the Platonists of Aristotle's time.

The arguments here referred to are given in a very concise form. We need the comments of Alexander of Aphrodisias to understand their sense fully.

⁶ τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν is the argument for the existence of Ideas from the existence of groups of particulars.

καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων - On the positive sense of negations according to Plato, see *Soph.* 257 d-258 b (our nr. 342). W. D. Ross comments: "There was no need to suppose bare negative Ideas; anything that could be explained by participation in a negative Idea could be explained more simply by non-participation in the positive Idea".

⁷ τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος - the argument from the fact that it is possible to think an object even when the thing has perished. Ar. argues that according to this argument there must be an Idea of each perishable thing.

⁸ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων - Ross, citing Jackson, explains: Ar. has previously pointed out certain *consequences* of Platonic arguments; he now points out certain *implications actually stated* in Plato's more accurate arguments, though unwelcome to his successors.

⁹ τῶν πρὸς τι - e.g. in the *Phaedo* the Idea of τὸ ἴσον (74 a-77 a).

¹⁰ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον - See on this argument *Parm.* 132 d-133 a (our nr. 327c).

περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι οὐ μόνον τῆς 25
οὐσίας εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτέρων, καὶ ἄλλα δὲ μυρία συμβαίνει τοιαῦτα)· κατὰ δὲ
τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς δόξας τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴ ἔστι μεθεκτὰ τὰ εἶδη, τῶν
οὐσιῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἰδέας εἶναι μόνον. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχονται ¹
ἀλλὰ δεῖ ταύτῃ ἐκάστου μετέχειν ἢ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται ² (λέγω δ' 30
οἷον, εἴ τι αὐτοδιπλασίον μετέχει, τοῦτο καὶ αἰδίου μετέχει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκὸς· συμβέβηκε γὰρ τῷ διπλασίῳ αἰδίῳ εἶναι), ὥστ' ἔσται οὐσία τὰ εἶδη.

529—Ar. now presents his main objection: Forms do not contribute anything to sensible things, nor to our knowledge of them.

Plato's
Ideas are
of no use

a. Ib., 99i a⁸⁻¹⁹:

Πάντων δὲ μάλιστα διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις τί ποτε συμβάλλεται τὰ εἶδη τοῖς
αἰδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ³ ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ φθειρομένοις· οὔτε γὰρ κινή- 10
σεως οὔτε μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν αἷτια αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὴν
ἐπιστήμην οὐθὲν βοηθεῖ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσία ἐκεῖνα τούτων· ἐν
τούτοις γὰρ ἂν ᾔην), οὔτε εἰς τὸ εἶναι, μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντά γε τοῖς μετέχουσιν·
οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως αἷτια δόξειεν εἶναι ὡς τὸ λευκὸν μεμιγμένον τῷ λευκῷ, 15
ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος λίαν εὐκίνητος ⁴, ὃν Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν πρῶτος Εὐδόξος ⁵
δ' ὕστερον καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἔλεγον (ῥᾶδιον γὰρ συναγαγεῖν πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα
πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν).

b. Ib., a¹⁹-b¹:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶ τᾶλλα κατ' οὐθένα τρόπον τῶν εἰωθότων 20
λέγεσθαι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν παραδείγματα αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν τᾶλλα κενο-
λογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικὰς. τί γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς
τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον ⁶; ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ὅμοιον ὅτιοῦν
καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ⁷, ὥστε καὶ ὄντος Σωκράτους καὶ μὴ ὄντος 25
γένοιτ' ἂν οἷος Σωκράτης· ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἴ ᾔην ὁ Σωκράτης αἰδῖος.
ἔσται τε πλείω παραδείγματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ εἶδη, οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου

¹ "for participation per accidens does not exist".

² "but a thing must share in its Form as in something not predicated of a subject".

³ τ. αἰδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν - as in 526: the heavenly bodies.

⁴ λίαν εὐκίνητος - easily refutable. On the doctrine of Anaxagoras referred to, see our nr. 124.

⁵ Eudoxus of Cnidus, the famous astronomer, who spent long years in Plato's Academy (± 365), seems to have taught that the Ideas are immanent in things, though he held that they are substances. On the last point he did not agree with the (later) theory of Ar.

⁶ These words refer to the Demiurgus in Plato's *Timaeus*.

⁷ "without being copied from it".

τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτοάνθρωπος. ἔτι οὐ μόνον τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 30 παραδείγματα τὰ εἶδη ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ γένος, ὥς γένος εἰδῶν¹.
 ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται παράδειγμα καὶ εἰκὼν.

530—Ib., 99i b¹⁻⁹:

"Ἐτι δόξειεν ἂν ἀδύνατον εἶναι χωρὶς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ ἢ οὐσία· ὥστε
 πῶς ἂν αἱ ἰδέαι οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων οὔσαι χωρὶς εἶεν; ἐν δὲ τῷ Φαίδωνι οὕτω
 λέγεται, ὥς καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι αἰτία τὰ εἶδη ἐστίν· καίτοι τῶν
 5 εἰδῶν ὄντων ὅμως οὐ γίγνεται τὰ μετέχοντα ἂν μὴ ᾗ τὸ κινῆσον, καὶ πολλὰ
 γίγνεται ἕτερα, οἷον οἰκία καὶ δακτύλιος, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶδη εἶναι· ὥστε δῆλον
 ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἷας καὶ
 τὰ ῥηθέντα νῦν.

How can
 Ideas exist
 separately?

531—Ib., 99i b⁹⁻²¹:

"Ἐτι εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἶδη, πῶς αἴτιοι ἔσονται; πότερον ὅτι ἕτεροι
 10 ἀριθμοὶ εἰσι τὰ ὄντα, οἷον ὁδὶ μὲν <ὁ> ἀριθμὸς ἄνθρωπος ὁδὶ δὲ Σωκράτης ὁδὶ
 δὲ Καλλίας; τί οὖν ἐκεῖνοι τούτοις αἰτιοὶ εἰσιν; οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ οἱ μὲν αἰτίδιοι οἱ
 δὲ μή, οὐδὲν διοίσει. εἰ δ' ὅτι λόγοι ἀριθμῶν² τάνταῦθα, οἷον ἡ συμφωνία,
 δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶν ἓν γέ τι ὧν εἰσι λόγοι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἡ ὕλη, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ
 15 οἱ ἀριθμοὶ λόγοι τινὲς ἔσονται ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον. λέγω δ' οἷον, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ
 Καλλίας λόγος ἐν ἀριθμοῖς πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος, καὶ ἄλλων
 τινῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἰδέα ἀριθμός· καὶ αὐτοάνθρωπος, εἴτ' ἀριθμός
 20 τις ὧν εἴτε μή, ὅμως ἔσται λόγος ἐν ἀριθμοῖς τινῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀριθμός, οὐδ'
 ἔσται τις διὰ ταῦτα ἀριθμός.

If Ideas are
 numbers,
 how can they
 be causes?

532—a. Ar. repeats his main objection to the theory of Ideas, and reproaches the Academy for having abandoned the chief task of philosophy: to seek the cause of sensible phenomena.

Ib., 992 a²⁴⁻²⁹:

"Ὅλως δὲ ζητούσης τῆς σοφίας περὶ τῶν φανερῶν³ τὸ αἷτιον, τοῦτο μὲν
 εἰάκαμεν (οὐθὲν γὰρ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς αἰτίας ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς),
 τὴν δ' οὐσίαν οἰόμενοι λέγειν αὐτῶν ἑτέρας μὲν οὐσίας εἶναι φαμεν, ὅπως δ'
 ἐκεῖναι τούτων οὐσίαι, διὰ κενῆς λέγομεν⁴. τὸ γὰρ μετέχειν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον
 εἵπομεν, οὐθὲν ἐστίν.

Ideas do not
 explain
 phenomena

b. Ib., a^{29-b 1}:

Οὐδὲ δὴ ὅπερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὁρῶμεν ὄν αἷτιον, δι' ὃ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς καὶ

They have
 nothing to do
 with the final
 cause

¹ In the sense of genus of various species.

² λόγοι ἀριθμῶν - ratios of numbers.

³ τ. φανερῶν - sensible things.

⁴ διὰ κενῆς λέγομεν = κενολογοῦμεν (is empty talk).

πᾶσα φύσις ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, ἣν φαμεν εἶναι μίαν τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὐθὲν ἄπτεται τὰ εἶδη, ἀλλὰ γέγονε τὰ μαθήματα τοῖς νῦν¹ ἡ φιλοσοφία, φασκόντων ἄλλων χάριν αὐτὰ δεῖν πραγματεύεσθαι.

3—SUBSTANCE

What "is" in the primary sense is substance

533—a. *Metaph. Z* I, 1028 a¹⁰⁻²⁰, 29, 31:

Τὸ ὃν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καθάπερ διειλόμεθα πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ἰο ποσαχῶς². σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι³, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουμένων. τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος φανερόν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὃν τὸ τί ἐστιν, ὅπερ σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν (ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπωμεν ποῖόν τι τόδε, ἢ ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν ἢ κακόν, ἀλλ' οὐ 15 τρίπηχυ ἢ ἄνθρωπον· ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστιν, οὐ λευκὸν οὐδὲ θερμὸν οὐδὲ τρίπηχυ, ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεόν), τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος τὰ μὲν ποσότητες εἶναι⁴, τὰ δὲ ποιότητες, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλο τι. — Δῆλον 20 οὖν ὅτι διὰ ταύτην⁵ κακείνων ἕκαστον ἐστίν, ὥστε τὸ πρῶτως ὃν καὶ οὐ τί ὃν ἀλλ' ὃν ἀπλῶς ἢ οὐσία ἂν εἴη.

Substance is primary in definition, in knowledge and in time

b. *Ib.*, 1028 a³¹-b²:

Πολλαχῶς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τὸ πρῶτον· ὅμως δὲ πάντως ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐθὲν χωριστόν, αὕτη δὲ μόνη· καὶ τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκάστου λόγῳ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐνυπάρχειν)· καὶ εἰδέναι δὲ τότ' οἴομεθα ἕκαστον 35 μάλιστα, ὅταν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος γινώμεν ἢ τὸ πῦρ, μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ πού, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τότε ἕκαστον ἴσμεν, ὅταν τί ἐστι τὸ b ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποιὸν γινώμεν.

The eternal question "What is being" means "What is substance"

c. *Ib.*, 1028 b²⁻⁴:

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαί τε καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπορούμενον, τί τὸ ὃν, τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἢ οὐσία.

¹ τοῖς νῦν - The reference is certainly to Speusippus, head of the Academy since the death of Plato.

² Sc. in Δ 7.

³ τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι - It should be noticed that the author, before coming to his definitive conception of οὐσία, in the beginning of this very book uses the term in exactly the same way as it is used in *Categ.* 5 (our nr. 438a), namely, not only in the sense of essence or quiddity (τί ἐστι), but also in the sense of *the individual being*.

⁴ τῷ - εἶναι: "by the fact that they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it", etc.

⁵ διὰ ταύτην - sc. τ. πρώτῃν κατηγορίαν.

534—Having first qualified οὐσία as τί ἐστί or as τόδε τι, Ar. now proceeds to ask whether, then, natural bodies and their parts are substances (as he seems inclined to admit ¹), or something else next to them (e.g. Ideas and mathematical objects), or even not these but some other things.

Metaph. Z 2, 1028 b⁸⁻¹⁵:

Are natural
bodies and
their parts
substances?

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν (διὸ τὰ τε ζῷα
10 καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν οὐσίας εἶναι φαμεν, καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα,
οἷον πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον, καὶ ὅσα ἡ μόρια ἡ
τούτων ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ μορίων ἡ πάντων, οἷον ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μόρια
αὐτοῦ, ἄστρα καὶ σελήνη καὶ ἥλιος)· πότερον δὲ αὐταὶ μόναι οὐσίαι εἰσὶν ἢ καὶ
15 ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐθὲν ἕτεραι δὲ τινες, σκεπτέον.

535—a. Four possibilities must be considered.

Metaph. Z 3, 1028 b³³⁻³⁶:

Four
meanings
of the term
"substance"

Λέγεται δ' ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν τέτταρσί γε μάλιστα· καὶ γὰρ
τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑκάστου, καὶ
τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

b. *Ib., 1028 b³⁶-1029 a²:*

Can the sub-
stratum be
substance?

Τὸ δ' ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καθ' οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτὸ μηκέτι
κατ' ἄλλου· διὸ πρῶτον περὶ τούτου διοριστέον· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι
οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον.

c. Now matter is defined as that which is nothing in itself: neither a definite being, nor a quantity nor any other thing by which being is qualified (our nr. 476c). "For there is something of which each of this is predicated"...

Ib., 1029 a²⁶⁻³³:

Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων θεωροῦσι συμβαίνει οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην· ἀδύνατον δέ· *In fact, this
consequence
is impossible*
καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, διὸ τὸ
εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης. τὴν μὲν τοίνυν
30 ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἐκ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ἀφετέον, ὅστερα
γὰρ καὶ δῆλ· φανερά δὲ πως καὶ ἡ ὕλη· περὶ δὲ τῆς τρίτης σκεπτέον, αὕτη
γὰρ ἀπορωτάτη.

536—Ar. now proceeds to study essence. He begins with some logical remarks.

Substance
as essence

¹ Note the expressions φανερώτατα μὲν and φαμεν.

Metaph. Z 4, 1029 b₁₃₋₁₆:

b. Only those things have an essence whose account is a definition.

E.g., "white man" cannot be defined, because it is a compound of substance and another category, the essence being "just what something is".

[illegible]

•(Նդառնալիցիոն Նո Զոն

d. Ib., 1030 a¹⁴⁻³²:

[illegible]

Иб., 1030 б-7:

5. අනුමැතිය ලබාදීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය වන ප්‍රධාන කාරණා

537—In the next chapter (5) Ar. deals with some difficulties concerning the definition of τὰ οὐχ ἀπλᾶ, ἀλλὰ συνδεδυασμένα, such as σιμότης, where the definition of “snub” always implies a reference to the substance to which it belongs (“nose”). Ultimately all terms in categories other than substance are shown to be in principle of this type, the definition of them being ἐκ προσθέσεως, i.e. involving a reference to the substance to which they belong.

Metaph. Z 5, 1031 a¹⁻⁵:

Δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι μόνης τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν, ἀνάγκη ἐκ προσθέσεως εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ ἵπποιοῦ¹ καὶ περιττοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ ζώου (τὸ δὲ ἐκ προσθέσεως λέγω ἐν οἷς συμβαίνει δις τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις).

The definition of compounds always ἐκ προσθέσεως

538—Ar. now raises the question whether a thing is identical with its essence. He answers: Not always. E.g. not in terms formed by a substance coupled with an accidental predicate, such as “white man”. But in terms καθ’ αὐτό they are the same. E.g. “the Good” itself cannot differ from its essence, nor can “living being”.

a. *Metaph.* Z 6, 1031 a¹⁵⁻¹⁸:

Is each thing = its essence?

Πότερον δὲ ταυτὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ἕτερον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον, σκεπτέον. ἔστι γὰρ τι πρὸ ἔργου πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας σκέψιν· ἕκαστόν τε γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἢ ἕκαστου οὐσία.

b. *Ib.*, 1031 a¹⁹⁻²⁴:

Not in the case of accidental unities

Ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν λεγομένων κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δόξειεν ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι, οἷον λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἕτερον καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὡς φασίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ.

c. *Ib.*, 1031 a^{28-b⁴}, b¹¹⁻¹⁵:

but in the case of self-subsistent beings

30 Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ’ αὐτὰ λεγομένων ἄρ’ ἀνάγκη ταυτὸ εἶναι, οἷον εἴ τινας εἰσὶν οὐσίαι ὧν ἕτεραι μὴ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι μηδὲ φύσεις ἕτεραι πρότεραι, οἷας φασὶ
b τὰς ιδέας εἶναι τινας; εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἕτερον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, καὶ ζῶον καὶ τὸ ζῶον, καὶ τὸ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἔσονται ἄλλαι τε οὐσίαι καὶ φύσεις καὶ ιδέαι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας, καὶ πρότεραι οὐσίαι ἐκείναι, εἰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία ἐστίν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπολελυμένοι ἀλλήλων, τῶν μὲν² οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη

¹ ποιοῦ codd. Bonitz conjectured ἀρτίου.

² τῶν μὲν - the οὐσίαι.

τὰ δ' ¹ οὐκ ἔσται ὄντα. — Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, <καὶ> ὅσα μὴ κατ' ἄλλο λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ πρῶτα· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν ἂν ὑπάρχη, καὶ μὴ ἦ εἶδη, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως καὶ ἦ εἶδη.

Other
argument
for the
identity

d. Ib., 1031 b¹⁸⁻²²:

Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων ἐν καὶ ταῦτό οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι γε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἕκαστον τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ² ἀνάγκη ἐν τι εἶναι ἄμφο.

The case of
accidental
terms

e. Ib., 1031 b²²⁻²⁸:

(τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ λευκόν, διὰ τὸ διττὸν σημαίνειν οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὡς ταῦτό τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὅ συμβέβηκε λευκὸν καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός ³, ὥστ' ἔστι μὲν ὡς ταῦτόν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ ταῦτό τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ ταῦτό, τῷ πάθει δὲ ταῦτό ⁴).

Conclusion

f. Ib., 1032 a⁴⁻⁶:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ λεγομένων τὸ ἑκάστω εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν ἐστι, δῆλον.

Essence and
definition

539—After a digression on the various kinds of becoming (ch. 7-9), Ar. now raises the question as to what belongs to the essence, and therefore to the definition. Should the definition of a whole contain the definitions of the parts?

Whole and
parts

a. *Metaph. Z* 10, 1034 b²⁰⁻²⁸:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ⁵ ἐστὶ, πᾶς δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ὡς δὲ ὁ λόγος 20 πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ μέρος τοῦ πράγματος ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀπορεῖται ἤδη πότερον δεῖ τὸν τῶν μερῶν λόγον ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὅλου λόγῳ ἢ οὐ. ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ φαίνονται ἐνόντες ἐνίων δ' οὐ. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κύκλου ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν 25 στοιχείων· καίτοι διαιρεῖται καὶ ὁ κύκλος εἰς τὰ τμήματα ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα.

¹ τὰ δὲ - the Ideas themselves, e.g. the Good.

² It becomes clear by the exhibition of instances.

³ "For both that to which the accidental quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white" (Ross).

⁴ But it will be the same as the quality "white".

⁵ Ross translates "formula", with reference to *De interpr.* 16 b²⁶ (our nr. 442a).

b. Then, are the parts prior to the whole?

Ib., 1034 b²⁸⁻³²:

Are the parts
prior?

"Ἐτι δὲ εἰ πρότερα τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου, τῆς δὲ ὀρθῆς ἡ ὀξεῖα μέρος καὶ ὁ δάκ-
τυλος τοῦ ζώου, πρότερον ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀξεῖα τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
που. δοκεῖ δ' ἐκεῖνα εἶναι πρότερα· τῷ λόγῳ γὰρ λέγονται ἐξ ἐκείνων¹, καὶ
τῷ εἶναι δὲ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων πρότερα².

540—Why, then, is man prior to the finger and a circle to its segments,
whereas individual letters are prior to the syllable?—Ar. answers:
material parts are not prior, parts of the form are.

a. Ib., 1035 a¹⁻¹²:

Material
parts not
prior

Εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων, καὶ οὐσία ἢ τε ὕλη καὶ
τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι μὲν ὥς καὶ ἡ ὕλη μέρος τινὸς λέγεται, ἔστι δ'
ὥς οὐ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ὁ τοῦ εἶδους λόγος³. οἷον τῆς μὲν κοιλότητος οὐκ ἔστι μέρος
5 ἡ σάρξ (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἐφ' ἧς γίγνεται), τῆς δὲ σιμότητος μέρος· καὶ τοῦ
μὲν συνόλου ἀνδριάντος μέρος ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ δ' ὥς εἶδους λεγομένου ἀνδριάντος
οὐ (λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον⁴, τὸ δ' ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε
καθ' αὐτὸ λεκτέον⁵)· διὸ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κύκλου λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων,
10 ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου
μέρη τοῦ εἶδους καὶ οὐχ ὕλη, τὰ δὲ τμήματα οὕτως μέρη ὥς ὕλη ἐφ' ἧς ἐπι-
γίγνεται.

b. So parts of the definition are prior. E.g. the acute angle is not
a preceding part of the right angle, but the right angle is logically prior.
For the acute angle is defined as being smaller than the right angle.

Ib., 1035 b⁴⁻⁸:

E.g. the
acute angle

"Ὅσα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λόγου μέρη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὁ λόγος, ταῦτα πρότερα
ἢ πάντα ἢ ἓν· ὁ δὲ τῆς ὀρθῆς λόγος οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ὀξεῖας λόγον⁶, ἀλλ' <ὁ>
τῆς ὀξεῖας εἰς ὀρθήν· χρῆται γὰρ ὁ ὀριζόμενος τὴν ὀξεῖαν τῇ ὀρθῇ· »ἐλάττω«
γὰρ »ὀρθῆς« ἡ ὀξεῖα.

¹ The parts are explained by reference to the whole (ἐξ ἐκείνων λέγονται).

² "in respect also of the power of existing apart from each other the wholes are prior to the parts" (Ross).

³ ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν etc. - but only the elements of which the formula of the form exists.

⁴ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ εἶδος ἔχει - "the form, or the thing as having form, should be said to be the thing".

⁵ τὸ δ' ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε - "but the material element by itself must never be said to be so".

⁶ The formula of the right angle does not include the formula of the acute angle.

c. Other examples and conclusion. Ib. 1035 b⁹⁻¹⁴:

Parts of the
definition
prior

‘Ομοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον ἔχουσιν· τὸ γὰρ ἡμικύκλιον τῷ κύκλῳ ὀρίζεται καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὄλῳ· »τὸ αὖ γὰρ »τοιόνδε μέρος ἀνθρώπου αὖ δάκτυλος. ὥσθ’ ὅσα μὲν μέρη ὡς ὕλη καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν διαιρεῖται ὡς ὕλην, ὕστερα· ὅσα δὲ ὡς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἓν αἶν.

d. Thus in living beings, too: parts of the soul have priority, material parts have not.

So in the case
of living
beings

Ib., 1035 b¹⁴⁻²²:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζώων ψυχὴ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι (ἕκαστον γοῦν 15 τὸ μέρος ἐὰν ὀρίζεται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὀριεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ αἰσθησεως), ὥστε τὰ ταύτης μέρη πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἓν αἶν τοῦ συνόλου ζώου, καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον δὲ ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου μέρη ὕστερα ταύτης 20 τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ὡς εἰς ὕλην οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον.

541—To the question whether matter should be admitted into the definition of physical beings, these being essentially composed of form and matter, Ar. answers: no, matter does not enter into the definition.

a. Ib., 1035 b²⁷⁻³¹:

matter the
individuating
principle

‘Ὁ δ’ ἀνθρώπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα, καθόλου δέ ¹, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία ἀλλὰ σύνολόν τι ἐκ τουδὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τησδὶ τῆς ὕλης ὡς καθόλου· καθ’ ἕκαστον δ’ ἐκ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕλης ὁ Σωκράτης ἤδη ἐστίν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.

In the last sentence (καθ’ ἕκαστον δὲ e.q.s.) matter is qualified as the principle of individuation: “As to the individual, immediately after the ultimate matter Socrates comes in”.

Only parts of
the form are
parts of the
definition

b. Ib., 1035 b^{31-1036 a²}:

Μέρος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ εἶδους (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) καὶ τοῦ συνόλου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης <καὶ τῆς ὕλης> αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐ μέρος τὸ οὐ εἶδος μόνον ἐστίν, ὃ δὲ λόγος ἐστὶ τοῦ καθόλου· τὸ γὰρ κύκλω εἶναι καὶ κύκλος καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴ ταυτό.

Concrete
things not
definable

c. Ib., 1036 a²⁻⁸:

Τοῦ δὲ συνόλου ἤδη, οἷον κύκλου τουδὶ καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστά τινος ἢ αἰσθητοῦ

¹ τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα etc. - terms which are thus applied to individuals, but universally.

ἡ νοητοῦ — λέγω δὲ νοητοὺς μὲν οἷον τοὺς μαθηματικούς, αἰσθητοὺς δὲ οἷον τοὺς χαλκοῦς καὶ τοὺς ξυλίνους — τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἀλλὰ μετὰ νοήσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζονται, ἀπελθόντες δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας¹ οὐ δῆλον πότερον εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ λέγονται καὶ γνωρίζονται τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ.

d. Ib., 1036 a⁸⁻¹²:

Ἡ δ' ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν. ὕλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητὴ ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ νοητή, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινήτῃ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ἢ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά.

ὕλη αἰσθητή
and
ὕλη νοητή

ὕλη νοητή is identified by Alexander with extension.

542—Ar. now proceeds to discuss the question why that, the account of which is a definition, is one.

E.g.: why is "two-footed animal" one and not two? "Man" and "white" are two when the one does not belong to the other, one when it does. But in "two-footed animal" one element does not share in the other; the genus does not share in the differentiae (else it would share in contraries at the same time). And even if it were to share in its differentiae, the same difficulty would arise, for the differentiae of man are more than one: possessed of feet, two-footed, wingless. Why, then, are these one?

Ar. answers: ζῷον is the genus, διπουν the differentia. But this difference is to be divided again, and again, until the indivisible species is reached. The last difference will be the substance and definition of the thing.

Metaph. Z 12, 1038 a¹⁶⁻²⁰:

Οὕτως αἰεὶ βούλεται βαδίζειν ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὰ ἀδιάφορα· τότε δ' ἔσονται τοσαῦτα εἶδη ποδὸς ὅσαι περ αἱ διαφοραὶ, καὶ τὰ ὑπόποδα ζῶα ἴσα ταῖς διαφοραῖς. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, φανερόν ὅτι ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος ἔσται καὶ ὁ ὁρισμός.

So the last difference constitutes the unity of the subject of a definition.

543—The author now comes to his conclusions from the preceding points (ch. 13-17).

a. First, the universal cannot be a substance.

Ib. Z 13, 1038 b⁸⁻¹⁶:

Ἦοικε γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οὐσίαν εἶναι ὅτι οὖν τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων.
10 Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐσία ἐκάστου ἢ ἴδιος ἐκάστῳ, ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινόν· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὃ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. τίνος οὖν οὐσία τοῦτ' ἔσται; ἢ γὰρ πάντων ἢ οὐδενός, πάντων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε·

No universal
a substance

First
reason

¹ ἀπελθόντες ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας - as soon as they are no more actuated by νόησις or by αἰσθησις.

ἐνός δ' εἴ ἐσται, καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦτ' ἐσται· ὧν γὰρ μία ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐν.

Second
reason

Ἐτι οὐσία λέγεται τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ καθόλου καθ' ὑποκειμένου 15
τινός λέγεται αἰεί.

b. No substance can consist of substances.

Ib., 1039 a³-10:

No substance
consists of
substances

Ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχουσῶν ὡς ἐντελεχεία· τὰ γὰρ
δύο οὕτως ἐντελεχεία οὐδέποτε ἐν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ἦ, ἐσται 5
ἐν (οἷον ἡ διπλασία ἐκ δύο ἡμίσεων δυνάμει γε· ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει),
ὥστ' εἰ ἡ οὐσία ἐν, οὐκ ἐσται ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν
τρόπον, ὃν λέγει Δημόκριτος ὀρθῶς· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναί φησιν ἐκ δύο ἐν ἡ ἐξ
ἐνός δύο γενέσθαι.

10

544—The next consequence concerns the theory of Ideas.

Absurd con-
sequences as
to the Ideas

Metaph. Z 14, 1039 a³⁰-b⁶, b¹⁷-19:

Εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τις ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν τόδε τι καὶ κεχωρισμένον, ἀνάγκη
καὶ ἐξ ὧν, οἷον τὸ ζῶον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, τόδε τι σημαίνειν καὶ εἶναι χωριστὰ
καὶ οὐσίας· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ζῶον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔππῳ καὶ τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ σὺ σαυτῷ, πῶς τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι χωρὶς ἐν ἐσται, καὶ διὰ τί b
οὐ καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐσται τὸ ζῶον τοῦτο; ἔπειτα εἰ μὲν μεθέξει τοῦ δίποδος
καὶ τοῦ πολυπόδος, ἀδύνατόν τι συμβαίνει, τάναντία γὰρ ἅμα ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ
ἐνὶ καὶ τῷδὲ τινι ὄντι· εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ὅταν εἴπη τις τὸ ζῶον εἶναι δίπουν 5
ἢ πεζόν; ἀλλ' ἴσως σύγκειται καὶ ἄπτεται ἢ μέμικται· ἀλλὰ πάντα ἄτοπα. —
Εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον οὕτως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν εἶδη αὐτῶν οὕτως ὡς
τινές φασιν.

Therefore,
Ideas no
substances

545—Another consequence: concrete individual beings are not definable;
—therefore, the Ideas, which are said to be separate particulars (!),
cannot be defined.

Individual
beings not
definable

a. *Metaph. Z* 15, 1039 b²⁰-31:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οὐσία ἐτέρα, τό τε σύνολον καὶ ὁ λόγος (λέγω δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν οὕτως 20
ἐστὶν οὐσία, σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ συνειλημμένος ὁ λόγος, ἡ δ' ὁ λόγος ὅλως), ὅσαι μὲν
οὖν οὕτω λέγονται, τούτων μὲν ἐστὶ φθορά (καὶ γὰρ γένεσις), τοῦ δὲ λόγου
οὐκ ἐστὶν οὕτως ὥστε φθείρεσθαι (οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις, οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκία
εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ), ἀλλ' ἄνευ γένεσεως καὶ φθορᾶς εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ 25
εἰσίν· δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ταῦτα γεννᾷ οὐδὲ ποιεῖ. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν
οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα οὔτε ὀρισμός οὔτε ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν,
ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὕλην ἧς ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη ὥστ' ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ· διὸ
φθαρτὰ πάντα τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αὐτῶν.

30

b. *Ib.*, 1040 a⁸⁻⁹:

Οὐδὲ δὴ ἰδέαν οὐδεμίαν ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ ἰδέα, ὡς φασί, καὶ χωριστή.

Therefore,
no definition
of Ideas

A very strange conclusion, which, really, does not redound to the credit of its author.

546—Two wrong views about substance.

a. *Metaph.* Z 16, 1040 b⁵⁻¹⁰:

5 Φανερόν δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν δοκουσῶν εἶναι οὐσιῶν αἱ πλεῖσται δυνάμεις εἰσί, τὰ τε μόρια τῶν ζώων (οὐθὲν γὰρ κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν ἐστίν· ὅταν δὲ χωρισθῇ, καὶ τότε ὄντα ὡς ὕλη πάντα) καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐν 10 ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷον σωρός, πρὶν ἢ πεφθῇ καὶ γένηται τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν.

Most
so-called
substances
are
potentialities

b. *Ib.*, b 16-27:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐν λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τοῦ ἐνός μία, καὶ ὦν μία ἀριθμῶ ἐν ἀριθμῶ¹, φανερόν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἐν οὔτε τὸ ὄν ἐνδέχεται οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ στοιχείω εἶναι ἢ ἀρχῇ· ἀλλὰ ζητοῦμεν 20 τίς οὖν ἡ ἀρχή, ἵνα εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀναγάγωμεν. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν τούτων² οὐσία τὸ ὄν καὶ ἐν ἢ ἡ τε ἀρχή καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ τὸ αἷτιον, οὐπω δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μὴδ' ἄλλο κοινὸν μὴδὲν οὐσία· οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἡ οὐσία ἀλλ' 25 ἡ αὐτῇ τε καὶ τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οὗ ἐστίν οὐσία. ἔτι τὸ ἐν πολλαχῇ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅμα, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἅμα πολλαχῇ ὑπάρχει· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπάρχει παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα χωρίς.

Unity and
being are no
substances

To the question why a thing is, and why it is one, Plato answered: because it participates of being and of unity. Ar. rejects this answer, for the "one" and "being" are no substances. They are κοινά, being predicated of all things.

547—Ar.'s final view of substance: substance is "form" or "quiddity".

a. Ar. now again asks the question: Why is a thing what it is? E.g. why are these stones etc. a house?

Metaph. Z 17, 1041 a²⁶⁻³²:

Διὰ τί ταδί, οἷον πλίνθοι καὶ λίθοι, οἰκία ἐστίν; φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ζητεῖ τὸ αἷτιον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὡς εἰπεῖν λογικῶς, ὃ ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν ἐστὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, οἷον ἰσως ἐπ' οἰκίας ἢ κλίνης, ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τί ἐκίνησε πρῶτον· 30 αἷτιον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἷτιον ἐπὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ζητεῖται καὶ φθείρεσθαι, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι.

Why is a
thing
what it is?

¹ ὦν μία ἀριθμῶ ἐν ἀριθμῶ - as things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, —

² τούτων - partitively: of these concepts.

b. The question really means: why is this material a certain thing?

Because the quiddity belongs to it

Ib., 1041 b^{4,9}:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί <τί> ἐστίν· οἷον οἰκία ταδὶ διὰ τί; ὅτι ὑπάρχει δὲ ἦν οἰκία εἶναι. καὶ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδί ἔχον. ὥστε τὸ αἷτιον ζητεῖται τῆς ὕλης (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος) ὃ τί ἐστίν· τοῦτο δ' ἡ οὐσία.

This, then, is Ar.'s final answer to the question: what substance is.

4—POTENCY AND ACTUALITY

548—a. A definition of "potency" in its primary sense ("power") is given in

Primary sense of the term δύναμις

Metaph. Θ 1, 1046 a¹¹:

ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο.

"a source of change in another thing, or in the thing itself *qua* other".

b. From this primary sense the author derives (a) the potency of being acted on by another or by the thing itself *qua* other; and (b) insusceptibility to change for the worse by the agency of another thing, etc.

Derived notions

Ib., 1046 a^{11,16}:

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἢ ἄλλο· ἡ δ' ἐξὶς ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἢ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὅροις ὁ τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως λόγος.

c. Ar. wants to distinguish the notion of "power" of the term δύναμις from the notion of "potentiality". This sense of the term is explained in ch. 6 of the same book,

Potentiality

1048 a^{32,35}:

Λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει (sc. ὑπάρχειν τὸ πράγμα) οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὄλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἂν δυνατός ᾗ θεωρῆσαι.

549—Ar. continues speaking on potency in the sense of "power".

Rational and non-rational powers

Metaph. Θ 2, 1046 a^{36-b⁹}, 15.20:

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν β δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου· διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσὶν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι μία

5 ἑνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον ἢ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας.
αἷτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ
τὴν στέρησιν. — Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἢ δ' ἐπιστήμη
δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν
17 ὑγίειαν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα,
ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἄμφω.

550—The existence of any “potential being” when there is no actuality, is denied by the Megarian school¹. Ar. defends his theory against this attack.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 3, 1046 b²⁹⁻³³:

The attack
of the Mega-
rian school

Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἳ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι²,
ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδο-
μεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.

b. *Ib.*, 1046 b^{33-1047 a}¹⁷:

Absurd
consequences
of this theory

Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτ' οἰκοδόμος ἐστὶ ἐὰν μὴ οἰκοδομῇ (τὸ γὰρ οἰκοδόμῳ
35 εἶναι τὸ δυνατῷ εἶναι ἐστὶν οἰκοδομεῖν), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν.
εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν τέχνας μὴ μαθόντα ποτὲ καὶ λαβόντα, καὶ
1047a μὴ ἔχειν μὴ ἀποβαλόντα ποτέ (ἢ γὰρ λήθη ἢ πάθει τινὶ ἢ χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ
τοῦ γε πράγματος φθαρέντος, ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν), ὅταν παύσῃται, οὐχ ἔξει τὴν
τέχνην, πάλιν δ' εὐθὺς οἰκοδομήσει πῶς λαβών;

5 Καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα δὴ ὁμοίως· οὔτε γὰρ ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε γλυκὺ οὔτε
ὅλως αἰσθητὸν οὐθὲν ἐστὶ μὴ αἰσθανομένων· ὥστε τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον³
συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αἰσθησιν ἔξει οὐδὲν ἂν μὴ αἰσθάνηται
μηδ' ἐνεργῇ. εἰ οὖν τυφλὸν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, πεφυκὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ ἐτι
10 ὄν, οἱ αὐτοὶ τυφλοὶ ἔσονται πολλάκις τῆς ἡμέρας, καὶ κωφοί.

Ἔτι εἰ ἀδύνατον τὸ ἐστερημένον δυνάμεως, τὸ μὴ γιγνόμενον ἀδύνατον
ἐστὶ γενέσθαι· τὸ δ' ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ὁ λέγων ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἐσεσθαι ψεύσεται
15 (τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο ἐσθαι μάλιστα), ὥστε οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐξαιροῦσι καὶ κίνησιν
καὶ γένεσιν. ἀεὶ γὰρ τό τε ἐσθηκὸς ἐστήξεται καὶ τὸ κατήμενον καθεδεῖται·
οὐ γὰρ ἀναστήσεται ἂν καθεζέται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐστὶ ἀναστῆναι ὅ γε μὴ
δύναται ἀναστῆναι.

Actuality

551—Ar. now proceeds to explain what actuality is.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 6, 1048 a^{30-32, 35}:

¹ See our nrs. 234 and 235.

² ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι - “that there is only δύναμις when there is ἐνέργεια”.

³ τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον - see our nr. 171.

Ἔστι δὴ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει ¹. — τὸ δὲ ² ἐνεργεία.

b. The author wishes to explain the thing by instances, not by definition. He apologizes for this method.

Explained
by instances

Ib., 1048 a³⁵-b⁵:

Δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ ὁ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ ³⁵
παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν
πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν ³, καὶ τὸ ἐργηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὀρῶν πρὸς b
τὸ μῦον μὲν ὅψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ
τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον. ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς θατέρω μορίῳ
ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη θατέρω δὲ τὸ δυνατόν.

5

Difference
between
movement
and actuality

552—Potential being must be actualized by a moving cause; but movement as such is not really action, or not complete action. It is actuality only when the end is present in it.

Ib., 1048 b¹⁸⁻³⁵:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἔστι πέρας οὐδεμία τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος,
οἷον τὸ ἰσχυαίνειν ἢ ἰσχυασία [αὐτό], αὐτὰ δὲ ⁴ ὅταν ἰσχυαίνῃ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν ²⁰
κινήσει, μὴ ὑπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἡ κίνησις ⁵, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα πρᾶξις ἢ οὐ τελεία
γε (οὐ γὰρ τέλος). ἀλλ' ἐκείνη <ῆ> ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος καὶ [ῆ] πρᾶξις. οἷον
ὀρᾷ ἅμα <καὶ ἐώρακε>, καὶ φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε>, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν.
ἀλλ' οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδ' ὑγιαίνει καὶ ὑγίασται. εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ²⁵
ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔδει ἂν ποτε παύεσθαι
ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχυαίνῃ, νῦν δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν. τούτων δὴ <δεῖ> τὰς μὲν
κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχυασία μάθῃσις
βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις. αὐταὶ δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει ³⁰
καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ οἰκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ
κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν. ἐώρακε δὲ καὶ
ὀρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω,
ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν.

35

553—When is one thing the potency of another? E.g. can we say that earth is potentially a man, or even that sperma is?

¹ Here follows the description of the δυνάμει ὄν, cited sub 548c.

² The thing which stands in contrast to this.

³ τὸ οἰκοδομικόν - that which is capable of building.

⁴ αὐτὰ δὲ - the bodies.

⁵ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα etc. - without being already that at which the movement aims.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 7, 1048 b³⁷-1049 a⁵:When does a
thing exist
potentially?

Πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἔστιν ἕκαστον καὶ πότε οὐ, διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ὅποτε οὖν. οἷον ἡ γῆ ἄρ' ἔστι δυνάμει ἄνθρωπος; ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν ἤδη γένηται σπέρμα, καὶ οὐδὲ τότε ἴσως; ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ὑπὸ ἱατρικῆς ἅπαν ἂν ὑγιασθεῖη οὐδ' ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι ὃ δυνάτὸν ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὑγιαῖνον δυνάμει.

b. Ar. distinguished two ways of passing from potentiality into actuality: (1) ἀπὸ διανοίας, i.e. by art, (2) in natural beings by an immanent principle (ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι).

Ib., 1049 a⁵⁻¹²:In products
of art

5 "Ὅρος δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐντελεχείᾳ γιγνομένου ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν βουληθέντος γίγνηται μηθενὸς καλύοντος τῶν ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ, ὅταν μηθὲν καλύῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· ὁμοίως δὲ δυνάμει καὶ οἰκία· εἰ μηθὲν καλύει τῶν ἐν τούτῳ καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι οἰκίαν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὃ δεῖ
10 προσγενέσθαι ἢ ἀπογενέσθαι ἢ μεταβαλεῖν, τοῦτο δυνάμει οἰκία· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ὅσων ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως.

c. Ib., 1049 a¹³⁻¹⁸:In natural
beings

Καὶ ὅσων δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μηθενὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται δι' αὐτοῦ· οἷον τὸ σπέρμα οὐπῶ (δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ <πεσεῖν> καὶ μετα-
15 βάλλειν), ὅταν δ' ἤδη διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς ἢ τοιοῦτον, ἤδη τοῦτο δυνάμει· ἐκεῖνο δὲ¹ ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται, ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ οὐπῶ ἀνδριάς δυνάμει (μεταβαλοῦσα γὰρ ἔσται χαλκός).

554—Actuality is prior to potency in the broadest sense.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 8, 1049 b⁴⁻¹²:Actuality
prior to
potency

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πρότερον διώριται ποσαχῶς λέγεται², φανερόν ὅτι πρότερον
5 ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως ἔστιν. λέγω δὲ δυνάμεως οὐ μόνον τῆς ὠρισμένης ἢ λέγεται ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἡ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὅλως πάσης ἀρχῆς κινητικῆς ἢ στατικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν ταύτῳ [γίγνεται· ἐν ταύτῳ γὰρ] γένει τῇ δυνάμει.
10 ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινητικὴ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτό. — πάσης δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης προτέρα ἔστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ· χρόνῳ δ' ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δὲ ὥς οὐ.

b—First it is logically prior. Ib., 1049 b¹²⁻¹⁷:

i. logically

Τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δῆλον (τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνάτὸν ἔστι τὸ πρῶτως δυνάτὸν, οἷον λέγω οἰκοδομικόν τὸ δυνάμενον οἰκοδομεῖν,

¹ ἐκεῖνο δὲ - in the former state.² διώριται - namely, in Δ 11.

καὶ ὁρατικὸν τὸ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ὁρατὸν τὸ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ 15 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸν λόγον προϋπάρχειν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς γνώσεως).

c. Next, it is prior in time in the following sense.

2. in time Ib., 1049 b¹⁷⁻²⁷:

τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πρότερον ᾧδε· τὸ τῷ εἶδει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦν πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δ' οὐ. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι τοῦδε μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος κατ' ἐνέργειαν 20 καὶ τοῦ σίτου καὶ τοῦ ὀρῶντος πρότερον τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὁρατικόν, ἃ δυνάμει μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος καὶ σῖτος καὶ ὀρῶν, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὐπω· ἀλλὰ τούτων πρότερα τῷ χρόνῳ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα ἐγένετο· αἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, 25 οἷον ἀνθρώπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, αἰ κινουντός τινας πρώτου· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἐστίν.

3. in substance

d. Thirdly, it is prior in substance. Ib., 1050 a⁴⁻¹⁰:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσίᾳ γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα (οἷον ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπος σπέρματος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δ' οὐ), καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος ¹ (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἔνεκα ἢ γένεσις), τέλος δ' ἢ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἢ δύναμις λαμβάνεται.

Actuality either in the object, or in the agent

555—a. Actuality can either be in the object which is made, or in the agent.

Ib., 1050 a³⁰⁻³³:

Ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερον τί ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν 30 ἢ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν (οἷον ἢ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἢ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὕφαινομένῳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἢ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ)· ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἢ ἐνέργεια (οἷον ἢ ὁρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἢ θεωρία ἐν τῷ 35 θεωροῦντι καὶ ἢ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ²· ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τίς ἐστίν). ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν.

b. In time, one actuality precedes the other, straight back to the First Mover.

the First Mover first actuality

Ib., 1050 b³⁻⁶:

Κατὰ τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φανερόν ὅτι πρότερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐνέργεια δυνά-

¹ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν . . . καὶ τέλος - to a principle, i.e. an end.

² That eudaemonia is an "energy" of the soul, is the starting-point or basis of Ar.'s treatise on the virtues in the *Eth. Nic.* See our nr. 566 (EN I 7, 15, 1098a¹⁶⁻¹⁷).

μεως, καὶ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν¹, τοῦ χρόνου αἰὲ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας ἕως τῆς τοῦ αἰὲ κινουντος πρώτως.

c. The eternal is always actual. It cannot be potential, for the potential is contingent, and therefore perishable.

Ib., 1050 b⁶⁻¹⁴, 16¹⁷, 18:

Eternal
beings
always
actual

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ κυριωτέρως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰδία πρότερα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν φθαρτῶν, ἔστι δ' οὐθὲν δυνάμει αἰδίων. λόγος δὲ ὅδε· πᾶσα δύναμις ἅμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς 10 ἔστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸν ὑπάρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρξειεν οὐθενί, τὸ δυνατὸν δὲ πᾶν ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. τὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι 14, 16 ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι φθαρτόν. — Οὐθὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἀπλῶς δυνάμει ἔστιν ἀπλῶς. — Ἐνεργεῖα ἄρα πάντα.

556—a. *Metaph.* Θ 9, 1051 a⁴⁻¹⁵:

The good
actuality
more
valuable
than the
good
potency

Ὅτι δὲ καὶ βελτίων καὶ τιμιωτέρα τῆς σπουδαίας δυνάμεως ἡ ἐνέργεια, 5 ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι λέγεται, ταύτῳ ἐστὶ δυνατὸν τάναν- 10 τία², οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι λεγόμενον ὑγιαίνειν ταύτῳ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, καὶ ἅμα³· ἡ αὐτὴ γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν, καὶ ἡρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, 10 καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ καταβάλλειν, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι καὶ καταπίπτειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τάναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχει· τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἅμα ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὰς ἐνε- 15 ργείας δὲ ἅμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν (οἷον ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τούτων θάτερον εἶναι τάγαθόν, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρων ἢ οὐδέτερον· 15 ἡ ἄρα ἐνέργεια βελτίων.

b. Ib., 1051 a¹⁵⁻¹⁹:

A bad
actuality
worse than
bad potency

Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι χειρόν τῆς 5 δυνάμεως· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ταῦτ' ἄμφω τάναντία. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι 10 τὸ κακὸν παρὰ τὰ πράγματα· ὕστερον γὰρ τῇ φύσει τὸ κακὸν τῆς δυνάμεως.

c. From this fact the author draws an important conclusion, namely, that there is no evil among eternal things.

Ib., 1051 a¹⁹⁻²¹:

No evil
among
eternal
things

Οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῖς αἰδίοις οὐθὲν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε 5 ἀμάρτημα οὔτε διεφθαρμένον⁴ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφθορά τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν).

¹ Vid. supra (554b, the end).

² "Ὅσα γὰρ etc. - "Everything of which we say that it can do something, is alike capable of contraries" (Ross).

³ καὶ ἅμα - "and it has both potencies at one and the same time".

⁴ διεφθαρμένον - perverted; διαφθορά - perversion.

5—BEING AND TRUTH

557—In the last chapter of *Metaph.* Θ the author gives his definition of truth, which has become so famous in the history of human thought. It is presented as follows.

Metaph. Θ 10, 1051 a³⁴-b⁹:

Definition
of truth

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὄν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύνάμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν τούτων ἢ τάναντία, τὸ δὲ [κυριώτατα ὄν] b ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τοῦτο δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διηρῆσθαι, ὥστε ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον οἰόμενος διηρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα, πότ' ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς 5 λεγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος; τοῦτο γὰρ σκεπτέον τί λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἴεσθαι ἀληθῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἴ σὺ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν.

558—a. In *Metaph.* E 4 Ar. separated truth from the province of Metaphysics, because truth and falsity are not "in things", but merely a πάθος τῆς διανοίας.

Truth
excluded
from meta-
physics in E 4

E 4, 1027 b²⁵-1028 a¹:

Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ κακὸν εὐθὺς ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' ἐν διανοίᾳ, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἐν διανοίᾳ. — ὅσα μὲν οὖν δεῖ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὸ οὕτως ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ συμπλοκή ἐστὶν καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν διανοίᾳ 30 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, τὸ δ' οὕτως ὄν ἕτερον ὄν τῶν κυρίως¹ (ἢ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ποιὸν ἢ ὅτι ποσὸν ἢ τι ἄλλο συνάπτει ἢ διαιρεῖ ἢ διάνοια), τὸ μὲν ὡς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὄν ἀφετέον — τὸ γὰρ αἷτιον τοῦ μὲν ἀόριστον τοῦ δὲ τῆς διανοίας τι πάθος.

To this view our passage in Θ 10 adds a new element, namely that, with the συμπλοκή in thought, a συμπλοκή in reality must correspond.

The same view has been expressed with some emphasis by Plato, at the end of his *Sophist*, as a solution of the difficulty concerning ψευδὴς δόξα. See our nr. 343.

b. That truth and falsity depend on combination, is also said in *Categ.* 4, at the end. Immediately after having enumerated the ten categories, with a few instances of each, the author continues (*Categ.* 4, 2 a⁴⁻¹⁰):

¹ τὸ οὕτως ὄν ἕτερον τῶν κυρίως - since which *is* in this sense is a different sort of "being" from the things that are in the full sense.

Ἐκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ καταφάσει λέγεται, τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις γίνεται. ἅπαντα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἦτοι ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι· τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψευδὸς ἐστίν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

Truth and falsity depend on combination

559—In Θ 10 Ar. develops the consequences of this view.

Considering first truth and being in the case of "composites" ¹, he states: "Being is being-united; not-being is not-being-united. About things which may be either united or divided the same opinion is at different times false and true; not so with regard to things that must be as they are" (Ross).

a. *Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b⁹⁻¹⁷:

Εἰ δὴ τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ σύγκειται καὶ ἀδύνατα διαιρεθῆναι, τὰ δ' αἰεὶ διήρηται καὶ ἀδύνατα συντεθῆναι, τὰ δ' ἐνδέχεται τάναντία, τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἐστὶ τὸ συγκεῖσθαι καὶ ἔν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ πλείω εἶναι· περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ² ἢ αὐτὴ γίγνεται ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς δόξα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐνδέχεται ὅτε μὲν ἀληθεύειν ὅτε δὲ ψεύδεσθαι· περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ γίγνεται ὅτε μὲν ἀληθὲς ὅτε δὲ ψευδός, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ταυτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.

Truth and being in the case of composites

Bonitz (*Metaph.* 409) remarked that the meaning of "composites" in this passage is not "quae ex pluribus elementis coaluerunt"—and in this he was right—but "in quibus cum substantia coniungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo albus, homo sedens, diagonalis irrationalis et similia". Now, if this last point were true, the whole class of composites would consist of ἐνδεχόμενα, and those things which "are always composed" or "cannot be divided" could not belong to them. By σύνθετα then is rather meant: *judgments*, in which a subject is copulated with a predicate, be it accidental or not; so that the "truth" intended here is what is called the *veritas logica* by the schoolmen (adaequatio rei et intellectus).

b. Since being and non-being, truth and falsehood then depend on combination, the question arises: what is being and non-being; what truth and falsity, in the case of incomposites.

Ib., 1051 b¹⁷⁻³⁰:

Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀσύνθετα τί τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψευδός; οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ σύνθετον, ὥστε εἶναι μὲν ὅταν συγκέηται, μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἐὰν διηρημένον ᾖ, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν <τὸ> ξύλον ἢ τὸ ἀσύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον· οὐδὲ 20 τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψευδός ὁμοίως ἔτι ὑπάρξει καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων. ἢ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ

Truth and being in the case of incomposites

¹ For the meaning of this term see our explanation under the text. It has been suggested to the author by Mr. L. M. de Rijk, who deals with it in the first chapter of his thesis, *The Categories of being*, Assen 1952.

² τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα - "contingent things", i.e. composed things, consisting of a substance and an accidental attribute, e.g. "white man".

τὸ ἀληθές ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος, τὸ μὲν θιγγεῖν¹ καὶ φάναι ἀληθές (οὐ γὰρ ταῦτο κατάφασις καὶ φάσις), τὸ δ' ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν (ἀπατηθῆναι γὰρ περὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς μὴ συνθετάς οὐσίας, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι· καὶ πᾶσαι εἰσὶν ἐνεργεῖα, οὐ δυνάμει, ἐγίγνοντο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐφθείροντο, νῦν δὲ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ οὐ γίγνεται οὐδὲ φθείρεται, ἔκ τινος γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο). 30

By *ἀσύνθετα*, as opposed to the *σύνθετον*, is meant: being as the object of thinking, *before* the act of judging; i.e. being as the object of *simple apprehension*. Thought "grasps" a thing without any affirmative or negation. This apprehension is called by Ar. *θιγγάνειν*. Rightly he says that, strictly speaking, there is no question of falsehood in this case: things do not lie (i.e.: they do not cause an untrue image of themselves in our mind). "Truth" may then be spoken of here as far as things are the causes of images in our mind. This is what is called by scholastics *veritas ontologica*.

c. The author concludes: About all things that are essences and "actualities" (i.e. actually existing beings) we cannot err. Either we know them or we do not.

In this case
error is
excluded

Ib., 1051 b³⁰⁻³³:

"Ὅσα δὴ ἐστὶν ὅπερ εἶναι τι καὶ ἐνεργεῖαι, περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι ἀλλ' ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μὴ· ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ἐστι ζητεῖται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἢ μὴ.

d. So "being" in the sense of truth, and non-being in the sense of falsity, is one group (depending on combination); the other (that of the *ἀσύνθετα*) is "true" only in this sense that it is known, the opposite being not "falsity" or "error", but "ignorance".

Ib., 1051 b^{33-1052 a⁴}:

Τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὡς τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν², εἰ σύγκειται, ἀληθές, τὸ δ' εἰ μὴ σύγκειται, ψεῦδος· τὸ δὲ ἐν³, εἴπερ ὄν, οὕτως ἐστὶν⁴· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, οὐκ ἔστιν; τὸ δὲ ἀληθές τὸ νοεῖν ταῦτα· τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος αὐτὸ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἀπάτη, ἀλλὰ ἄγνοια, οὐχ οἷα ἡ τυφλότης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυφλότης ἐστὶν ὡς ἂν εἰ τὸ νοητικὸν ὅλως μὴ ἔχοι τις.

560—As to eternal being, something has been said of it in the books on Substance (Z H) and in that on Potency and Actuality. The existence and nature of the unmoved Movers is dealt with in Λ 6-10. We have treated this part of Ar.'s first philosophy in connexion with *Phys.* VIII (nrs. 515-518).

¹ θιγγεῖν - Ar. means by this: an apprehension which is infallible and direct.

² ἐν μὲν - is one group.

³ τὸ δὲ ἐν - the other —.

⁴ οὕτως ἐστὶν - it exists in the sense as indicated *supra*.

FIFTEENTH CHAPTER

THE PRACTICAL SCIENCES

I—THE THREE ETHICS AND THEIR INTERRELATION

561—The three Ethics of the Corpus Aristotelicum are first mentioned as works of Ar. by Atticus, a Platonist in the days of Marcus Aurelius, cited by Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* XV 4, 9, p. 795 d: Three works on ethics attributed to Ar.

αἱ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ταῦτα πραγματεῖαι, Εὐδῆμειοί τε καὶ Νικομάχιοι καὶ Μεγάλων Ἠθικῶν ἐπιγραφόμεναι . . .

562—a. Five books of Ethics are mentioned in the list of Aristotle's works in Diog. Laert. V 1, 23:

Ἠθικῶν α' β' γ' δ' ε'.

the *Eth. Eud.*

By these five books the *Eudemian Ethics* must have been meant.

b. A work on ethics in ten books is mentioned in the list of Hesychius: the *Nicomachean Ethics*. the *Eth. Nic.*

From these data we may infer that books Δ Ε Ζ of the *Eud. Eth.*, which are identic with *Eth. Nic.* Ε Ζ Η, belonged to the last work, and not to the *Eud. Eth.*

563—a. That the *Eth. Nic.* were in earlier Antiquity generally considered as a work of Ar., may be inferred from Cic., *De fin.* V 5, 12. Who is the author of these works?

(One should not concede too much space to Fortune, the author says; for in doing so you encroach upon the force and dignity of virtue).

Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius.

b. In later Antiquity traces may be found here and there of the opinion that Eudemus and Nicomachus were the authors of the works named after them. E.g. Diog. Laërt. VIII 88:

φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν — sc. Εὐδοξον — Νικόμαχος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν.

Here a passage from *Eth. Nic.* X is referred to under the name of N.

Difference
in character

564—The reason why these works have been attributed to different authors, may have lain in the fact that they show a remarkably different conception of life. In the *Eud. Eth.* we find a platonic view of life, of a clearly religious character. Philosophy is directed to the contemplation of the highest Being, the Good. And it is this contemplation which endows man with the force and the power of acting virtuously. On the other hand, in the *Nic. Eth.* the bond with religion is severed: moral life depends on itself.

See for this difference Jaeger, *Ar.*, p. 238 ff. Of great importance is the meaning of the term *φρόνησις* in both works. In the *Eud. Eth.* it means philosophical insight into the highest Being, while in the *Nic. Eth.* it indicates practical wisdom, which is not even limited to man, but may be attributed to animals too. Cp. our nr. **420a**, remark II.

Modern
judgment
about the
authenticity

565—a. The authenticity of the *Eud. Ethics* was first defended by P. von der Mühl (Göttingen thesis, 1909), next by E. Kapp (Freiburg thesis, 1912). W. Jaeger adopted Kapp's results and determined the place of the *Eud. Eth.* as a platonizing work of Ar.'s early years, between the *Protr.* and the *Nic. Eth.*

This view has been generally accepted, e.g. by Ross and by A. Mansion.

Recently E. J. Schächer, *Studien zu den Ethiken des Corpus Aristotelicum*, Paderborn 1940¹, has come back to the ancient hypothesis which makes Eudemus the author of the *Ethics* named after him. Schächer tries to prove by a comparison of the passages on *φιλία*, that the *Eud. Eth.* depend on the *Nic.*, not inversely, and that the *Magna Mor.* were written before the *Eud. Eth.*, this work being apparently unknown to the author of the *M. M.* The arguments used by Sch. are for the greater part not conclusive. Yet he has re-opened the discussion on the authenticity of the *Eud. Eth.*, and further inquiry must decide whether his solution is correct.

b. As to the *Magna Mor.*, modern research has led to reliable results: this work dates from the first generation of the Peripatetic School, the years of Theophrastus and before the influence of the Stoa.

The question has been hotly debated by W. Jaeger and H. von Arnim, during the years 1924 - 1929. This discussion has been amply reported by A. Mansion, *Autour des Ethiques attribuées à Aristote*, in the *Revue Néoscholastique de Louvain*, 1931, p. 80-107, 216-236 and 360-380.

E. J. Schächer, in the first of his above-cited Studies, begins with Schleiermacher and deals too with the studies of Brink (an analysis of the style of the *MM*, Berlin thesis, 1933) and Theiler (1934).

If any doubts were still possible as to the date of the *MM*, they have been definitely removed by the thesis of Brink.

¹ *Studien zur Geschichte u. Kultur des Altertums*, herausgeg. von der Görresgesellschaft, XXII. Band, 1. u. 2. Heft.

2—THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. FORMAL PRINCIPLES
(the Books I-III 5)

566—Ar. qualifies all human action as being directed towards a purpose, and defines the final purpose as *well-being* (eudaemonia), which consists of an activity of the soul in accordance with reason, i.e. in accordance with virtue.

Eth. Nic. I, 1-7, 1094 a¹-1098 a²⁰.

All human
activities
aim at
some good

A hierarchy
of ends

The supreme
end

It is the
object of
politics

1094a Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ
τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ¹. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφάνησαντο τὰγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται.
Διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν. τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ'
5 αὐτάς ἔργα τινά. Ὡν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω
πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. Πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ
ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη. ἱατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ
πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. "Οσοι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιού-
10 των ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἵππικὴν χαλινοποιητικὴ καὶ
ἔσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἵππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις
ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας, — ἐν ἀπάσαις
15 δὴ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά. Τούτων
γὰρ χάριν κάκεῖνα διώκεται. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτάς εἶναι τὰ
τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθειςῶν ἐπι-
στημῶν.

Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἔστι τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο,
20 καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ'
εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὁρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ
ἄριστον. — Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλῃν ἔχει ῥοπὴν,
καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος;
25 Εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονι-
κῆς. Τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. Τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν
1094b ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει².
ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτῃν οὐσας, οἷον στρατη-

¹ W. D. Ross rightly remarked that, according to the division of πᾶσα διάνοια in *Metaph. E 1*, we might have expected that Ar. would have distinguished between productive and moral activity, the first being ποιητική, the second πρακτική; and that, if this distinction had been made, a very different system of ethics would have resulted.

² Which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and up to what point they should be learned, is a question which has been dealt with at length in the *Republic* of Plato. To a disciple of the Academy it was indeed a major point of politics.

γικήν οικονομικήν βήτορην. Χρῶμεν δὲ ταύτης τὰς λοιπὰς πρακτικὰς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετησῶς τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ ταύτης τέλος περὶ αὐτῶν ἀλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' αὖ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτον ἔστιν ἐν καὶ πᾶσι, μετ' οὗτο γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα τῆς πᾶσι φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σφύζειν. ἀγαπῶν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν μὲν, καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ καὶ θεοὶ καὶ πᾶσι.

Different degrees of precision in different sciences

Ἡ μὲν οὖν μεθόδος τούτων ἐφέσταται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα. ἀλλοιοτο δ' αὖτε καὶ, ἀπασιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥστε ἐν τοῖς δημίουρομμένοις. Ἰὰ δὲ καὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφοράν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὥστε δοκεῖν ὅτι τῶν εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μὴ. Τοιαύτην δὲ τῶν πᾶσι καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν. Ἥδη γὰρ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦτον διὰ πολλοῦν, ἔτεροι δὲ δὴ ἀνθρώπων. Ἀγαπῶν οὖν περὶ τοῦτον καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον ἡγεοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τυπῶ τὰ μὲν ἐνδεκτικῶν, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὧν ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶσι καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον ἡγεοντας τοιαύτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι.

Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδεχέσθαι χρῶν ἕκαστον τῶν ἀγνοούντων. περὶ δευτέρου γὰρ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῶν τοσούτων τὰ κριβέδες ἐπιζητητέον καὶ ἕκαστον γὰρ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδεχέσθαι. παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μετὰ τῶν ἡλικιῶν τε πῶς ἀνοήτων ἀποδεχέσθαι καὶ βήτορην καὶ ἀποδεχέσθαι κριτική.

The student should have reached riper years

Ἑκαστος δὲ κριτεῖ καλῶς ἀ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἔστιν ἀλλοιότης κριτική. ἡλικιῶν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς πᾶσι ἀνοήτων ἀλλοιότης ἀνταίσις ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνταίσις, ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν ἔστιν οὐ γινώσκον ἀλλὰ πράξις. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν ἄλλο τῶν ἡλικιῶν ἢ τὸ ἥθος καὶ τὸν γὰρ πᾶσι τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἐλαττωσὶς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πᾶσι καὶ διωκεῖν ἕκαστον. Τοῖς γὰρ τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ γινώσκουσι γινώσκει, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. τοῖς δὲ κατὰ ἄλλον τὰς ἀποδεχέσθαι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀνταίσις ἀνταίσις.

What is the supreme good?

Καὶ περὶ μὲν ἕκαστου, καὶ πᾶσι ἀποδεχέσθαι, καὶ τὴν ποριθίμην, περὶ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τινος ἀποδεχέσθαι, τὴν ποριθίμην ἐφέσταται καὶ τὴν τῶν πᾶσι ἀνθρώπων ἀποδεχέσθαι ἀλλοιότης.

1 "What we are to do and what we are to abstain from" has been minutely prescribed in the *Laws* of Plato. Ar. again shows himself a true disciple of the Academy in regarding this point as the normal task of legislation.

2 ἐκ τοῦτον - with such premisses.
3 παχυλῶς - roughly.
4 It is a basic law of the syllogism that the conclusion cannot contain more than the premisses.

πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες ¹
λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτον ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν·
20 περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς
σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν
ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον (νοσήσας
25 μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον), συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς
μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν· ἐνιοὶ δ' ὄροντο παρὰ τὰ
πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν αἰτιόν ἐστι
τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. Ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιώτερον ἴσως ἐστίν,
30 ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. Μὴ λανθα-
νέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ² λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ³.
Εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο, καὶ ἐζήτει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ
1095b τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστίν ἡ δόξαι ⁴, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ
ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. Ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν
γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς ⁵. Ἰσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων.
5 Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς ⁶ τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλων τῶν
πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο
ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν
ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως ⁷. Ὡ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου ⁷.

A methodical
remark

10 οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται,
ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοήῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήσιος ἀνὴρ.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. Τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμο-
15 νίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκόλασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν. Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτι-

¹ οἱ χαρίεντες - people of superior refinement.

² "Arguments from the first principles" are *deductive* or *apodeictic* arguments; those to the first principles are *inductive*. See our nrs. 447-455.

³ Ross points to *Rep.* VI 511 b, the passage about the ἀνυπόθετον (our nr. 294, p. 203). But in fact, neither Plato's ascent from the hypotheses, used as ἀρχαί, upward to the anhypotheton is anything like Aristotle's deductive argument, nor is his descent from the anhypotheton back to the inferior εἶδη of the same kind as a λόγος ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς with Ar. Mark also the use of the imperfect: ἠπόρει and ἐζήτει. Evidently there are frequent λόγοι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς in the Socratic dialogues. And whenever things are explained by participation in Ideas, what else is this than a λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν?

⁴ On the distinction between γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν and γνωριμώτερα ἀπλῶς see our nr. 406, n. 5.

⁵ "must have been brought up in good habits".

⁶ The man who is trained by good habits possesses moral principles implicitly.

⁷ *Erga* 293, 295-297 Rzach.

Three main
types of life

κώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. Τρεῖς γάρ
εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προέχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικός καὶ τρίτος ὁ
θεωρητικός¹. Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκη- 20
μάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς
ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλω². Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες³ καὶ πρακτικοὶ
τιμῇ. Τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. Φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον
εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, 25
τὰγαθὸν δ' οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. Ἐτι δ' εἰκότασι τὴν
τιμῇ διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν
φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι
κατὰ γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. Τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτι- 30
κοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. Φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέ-
χεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις
κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτως ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμο- 1096a
νίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλης (ικανῶς γὰρ καὶ
ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν)· τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ
οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. Ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις 5
ἐστὶν⁴, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ

¹ Ar.'s three βίοι are clearly of Pythagorean origin. Cp. our nr. 4.

² Athenaeus mentions two epitaphs of Sardanapallus (336 a and 530 b, c). The first is: "Ἐσθιε, πῖνε, παῖζε· ὥς τᾶλλα τούτου οὐκ ἄξια, sc. τοῦ ἀποκροτήματος (is not worth a snap of the fingers).

The second was probably cited by Ar. in his *Protrept.*, and by this quotation it became famous in Antiquity. It runs.:

Κεῖν' ἔχω ὅσος' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ μετ' ἔρωτος
τέρπν' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλβια πάντα λέλυνται.

Cic. translates it in *Tusc. Disp.* V 35, 101:

Haec habeo quae edi quaeque exsaturata libido
hausit; at illa iacent multa et praeclara relictæ.

He adds to it these lines of Ar., which Jaeger thinks were taken from the *Protr.*: "Quid aliud, inquit Ar., in bovis, non in regis sepulchro inscriberes? Haec habere se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur".

He refers again to it in *De finibus* II 32, 106.

³ See p. 137, note 1.

⁴ The text as we read it contains some difficulties. Modern interpreters mostly supply βίος with χρηματιστής and translate: "The life of money-making is a life of compulsion" or "constraint"; by which they mean either that this life is undertaken only under compulsion (Ross), or that in this life a man cannot follow his natural inclinations, or perhaps both. Yet there remains some doubt as to the question whether the text is sound. We have no other instances of χρηματιστής used adjectively. And even if this is right, I think it would be better to supply the word <βίος> after χρηματιστής, because in copying it could be easily dropped before βίαιος.

A former generation made some conjectures. G. Ramsauer in his edition of the *Eth. Nic.* of 1878 proposed to write βάνυσός τις instead of βίαιός τις. James Watt,

ἄλλου χάριν. Διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. Φαίνεται δὲ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ
10 καταβέβληνται.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου ¹ βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ The Good of
Plato
criticized
διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γιγνομένης
διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ
15 δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν ², ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλο-
σόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλοιον ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ³. Οἱ δὲ
κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον
ἔλεγον ⁴ (διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον)· τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται
20 καὶ ἐν τῷ τι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία
πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι ⁵ (παρὰφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι
τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινὴ τις ἐπὶ τούτων ἰδέα. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὰ γὰρ ὅν
ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τι λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ
25 ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρή-
σιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτα ⁶ καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον
ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἓν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετο ἐν πάσαις ταῖς
30 κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπι-

1. Argu-
ments from
the doctrine
of the
categories

followed by Burnet, read the text as it stands in this way: βίᾳ ὅστις ἐστίν ("the business-man is by compulsion whatsoever he is"). C. M. Mulvany (in *Class. Quart.* XV 1921, p. 85-98) suggests that βίαιος should be explained as βαιός: little, trifling. He translates: "The business-man is a little person"—sc. of minor importance towards happiness.

¹ τὸ δὲ καθόλου - sc. ἀγαθόν. In the conception of Ar. the Platonic Ideas are "universals", which are abstracted from the concrete things or phenomena. In this case "the good" as a universal should be abstracted from many concrete ἀγαθά. But this is impossible, Ar. says; since these good things fall under different categories, no κοινόν could be found here.

² τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν - to sink our personal feelings.

³ This maxim, which has become famous by the above words of Ar., has been expressed as clearly and explicitly by Plato in criticizing Homer: 'Ἄλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ (*Rep.* X, 595 c).

⁴ Plato and his followers do not admit of Ideas of things within which they recognize a priority and a posteriority. Well, Ar. says, this is exactly the case with the categories: substance is prior to the others.—He means priority in the hierarchy of being: like two presupposes the monad and three the dyad; again, like body presupposes the plane, and plane presupposes the line. In the same way to Ar. the more primitive soul has priority of being over the more developed soul: the vegetative soul over the sensitive, the sensitive over the rational. And that is why there does not exist a "soul" in general, which is a reality in itself (*De anima* A 1, 402 b⁵⁻⁸; B 3, 414 a^{29-b19}). So it is with substance and the other categories: substance can exist without the others, not inversely.

⁵ See the doctrine of the categories in 437b and 438a.

⁶ δίαίτα is used here for the good in the category of place. Heliodorus explains: τόπος ἐν ᾧ εὖ διάγομεν.

[illegible]

Distinction between primary and secondary goods

[illegible]

1 This is a Platonic principle. Cp. *Laches* 198 d-199 a; *Parm.* 134 a.
2 ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εὐστοχίᾳ - See our nr. 42, the Pythagorean table of opposites.—
Ar. means: it is more acceptable to range the one in a series of good things than to
identify it with the Good itself.
3 So this text of the *Eth. Nic.* provides evidence for the identification of the "Ev
and the 'Αγαθόν by Plato. Cp. our nr. 364c.
4 ἀντιφύσικαί τις - room for dispute.
5 "Δοτε ἡδύτατον - "In that case the form will be empty".

scholasticism equivocation: mere identity of names, the notions being different (see our nr. 436a). The second is what is called by Ar. τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ πολλοῦ things are called by the same name because they are related to the same object or the same idea; e.g. we speak of a healthy person (who possesses health), a healthy sleep (which is a symptom of health), a healthy climate (which preserves health), etc.

γάρ ἐν σώματι ὅψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν
 30 ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν, ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον·
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ιδέας. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τι καὶ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον
 ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό ¹, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ
 35 κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται. Τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον
 1097a εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παρὰ-
 δεῖγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπι-
 τευζόμεθα αὐτῶν. Πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἔοικεν δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστή-
 5 μαις διαφωνεῖν ². πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι
 παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ ³. Καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτον ⁴ τοὺς τεχνίτας
 ἅπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὖλογον. Ἀπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφελήθη-
 σεται ὑφάντης ⁵ ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδῶς αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ
 10 πῶς ἱατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ιδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος.
 Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ⁶ ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἱατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν
 ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἱατρεύει.
 15 Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ
 ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ
 τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἱατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. Τί
 οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; Ἡ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; Τοῦτο δὲ ἐν ἱατρικῇ
 20 μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν
 ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι
 πάντες. Ὡστε εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν

Return to
 our theme:
 what is the
 supreme
 practical
 Good?

In the same way the word "medical" indicates that which is relative to the medical art, the doctor because he possesses it, a treatment because it is a function of it, etc. (*Metaph.* Γ 1, 1003 a³³-b¹¹; Z 4, 1030 a³²-b³). In scholasticism this is called *analogia attributionis*.—This third kind is the *analogia proportionalitatis*. It is defined in *Poet.* 21, 1457 b¹⁶ ff. as a transference from analogy, which is possible "whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put D in lieu of B, and B in lieu of D." E.g. old age is to life as evening is to day. Now evening may be called old age of the day, or old age the evening of life.—It seems to be the author's intention to qualify the good as homonymous in the second sense.

¹ "Even if the good is universally predicable, or if there is a Good existing separately and absolute",—

Souilhé rightly remarks that the first and the second part of the sentence are not the same: a thing might be a common predicate but not an Idea. The ἢ then must be understood disjunctively, not in the copulative sense.

² "But it seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences" (Ross).

³ "But they do not trouble about the knowledge of the ideal Good" (Rackham).

⁴ βοήθημα τηλικούτον - sc. if it existed.

⁵ ὑφάντης - as in Plato's *Cratylus*.

⁶ οὐδὲ . . οὕτως - "not in this way", i.e. not in abstracto.

The supreme good = the supreme end ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. Μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφίκεται ¹.
τοῦτο δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. 25

Happiness
the supreme
end

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δὲ αἰρούμεθ' αἰετὶς δι' ἕτερα, οἷον
πλοῦτον αὐλοῦς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ'
ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. "Ὡστ' εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν
εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. Τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν 30
τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν <καὶ>
καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν
αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ·
ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν 1097b
καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαί-
νοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν,
διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσιν. Τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται 5
τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ
συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκές εἶναι δοκεῖ. Τὸ δὲ αὐταρκές λέγο-
μεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ 10
γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
Τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογό-
νους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυ-
θις ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκές τίθεμεν ὁ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον 15
καὶ μηθενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ἔτι δὲ πάντων
αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην ². Συναριθμουμένην γὰρ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετω-
τέραν μετὰ ³ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ
προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἰρετώτερον αἰεὶ. Τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται 20
καὶ αὐταρκές ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος.

What is
happiness?

Ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται,
ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. Τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ' εἰ
ληφθεῖν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ 25
παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν
εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.

¹ "So the argument has by a different way reached the same point"—i.e. the same as in ch. I, namely, that the supreme good is identical with the supreme end.

"By a different way"—in ch. I the argument was: "Every art and every inquiry etc. aims at some good; therefore, the supreme good is the supreme end, which is aimed at by every human activity". Here the argument runs: "The good and the end are identical in all individual cases; therefore, the supreme good and the supreme end will be also identical" (the stress being laid on τὶ οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν and τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων).

² μὴ συναριθμουμένην - "without being counted as one good thing among others" (Ross); i.e. not as a number of a series.

³ μετὰ - by the addition of —.

Πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου
 30 δ' οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς
 καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ
 πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν
 κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. Αφοριστέον ἄρα
 1098a τὴν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν¹. Ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη,
 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῳ. Λείπεται δὴ
 π ρ α κ τ ι κ ῆ τ ι ς τ ο ὦ λ ό γ ο ν ἔ χ ο ν τ ο ς (τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθές
 5 λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοοῦμενον²). διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης
 τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. Εἰ δ' ἔστιν
 ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ
 λ ό γ ο υ , τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου³,
 10 ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων,
 προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον (κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ
 τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ). εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον
 ζωὴν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δὲ
 15 ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δὲ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται·
 εἰ δὴ οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεταί κατ'
 ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην
 καὶ τελειοτάτην. Ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. Μία γὰρ χελιδὼν
 20 ἡμέρα οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία
 ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.

Happiness
to be
defined by
the special
function
of man

Definition

567—Book II deals with moral virtue in general. It is engendered in us not by nature, but by habit. By nature man possesses a capacity to receive virtues; he receives them actually by the habit of right action.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II, 1103 a¹⁴-b²:

Διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἡθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξησιν, διόπερ
 15 ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δὲ ἡθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται⁴, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα ἔσχηκεν μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. — Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον

The nature
of virtue.
Moral virtue
results from
habit

¹ θρεπτικὴν κ. αὐξητικὴν etc. - See *De anima* II 3, 414 a²⁹-b⁶; 415 a¹⁻⁷, on the faculties of the soul (our nr. 639).

² This parenthesis has been condemned by Burnet. Rackham follows him somewhat hesitatingly, and declares the sentence to be "an irrelevant anticipation of ch. 13, 9". Souilhé defends it.

³ τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι etc. - "and if we acknowledge the function of an individual (τοῦδε) and of a good individual (τοῦδε σπουδαίου) to be generically the same" (τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ γένει). —

⁴ περιγίγνεται - results from.

ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθῇ 20 ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθῇ. Οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίγνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι 25 αὐτάς, τελειούμενοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. — Ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ 30 χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν)· τὰς δὲ ἀρετάς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. Ἄ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίγνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα 1103b σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.

b. Since, then, virtue results from habit, and habit is formed by action, it is incumbent on us to exhibit activities of a certain quality.

Practical
consequence

Ib., 1103 b²²⁻²⁵:

Διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιᾶς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. Οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

568—How, then, are we to act rightly?—Ar. answers this question by developing his theory that virtue is the mean between two extremes.

Moral
qualities
destroyed
by excess and
by deficiency

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 2, 1104 a¹¹⁻²⁷:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ 1104a ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ ¹ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι), ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὁρῶμεν· τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλ-
λοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ 15 καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γιγνόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σφίζει. Οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. Ὁ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ 20 μὴδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίγνεται, ὃ τε μὴδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μὴδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, ἀναισθητός τις· φθίρεται δὴ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς 25 καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σφίζεται.

¹ ὑπὲρ - in illustration of.

b. Not only man *becomes* virtuous by acting in a certain way, but virtue is also exercised by the same actions.

Ib., 1104 a²⁷⁻²⁸:

Ἄλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ
 ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσσονται· καὶ γὰρ
 30 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται
 γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα
 δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. Οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τε γὰρ
 τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνά-
 35 μεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ
 1104b καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενό-
 μενοι μάλιστα δυνήσόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

Virtue
 exercised in
 the actions
 by which it
 was formed

569—Pleasure in acting virtuously is a sign that the virtuous disposition has been acquired. For there is an essential connexion of moral virtue with pleasure and pain.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 3, 1104 b³⁻¹¹:

Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς
 5 ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων
 σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων
 ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. Περὶ ἡδονᾶς γὰρ καὶ
 10 λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ. Διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ
 δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα.

Pleasure
 and pain
 the test of
 virtue

b. Again, this view leads to a practical consequence.

Ib., 1104 b¹¹⁻¹³:

Διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὥς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ
 λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἢ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν.

Consequence
 for
 education

570—Against Ar.'s theory that a man becomes virtuous by doing virtuous actions, the objection could be made: How can anyone do just actions when he is not yet just, or temperate when he is not yet temperate? On the contrary, if he does just actions, he is already just.—To this objection Ar. answers: No, only by doing just actions a man is not yet just. Three other conditions must be fulfilled.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 4, 1105 a¹⁷⁻³³:

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους
 1105a γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας. Εἰ γὰρ πράττουσιν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώ-
 φρονα, ὅτε ἂν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας. Εἰ γὰρ πράττουσιν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, ὅτε ἂν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας.

How can a
 man do just
 actions when
 he is not just?

φρονα, ἥδη εἰσι δίκαιοι καὶ σφόδρες, ὥστερ εἰ τὰ γράμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μου-
σικὰ, γράμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. "Ἡ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὐτως ἔχει; "Ενδ-
χεται γὰρ γράμματικὸν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς
τοῦτο οὖν ἔσται γράμματικὸς, ἔάν καὶ γράμματικὸν τι ποιῇσιν καὶ γράμματικῶς.
τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γράμματικὴν. "Ἐτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῶν
τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινώμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει
ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτα πᾶς ἔχοντα γινώμεθα. τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινώ-
μενα οὐκ ἔάν αὐτὰ πᾶς ἔχῃ, δίκαιος ἢ σφόδρος ἢ πᾶσι πᾶσι ἀρετῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔάν ὁ
πρόκτιων πᾶς ἔχων πρόκτιν, πῶτον μὲν ἔάν εἰδῶς, ἔπειτ' ἔάν προαφορῶμενος,
καὶ προαφορῶμενος δὲ αὐτὰ, τὸ δὲ πρόκτιν ἔάν καὶ βέλαιος καὶ ἀμετακινῆται

ἔχων πρόκτιν.

Conclusion

b. Ib., 1105 b⁹⁻¹⁸:

Ἐν οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πρόκτιν ὁ δίκαιος γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὁ
τὰ σφόδρα ὁ σφόδρος. ἔκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πρόκτιν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἄν οὐδὲ μετὰ τῆς
γινώμεθα ἀγαθός. Ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πρόκτιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον
καταφεύγοντες οὐλοῦνται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὐτως ἔσθθαι σπουδαῖοι ὁμοίον τι
ποιοῦντες τοῖς κήρυκσι, οἱ τῶν λατρῶν ἀκούοντες μὲν ἐπιμεινῶς, ποιῶντες δ' 15
οὐδὲν τῶν προστατομένων. "Ὅστερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα
οὐτὼ θεοπροφῶμενοι, οὐδ' οὐτοὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐτὼ φιλοσοφοῦντες.

571—Ar. now proceeds to define virtue.

a. Its genus is: a state of character, not a passion, nor a faculty.

Virtue
defined.
Its genus

Eth. Nic. II 5, 1105 b^{19-1106 a}:

Τὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑξῆς σκοπεῖν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινώμενα τρία 20
ἐστὶ, πᾶθῃ δυνάμεις ἑξῆς, τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ. Λέγω δὲ πᾶθῃ μὲν ἐπιθυ-
μικὴν ὁρμήν, ὁρῶν θάρος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλικὴν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλπον, ὧς
οἷς ἔπειτα ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη. δυνάμεις δὲ καὶ δὲ παθητικὰς τούτων λεγόμεθα,
οἷον καὶ δὲ δυνάμεις ὁρμητικαὶ ἢ λυπητικαὶ ἢ ἀνεσθαι. ἑξῆς δὲ καὶ δὲ πᾶσι
τὰ πᾶθῃ ἔχοντες εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πᾶσι τὸ ὁρμητικῶν, εἰ μὲν σφόδρως ἢ ἀνε-
μῶς, κακῶς ἔχοντες, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσι τῶν παθῶν μὲν
οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πᾶθῃ
σπουδαῖοι ἢ φανῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ 30
μὲν τὰ πᾶθῃ οὐτε ἐπαινοῦμεθα οὐτε ψευόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος
οὐδὲ ὁ ὁρμητικῶν, οὐδὲ ψεύεται ὁ ἀπᾶς ὁρμητικῶν ἀλλ' ὁ πᾶς), κατὰ δὲ 1106a
τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινοῦμεθα ἢ ψευόμεθα. "Ἐτι ὁρμητικῶν μὲν καὶ
φοβούμεθα ἀπροαφέςως, αἱ δὲ ἀρεταὶ προαφέςως τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαφέςως.
Πᾶς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πᾶθῃ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς 5
καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακρίσθαι πᾶς. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις

εἰσὶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. Καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ 10 ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθῃ εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

b. Its differentia: it is a disposition to choose the mean between two extremes.

Ib. 6, 1106 a¹²-1107 a⁸:

15 "Ο τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετὴ, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, 10 ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. Ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὗ ἂν ἡ ἀρετὴ, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. Ὀμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ 20 ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν 10 ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεταί καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. Πῶς δὲ τοῦτο ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν 25 εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. Ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἑλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. Λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον 30 τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἓν, οὐδὲ ταῦτόν πᾶσιν. Οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἕξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ 35 πρᾶγμα· ἴσω γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ 1106b δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς ἕξ μναῖς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. Ὀμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. Οὕτω δὴ πᾶς 5 ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτως τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο 10 ἀγούσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασι ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτε ἀφελεῖν ἐστὶν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειροῦσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σφζούσης), εἰ δὴ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῶνται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ 15 ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική. Λέγω δὲ τὴν ἡθικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ πάθῃ καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι

Its
differentia

Virtue in
general

Virtue of man

It seeks the
mean

καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλπίσαι καὶ ὁλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μάλλον 20
καὶ ἥττον, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω οὐκ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ βρεθεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πόδος οὐδὲ καὶ οὐ
ἐνεκα καὶ ὧς θεῖ, μέσων τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
περὶ τὰς πρᾶξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ
πάθῃ καὶ πρᾶξεις ἔστιν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτανεύεται καὶ ἡ ἐλλείψις 25
ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται. ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοῖν τῶν ἀρετῶν
μέσότης τις ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστικῇ γὰρ οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. "Ἐτι τὸ μέν
ἀμαρτανεύειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀρετοῦ, ὧς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι¹
εἰκαζόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς. διὸ 30
καὶ τὸ μέν ὁπόσον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν, ὁπόσον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν
δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. Καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἐλλείψις,
τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς ἡ μέσότης.

ἔσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀπᾶν, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί².

35

Definition of
moral virtue
as
between two
extremes

572—This definition applied to the particular virtues.

Eth. Nic. II 7, 1107 a³³-1108 b¹⁰:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβου καὶ θάρρους ἀνδρεία μέσότης. ταῦν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων δὲ 1107
μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἔστιν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θάρρει ὑπερ-
βαλλάν θρασύς, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν φοβέσθαι ὑπερβαλλάν τῷ δὲ θάρρει ἐλλείπων
δειδός. Περὶ ἡδονᾶς οὐ πᾶσας, ἥττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λυπὰς, ἡττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς
μέσους μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. Ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς
ἡδονὰς οὐ πᾶν γίνονται. διότερ οὐδ' ὁνείκτως τετυγχάνουσιν οὐδὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι,
ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναισθητοί. Περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν μέσότης μὲν ἐλευ-
θερίτης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. Ἐναντίας δ' ἐν 110
αὐτῇς ὑπερβαλλουσιν καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν ποῶσαι
ὑπερβαλλᾷ ἐν δὲ λήπει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δὲ ἀνελευθερός ἐν μὲν λήπει ὑπερβαλλᾷ ἐν
δὲ ποῶσαι ἐλλείπει. Νῦν μὲν οὖν τῶν καὶ ἐπὶ κερδαλίᾳ λέγοιμεν, ἀρκούντων

¹ See our nr. 42, the table of Pythagorean opposites.
² A quotation of unknown origin.

15 αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τὰ
 χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγα-
 λοπρεπτής διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά),
 20 ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία¹ καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι
 αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.
 Περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις
 λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὥς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέ-
 25 πειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ
 ὥς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων
 30 ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. Ἀνώ-
 νυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. Ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται
 οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας², καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον
 καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον
 1108a ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. Διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς
 ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑψηλὸν τρόπον.
 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ
 5 ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν, τὸν μέσον προῶν λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα
 καλέσομεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀρ-
 γιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀοργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ
 10 ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μὲν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι
 δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι
 δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔστι περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ
 μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων,
 15 ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ'
 ὀρθὰ οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα,
 πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας
 ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου³. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής
 20 τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον
 ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἰρων.
 Περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτρα-
 25 πελία, ἡ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
 ἀγροῖκος τις καὶ ἡ ἔξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδύ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν
 ὥς δεῖ ἡδύς ὢν φίλος⁴ καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενός

¹ ἀπειροκαλία - tastelessness.

² ἐπιδικάζονται etc. - the extreme characters lay claim to the middle place.

³ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου (ἕνεκα) - so that we may be easily followed.

⁴ φίλος - amiable.

ἔνεκα, ἄρσενος ἰ, εἰ δὲ ὠφελεῖται τῆς αὐτοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἄλλαισι καὶ ἐν παῖσι
 ἀγῶνις δυνάμεις τις καὶ δύσκολος. Εἰσι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ 30
 πᾶσι μερόσιν. ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετῆς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπειταίεται δὲ καὶ αἰδὼς
 τῶν. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀρεταῖς, ὁ δὲ ὑπερβαλλάντων, ὡς ὁ καταπατήρ
 ὁ παῖς αἰδοῦμενος, ὁ δὲ ἄλλαισι ἢ ὁ μὲν δυνάμεις ἀναγυῖντος, ὁ δὲ μερος 35
 αἰδῶν. Νέμεσις δὲ μερόσιν καὶ ἐπειταίεται καὶ, εἰσι δὲ περὶ ἅπλην
 καὶ ἡδονῶν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς σπουδαῖσι τοῖς πλεονάζουσιν ἢ ὁ μὲν πλεονάζουσιν
 σπουδαῖς ἀντιταίεται τῶν ἀντιταίεται, ὁ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀντιταίεται ὁ μὲν πλεονάζουσιν
 τοῖς ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀντιταίεται, ὁ δὲ ἐπειταίεται τοῖς ἀντιταίεται τοῖς ἀντιταίεται 5
 ὡς καὶ γὰρ. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῖς καὶ καὶ ἀλλοῖς κακοῖς ἔστιν. περὶ δὲ
 δικαιοσύνης, ἐπὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀρεταῖς, μὲν τὰς ἀντιταίεται ἀντιταίεται περὶ ἐκαστοῦ
 ἐποῦνται πᾶσι μερόσιν εἰσι. ὁ μὲν καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.

The author presented this table to his students in a *diapaphi*. It may

[illegible]

1 ὁρακιος - obsequious.
2 νεμεσις - righteous indignation. In this instance the application of the theory of the mean is very unfortunate.

573—a. By this theory the author is led to a remarkable consequence, namely, that the opposition between the extremes (being two vices) is sharper than that between virtue and vice.

Eth. Nic. II 8, 1108 b^{11,15}, 26,30.

1108b Τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὓσων, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς
δὲ κατ' ἑλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταιί
πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέσῃ
15, 26 ταῖς ἄκραις. — Οὕτως δὲ ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης
ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀκροῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστη-
κεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου
30 ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου.

The
opposition
between the
extremes is
the sharpest

b. Sometimes the excess, sometimes the defect is more opposed to the mean.

Ib., 1108 b³⁵-1109 a¹⁹:

1109a Πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἑλλειψις, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ
ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία
ἑλλειψις οὔσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἐνδεια οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἡ
5 ἀκολασία ὑπερβολή οὔσα. Διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ
αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον
τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον
10 εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἡ δειλία,
ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα
δοκεῖ εἶναι. Μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία
15 τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. Οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ
εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. Ταῦτ' οὖν
μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολή οὔσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

574—In the next chapter Ar. gives some practical rules for attaining the mean.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 9, 1109 a³⁰⁻³³:

30 Δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου,
καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

Three rules
for
attaining
the mean

τοῦτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε
νῆα.

33 τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἁμαρτωλότερον τὸ δ' ἥττον.

b. Ib., b¹⁻⁷:

Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς αὐτοὶς εὐκατάφοροι ἔσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα 1109b πεφύκαμεν. Τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. Εἰς τοῦναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες 5 τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.

c. Ib., b⁷⁻¹²:

Ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. "Ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· 10 οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἤττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα.

Conditions of responsibility for action 575—In book III, ch. 1-5, the conditions of responsibility for action are defined. First, the action must be voluntary (ἐκούσιον), i.e. done (1) not under compulsion, and (2) with knowledge of the circumstances.

The voluntary and involuntary

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 1, 1109 b³⁰-1110 a⁴:

Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκούσιόις 30 ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσιόις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις.

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γιγνόμενα. Βίαιον δὲ οὐ ἡ 35 ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ἡμῶν μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποιῇ ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.

Compulsory acts

b. Ib., 1110 b¹⁻⁵, 9-11:

Τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὅπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἢ καὶ 1110b ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται; "Α δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. — Εἰ δὲ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη 5. 9 βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν.

Acts done through ignorance are involuntary only when regretted

c. Ib., 1110 b¹⁸⁻²⁴:

Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὅτιοῦν, μηδὲν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ 20 τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ἤδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. Τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον.

d. Ib., IIIIO b³⁰-IIIII a⁶:Knowledge of
the circum-
stances
required

Τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην), ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ αἱ
 IIIIIA ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. Ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ,
 5 καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.

e. Ib., IIIII a²²⁻²⁹, b¹⁻³:Voluntary
acts

Ὅντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς
 25 λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράττει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ἀκουσίως; Ἡ γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; — δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἦττον
 IIIIIB ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας· ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

576—Moral virtue further implies that the action is done by choice.

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 2, IIIII b⁴⁻¹⁰:

Choice

Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται
 5 διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἡθὴ κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. — Ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτ' ὅν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ,
 10 προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ.

b. Ib., IIIIIB 10-19:

It is neither
desire nor
passion

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εἰκόασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. Καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς
 15 δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. Καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. Καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. — Θυμός δ' ἔτι ἦττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

c. Ib., IIIIIB 19-30:

Neither wish

20 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον. Προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν

ἢ ἀθλητὴν· προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' 25
αὐτοῦ. Ἐτι δὲ ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς
τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα. Προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ
εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν. Προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἄρμόζει·
ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι.

30

nor opinion

d. Ib. IIII b³⁰-III2 a¹¹:

Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν 30, 31
ἦττον περὶ τὰ ἀτίδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ
διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. — Ὅλως
μὲν οὖν δόξη ταύτων ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί. Τῷ γὰρ προαι- III2a
ρεῖσθαι τάγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοὶ τινὲς ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ. Καὶ προαιρού-
μεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ τίνι
συμφέρι ἢ πῶς· λαβεῖν δὲ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις 5
ἐπαινέται τῷ εἶναι οὐ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. Καὶ
προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν.
Δοκοῦσι τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἐνιοὶ δοξάζειν
μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ.

10

Choice
definede. Ib., III2 a¹³⁻¹⁷:

Τί οὖν ἡ ποῖόν τί ἐστὶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν; Ἐκ οὐ σι ο ν μὲν
δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. Ἀλλ' ἄρα γε τὸ π ρ ο β ε β ο υ - 15
λ ε υ μ ε ν ο ν ; Ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. Ὑποσημαίνειν
δ' ἔοικεν καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

577—Choice having been defined as “the Voluntary preceded by deli-
beration”, the question arises: on which objects does deliberation bear.
Ar. answers: (1) We deliberate about things that are in our power and
can be done; (2) not about ends, but about means.

Not every
thing is
object of
deliberationa. *Eth. Nic.* III 3, III2 a¹⁸⁻³⁴:

Βουλευόνται δὲ πότερα πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστὶν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ
ἐστὶ βουλή; Λεκτέον δὲ ἴσως βουλευτόν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος 20
ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. — Περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βου-
λεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμ-
μετροι. — Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτά γινομένων, εἴτ'
ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. — 25
Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὕμβρων. — Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ
τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. — Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων,
οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται.
Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐδὲν δι' ἡμῶν. — Βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' 30

ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. Αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. Τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλευόνται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν.

b. Ib., III2 b¹¹⁻²¹:

We deliberate
not about
ends, but
about means

III2b Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Οὔτε γὰρ ἱατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιαίνει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδείς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσιν, καὶ διὰ πλείονων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικεν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύνειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα.

578—After these preliminaries choice can be defined more precisely.

Eth. Nic. III 3, III3 a⁹⁻¹²:

Final
definition
of choice

Ὅντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὁρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσάσθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὁρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

579—a. Since, then, good and bad actions depend on choice, virtue and vice are in our power.

Eth. Nic. III 5, III3 b³⁻¹⁶:

We are
responsible
for good and
for bad
actions

III3b Ὅντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. Αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. Ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. Ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστε εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχροὺς ὃν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχροὺς ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Εἰ δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχροτά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῦς καὶ κακοῦς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὥς

15 οὐδείς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ¹

ἔοικεν τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δὲ ἀληθεῖ. Μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδείς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον.

¹ With this ancient Greek wisdom (the verse may be of Solon) the Socratic maxim that "nobody does wrong willingly" is implicitly condemned. Cp. our nr. 204c, d.

**presupposed
by legislation**

29, 30

Ib, IIII a⁹⁻³¹:

ՀՀ. ԱՌԹՈՒՆԻ ԽԱՆ ԱՄԱՆԱՅԹՈՒ ՐԵՅԱ ԽԱՆ ՔՑ ԵՐԵՅԻՄՈՒ, ԱՄԱՆԱՅԹՈՒ ԽԱՆ ԱՄՈՅԱՆՈՒՆԻ, ՂՁ ՔՑ ԵՂՈՒՆԻՍՏՈՒՆԻ, ԶԻՆՈՒՆԱՅԻ ԵՂՅԵՐԾՈ ԵՐԾՈՒՄԻՄ ԱՌԾԻՔ ԳՐԶ ԺՅԼ ԱՂԻ ԵՂՈՒ. ԱՂԻՄԻՆՈՒՆԱՅԻ ԽԱՆ ԵՂՈՒ ԵՈՒՄՈՒՄ

30

b. Ib, IIII a³¹-b²⁵:

ΕΙ ΔΕ ΤΙΣ ΘΕΛΟΙ ΤΙ ΠΑΡΕΤΕΡΕΣ ΕΦΕΛΕΥΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΔΥΛΑΘΩ, ΤΗΣ ΔΕ ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΣ ΙΙΙΙΒ
 ΟΥ ΧΥΡΙΟΙ, ΔΥΛ' ΕΠΙΟΝΟΣ ΠΟΘ' ΕΚΑΣΤΟΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΕΤΕΛΟΣ ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ
 ΑΥΤΩ. ΕΙ ΠΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΕΚΚΑΣΤΟΣ ΑΥΤΩ ΤΗΣ ΕΞΕΩΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΠΛΗΡΗΣ ΑΚΡΙΤΟΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΣ
 ΕΣΤΑΙ ΠΛΗΡΗΣ ΑΚΡΙΤΟΣ, ΕΙ ΔΕ ΤΟ ΠΛΗΡΕΣ ΑΥΤΩ ΑΚΡΙΤΟΣ, ΔΙΔΩ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΟΙΟΙΜΕΝΟΣ ΑΥΤΩ ΤΟ
 ΔΥΛΑΘΩΝ ΤΟΝ ΕΤΕΛΟΣΝ ΕΝΤΑΥΤΑ ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙ, ΔΙΔΩ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΟΙΟΙΜΕΝΟΣ ΑΥΤΩ ΤΟΝ ΕΤΕΛΟΣΝ
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 ΕΤΕΛΟΣΝ, Ή ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΕΤΕΛΟΣΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΕΤΕΛΟΣΝ, ΔΥΛ' ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ
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10 ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ
καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυῖα), εἰ δὴ ταῦτ'
ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ, τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; Ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως,
τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται,
15 τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. Εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος
μὴ φύσει ἐκάστῳ φαίνεται οἷονδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ
μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴ
ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἤττον καὶ ἢ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη. Ὅμοιως γὰρ καὶ
20 τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτόν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. Εἰ οὖν,
ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἔξεων συναίτιοι πως
αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακαί
25 ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἴεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.

c. Ib., III4 b³⁰-III5 a³:

Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἔξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεις
ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοι ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ
III5a τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἢ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν·
ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.

Actions and
states of cha-
racter not in
the same
sense
voluntary

3—THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF VIRTUE
(Books III 6-X)

581—Ar.'s treatment of courage gives a good instance of his method in defining moral virtues. It has been rightly remarked by Ross that this method is the reverse of that followed by Plato. Plato tends to interpret every virtue so widely that it is essentially identified with virtue as a whole—we have seen this in the *Laches* concerning courage (our nr. 210), and again in the *Republic* concerning justice (nrs. 284-285)—; by Ar. the spheres of the particular virtues are narrowed as much as possible.

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 6, III5 a⁶⁻³⁵:

Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερόν γεγένηται, φοβούμεθα δὲ δηλονότι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. Φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα
10 τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος
15 ἀναίσχυντος. Λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γὰρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Πενίαν δὲ ἴσως οὐ δεῖ

Courage
defined

φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος, λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα. Ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθεριοὶ εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων 20 ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. Οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παιῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. Περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; Ἡ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; Οὐθεις γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. Φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ 25 θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. Δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. Ἐν τίσιν οὖν; Ἡ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; Τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. Ὁμολογοὶ δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ 30 καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. Κυρίως δὲ ἡ λέγειται ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον.

35

b. Ib. 7, III5 b¹⁵⁻²⁴:

Γίνεται δὴ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι ὁ οὐ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι III5 οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν αὖ δεῖ b15 καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος (κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος· τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν, καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ 20 ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν· τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. Καλοῦ δὲ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Its motive
is its own
nobility

Again, W. D. Ross ¹ has made an interesting remark here: in his actual treatment of the virtues, he says, Ar. somewhat forgets his formal view; (namely, that all human action aims at an end other than itself); he nowhere attempts to deduce the necessity of any single virtue from the supreme end to be attained. He treats the agent as being moved to action by the contemplation of the "fineness" of the good act itself, and thus becomes in his detailed treatment an intuitionist.

582—a. The sphere of temperance is limited to the pleasures of touch and taste, but especially to those of touch.

Temperance *Eth. Nic.* III 10, III7 b²⁰-III8 b¹:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω (τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύψω III7 γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων)· μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν. b20 Δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης

¹ Aristotle, p. 204/5.

25 ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν (ἤττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως
 περὶ τὰς λύπας ἐστίν)· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. Περὶ ποίας
 οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. Διηρῆσθωσαν δὴ καὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ αἱ
 30 ψυχικαὶ, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομαθία· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός
 ἐστίν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας. Οἱ δὲ περὶ
 τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ'
 οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαὶ εἰσιν. Τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς
 35 καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ'
 III 8a οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς σω-
 ματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς
 διὰ τῆς ὕψεως, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε
 5 ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις,
 καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς
 γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεις ἀκολάστους λέγει,
 οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. Οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμὴν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
 10 τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μῆλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολά-
 στους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων ἢ ὀψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι,
 ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. Ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ
 τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ
 15 τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου. Τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ ταῦτα. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
 οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
 Οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν
 20 δ' αἰσθησιν ἡ ὁσμὴ ἐποίησεν· οὐδὲ ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ,
 ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἤσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται·
 ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. Περὶ τὰς
 τοιαύτας δὲ ἡ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία
 ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινῶν εἰ, ὅθεν ἀνδραπο-
 25 δώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὖται δ' εἰσὶν ἀφῇ
 καὶ γεῦσις. Φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι·
 τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως ἐστὶν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δο-
 κιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἷ γε
 30 ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν
 ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. Διὸ καὶ ἡϋξάτο τις ὀσφάγος ὢν τὸν
 φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γινέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ.

b. Ib., II, III 8 b²⁷⁻²⁸, III 9 a^{5,11}:

Excess and
defect

III 9a Ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον. —
 5 Ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἤττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται.
 Οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει

τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δέ τῳ μὴθέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μὴδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἐτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι. Οὐ τέτευχε δ' 10 ὀνόματος ὁ τοιοῦτος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι.

W. D. Ross¹ remarks on this passage: "Apart from the excessive narrowness of the conception of temperance, the main point to be noted here is the breakdown of the doctrine of the mean".

583—The crown of virtues is, according to Ar., that particular virtue which he calls "greatness of soul". It is described as follows.

Greatness
of soul

Eth. Nic. IV 3, 1123 a³⁴-1125 a¹⁶:

Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μέγала μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν 1123b ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. Δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀξιόσων· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν² οὐδείς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. Μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. (ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἀξίος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος 5 δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ). ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος (ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἀξίος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος). ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἀξίος μικρόψυχος, ἔαν τε μεγάλων ἔαν τε μετρίων, ἔαν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἀξίος 10 ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ· καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἀξίος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἀξίος;

Ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος (τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ). οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. 15

Εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἀξίος ὢν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. Ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμεμεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ (μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο 20 τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν). περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. Καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς· κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. Ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. Ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς 25 ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον.

Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἀξίος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μεζόνος γὰρ αἰεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἀξίος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Καὶ δόξειεν δ' <ἂν> εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ 30

¹ Aristotle, p. 207.

² τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν - sc. ἀξιούντων ἑαυτούς.

It is related
to honour
and
disgrace

ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. Δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, <ὕφ'> ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν 15 Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί· οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. Μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν 20 δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. Καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι¹, ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἄλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν. 25

in speaking
and acting
openly

Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον· τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβούμενου. Καὶ μέλει τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερώς· παρρησιαστής γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν. Διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν· εἰρώνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς. Καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ 30 δύνασθαι ζῆν² ἄλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ 1125a καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. Οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. Οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακὰ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. Οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος³· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ 5 ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἐτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῇται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται, οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. Καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥμισυ ὀλοφυρτικός καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. Καὶ οἶος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ 10 καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον.

Outward
appearance

Καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἢ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἢ ταχυτής διὰ τούτων. 15

We share the impression of Ross, who states that "as a whole the picture is an unpleasing one".

Justice

584—Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is devoted to justice. Contrary to Plato, Ar. follows the common use of language. Doing so, he distinguishes two main senses of the terms "just" and "unjust".

Two senses
of the terms
"just" and
"unjust"

Eth. Nic. V 1, 1129 a³²-b¹:

Δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνιστος, ὥστε

¹ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι - he does not strive after the things commonly held in honour.

² ζῆν πρὸς ἄλλον - living at the will of another.

³ ἀνθρωπολόγος - a gossip.

δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὃ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. Τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον.

585—In the first sense "justice" is perfect virtue, containing all other virtues and displayed in society.

Ib., 1129 b¹¹-1130 a⁸:

Justice in
the general
sense

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν. Οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ 15 ἀπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. Προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ 25 λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδὲ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν 30 κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὁρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὁρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος¹. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶν τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὔτε ἐφ' ὧς οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φαμεν

30 ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ ἐνι².

Καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετὴ, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστὶν, τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτὸν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς 1130a ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι »ἀρχὰ ἄνδρα δείξει«· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων. Διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερον 5 ἐστίν· ἄλλω γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῶ. Κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλ' ὁ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν.

586—a. There also exists a sort of "justice" in a special sense, which is a part of virtue in general.

Eth. Nic. V 2, 1130 a¹⁴⁻³⁴:

Justice in
the special
sense

Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην. Ἔστι γάρ τις, ὥς φαμέν.

¹ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος - if it has been made at random.

² Theognis, 147.

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν 15 γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινὰ (ψέγομεν γάρ) 20 καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. Ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθείς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυ- 25 μίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. Ἔτι περὶ μὲν τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίγνεται ἢ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινι μοχθηρίᾳ αἰεὶ, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλειπεν τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ 30 ἐπάταξεν, ἐπὶ ὀργήν, εἰ δὲ ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. Ὡστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἐν μέρει.

1. distributive, b. Justice in this sense is divided into two kinds: (1) distributive,
2. corrective (2) corrective.

Ib., 1130 b³⁰-1131 a¹:

Τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἔστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστιν καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἐν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλαγμασι διορθωτικόν.

Corrective
justice
subdivided

- c. Corrective justice again is subdivided into two divisions.

Ib., 1131 a¹⁻⁹:

Τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσιά ἐστιν τὰ δὲ 1131a ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷον πρᾶσις, ὠνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρῆσις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις (ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων 5 τούτων ἐκούσιος), τῶν δὲ ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ, μοιχεία, φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία¹, δουλαπατία, δολοφονία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἄρπαγὴ, πῆρωσις, κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός.

587—In a certain sense justice may be called a mean between two extremes. First distributive justice is considered.

Justice
a mean

Eth. Nic. V 3, 1131 a⁹⁻³²:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἄδικος ἄνιστος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστὶ 10 τοῦ ἀνίστου. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον. Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ

¹ Prostitution.

ἀνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη.
 15 Ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ
 ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ἥ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλείον
 καὶ ἑλαττον), ἥ δ' ἴσον ἐστὶ, δυοῖν, ἥ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον
 ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὅν, δύο ἐστὶ, καὶ
 20 ἐν οἷς [τὰ πράγματα], δύο. Καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὥς γὰρ
 ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ'
 ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ
 25 νέμωσιν. Ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς
 ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν
 λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ
 πλοῦτον, οἱ δὲ εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετὴν. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον
 30 ἀνάλογόν τι. Τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως
 ἀριθμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις.

a sort of
proportion

E.g.: the wages of A and B should be in proportion to the merits of A and B.
 Thus $\alpha : \beta = \gamma : \delta$, and $\alpha : \gamma = \beta : \delta$. Now $\alpha : \beta = (\alpha + \gamma) : (\beta + \delta)$.
 This is called geometrical proportion.

588—Next, corrective justice is to be dealt with. Here the proportion
 is *arithmetical*, the same being rendered for the same.

Eth. Nic. V 4, 1131 b²³-1132 a¹⁹:

In corrective
justice the
proportion is
arithmetical

25 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τῷ διορθωτικόν,
 ὃ γίγνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. Τοῦτο
 δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον
 τῶν κοινῶν αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην (καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων
 30 κοινῶν ἐὰν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι
 πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ
 τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν)· τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον
 1132a τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν
 ἀριθμητικήν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος
 ἐπιεικῇ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν
 5 διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος (καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις), εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ'
 ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ὁ μὲν ἐβλάψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. Ὡστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον
 ὅν ἰσάζειν πειράται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ
 καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διήρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειράται
 10 τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. (Λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ
 τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἄν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι,
 καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία
 τὸ δὲ κέρδος.) Ὡστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ

In this case,
too, justice
is a mean

κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 15
πλεόν τοῦ κακοῦ δὲ ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ
ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον
ζημίας καὶ κέρδους.

589—'Επιείκεια and the ἐπιεικές. *Eth. Nic.* V 10, 1137 a²¹-b²⁷:

Equity

Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιο-
σύνην τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικές πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς
ταῦτόν ἀπλῶς οὔτε ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπούμενοις, καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ
ἐπιεικές ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες 35
μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες, ὅτε δὲ 1137b
τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικές παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὃν
ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἡ τὸ ἐπιεικές οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ
ἄλλο· ἡ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταῦτόν ἐστιν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει 5
διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, ἔχει δὲ ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν
ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικές δικαίου τινὸς ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον,
καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. Ταῦτόν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ
ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαῖοι ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. Ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν 10
ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικές δίκαιον μὲν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρ-
θωμα νομίμου δικαίου. Αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δὲ
οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. Ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου,
μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ 15
ἁμαρτανόμενον. Καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἥττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ
νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ
τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστιν. Ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ 20
δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης
καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ καὶ ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς
εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ἥδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν. Διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἐστιν, καὶ βέλτιόν
τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος. Καὶ 25
ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ
καθόλου.

The intellec-
tual virtues
treated in
book VI

590—According to the definition of virtue given sub 571b, the φρό-
νιμος has the arbitrium in determining the μεσότης. Therefore, the in-
tellectual virtues, σοφία and φρόνησις, have to be dealt with, too. They
are treated in *Eth. Nic.* VI.

The author distinguishes two faculties in the rational part of the soul, namely
the ἐπιστημονικόν (which has to do with that which is of necessity, and therefore
eternal and invariable), and the λογιστικόν (a deliberating faculty, which has to
do with the contingent). The latter has a task towards practical action, since
choice must be preceded by deliberation.

There are five qualities by which the soul reaches truth: ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, νοῦς and σοφία. The first having been defined as demonstrative knowledge of the necessary and eternal, and the second as a rational quality, concerned with producing, which reasons truly (ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική), φρόνησις is considered in the following passage.

a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 5, 1140 a^{24,33}, b^{20,21}:

What is
φρόνιμος

1140a Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς
25 φρονίμους. Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς
βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα,
οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα
πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως¹. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους
30 λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη.
"Ὡστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.

Βουλευέται δ' οὐθεις περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχο-
b 20 μένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι. — "Ὡστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι
μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακ-
τικήν.

φρόνησις
defined

b. It is neither an art, nor a purely intellectual quality.

Ib., 1140 b^{21,30}:

It is neither
an art.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. Καὶ ἐν μὲν
τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος², περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἤττον, ὥσπερ καὶ
περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη.
25 Δυσκοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἔχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή,
τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξιν μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης
30 ἕξεώς ἐστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

nor a purely
intellectual
quality

In this passage Ar. rightly distinguishes practical reason from theoretical, as we shall again find in his definition of wisdom (our next nr.). By this distinction he is correcting Plato, who—doubtlessly by the ethico-religious character of his contemplation of the Ideas—mixed them willingly.

¹ Book X, where the contemplative life is treated, makes clear what the author means by the above formula: "to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some one department, e.g. what is good for his health or strength, but what is expedient as a means to the good life in general", this is the mark of a man who possesses practical wisdom. For this man acknowledges that the contemplative life is the supreme good for man, because it makes him most happy (by "contemplative life" being meant a life of scientific research).

² In Plato's *Hippias Minor* Socrates came to the strange conclusion that the man who does wrong willingly is better than the one who does it unwillingly (our nr. 212). To this famous theory Ar. replies: *In art*, indeed, the man who errs willingly is to be preferred; in φρόνησις, which is half an intellectual, half a practical quality, less. And so it is in the case of the other virtues. See our explanation of the text.

591—Again, νοῦς having been defined in the next chapter (6) as “knowledge” of the first principles from which science proceeds” (cp. our nr. 465), wisdom is treated in the following passage.

Wisdom

a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 7, 1141 a⁹⁻²⁰:

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, 1141a
οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν 10
οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ
τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ’ ἄλλο τι σοφοὺς, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρός
φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ

τὸν δ’ οὐτ’ ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ’ ἀροτῆρα
οὐτ’ ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

15

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν
μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. Ὡς τε
εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν
καὶ χροῦσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων.

20

“The highest objects” were to Ar., at least in the visible world, the heavenly
bodies, which he calls τὰ ἄλδια τῶν αἰσθητῶν. They are far superior to man. Therefore,
Ar. stresses the speculative character of wisdom, which is illustrated by the instances
of Thales and Anaxagoras (our next cited passage).

Speculative
character of
wisdom

b. *Ib.*, b³⁻⁸:

Διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους σοφοὺς μὲν, φρονίμους δ’ 1141b
οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ 5
μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ’,
ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

592—As such, then, wisdom ought to be superior to phrónesis, which
has a practical character. And yet, phrónesis, being practical, is directly
concerned with those things which can make man happy, and could,
therefore, seem to be more important. What, then is the relation of wisdom
to phrónesis?

Relation of
phronesis
to wisdom

Eth. Nic. VI 12, 1144 a¹⁻⁹:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καθ’ αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετάς αὐτὰς εἶναι, 1144a
ἀρετάς γ’ οὐσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου¹, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν
μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. Ἐπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὥς ἱατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ’
ὥς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν². μέρος γὰρ οὐσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς 5

¹ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου - he means: of each of the two faculties of the rational
soul, sc. the ἐπιστημονικόν and the λογιστικόν.

² “In the sense in which healthiness is the cause of health”, i.e. wisdom is the
formal cause of happiness.

τῷ ἔχεισθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. "Ἐν τῷ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον.

593—Since, then, man becomes good by doing good actions—if, at least, he does them by choice and for the sake of the good—, practical wisdom, which has the leading part in choice, plays a prominent rôle in the genesis of virtue. But this is not all. Whenever a man is virtuous, he possesses practical wisdom; for there is no true virtue without phronesis.

In the following passage Ar. explains the relation of practical wisdom (phronesis) to virtue (in the proper sense) by comparing it to that of a certain intellectual ability (*δυνάμεις*), which is the capacity for doing the things that conduce to the aim we propose, to natural virtue. "Cleverness" is not identical with practical wisdom, but practical wisdom implies it. Now natural virtue is related in the same way to Virtue in the proper sense.

a. *Eth. Nic. VI 13, 1144 b¹⁻³²*:

1144b Σκεπτόμεν δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν ἔχει, moral virtue

ὥς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα (ὁ τὰὐτὸ μὲν, ἴσμεν δὲ), ὁρτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. Ἰσάμεν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθικῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει καὶ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ταῖα ἔχουσιν εὐθὺς ἐκ τῆς φύσεως. ἀλλ' ὅπως ἡγενομένης ἑτέρον τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλ' ἀνευ νοῦ βλαβερά φερόμενα ὄντα. Πάλιν τοσοῦτον εἰσικεν ὀρθόσθαι, ὅτι οὐδ' ὅσπερ σὺμμετριῶς ἰσχυρῶς ἀνευ ὀφείας κινουμένης συμμετρίως σφάλλασθαι ἰσχυρῶς διαφέρει, ἡ δὲ ἕξις ἴσμεν οὐσα τότ' ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετῆ. "Ἄστε καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δὲ ἔστιν εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὐτως καὶ ἐν τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δὲ ἔστι, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τοῦτω ἡ κυρία οὐ γίγνεται ἀνευ φρονήσεως.

Διόπερ τίνας φανίμους τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεως εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τὴν φρόνησιν ἔχῃ τῇ δὲ ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεως ὥστε εἶναι πᾶσας ἀρετὰς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἀνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγε. Σημειὼν δὲ· but none of them is without it

καὶ πρὸς δὲ ἔστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. Ἐοικασί δὲ μαντεύεσθαι πῶς ἀπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετὴ ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. Δεῖ δὲ μικρόν μεταβῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ἕξις ἀρετῆς ἔστιν. Ὁρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησις ἔστιν.

Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ὥστε εἶναι (ἐπιστήμης γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσας),

ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι 30 κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἡθικῆς ἀρετῆς.

b. Nevertheless, this does not prove that *phronesis* is superior to wisdom.

**Phronesis
not superior
to wisdom**

Ib., 1145 a⁶⁻⁸:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγείας ἡ ἰατρικὴ.

594—Selfrestraint (*ἐγκράτεια*) and Unrestraint (*ἀκρασία*) are treated in Book VII, ch. 1-10. The last five chapters of this book (11-15) deal with *ἡδονή*, a much-discussed subject in the Academy in the later years of Plato. A summary of these discussions is given by Ar. in the following passage.

**Three main
views about
pleasure**

a. *Eth. Nic.* VII 11, 1152 b⁸⁻¹²:

Τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ 1152b συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτόν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔναι μὲν εἶναι, 10 αἱ δὲ πολλὰ φαῦλαι· ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν.

Of these three views, the first is that of Speusippus; the second is Plato's view in the *Philebus*. The third appears at the end of this dialogue. It is represented by Ar. in book X, *infra*.

b. For the first thesis it is argued that pleasure is not a good because it is a process (namely the filling of a void).

**An argument
for the first
thesis**

Ib., 1152 b¹²⁻¹⁴:

Ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή¹, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενῆς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία.

c. The same argument is adduced for the third view.

**and for the
third**

Ib., 1152 b²²⁻²³:

Ὅτι δ' οὐ τᾶριτον ἡ ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις.

595—To this argument Ar. opposes that pleasure is neither a process nor always linked up with a process; it is an activity and an end.

**This
argument
refuted**

Eth. Nic. VII 12, 1153 a⁷⁻¹⁵:

Οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασι τὸ τέλος 1153a τῆς γενέσεως. Οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι

¹ γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή - "a conscious process towards a natural state" (Rackham).

10 καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἑτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. Διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν ἐρ - γείαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως¹, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπό-

Definition
of pleasure

596—a. To the view of Speusippus that no pleasure is a good, Ar. opposes the thesis that pleasure as such is a good.

Eth. Nic. VII 13, 1153 b¹⁻⁷:

Pleasure
a good

1153b Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πᾶσι ἔμποδιστική. Τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. Ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. Ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος 5 ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττω καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον². οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

b. But not only pleasure as such is a good; against the third view mentioned in ch. 11 Ar. now argues (1) that *some pleasure* may be the supreme Good, and (2) that in fact the supreme Good will be a certain kind of pleasure.

Ib., 1153 b⁷⁻¹³:

The supreme
Good a cer-
tain kind of
pleasure

10 Τᾶριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονὴν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔναι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινα ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. Ἰσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης 10 ἕξεως εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ἢ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἰρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἡδονή. Ὡστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἀπλῶς.

c. This theory is confirmed by the fact that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure.

Ib., 1153 b²⁵⁻²⁶:

This theory
confirmed by
experience

25 Καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημειόν τι τοῦ εἶναι πῶς τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν.

The argument is of Eudoxus of Cnidus, who according to *Eth. Nic.*

¹ "an activity of our natural state".

² The argument of Speusippus is more fully exhibited in X 2, 5: "They say, if pain is an evil, it does not follow that pleasure is a good; for evil can also be opposed to evil and to a thing which is neither good nor evil"—(if we follow the reading of Hackforth, who bracketed the word ἔμφω. According to the traditional text the meaning of the last words is: "and both are opposed to the neutral state"—which is, of course, true, but not exactly *ad rem*).

X 2, held that "pleasure is the Good", because "all creatures, rational and irrational alike, seek to obtain it". To this account Ar. adds the remark that the argument was believed more because of the excellence of Eudoxus' character than for its own sake. "For he (E.) had the reputation of being a man of exceptional temperance, and hence he was not suspected of upholding this view because he was a lover of pleasure, but people thought it must really be true" ¹.

597—Pleasure is treated again by Ar. in book X, ch. 1-5. The later exhibition goes further than that of book VII. We find the author's final view of pleasure in the following passage.

Pleasure is
not a process

a. *Eth. Nic.* X 4, 1174 a¹¹⁻²³, b⁵⁻⁶, b¹⁰⁻¹³:

Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ² περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω· τί δ' 1174a
ἐστὶν ἡ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. Δοκεῖ
γάρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις καθ' ὄντιν οὖν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνδεῆς οὐδενὸς 15
ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γεγόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιοῦτ' ὁμοίει καὶ ἡ
ἡδονή. "Ὅλον γὰρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἢς
ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. Διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις
ἐστὶν. Ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ 20
τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ ἐφίεται, ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς
μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων.
— Τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁπωῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. — Ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον b 5, 6
καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τῆς ἡδονῆς ³. Οὐ γὰρ πάντων 10
ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι
γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθέν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις·
οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γὰρ τι.

neither the
result of a
process

b. Positively, pleasure is defined as something which accompanies and completes activity.

Definition
of pleasure

Eth. Nic. X 4, 1174 b¹⁴⁻³⁴:

Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὐ διακει-
μένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν (τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστα εἶναι 15
δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέ-
τω), καθ' ἕκαστον δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἁρίστα διακειμένου πρὸς
τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. Κατὰ 20

¹ Translation of Rackham.

² τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα - the current opinions.

³ τῆς ἡδονῆς is a necessary correction, first made by Ramsauer and adopted by W. D. Ross and H. Rackham. The mss. have τὴν ἡδονήν.

πᾶσαν γὰρ αἰσθησὶν ἔστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν. Τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. Οὐ τὸν
 25 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἢ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἱατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἔστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. Καθ' ἐκάστην δ' αἰσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον· φαμέν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἢ τε αἰσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ
 30 πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰετῶς ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισμένου. Τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή οὐχ ὥς ἐξ ἑνὸς ὑπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.

598—Consequences of this definition are:

a. Pleasures differ in kind, since activities differ.

1175a *Eth. Nic. X 5, 1175 a²⁰⁻²⁸:*

Consequences of this definition

20 Ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσαν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή. Ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν. Τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει ὕψ' ἐτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι. Οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῶα καὶ
 25 δένδρα καὶ γραφή καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκευὸς. Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. Διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὗται ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.

b. Activities have their own pleasures which stimulate them.

Ib., 1175 a^{28-b¹}:

30 Φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συμφκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢν τελειοῖ. Συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκία ἡδονή. Μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρύνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς
 35 τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. Συναύξουσι δὴ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα. Τοῖς ἐτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει.

599—Good pleasures are those in which the φρόνιμος takes a delight.

What are good pleasures?

1176a *Eth. Nic. X 5, 1176 a¹⁵⁻²²:*

15 Δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἢ τοιούτος, καὶ ἡδοναί εἶναι ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς

οὗτος χαίρει. Τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῇ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· 20
πολλὰ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ
τούτοις καὶ τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις.

600—In Books VIII and IX friendship is dealt with.

The author proceeds to determine its conditions by answering these two questions: (1) Is friendship only possible between good men? (2) Is it of one kind or of more than one?

Friendship
defined

Eth. Nic. VIII 2, 1155 b¹⁷-1156 a⁵:

Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοκεῖ 1155b
γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον.
Δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν 20
εἴη τάγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. Πότερον οὖν τάγαθόν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς
ἀγαθόν; Διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. Δοκεῖ δὲ
τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθόν φιλητόν,
ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ ἐκάστω. Φιλεῖ δὲ ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὃν αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινό- 25
μενον. Διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητόν φαινόμενον.

Τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται
φιλία. Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων ἀγαθοῦ (γελοῖον γὰρ
ἴσως τῷ οἴῳ βούλεσθαι τάγαθὰ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ σφῆζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα 30
αὐτὸς ἔχῃ). τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ
ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. Τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ
εὖνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου
γίγνηται· εὖνοϊαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονηθόσιν φιλίαν
εἶναι. Ἡ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσιν; Πολλοὶ γὰρ
εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· 35
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκείνων τις πάθῃ πρὸς τοῦτον. Εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι 1156a
φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν
ἑαυτοῖς; Δεῖ ἄρα εὖνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας
δι' ἓν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

5

So friendship is defined by four characteristics:

(1) it is goodwill (εὖνοια), (2) mutual (ἐν ἀντιπεπονηθόσιν), (3) known to the other (μὴ λανθάνουσα), (4) for the sake of the other (τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα).

By the last characteristic, strictly speaking, friendships of utility and of pleasure are excluded. They may be called friendship only by analogy, or (as Ar. calls it in the next chapter) *accidentally*.

The point is discussed by Schächer in his work cited sub 565a, where he compares the passages on φιλία in the three Aristotelian treatises on ethics.

601—a. According to the three kinds of φιλητά, three species of friendship are distinguished.

Eth. Nic. VIII 3, 1156 a⁶⁻²⁴:

Three species
of friendship

1156a Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. Τρία
δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντι-
φιλήσις οὐ λανθάνουσα. Οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις
10 ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ'
αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ γίγνεται τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
οἱ δι' ἡδονήν. Οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ'
ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς. Οἱ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν
15 στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν
<ὅσπερ ἐστίν>, ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. Κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι
αὐταὶ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ
πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν. Εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται εἰσιν,
20 μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ᾖσιν, παύονται
φιλοῦντες. Τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίγνεται. Ἀπολυθέντος
οὖν δι' ὁ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὗσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα.

b. Friendships of utility occur most frequently between the old.

Ib., 1156 a²⁴⁻²⁶:

Friendships
of utility

25 Μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἢ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ
ἡδύ οἱ τηλικούτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον).

c. Friendships of pleasure seem to occur mostly between the young.

Ib. 1156 a³¹⁻³⁵:

Friendships
of pleasure

Ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονήν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι,
καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδύ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτού-
35 σης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. Διὸ ταχέως γίνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται.

d. The perfect kind of friendship is that which is based on virtue.

Ib., 1156 b⁷⁻¹²:

Perfect
friendship

1156b Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. Οὗτοι γὰρ
τὰγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ εἰσι καθ' αὐτούς·
10 οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τὰγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι (δι' αὐτοὺς
γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία
ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾖσιν, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον.

e. Friendships of virtue occur rarely, those of utility or pleasure are frequent.

1158a *Eth. Nic. VIII 6, 1158 a¹⁰⁻¹⁸:*

Perfect
friendship
occurs
rarely

10 Πολλοὶς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα· ἔοικεν γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτον δὲ πρὸς ἓνα πέφυκε

γίνεσθαι, πολλούς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥάδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθούς εἶναι. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχά- 15 λεπον. Διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.

602—Self-love the type of and basis for love of others.

Self-love
the basis for
friendship

Eth. Nic. IX 4, 1166 a¹⁻³³:

Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὀρίζονται, ὅμοιον ἐκ 1166a τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. Τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλούμενον καὶ πράττοντα τάγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλούμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασιν, καὶ τῶν φίλων 5 οἱ προσκεκρουκότες ¹. οἱ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας οὐμβαίνει. Τούτων δὲ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὀρίζονται. Πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν 10 εἶναι. Ὅμοιον δὲ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν. Καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τάγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ 15 γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τάγαθόν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σφῆζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. Ἐκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τάγαθὰ, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν [ἐκεῖνο 20 τὸ γενόμενον] ² (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τάγαθόν), ἀλλ' ὧν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοεῖν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα. Συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνήμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. Καὶ 25 θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. Συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὥς εἶπεῖν. Τῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν [μὲν] ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ φίλος 30 ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.

603—a. An objection to this view is mentioned in ch. 8 of the same book, 1168 a²⁸⁻³⁵:

An objection
to this view

Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά. Ἐπι- 35 τιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὥς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ φιλαύτους ἀπο-

¹ Those who have quarrelled.

² Secl. Vermehren, followed by Rackham.

30 καλοῦσι· δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον (ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ ὅλον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄφ'
ἑαυτοῦ πράττει), ὁ δὲ ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον
35 διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίησιν.

b. Ar.'s reply to this objection. Ib., 1168 a³⁵-1169 a¹⁵:

Aristotle's
reply

1168b Τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. Φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν
μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλούμενος ᾧ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ
ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται. Ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς
5 αὐτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάντα οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἅπ' αὐτοῦ
πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. Καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι
ὁμογενωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ »μία ψυχὴ«¹ καὶ »κοινὰ τὰ φίλων« καὶ »ἰσότης
φιλότης« καὶ »γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον«². πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτόν μάλιστ'
10 ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ, καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν. Ἀπο-
ρεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶν ἔπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων τὸ πιστόν.
Ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιοῦτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον
ἐκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. Εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἐκάτεροι
15 λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον. Οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους
καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς
ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ
αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. Οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται
20 χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς.
Τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ
φαύλου ὄντος. Δικαίως δὲ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. Ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ
τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασιν λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον·
25 εἰ γὰρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ
σώφρονα ἢ ὅποιον ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ
περιποιεῖτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὔδ' ἐψέξει. — Δόξεις δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος
μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθὰ,
30 καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ
πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ
ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος.
35 Καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ, ὡς τούτου
1169a ἐκάστου ὄντος καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοῖ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου
μάλιστα. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ
ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. Διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος
5 τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ

¹ "Friends have one soul between them". Euripides, *Orestes*, 1046.

² "Charity begins at home" (Ross).

πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. Τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δεόντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, 10 εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. — "Ὡστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει, τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθειςιν ἐπόμενος.

15

604—The question whether friendship is necessary for happiness, is answered by Ar. in the affirmative.

Is friendship
necessary for
happiness?

Eth. Nic. IX 9, 1169 b³⁻¹³, b¹⁶⁻²², 1170 a¹¹⁻¹³:

Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεῖσεται φίλων ἢ μή. Οὐθὲν 1169b γὰρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς 5 τάγαθά· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἂ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

ἔοικεν δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντα ἀπονέμοντας τάγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. — Εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον ἐστὶ 10 τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεῖσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. — Ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν 16 καθ' αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. Καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. Δῆλον δ' 20 ὥς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεῦειν· δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. — Γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς 1170a ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θεόγνις φησιν.

12, 13

605—Having dealt with the problem of ἡδονή in the first part of Book X, the author speaks of the happy life in the following chapters (6-8).

Happiness
an activity
chosen for its
own sake

a. Recapitulation of preceding statements on the character of happiness.

Eth. Nic. X 6, 1176 a³⁰⁻³⁹.

Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ 1176a εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. Ἀναλαβοῦσι δὲ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. Εἴπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἂν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς 35

1176b ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ
 μέν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεται αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτάς αἰρετῶν τινα θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ
 5 ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. Καθ' αὐτάς δ' εἰσὶν αἰρεται ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν
 ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν.

Cp. to this definition that of I 7 (our nr. 566, at the end).

b. Is not play an activity chosen for its own sake?—To this question Ar. answers that play can never be an absolute end, only a means for further activity.

Is not play
 chosen for
 its own sake?

Ib., 1176 b¹⁰⁻¹¹, b³²-1177 a¹:

10 Καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτάς αἰροῦνται. — Σπουδά-
 32 ζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίζειν
 δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὁρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. Ἀναπαύσει γὰρ
 35 ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. Οὐ δὲ
 τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας.

c. Serious things contribute more to happiness.

The happy
 life is
 serious

Ib., 1177 a¹⁻⁶:

1177a Δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαιμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ'
 οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. Βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ
 παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν
 5 ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη.

606—a. Perfect happiness is that activity which exercises the highest virtue, i.e. that of the highest function of man, i.e. the intellect.

Eth. Nic. X 7, 1177 a¹²⁻¹⁸:

Perfect hap-
 piness lies in
 contempla-
 tion

Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην·
 αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. Εἴτε δὲ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν
 15 δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἐννοίαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῶν
 ὧν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν
 ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. "Ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται.

b. The reasons for this statement are given in the next passage. Reasons

Ib., 1177 a^{20-b⁶}, b²⁶-1178 a⁸:

20 Κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ (1) It is the
 τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ αὐτοῦ νοῦς. "Ἐτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα
 συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὅτιοῦν. Οἰόμεθ' αὖτε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεῖχθαι
 τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολο-

(1) It is the
 activity of
 the nous

γουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστάς ἡδονάς ἔχειν καθαριότητι 25
καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.

(2) most self-
sufficient

"Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ
πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ
τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς δικαιοπραγίᾳ 30
καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος,
ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ,
μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος.

(3) an end in
itself

Δόξει τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται 1177b
παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα
παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ
ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵνα εἰρήνῃν ἄγωμεν. 5

(4) a divine
life

Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπὸς 26
ἐστὶν οὕτως βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο
τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. Εἰ δὲ θεῖον
ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον 30
βίον. Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα
οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν
πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, 1178a
δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι
ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν
αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. Τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν·
τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ᾗδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ. Καὶ 5
τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος. Οὗτος
ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

Cp. *Metaph.* A 2, 982 b²⁸⁻³² (our nr. 519).

c. The life of moral virtue takes the second place.

Moral virtue
ranked as
secondary

Ib. c. 8, 1178 a⁹⁻¹⁴:

Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρω-
πικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς πρὸς ἀλλήλους 10
πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεῖαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἐν τε τοῖς
πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστῳ, ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρω-
πικά.

607—Further reasons for superiority of the contemplative life.

Contempla-
tion needs
few external
goods

a. *Eth. Nic.* X 8, 1178 a²³⁻³⁴:

Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρόν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς
ἡθικῆς. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεῖα καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον 25
διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικὸς, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρόν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρει·

b. Ib. 1178 b7-23:

c. Ib., 1178 b²⁴⁻³²:

Հղիությունը ծննդի օրը հաշվարկելու համար օգտագործվում է հետևյալ բանաձևը՝

and therefore happiest.

[illegible]

4—THE POLITICS

608—In Aristotle's opinion the supreme science in the province of practical reason is not ethics, but politics, since its object is to secure the well-being, not of the individual, but of a whole community or state (*Eth. Nic.* I 2, our nr. 566).

The first Book of the Politics inquires into the structure and the aims of the state.

Family
the germ-cell
of the state

a. *Polit.* I 2, 1252 a²⁶⁻³⁴, b⁹⁻¹²:

Ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, 1252a οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν 30 σωτηρίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπότην φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον ταῦτα τῷ σώματι ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλῳ ταῦτό συμφέρει. — Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν δύο κοινω- 34 νιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὁρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας νοῖκον μὲν πρώτιστα b 10 γυναικὰ τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα· ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἐστίν.

b. *Ib.*, 1252 b¹⁵⁻¹⁶, 27³⁰:

Structure of
the state,
and its aim

Ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. — Ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων καμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἥδη πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκειᾶς ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὔ ζῆν.

The state
exists by
nature

609—a. *Ib.*, 1252 b³⁰-1253 a⁴:

Διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη 30 ἐκείνων, ἥ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον· ἥ δ' αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. 1253a ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερόν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος.

Man a
political
animal

b. *Ib.*, 1253 a⁷⁻¹⁸:

Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὥς φαμέν, μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων· ἥ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ 10 σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῴοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἰσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις),

ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερὸν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ
 15 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον,
 τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἵσθησιν
 ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

610—Since the slave is a part of the household, slavery must be discussed first.

a. *Polit.* I 4, 1253 b²³⁻³³, 1254 a¹⁻², 5-8:

The slave
 a living
 tool

1253b Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας
 25 (ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὀρις-
 μέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀπο-
 τελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν
 30 ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἷαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῶρεὺς
 30 ἔμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ
 <τῷ οἰκονομικῷ> τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζώην ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος
 ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον. καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων
 1254a πᾶς ὑπηρέτης. — Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ
 5 κτῆμα πρακτικόν. — Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις εἶδει καὶ ἡ πράξις, καὶ
 δέονται ἀμφοτέραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν.
 ὁ δὲ βίος πράξις, οὐ ποίησις ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν
 πράξιν.

b. *Polit.* I 5, 1254 a¹⁷⁻²⁴, b¹⁶⁻²³:

Some men
 are slaves
 by nature

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιον
 τινι δουλεῦειν ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ, μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον.
 20 οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ
 γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων
 ἐστὶ. καὶ εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ
 b 16 ἄρχειν. — Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἄνθρωπος
 θηρίου (διάκεινται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρήσις,
 καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν
 20 ἐστὶν ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοισι. ἐστὶ γὰρ φύσει
 δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν) καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου
 τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν.

c. *Ib.*, 1254 b²⁷-1255 a¹:

Βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων
 καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ

ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον 30
(οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἷς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρεῖαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικὴν),
Exceptions συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τούναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων
τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχάς· ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὥς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιτο διάφοροι
τὸ σῶμα μόνον, ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν 35
ἂν ἀξιόους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεῦν. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολὺ
δικαιότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν τό
τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

611—In the final chapter of this Book the author raises the question whether the slave can have virtue. He treats it in a larger framework: the same question namely must be asked concerning women and children, since they too are ἀρχόμενοι, though in another sense than slaves.—Ar. gives the answer of Gorgias, who said that the virtue of a woman is different from that of a man, and the virtue of slaves different from that of free-born people (Plato, *Meno* 72 a; our nr. 267b).

Can the
slave have
virtue?

Polit. I 13, 1259 b²¹-1260 a², a¹⁰⁻²⁸, 33, 36:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τις 1259b
δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα τούτων, οἷον
σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕξεων,
ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφο- 25
τέρως· εἴτε γὰρ ἔστιν, τί διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων
ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον. σχεδὸν δὴ ταυτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητού-
μενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ 30
τὴν γυναικα εἶναι σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκό-
λαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὐ; καὶ καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ
ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ
ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν δεοὶ ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι 35
καθάπαξ; (οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρ-
χεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἶδει διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐδέν)· εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν
δεῖ τὸν δὲ μὴ, θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἄρχων μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δίκαιος,
πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς; εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθήσεται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ 40
ὢν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει τῶν προσηκόντων. — Καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ 1260a
μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δούλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει
τὸ βουλευτικόν. τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ'
ἀτελές. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαιῶς ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἡθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, 15
δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστω πρὸς τὸ
αὐτοῦ ἔργον. διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν (τὸ γὰρ
ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων

20 ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν
εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ'
ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἡ
δ' ὑπηρετικὴ, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος
25 μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν. καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι τὸ
εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετὴ, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ
ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως
33 ὀριζομένων. — Ἐθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον, ὥστε
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν
μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων.

Only of an
inferior kind

612—a. Property is considered by Ar. as an indispensable substratum of the household, and there is a kind of acquisition which he called natural.

Polit. I 8, 1256 a¹⁻⁵, 10, 21, b⁶⁻¹⁰, 26-34.

Property and
acquisition

1256a "Ὡς δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν
ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ᾔν. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις πότερον ἢ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστὶν
5, 10 ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετικὴ. — "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ,
δῆλον (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρῆσασθαι· τίς γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρη-
σομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν;)· πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς
ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν· εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ
15 θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ κτήσις ἐστὶ, . . . ἢ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περιείληφε
μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἢ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς
ἢ ἕτερόν τι γένος; καὶ καθόλου ἢ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτήσις. Ἀλλὰ
20 μὴν εἶδῃ γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ οἴον τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους
b πεποιήκασιν διαφέροντας τῶν ζώων. — Ὡς ἂν ἡ χρεια συναναγκάζῃ, τοῦτον
τὸν τρόπον διάγουσιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτήσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως
9, 10 διδομένη πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν.
26, 27 — "Ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν, καθὸ
δεῖ ἥτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχει, ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημά-
30 των πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ
ἔοικεν ὁ γ' ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἢ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως
αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας
»πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται«· κεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ
34 καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις.

A certain
kind is
natural

b. Wealth pursued for its own sake is unnatural.

Another is
unnatural

Ib. I 9, 1256 b⁴⁰⁻¹²⁵⁷ a²¹, a³¹⁻³⁴, a^{41-b}⁸, b²³⁻²⁴, b³⁰⁻³¹.

"Ἐστὶ δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν,

χρηματιστικήν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως. ἦν ὡς 1257a
 μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν· ἔστι δ'
 οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' οὐ φύσει
 αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐμπειρίας τινὸς καὶ γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς 5
 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις ἐστίν, ἀμφοτέραι
 δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ' οὐκ οἰκεία
 τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμφοτέραι
 γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττόμενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος 10
 ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν
 χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν γέγονε. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 15
 ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς
 ἀνθρώπους. ἦ καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική·
 ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιῆσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ
 πρώτη κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἔργον αὐτῆς, 20
 ἀλλ' ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὐσης. — Ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς 31
 βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὦν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὦν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις. — Πορισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς 1257b
 ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ
 μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἴτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον,
 πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματισ- 5
 τικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι
 πόθεν ἔσται πλῆθος χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων.
 — Καὶ ἄπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. — 23, 24
 Τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς 30, 31
 ἔργον.

613—Of the second Book the first part (ch. 1-8) is concerned with ideal commonwealths, particularly with Plato's (see our nr. 310). In the second part (ch. 9-12) the best existing states are discussed (Sparta, Crete and Carthage), and a word is said about the most famous lawgivers.

614—The first part of the third Book (ch. 1-5) is devoted to the citizen and his relations to the state.

a. The citizen is defined as the man who has political power, however acquired.

Definition
of a citizen

Polit. III 1, 1275 a²²⁻²³:

Πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς.

b. Since constitutions differ from one another, the citizens corresponding to each form of constitution will also be different. Hence the definition of a citizen should be formulated more precisely.

Ib., 1275 a³⁸⁻³⁹, b³⁻²¹:

1275b Τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, . . . ὥστε καὶ τὸν
πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἑκάστην πολιτείαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς
5 ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ' ἐστὶ πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μὲν, οὐ
μὴν ἀναγκαῖον. <ἐν> ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶ δῆμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν
ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι
10 τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς
φονικάς, ἑτέρα δ' ἴσως ἀρχὴ τις ἑτέρας. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα·
πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας. ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου
διορισμός. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων ἐκκλησιαστής
15 ἐστὶ καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλὰ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὠρισμένος· τούτων γὰρ ἡ πᾶσιν ἡ
τισὶν ἀποδεδόται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν ἡ περὶ πάντων ἡ περὶ τινῶν.
τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ὦ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοι-
νωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἡ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἡδη
20 λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων
πληθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

This
definition
corrected

The author remarks, that this definition is better than the usual formula, which defines the citizen as one of whom both the parents are citizens. For this formula cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.

615—Similarly the state is defined by reference to the distribution of political power: when the mode of distribution is changed, a new state comes into existence.

a. In *Polit.* III 3 the question is raised: what exactly is the identity of the state, 1276 a¹⁷⁻²⁰:

What is the
identity of
the state?

. . . Πῶς ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν; ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιωτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν.

b. Ib., 1276 b¹⁻¹³:

Ar.'s reply

1276b Εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστὶ κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἐστὶ δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας,
γινομένης ἑτέρας τῇ εἶδει καὶ διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
δόξειεν ἂν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν. ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὅτε μὲν κωμικὸν
5 ὅτε δὲ τραγικὸν ἕτερον εἶναι φαμεν, τῶν αὐτῶν πολλὰκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἑτέραν, ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον ἢ
τῆς συνθέσεως, οἷον ἁρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγομεν, ἂν

ὅτε μὲν ἡ Δώριος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν ἐστι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν ἰοῦ ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτόν ἐξεστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν καὶ πάνπαν ἐτέρων ἀνθρώπων.

616—a. The question may be raised whether a good citizen is always a good man. Ar. answers in the negative: the good citizen has some special ἀρετή for some particular purpose; he has not, as such, *the* ἀρετή which is proper to the good man.

The good citizen may be not a good man

Polit. I 4, 1276 b²⁸⁻³⁴:

Τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστὶ, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία· διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς 30 τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἐστὶ πλείω πολιτείας εἶδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν· τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμέν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν.

b. So in general the virtue of the good man and the good citizen is not the same. In one particular case however they are identical, namely in the good ruler.

The good ruler always a good man

Ib., 1277 a¹²⁻¹⁷:

Διότι μὲν τοῖνον ἀπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς 1277a ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμέν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον 15 εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς ἐτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες τοῦ ἄρχοντος.

c. The good citizen knows both how to rule and how to obey. Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler.

The virtue of the subject and the virtue of the ruler

Ib., 1277 b¹³⁻²¹, 25-32:

Δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ 1277b ἄρχειν, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' 15 ἀμφοτέρα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ ἀγαθοῦ ἅμφω, καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ἐστὶ οὐ μίαν ἂν εἶη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετὴ, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἶδη ἔχουσα καθ' ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία. — 20
Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον 25, 26 εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δὲ γε οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής· ὥσπερ αὐλοποιοὺς γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δ' ἄρχων αὐλητής ὁ χρώμενος. Πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὕτη ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς 30 ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὕτη καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων.

617—Constitutions are good or bad according as the common welfare is, or is not, their aim. There are three good constitutions: Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity. Of bad ones there are also three: Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy.

Polit. III 7, 1279 a²²-b¹⁰:

Classifica-
tion of con-
stitutions

1279a Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενον ἔστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσαι
τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶ, καὶ πρῶτον τὰς ὀρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις
25 ἔσονται φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεισῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ πολίτευμα
σημαίνει ταυτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἔστι τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι
κύριον ἢ ἓνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς· ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ
πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολι-
30 τείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις.
ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολιτάς φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἢ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.
καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν
συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν πλείονων δ' ἑνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν
35 (ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς
κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλήθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον,
καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως·
40 ἓνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χυλεπόν
1279b ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν (ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν
πλήθει γίγνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολε-
μοῦν καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα). παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρη-
5 μένων τυραννὶς μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ
πολιτείας. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἔστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος,
ἢ δ' ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἢ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμ-
10 φέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

618—a. Against this classification the objection might be made that in a state the majority of the citizens might be wealthy and the minority poor. In this case the distinction which has been made between oligarchy and democracy would not hold good.

Polit. III 8, 1279 b²⁰⁻²⁶:

An objection
to this clas-
sification

20 Πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ εἶεν οἱ πλείους ὄντες
εὖποροι κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' ἔστιν ὅταν ἢ κύριον τὸ πλήθος,
ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν ἂν εἴη που συμβαίνειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν
εὐπόρων, κρείττους δ' ὄντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δ' ὀλίγον κύριον
25 πλήθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι φασιν, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν
πολιτειῶν.

b. To this objection Ar. replies: not number, but wealth or poverty of the rulers is the specific difference of these constitutions.

Ar.'s answer

to this
objection

Ib., 1279 B³⁴⁻³⁶, B³⁹-1280 a⁶:

"Εἰκοις τοῖσιν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δὴλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν δάλοϋς ἢ πολυδὸς εἶναι κν-
ρίους συμπέφυκός ἐστιν, . . . ᾧ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἢ τε δημοκρατία καὶ ἢ ἀριστοκρατία
ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦτος ἐστίν, καὶ ἀναγκαστὸν μὲν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ 1280a
πλοῦτον ἂν ἢ ἀδύττους ἂν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ἀριστοκρατίαν, ὅπου δ' οἱ
ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, τοὺς μὲν δάλοϋς
εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς. εὐποροῦσι μὲν γὰρ δάλοιοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν 5
πάντες. δι' αἷς αἰτίας ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀμφοτέρω τῆς πολιτείας.

619—a. The next chapter deals with the principles of the distribution of power in democratic and in oligarchic states, i.e. with the conception of justice on both sides.

Justice

according to
democratic
and oligar-
chic prin-
ciples

Polit. III 9, 1280 a⁷⁻¹⁶, 22-25:

Ἀγρεῖον δὲ πῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ δημοκρατίας,
καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε δαίμαρχικόν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἄπορονται
δίκαιον τινός, ἀλλὰ μετρίως τινὸς προερχόμενοι, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κέρως 10
δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ τὸν τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι,¹ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσι ἀλλὰ τοῖς
λοῖς. καὶ τὸ ἀνισὸν δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι,² καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσι ἀλλὰ
τοῖς ἀνίστοις. οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κέρως κακῶς. τὸ δ' αἵτιον
ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρισις. οὐ γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι φανῶσι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. 15
— Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τὴν ἀνισορίαν, οἷον χερήμασιν, ὧς οἷοντα ἀνισορίαν
εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατὰ τὴν ἰσορίαν, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὧς ἰσορίαν τὸ δὲ κέρως τῶν οὐ

Ar.'s own
view

b. The standard should be: the true aim of the state. I.e.: the citizens have a claim to power according to their contribution to the εὖ ζῆν.

Ib., 1280 B³⁹-1281 a⁸:

Τέλος μὲν οὖν πῶς τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους γὰρ. πόλις δὲ ἡ γένων
καὶ κωμῶν κοινωλία ζῶνς τελέει καὶ ἀντάρκους <γὰρ>. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὧς 1281a
φαιεῖν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα προεχέων γὰρ ὅσον

¹ "Οτι δοκεῖ τὸν τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι is the democratic view of justice. Ar. says: It is, but not for everybody—only for equals.
² Oligarchs, on the other hand, hold that inequality is justice, namely, that political rights should be unequal and proportionate to wealth. To this view Ar. opposes again: granting that inequality is just, it is so not for everybody, but only for unequals. And by what standards are the qualifications of the persons concerned to be judged?—This is what Ar. calls "the main point", the κέρως, and on this point most people are in error.

εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται
5 πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον ἢ
τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μείζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν
ἀρετὴν ἀνίστοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις.

620—Monarchy is only desirable in one case.

Polit. III 17, 1287 b⁴¹-1288 a²⁹:

Monarchy
desirable
only in an
exceptional
case

1288a Ἄλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε ¹ φανερόν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε
συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἓνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων,
ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ
5 ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ἦ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ
τρόπος, λεκτέον· εἴρηται δὲ πως ἤδη καὶ πρότερον. πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ
βασιλευτόν ² καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικόν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν ³. βασιλευτόν μὲν
οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν γένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς
10 ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικὴν, ἀριστοκρατικόν δὲ πλῆθος [ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν πλῆθος]
ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ⁴ ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν
πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος [ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε ἐγγίγνεσθαι πλῆθος]
πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα
15 τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς. ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένος ὅλον ἦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἓνα τινὰ συμβῇ
διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν
ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικόν καὶ κύριον πάν-
των καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἓνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρότερον, οὐ μόνον
20 οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ προφέρειν εἰώθασιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες
οἷ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς·
πάντη γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν ⁵. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὁστρακίζειν δὴ που
25 τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν, οὐτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε
τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην υπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο
συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι
μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς.

621—In the first part of Book IV (ch. 1-10) the main types of constitutions are dealt with.

a. There are four kinds of democracy, the fourth of which is a perversion. True democracy is described as follows.

¹ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε - sc. about just and unjust, in ch. 9 (619a).

² βασιλευτόν - fit for being ruled by a king.

³ πολιτικόν - fit for what is called by Ar. a polity (constitutional government).

⁴ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχήν secl. Immisch.

⁵ Sc. according to the right of merit, expounded in ch. 9 (619b).

Democracy *Polit.* IV 4, 1291 b³⁰-1292 a⁴:

Δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτη μὲν ἢ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. 1291b
ἴσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ¹ ὑπερέχειν
τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι ὅποτερουσούν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους
ἀμφοτέρους. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστ' ἐστὶν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καθάπερ ὑπο- 35
λαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ ἰσότης, οὕτως ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, κοινωνούντων ἀπάντων
μάλιστα τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δῆμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν
τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος δημοκρατίας
τοῦτο. [ἄλλο δὲ] τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων 40
ὄντων. δεῖ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν καὶ τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ
μετέχειν. ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι 1292a
ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον. ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετ-
εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ἢ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον.

Its perversion **b.** The fourth kind. Ib., 1292 a⁴⁻¹³, 15-18, 30-37:

Ἐτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τᾶλλα μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος 5
καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος.
συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημο-
κρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ' οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσιν ἐν
προεδρίᾳ. ὅπου δ' οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρ- 10
χος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσιν
οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. — Ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὢν, 13, 15
ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε
οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ
τυραννίδι. — Εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι 18, 30
δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία.
δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μὲν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ ταύτην
πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερόν
ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ἣ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία 35
κυρίως. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου.

622—Of oligarchies, too, there are four kinds, of which the fourth is the worst.

Oligarchy *Polit.* IV 5, 1292 a³⁹-b¹⁰:

Ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ εἶδη ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικούτων
ὥστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν πλείους ὄντας, ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν 40

¹ The expression *μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ* means simply "as much as" and is in practice often used in places where *μηδὲν ἥττον ἢ* could be logically expected. Some striking examples of this use have been adduced by L. M. de Rijk in *Mnemosyne* 1950, pp. 314-318.

1292b τῆς πολιτείας, ἄλλο δέ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμῆμάτων μακρὸν ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰφύτωνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλπίσποντας (ἀν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πέντων τοῦτων τοῦτο ποιῶσι, δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐάν δὲ ἐκ τινὸν ἀφωρισμένων, ὀλιγαρχικόν). ἔτερον εἶδος ὀλιγαρχίας, ὅταν πᾶσι ἀντὶ παρὸς εἰσὶν, τέταρτον δ', ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τὸ τε οὖν λαχθῇ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχόντες. καὶ ἔστιν ἀντί-στροφος αὐτῇ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἧς τελέσονται εἰρηματικῶς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις. καὶ καλοῦσι 10

623—α. Of aristocracy in the strict sense there is but one form.

Polit. IV 7, 1293 b1-7:

1293b Ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλεῖται καλεῖται περὶ ἧς διηγήσομεν ἐν τοῖς πρότοις λόγοις (τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπᾶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείας καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπερβολὴν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν¹ μόνον δικαίον προσαναγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν. 5 ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἀπᾶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολιτὴς ἀγαθὸς ἔστιν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὐτὴν).

b. Ib., 1293 b7-19:

Ὁ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰσὶ τινες αἱ πρὸς τε τὰς ὀλιγαρχουμένους ἔχουσι διαφορὰς [καὶ καθορταῖ ἀριστοκρατίαι] καὶ πρὸς τὴν καλοῦμεν τὴν πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ 10 μόνον παύσονται ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστὶδὴν αἰρουμένηται τὰς ἀρχάς, αὐτὴ ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἀριστοκρατικῇ καλεῖται. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμένους κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅπως τινες οἱ εὐδοκίμουσιντες καὶ δοκουῦντες εἶναι ἐπικλείεις. ὅπου οὖν ἡ πολιτεία βλάπτει εἰς τε πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον, 15 ὅλον ἐν Κραχθῶνι, αὐτὴ ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἔστιν, καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὸ ὅλο μόνον, ὅλον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, εἰς τε ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο τοῦτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. Ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρόωπὴν τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο εἶδη.

624—“Polity” or constitutional government.

Polit. IV 8, 1293 b31-38, 1294 a15-25:

Νῦν δὲ δεῖκναι ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας. φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δυνάμεις αὐτῆς διωρισμένων τῶν περὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὡς ἀπᾶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. Εἰδῶσι δὲ καλεῖται τὰς μὲν 35 ἀποκλινοῦσας ὡς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατίας διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκοινοῦσθαι παρὶς καὶ εὐγενεῖαν τοῖς 1294a εὐπορωτέροις. — Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πᾶσι ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος

¹ πρὸς ὑπερβολὴν τινα ἀγαθῶν - good according to some arbitrary standard.

καλεῖται¹. μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, 16
 πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας² σχεδὸν δὲ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὐποροὶ τῶν καλῶν
 ἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσι κατέχειν χώραν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τῆς
 ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετή (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, ὃ καλοῦσιν 20
 εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσὶν· ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστὶν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ
 ἀρετή), φανερόν ἐστι τὴν μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων,
 πολιτεῖαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων (παρὰ
 τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην).

25

625—Tyranny, too, must have its place. Two moderate forms of it have been considered before, in dealing with monarchy. A third kind, which is the extreme, is added here.

Tyranny *Polit.* IV 10, 1295 a¹⁻⁴, 7-23:

Moderate forms Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἦν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὥς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ 1295a
 αὐτήν, ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν
 πολιτειῶν τι μέρος. — Τυραννίδος δ' εἶδῃ δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας 7, 8
 ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πῶς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασι-
 λείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς (ἐν τε γὰρ τῶν 10
 βαρβάρων τισὶν αἰροῦνται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς
 ἀρχαίοις Ἑλλήσιν ἐγίγοντό τινες μόναρχοι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὓς ἐκάλουν
 αἰσυμνήτας), ἔχουσι δὲ τινες πρὸς ἀλλήλας αὐταὶ διαφοράς, ἦσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν 15
 τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικαὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἐκόντων, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ
 δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος, ἥπερ
The strict form μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὖσα τῇ παμβασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτην δ'
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μοναρχίαν, ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων 20
 καὶ βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ
 τῶν ἀρχομένων. διόπερ ἀκούσιος· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν ὑπομένει τῶν ἐλευθέρων
 τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν.

626—Books VII and VIII are devoted to a description of the best state. The material conditions (size of the population, extent and nature of the territory, site of the city and national character of the population) having been determined, the author proceeds to treat the internal structure of the state. First he distinguishes its members (the citizens) from those who are necessary as its servants, but not a part of it.

¹ The text is probably not sound. Immisch reads καλλωπίζεται instead of καλεῖται. Ross retains καλεῖται and translates: "Now in most states the form called polity exists".

² Ross explains rightly: "for the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich".

a. *Polit.* VII 8, 1328 a²¹-b²³:

1328a Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι μόρια
 τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη
 θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς
 25 ἐξ ἧς ἔν τι τὸ γένος (ἐν γάρ τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταῦτό τοις κοινωνοῖς, ἂν
 τε ἴσον ἂν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν) · οἷον εἴτε τροφὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν εἴτε χώρας
 πληθὸς εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. ὅταν δ' ἢ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἔνεκεν τὸ δ'
 30 οὐ ἔνεκεν, οὐθὲν ἔν γε τούτοις κοινὸν ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν ·
 λέγω δ' οἷον ὀργάνω τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς ·
 οἰκία γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐθὲν ἐστίν ὃ γίγνεται κοινόν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τῆς οἰκίας
 χάριν ἢ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν
 35 ἢ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως. πολλὰ δ' ἐμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἐστίν. ἢ δὲ
 πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης.
 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τις
 τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ
 40 μικρὸν ἢ μηδὲν, δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἷτιον τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη καὶ διαφορὰς
 καὶ πολιτείας πλείους · ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες
 1328b τοὺς τε βίους ἐτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα
 ταυτί ἐστὶν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἴη · καὶ γὰρ ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως,
 ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν.

Not all the
 necessary
 elements
 are parts of
 the state

5 Ληπτέον τοίνυν τῶν ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμὸν · ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον. πρῶτον
 μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφὴν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ
 ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὅπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν
 ὅπλα πρὸς τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξωθεν ἀδικεῖν
 10 ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ'
 αὐτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον
 ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαιό-
 15 τατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν (ἢ γὰρ πόλις
 πληθὸς ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ τυχόν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὐτάρκης, ὡς φαμεν, ἐὰν δέ τι τυγ-
 20 χάνη τούτων ἐκλείπον, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι ταύτην) ·
 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν · δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν
 τ' εἶναι πληθὺς, οἱ παρασκευάσουσι τὴν τροφὴν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον,
 καὶ τὸ εὐπορον, καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων.

The
 necessary
 functions

Six
 correspond-
 ing classes

b. *Ib.* 9, 1328 b²⁴-1329 a³⁹:

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι κοινωνητέον πάντων
 25 τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ
 τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικάζοντας), ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους

Has
 everybody
 to share in
 all of these
 occupations?

Mechanics,
traders and
husbandmen
excluded
from
citizenship

The citizens
will be
warriors
and rulers

They will
possess land

and be
priests

ὑποθετέον, ἥ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταυτὸ πολιτεία. καθάπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων 30 καὶ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἑτέρας· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸυναντίον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων, τὴν δ' εὐδαι- 35 μονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἶρηται πρότερον, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὥς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάνουσον βίον οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννήs γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), 40 οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν 1329a γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικὰς).

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, πότερον ἕτερα <ἐτέροις> καὶ ταῦτα θετέον ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἅμφω; 5 φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι τρόπον μὲν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόπον δὲ τινα καὶ ἐτέροις. ἥ μὲν γὰρ ἑτέρας ἀκμῆς ἐκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἐτέροις· ἥ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύειν, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους ἀεὶ, ταύτη δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. 10 οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένουν ἢ μὴ μένουν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν. λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἅμα δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσ- 15 βυτέροις εἶναι, εἰσικεν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρειν καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ περὶ τούτους <εἶναι>. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὗτοι. τὸ γὰρ βάνουσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς 20 πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐθέν γένος ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν ἐστιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι 25 τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ἦ] περιούκους.

Λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος. φανερά δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε βάνουσον ἱερέα καταστατέον (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς)· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς 30 δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τό τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει δὲ τὴν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτοις ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

Ὡν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ πόλις οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη πόλεως, εἴρηται 35

(γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικόν, ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὀπλιτικόν καὶ βουλευτικόν, καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος).

627—a. Marriage and procreation ought to be regulated by strict laws.

Polit. VII 16, 1334 b²⁹-1335 a¹, a¹¹⁻¹⁷, 28, 35:

Laws about
marriage
and
procreation

1334b Εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὄρᾱν δεῖ ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα
30 γίνηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ
ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν. Δεῖ δ'
ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ
35 ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ
διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης,
ἢ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς μὴ (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ
διαφοράς)· ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχὴν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπο-
40 λείπεσθαι ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσ-
βυτέροις ἢ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἢ δὲ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς
1335a τέκνοις) οὔτε λίαν ἀπαργγυρῆσαι εἶναι. — Ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συνδυασμὸς φαῦλος
12 πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζώοις ἀτελεῖ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα καὶ θηλυ-
τόκα μᾶλλον καὶ μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον ταῦτό τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
15 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζεται
τὸ νέους συζευγύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτελεῖς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματά εἰσιν. — Διὸ
28 τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγύναι, τοὺς
δ' ἐπτά καὶ τριάκοντα ἢ μικρόν. ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσιν τε τοῖς σώμασι
30 σύζευξις ἔσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῦλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται τοῖς
χρόνοις εὐκαιρῶς· ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς
ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς
35 ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν.

b. Deformed infants ought to be exposed, and the number of children should be limited by procuring abortion in the case of excess, before sense and life have begun.

Ib., 1335 b¹⁹⁻²⁶:

Exposure of
infants and
abortion in
special cases

b 20 Περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γιγνομένων ἔστω νόμος μὴδὲν πεπηρω-
μένον τρέφειν· διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, (ἢ γὰρ τάξιν ¹ τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύει μὴθὲν
ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων) ὥρίσθαι δὴ δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν
δέ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ
25 ζῶην, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ
αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται.

¹ ἢ γὰρ τάξις - Wallies. The Mss have: ἐὰν ἡ τάξις - κωλύη.

c. Adultery during the time of procreation should be punished with a loss of privileges.

Adultery
punished

Ib., 1335 b³⁸-1336 a²:

Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον (sc. ὁμιλίας), ἔστω μὲν ἀπλῶς μὴ καλὸν ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ἦ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις· περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας ἐάν τις φαίνεται τοιοῦτόν τι δρῶν, ἀτιμίᾳ ζημιούσθω πρεπούση πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.

628—On these and on the following points Ar. is not far from the ideas of his master, Plato.

Physical training of infants and young children should be prescribed by law. Moral education of children up till the age of five years is to be placed under state-supervision.

Education
of young
children
settled by law

Polit. VII 17, 1336 a³⁰-b¹⁶, b²⁰⁻²³:

Καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, 1336a ἐπιμελὲς ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσι παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδίας εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολλὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ὕστερον σπουδαζομένων. τὰς δὲ διατάσεις τῶν παιδῶν καὶ κλαυθμούς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· 35 συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν· γίγνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, ὁ συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τὴν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἤκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γὰρ 40 τὴν ἡλικίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. 1336b εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ¹ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι οὖν τῶν αἰσchrῶν 5 γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς)· μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον. ἐάν δέ τις φαίνηται τι λέγων ἢ πράττων τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως ἡξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις [ἀτιμίαις] κολάζειν καὶ πληγαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας 10 ταύτης ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἢ γραφὰς ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσι μηθὲν μήτε ἀγαλμα μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι 15 τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν. — Τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὗτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμῶδίας 20 θεατὰς ἑατέον, πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ᾗ καὶ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων γιγνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἡ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας.

¹ The codd. indicated by Immisch as II² have ἀπελαύνειν.

629—In Book VIII the treatment of ideal education is continued.

a. That education should be regulated by law and should be a public affair, is generally accepted; but people by no means agree as to what subjects are to be taught.

General
remarks on
education

Polit. VIII 2, 1337 a³³-b³:

1337a "Οτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην κοινὴν ποιητέον,
35 φανερόν· τίς δ' ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία καὶ πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.
νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι
δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον,
οὔδ' φανερόν· πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
40 ἥθος· ἐκ τε τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας ταραχῶδης ἢ σκέψις καὶ δῆλον οὐδὲν πό-
τερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ
1337b περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτὰς τινες)· περὶ τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν
οὐθέν ἐστιν ὁμολογούμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες
τιμῶσιν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσκήσιν αὐτῆς).

Present dis-
agreement

b. Vulgar occupations should be excluded, and likewise all paid employments.

Ib., 1337 b⁴⁻¹⁶:

"Οτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι
5 δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερόν·
ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ
βάνουσον. βάνουσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ
10 μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον
ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς
τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους
καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας. ἄσכולον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν
καὶ ταπεινὴν.

Vulgar
occupations
excluded

630—There might be some doubt as to the paedagogical value of one of the four traditional branches of education, namely music. Ar. defends it, on this ground, that it is highly important that people should be able to use leisure well.

Polit. VIII 3, 1337 b²³⁻³⁵:

"Ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἃ παιδεύειν εἰώθασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν
25 καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικὴν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν
ὥς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὓσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν
ὥς συντείνουσιν πρὸς ἀνδρείαν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις.
νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὥς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς

4 traditional
disciplines

Difficulties
concerning
music

ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται, μὴ 30
μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων,
ἵνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ αἰρετόν
τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον τί ποιοῦντας δεῖ σχολάζειν. 35

631—The author warns against a one-sided physical training:

Gymnastics
and athletics

a. *Polit.* VIII 4, 1338 b⁹⁻¹⁶:

Νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ 1338b
μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λωβώμεναι τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν τῶν 10
σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ'
ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὥς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρείαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι,
καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα 15
ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν.

b. Our leading principle should be, that what is noble, not what
is brutal, ought to have the first place.

The leading
principle

Ib., 1338 b²⁹⁻³⁴:

“Ὡστε τὸ καλὸν ἄλλ’ οὐ τὸ θηριῶδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος 30
οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐθένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθός, οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα¹ ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων
ἀπαιδαγωγήτους ποιήσαντες βαναύσους κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ ἀληθές.

632—The question of the paedagogical value of music is more amply
treated in chapters 5 and 6.

What is
exactly the
paedagogical
value of
music?

a. *Polit.* VIII 4, 1339 a¹¹⁻²⁶:

Περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔνια μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πρότερον, καλῶς δ’ 1339a
ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται²
τοῖς λόγοις οὓς ἂν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα ἔχει
δύναμιν ῥάδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον 15
παιδιᾶς ἔνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὰ
μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ’ ἡδέα, καὶ ἅμα παύει μέριμναν, ὥς φησιν Εὐριπί-
δης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ χρῶνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὕπνῳ καὶ μέθῃ 20
καὶ μουσικῇ· τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὀρχήσιν ἐν τούτοις), ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς
ἀρετὴν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικὴν, ὥς δυναμένην, καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα
ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσιν
δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν 25
(καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων).

¹ ταῦτα - sc. gymnastics.

² ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται etc. - “that our remarks may serve as a prelude to further discussions on the subject”.

b. Ib., 1339 a²⁶-b¹⁰:

᾽Οτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ μάθησις)· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν¹ γε 30 παισὶν ἀρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐθενὶ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος). ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν ἢ τῶν παίδων σπουδὴ παιδιᾶς εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνας 35 βασιλεῖς, δι' ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιούντων μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον. εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὕψων πραγματεῖαν 40 αὐτοὺς ἂν δέοι παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλ' ἄτοπον.

Τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἥθη βελτίω ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ 1339b τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρων ἀκούοντας ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὥς φασι, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς 5 λόγος καὶ εἰ πρὸς εὐημερίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον χρηστέον αὐτῇ· τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκοπεῖν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς αἰδεῖ καὶ καθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. ἀλλὰ καὶ βανούσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν 10 οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος.

c. Ib., 1339 b¹⁰⁻²⁷:

Ἄλλ' ἴσως περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἢ δὲ πρώτη ζήτησίς ἐστι 1 πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θετέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν 13 διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιάν ἢ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς 15 πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἢ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστι, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τίς ἐστιν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν)· τὴν δὲ 20 μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας (φησὶ γὰρ καὶ Μουσαῖος εἶναι »βροτοῖς ἡδιστον αἰδεῖν«· διὰ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὥς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι παιδεύεσθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς 25 νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῇ τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν.

d. Ib., 1339 b⁴²-1340 a²³, a⁴⁰-b¹³:

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς

Should
children be
taught to
perform
music
themselves?

Music can
serve three
purposes:
1. relaxation

2. the
forming of
the
character

¹ διαγωγή is used to indicate intellectual enjoyment.

ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρεῖαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς 1340
μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἥς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθῆσιν (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν
φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἦθουσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλέης), 5
ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν
εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἦθη γιγνόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα
ποιοὶ τινες, φανερόν διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἐτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν
Ὀλύμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικάς, 10
ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθους πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι
τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν
μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν
περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθί- 15
ζεσθαι μὴθὲν οὕτως ὥς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἦθεσι καὶ
ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· ἐστὶ δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις
ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρείας καὶ 20
σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν (δῆλον
δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων). —

Εὐθύς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις. ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατί- 40
θεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν
ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιζολυδιστί 1340
καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας,
μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστί
μόνη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, ἐνθουσιαστικούς δ' ἡ φρυγιστί. ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν 5
οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ μαρτύρια
τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς
ῥυθμούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων
οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας). ἐκ μὲν οὖν 10
τούτων φανερόν ὅτι δύναται ποιοῦν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρα-
σκευάζειν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον
ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς νέους.

About the third purpose of learning music, which was called διαγωγή, Ar. does not speak explicitly. But we may admit that this function of music is implied in the first purpose, or perhaps even in the second.

e. Finally an answer is given to the question whether children should be taught to perform music themselves.

Children
should
learn to per-
form music
themselves

Polit. VIII 6, 1340 b²⁰⁻³³:

Πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄδοντας τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἡ μή, καθά- 20
περ ἡπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον. οὐκ ἄδηλον δὴ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν
πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ποιούς τινας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἐν γὰρ τι

τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶ μὴ κοινωνήσαντας τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι
 25 σπουδαίους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτου
 πλαταγὴν¹ οἶεσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἣν διδῶσι τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅπως χρώμενοι
 ταύτῃ μὴδὲν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν· οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχά-
 30 ζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τοῖς νηπίοις ἀρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων, ἣ δὲ παιδεία
 πλαταγὴ τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν νέων. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὕτως
 ὥστε καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων.

¹ τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγὴν - "the rattle of Archytas" seems to have been a popular toy in the days of Aristotle.

SIXTEENTH CHAPTER THE PSYCHOLOGY

I—SOUL AND ITS VARIOUS FUNCTIONS

The *aporiai* 633—In his first book *De anima*, according to his usual method, Ar. begins by stating the *aporiai*.

a. Is soul a substance, or to which of the other categories does it belong? Is it potential, or rather an actuality?

1. Is soul a substance? *De anima* I 1, 402 a²²-b¹:

Πρῶτον δ' ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστι, λέγω δὲ 402a
πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ καὶ τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν
κατηγοριῶν, ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις· 25
διαφέρει γὰρ οὗ τι σμικρόν.

b. Can soul be defined in one general formula?

2. Is there one definition of soul? *Ib.*, 402 b¹⁻⁸:

Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον ὁμοειδὴς ἅπαντα ψυχὴ 402b
ἢ οὐ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδὴς, πότερον εἶδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ
λέγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης εὐλόγησιν ἐπι-
σκοπεῖν. εὐλαβητέον δ' ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ, 5
καθάπερ ζῴου, ἢ καθ' ἑκάστην ἕτερος, οἷον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ,
τὸ δὲ ζῶον τὸ καθόλου ἢ τοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον.

c. Are there any affections of the soul in itself?

3. Is soul capable of separate existence? *Ib.*, 403 a³⁻¹⁶:

Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ 403a
ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστὶ τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, 5
οὐ ῥᾶδιον δέ. φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν
οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. μάλιστα
δ' εἴκειν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας,
οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τι τῶν τῆς 10
ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴθὲν

b. The case of mind is different.

Mind is
impassibleIb., 408 b^{18,30}:

‘Ο δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὐσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετ’ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρα ἁμαυρώσεως, νῦν δ’ ἴσως ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθη- 20
τηρίων συμβαίνει· εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτης ὄμμα τοιονδί, βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ
καὶ ὁ νέος. ὥστε τὸ γῆρας οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ, καθάπερ
ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις. καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται ἄλλου τινὸς
ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν 25
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δι’ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει. διὸ καὶ
τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θεϊότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν.

The unity
of the soul635—*De an.* I 5, 411 b^{5,14}:

Λέγουσι δὴ τινες μεριστὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ ἄλλω μὲν νοεῖν ἄλλω δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν. τί 5
οὖν δὴ ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχὴν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα·
δοκεῖ γὰρ τούναντίον μᾶλλον ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξελλούσης γοῦν
διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ’ ἂν
εἴη ψυχὴ. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κάκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἐν ᾧ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ 10
ἓν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἓν; εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσῃ τί
τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.

636—After having discussed in the first Book the views of his predecessors, Ar. now proceeds to define soul in a general formula.

De an. II 1, 412 a^{3,9}:Definition
of soul

Τὰ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρήσθω· πάλιν 412a
δ’ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πειρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστὶ ψυχὴ καὶ τίς 5
ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς. λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἐν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν,
ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην, ὃ καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, ἕτερον δὲ μορφήν
καὶ εἶδος, καθ’ ἣν ἤδη λέγεται τόδε τι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων. ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν
ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δ’ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, 10
τὸ δ’ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστ’ εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα, καὶ τούτων
τὰ φυσικά· ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχαί. τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζῶην,
τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἔχει· ζῶην δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι’ αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὐξήσιν καὶ
φθίσιν. ὥστε πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν εἴη, οὐσία δ’ 15
οὕτως ὡς συνθέτη. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιονδί τοῦτο, ζῶην γὰρ ἔχον,
οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα ψυχὴ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα,
μᾶλλον δ’ ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν 20
οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει 20
ζῶην ἔχοντος· ἡ δ’ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια. τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια.

The form of
a natural
body

αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερόν οὖν
 ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσις
 25 ἔστιν, ἀνάλογον δ' ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ' ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ
 ἐνεργεῖν· προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμη. διὸ ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν
 ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σῶματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωήν
 412b ἐχόντος. τοιοῦτο δέ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὁργανικόν. ὅργανα δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν μέρη,
 ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἀπλᾶ, οἷον τὸ φύλλον περικαρπίου σκέπασμα, τὸ δὲ περικάρπιον
 καρποῦ· αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον· ἄμφω γὰρ ἔλκει τὴν τροφήν. εἰ δὲ
 5 τὴν κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη
 σῶματος φυσικοῦ ὁργανικοῦ. διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν εἰ ἐν ἡ
 ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, οὐδ' ὅλως τὴν ἐκάστου
 ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὐ ἢ ὕλη· τὸ γὰρ ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως
 ἡ ἐντελέχεια ἔστιν.

First
entelechy

637—This definition implies (1) that soul is the essence of a natural body, (2) that it is not separable from body.

a. *De an.* II 1, 412 b⁹⁻¹⁵:

Soul is the
essence of
a natural
body

10 Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ· οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
 τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι τῷ τοιῶδὲ σῶματι, καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὁργάνων φυσικόν
 ᾗν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς· ᾗν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ
 ψυχὴ τοῦτο· χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς ᾗν, ἀλλ' ἡ ὁμωνύμως.
 15 νῦν δ' ἐστὶ πέλεκυς.

b. *Ib.*, 413 a⁴⁻⁵:

Not
separable
from body

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ μέρη τινὰ αὐτῆς,
 εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον.

638—Soul is characterized by life. Now this term has various meanings, of which the most general is self-nutrition and growth.

a. *De an.* II 2, 413 a²⁰⁻³¹:

Life

20 Λέγομεν οὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἐμψυχον τοῦ
 ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν. πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, καὶ ἐν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχει
 μόνον, ζῆν αὐτὸ φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον,
 25 ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφήν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξεισις. διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα πάντα
 δοκεῖ ζῆν· φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι'
 ἧς αὔξουσιν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους· οὐ γὰρ ἄνω
 μὲν αὔξεται, κάτω δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐπ' ἄμφω καὶ πάντῃ ἐκτρέφεται καὶ
 30 ζῆν διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἂν δύνῃται λαμβάνειν τροφήν.

Its most
general
sense

b. *Ib.*, 413 b¹⁻⁴:

Animals
characterized
by sensation

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴσι, τὸ δὲ ζῶν διὰ

τὴν αἴσθησιν πρῶτως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μὴδ' ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δ' αἴσθησιν ζῶα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον.

Mind, or the
thinking
power

c. Ib., 413 b²⁴⁻²⁷:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ αἰδίδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ.

639—A survey of the various psychic powers.

a. *De an.* II 3, 414a^{29-b⁶}, b¹⁶⁻¹⁹:

The five
psychic
powers

Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ 414a εἶπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. δυνάμεις δ' εἶπομεν θρεπτικόν, 30 ὀρεκτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικόν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικόν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτο τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὀρεξίς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, 414b τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντ' ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἀφήν· ᾧ δ' αἰσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ 5 ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὀρεξίς αὕτη. — Περὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον, ὕστερον 16 δ' ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τιμιώτερον.

b. The higher power cannot exist apart from the lower, the lower can exist apart from the higher power.

Ib., 415 a¹⁻¹²:

The higher
ones presup-
pose the
lower

Ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικόν οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦ δ' αἰσθητικοῦ 415a χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικόν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ' ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἀπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἀφή δ' ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζώων οὐτ' ὅψιν οὐτ' ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν οὐτ' ὁσμῆς αἴσθησιν. καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν 5 δὲ τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει. τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστον λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ' ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμὸς, ἀλλὰ 10 τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτη μόνη ζῶσιν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος.

640—The nutritive soul.

The nutritive
soul

a. *De an.* II 4, 415 a²²⁻²⁵:

Ὡστε πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον· ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δυνάμις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν.

b. This first soul ought to be named the reproductive soul.

Ib., 416 b^{20,25}:

20 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τρία, τὸ τρεφόμενον καὶ ὃ τρέφεται καὶ τὸ τρέφον, τὸ μὲν τρέφον ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον τὸ ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα, ὃ δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ τροφή. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἅπαντα προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δὲ τὸ 25 γεννῆσαι οἷον αὐτό, εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἷον αὐτό.

Cp. *De gen. an.* II 4, 740 b³⁴-741 a³: Ἡ γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὕλη ἣ ἀυξάνεται 35 καὶ ἐξ ἧς συνίσταται τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ποιοῦσα δύναμις ταῦτο τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. μείζων δὲ αὕτη ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ, αὕτη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ γεννώσα· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἐκάστου, ἐνυπάρχουσα καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς 741a καὶ ἐν ζώοις πᾶσιν. τὰ δ' ἄλλα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς δ' οὐχ ὑπάρχει τῶν ζώων.

2—SENSE-PERCEPTION

641—Distinction between special and common objects of the senses.

De an. II 6, 418 a^{10,20}:

Special and
common
sensibles

10 . . . τὸ μὲν ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πασῶν. λέγω δ' ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἐτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι, οἷον ὄψις χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ ψόφου καὶ γεῦσις χυμοῦ. ἡ δ' ἀφή 15 πλείους μὲν ἔχει διαφορὰς· ἄλλ' ἐκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπατᾶται 15 ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ' ὅτι ψόφος, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἢ ποῦ, ἢ τί τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ ποῦ. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἐκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἡρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις. καὶ 20 γὰρ ἀφ᾽ ἡ κίνησις τίς ἐστὶν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὄψει.

The same distinction is made by S. Thomas Aquinas, who speaks of *sensibilia propria* and *communia* in *S. th.* I, qu. 17, art. 2, and in qu. 78, art. 3.

642—The object of sight.

a. Ib., II 7, 418 a²⁷-b³:

The object
of sight

Οὐ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁρατόν. ὁρατὸν δ' ἐστὶ χρῶμα μὲν, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν¹. δῆλον δὲ ἔσται ὃ λέ- 30 γομεν προσελθοῦσι μάλιστα. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ 30 καθ' αὐτὸ ὁρατοῦ· καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ², ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸ αἷτιον τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατόν. πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, 418b καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις. διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἐκάστου χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶται.

¹ He alludes to phosphorescing objects, which can be seen only in darkness.

² It is visible, not by its essence, but per accidens.

Light

b. What is light. Ib., 418 b³⁻¹³, b¹⁸⁻²⁰:

Διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί ἐστίν. ἔστι δὴ τι διαφανές. διαφανές δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι μὲν ὁρατόν, οὐ καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ ὁρατόν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' 5 ἀλλότριον χρῶμα. τοιοῦτον δὲ ἐστὶν ἀήρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν στερεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὕδωρ οὐδ' ἡ ἀήρ, διαφανές, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐστὶ φύσις ὑπάρχουσα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι¹. φῶς δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια, τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἢ διαφανές. δυνάμει δὲ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ σκότος. 10 τὸ δὲ φῶς οἷον χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ἢ ἐντελεχέεια διαφανές ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιοῦτου οἷον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τι ὑπάρχει ἐν καὶ ταυτόν. —

Darkness

Δοκεῖ τε τὸ φῶς ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ σκότει· ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρησις τῆς 18 τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ τούτου παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστίν.

Sound

643—a. *De an.* II 8, 419 b⁹⁻¹³:

Γίνεται δ' ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ψόφος αἰετίνος πρὸς τι καὶ ἐν τινι· πληγὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ποιοῦσα. διὸ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον· ὥστε τὸ ψοφοῦν πρὸς τι ψοφεῖ· πληγὴ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορέως.

Voice

b. Ib., 420 b^{13-421 a}⁴:

Φωνὴ δ' ἐστὶ ζώου ψόφος, καὶ οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πᾶν ψοφεῖ 420b τύπτοντός τινος καὶ τι καὶ ἐν τινι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀήρ, εὐλόγως ἂν φωνοίη τὰυτα 15 μόνα ὅσα δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα. ἥδη γὰρ τῷ ἀναπνεομένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα, καθάπερ τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπὶ τε τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὣν ἡ μὲν γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχει), ἡ δ' ἐρμηνεία ἕνεκεν τοῦ εὔ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ πνεύματι τε τὴν θερμότητα τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (τὸ δ' αἴτιον ἐν ἐτέροις 20 εἰρήσεται) καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνήν, ὅπως ὑπάρχει τὸ εὔ.

How produced

Ὅργανον δὲ τῇ ἀναπνοῇ ὁ φάρυγξ· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ μόριόν ἐστὶ τοῦτο, πλεῦμων· τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ μορίῳ πλεῖστον ἔχει τὸ θερμὸν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖται δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος πρῶτος. διὸ ἀναγκαῖον 25 εἶσω ἀναπνεομένου εἰσιέναι τὸν ἀέρα, ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴ ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζώου ψόφος φωνή, καθάπερ εἵπομεν (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ 30 ψοφεῖν καὶ ὡς οἱ βήττοντες), ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας τινός· σημαντικός γὰρ δὴ τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή· καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἡ βήξ, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς 421a αὐτήν. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα πρὸς αὐτήν. σημεῖον

¹ He means his fifth element, the aether, which constitutes the celestial sphere, in which the heavenly bodies move.

δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα μὴδ' ἐκπνέοντα, ἀλλὰ κατέχοντα· κινεῖ γὰρ τοῦτω ὁ κατέχων. φανερόν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθύες ἄφωνοι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα.

Why fish
are mute

644—Intelligence is, according to Ar., dependent on the sense of touch.

De an. II 9, 421 a²⁰⁻²⁶:

Intelligence
and the sense
of touch

20 Ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις (sc. αἰσθήσεσι) λείπεται (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) πολλῶν τῶν ζώων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀφὴν πολλῶν τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῦς. διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζώων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἀφυεῖς, παρ' ἄλλο δὲ μὴδέν· οἱ
25 μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς.

645—Why man smells only when he inhales.

De an. II 9, 421 b^{8-422 a⁶}:

Smell in
man and in
other
animals

421b Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ, οἷον ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος· καὶ γὰρ τὰ
10 ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὁσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁμοίως καὶ ἔναιμα καὶ ἄναιμα, ὥσπερ καὶ
τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφήν ὑποσμα
γινόμενα, διὸ καὶ ἄπορον φαίνεται, εἰ πάντα μὲν ὁμοίως ὁσμᾶται, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος
15 ἀναπνέων, μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ ἄλλ' ἐκπνέων ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ὁσμᾶται,
οὔτε πόρρωθεν οὔτ' ἐγγύθεν, οὔδ' ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ μυκτῆρος ἐντὸς τεθῇ· καὶ τὸ μὲν
ἐπ' αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι κοινὸν πάντων· ἀλλὰ τὸ
ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἴδιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων· δῆλον δὲ πειρωμένοις.
20 ὥστε τὰ ἄναιμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀναπνέουσιν, ἑτέραν ἂν τιν' αἰσθησιν ἔχοι παρὰ
τάς λεγομένας. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἴπερ τῆς ὁσμῆς αἰσθάνεται· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ὀσφραν-
τοῦ αἰσθησις καὶ δυσώδους καὶ εὐώδους ὀσφρησίς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα
φαίνεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ὁσμῶν ὑφ' ὧνπερ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον ἀσφάλτου καὶ
25 θείου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναπνέοντα.
ἔοικε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διαφέρειν τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων
ζώων, ὥσπερ τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὰ τῶν σκληροφθάλμων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει φράγμα
30 καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰ βλέφαρα, ἃ μὴ κινήσας μὴδ' ἀνασπᾶσας οὐχ ὀρᾷ· τὰ
δὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιούτον, ἀλλ' εὐθέως ὀρᾷ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ δια-
φανεῖ· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον τοῖς μὲν ἀκάλυφτος εἶναι,
422a ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἀέρα δεχομένοις ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, ὃ ἀναπνεόντων
ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι, διευρυνόμενων τῶν φλεβίων καὶ τῶν πόρων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
τὰ ἀναπνέοντα οὐκ ὁσμᾶται ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὀσφρανθῆναι ἀναπνεύ-
5 σαντα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἀδύνατον.

646—Taste and touch do not take place through an interposed foreign body.

Taste and
touch

De an. II 10, 422 a⁸⁻¹⁰:

Τὸ δὲ γευστόν ἐστιν ἀπτόν τι· καὶ τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αἰσθητόν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἄλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀφή.

647—General description of a "sense".

"Sense"
in general

De an. II 12, 424 a¹⁷⁻²⁴:

Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἰσθησίς ἐστι τὸ 424a δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ 20 τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησίς ἐκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ἑκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἢ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον¹.

3—THINKING

648—In his third Book *De anima* Ar. treats *noûs* or the thinking power. The first stage superior to the senses, namely that faculty by which we distinguish the object of one sense from that of the other, is discussed in the following passage.

The "sensus
interior"

De an. III 2, 426 b⁸⁻²¹:

Ἐκάστη μὲν οὖν αἰσθησίς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν 426b τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἢ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ δια- 10 φοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψεις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἑκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἑκαστον κρίνομεν, τίτι καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει; ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰσθήσει· αἰσθητὰ γὰρ ἐστίν. ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ 15 ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦν ἀπτόμενον αὐτοῦ κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον. οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐνί τινι ἄμφοι δῆλα εἶναι. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ καὶ εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ σὺ αἰσθοιο, δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἐν λέγειν ὅτι ἕτερον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ 20 γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ. λέγει ἄρα τὸ αὐτό.

The problem was first formulated by Plato, *Theaet.* 185a². S. Augustine, in *De libero arbitrio* II 3, 8, qualifies that faculty by which we judge "quid ad quemque sensum pertineat, et quid inter se vel omnes vel quidam eorum communiter habent", as a *sensus interior*, and distinguishes it from reason, because animals too possess it. "Namque aliud est quo videt bestia, aliud quo ea quae videndo sentit, vel vitat vel appetit: ille enim sensus in oculis est, ille autem intus in ipsa anima".

¹ According to its "form" or formulable essence.

² Our nr. 319a.

649—Difference between thinking and perceiving.**a. Thinking and perceiving identified by the ancients.***De an.* III 3, 427 a¹⁹-b⁵:**Thinking
and
perceiving**

427a Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι εἶναι (ἐν ἀμφο-
20 τέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων), καὶ οἷ γε ἀρχαῖοι
τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναι φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς
εἴρηκε ¹.

»πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέζεται ἀνθρώποισιν.«

25 καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις· ὅθεν

«σφίσιν αἰεὶ

καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἄλλοῖα παρίσταται . . . »

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται καὶ τὸ Ὀμήρου »τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστίν« ². πάντες
γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν καὶ αἰσθά-
νεσθαι τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς λόγοις
427b διωρίσαμεν· καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἡπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς λέγειν, οἰκειότερον
γὰρ τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ· διὸ ἀνάγκη ἦτοι,
ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου
5 θίξιν ἀπάτην εἶναι, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν.

b. Thinking is different from perceiving. It is partly imagination, partly judgment.

Ib., 427 b²⁷⁻²⁹:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία
δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου
λεκτέον.

650—Imagination.**Imagination****a. It is neither sense, nor opinion.***Ib.*, 428 a⁵⁻²², b⁹⁻¹⁰:

428a Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἦτοι
δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὄρασις, φαίνεται δὲ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρ-
χοντος τούτων, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. εἴτα αἴσθησις μὲν αἰεὶ πάρεστι, φαντασία
10 δ' οὐ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν
ὑπάρχειν· δοκεῖ δ' οὐ. οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώλῃ. εἴτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς
αἰεὶ, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς. ἔπειτ' οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν

**Neither
sense**

¹ Emped. fr. 106 and 108 (*Gr. Ph.* I p. 61 n. 2, to nr. 113a).

² From *Od.* XVIII 136 ff.

ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα· τότε ἢ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής. καὶ ὅπερ δὲ 15 ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὁράματα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν αἰ ἀληθεύοντων οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἢ νοῦς· ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής. λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα· γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής. **nor opinion** ἀλλὰ δόξη μὴν ἔπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ 20 πιστεῦειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δ' ἐν πολλοῖς. — Οὐτ' ἄρα ἐν τι τούτων ἔστιν οὐτ' ἐκ τούτων ἢ φαντασία.

b. What is imagination.

What it is Ib., 428 b¹⁰⁻¹⁷, 428 b³⁰-429 a⁴:

Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἔστι κινήθentos τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἢ δὲ φαν- 428b τασία κίνησις τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανο- μένοις καὶ ὧν αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἢ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ 15 κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. —

Definition Εἰ οὖν μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχοι ἢ τὰ εἰρημένα ἢ φαντασία, τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ 30 λεχθέν, ἢ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνο- 429a μένης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἢ ὅψις μάλιστα αἰσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἴ- ληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτός οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.

651—The thinking part of the soul.

Thinking *De an.* III 4, 429 a¹⁰⁻¹³:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ γινώσκει τε ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τίν' ἔχει διαφοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.

A passive faculty **a.** Ib., 429 a¹³⁻²⁹:

Εἰ δὴ ἔστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ 429a ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ δυνάμει 15 τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο ¹, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά. ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ· παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει· ὥστε μὴδ' αὐτοῦ 20 εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν. ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς

¹ The mind "becomes its objects" in actual knowledge. Therefore, the thinking power must be *potentially* identical with its possible objects. *Animus est quodammodo omnia*, as it is formulated later by S. Thomas Aquinas.

νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ) οὐθὲν ἐστὶν ἐνεργεία
 25 τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι εὐλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποίος τις
 γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμὸς, ἢ καὶ ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ·
 νῦν δ' οὐθὲν ἐστὶν. καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν¹, πλὴν
 ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἡ νοητικὴ, οὔτε ἐντελεχεία ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἶδη.

b. Since in the above passage thinking is qualified as a passive process, while on the other hand *noûs* is described as being ἀπαθής and ἀμιγής, an objection might arise.

Ib., 429 b²²⁻²⁶:

Objection

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστὶν. ἢ γὰρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν.

c. Ar. replies, 429 b²⁹-430 a²:

Reply

... τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχεία οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ. δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὥσπερ
 430a ἐν γραμματείῳ ὃ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχεία γεγραμμένον, ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ.

652—Mind is not *only* a passive faculty.

De an. III 5, 430 a¹⁰⁻²⁵:

Active
mind

10 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἢ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα
 15 ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργεία χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθής καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὦν ἐνεργεία. αἰεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ
 20 ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἢ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐ χρόνῳ· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίδιον. οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς
 25 νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.

Cp. the next nr.

653—With this description of the νοῦς ποιητικός, as it is called later, we might compare the following passage from the *De gen. anim.*, where

¹ The formula τόπος εἰδῶν does not occur in Plato's Dialogues, but it expresses fairly well his view of the soul.

it is argued that no material activity can exist apart from a body, and consequently, that no bodily activity could enter from outside. Exception is to be made for *noûs* exclusively, for only *noûs* has no connexion with any bodily activity.

Noûs enters from outside *De gen. an.* II 3, 736 b²²⁻²⁹:

"Ὅσων γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματική, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον βαδίξειν ἄνευ ποδῶν· ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον. οὔτε γὰρ αὐτάς καθ' αὐτάς εἰσιέναι οἷόν τε ἀχωρίστους οὔσας, οὔτ' 25 ἐν σώματι εἰσιέναι· τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα περίττωμα μεταβαλλούσης τῆς τροφῆς ἐστίν. λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐθεν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματική ἐνέργεια.

SEVENTEENTH CHAPTER RHETORIC AND POETICS

I—THE RHETORIC

654—Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is closely related with his logical writings, at least with the *Topics* and *Analytics*. This does not imply, however, that it should belong to the same period of Aristotle's life. Not only the political event mentioned in II 23, points to a date after 339¹; indeed, chapters like 12-14 of the same book can hardly be the work of a young man.

a. Against Plato's *Gorgias* Aristotle defends that rhetoric is a τέχνη, which ought to have a special method.

Rhet. I 1, 1354 a¹⁻¹¹:

Rhetoric the
counterpart
of dialectic

1354a Ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ². ἀμφότεραι γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων εἰσὶν αἱ κοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἀπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης. διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν. 5 πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἔξωθεν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδοποιεῖν. δι' ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἳ τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ 10 ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἤδη πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι.

b. Against existing treatises on "the Art of Speech", composed by professional rhetors, he complains that their authors always neglected the argumentative element of rhetoric, which is, in fact, its essential part.

Ib., 1354 a¹¹⁻¹⁸:

Defect of
existing
treatises

Νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὀλίγον πεπορίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον. αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἐντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, οἱ 15 δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων³ οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ

¹ See M. Dufour's Introduction to Ar.'s *Rhetoric*, Paris 1932, p. 14 f.

² On the meaning of the term *dialectic* in Aristotle see our nr. 435 sub a and b, and the text of *Top.* I 1 cited there.

³ The *enthymema* has been defined by Ar. in the *Anal. Pr.* II 27, 70 a¹⁰⁻¹¹, as a syllogism from probabilities or signs.

δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γάρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργή καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν.

655—The use of rhetoric.

a. As means of producing conviction.

Use of
rhetoric

Rhet. I 1, 1355 a²⁰⁻²⁹:

Χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διὰ τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τάληθῃ καὶ 20 τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον αἱ κρίσεις γίνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμῆσεως. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους οὐδ' εἰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχοιμεν ἐπιστήμην, ῥᾶδιον ἀπ' ἐκείνης πείσαι 25 λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς ἐλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως ¹.

b. Rhetoric has to draw opposite conclusions.

Rhetoric as
ἀντιλογικὴ
τέχνη

Ib., 1355 a²⁹⁻³⁸:

Ἦτι δὲ τάναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, 30 οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφοτέρω πρᾶττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν) ἀλλ' ἵνα μήτε λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τάναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφοτέραι 35 τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑποκείμενα πράγματα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ' αἰετὰ λήθῃ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

c. Its possible abuse is no argument against it.

Why
admissible

Ib., 1355 a^{38-b7}:

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐκ αἰσχρὸν· ὁ μᾶλλον ἰδιὸν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος 1355b χρείας. εἰ δ' ὅτι μεγάλα βλάβειεν ἂν ὁ χρωμένος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἷον ἰσχύος ὑγιείας πλούτου στρατηγίας· 5 τούτοις γὰρ ἂν τις ὠφελήσειε τὰ μέγιστα χρωμένος δικαίως καὶ βλάβειεν ἀδίκως.

¹ The reference is to *Top.* I 2, 101 a²⁶⁻²⁷ ff., where it is said that the subject treated in this book (namely, dialectic) is useful for three purposes: for intellectual training, for causal encounters (πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις) and for the philosophical sciences.

d. Its function is not only to persuade, but to see the possible ways of persuading people about any given subject.

Ib., 1355 b⁹⁻¹⁴:

Its true
function

10 ... καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πείσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις πάσαις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγίειας ὅμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς.

656—Rhetoric, then, is defined by Ar. in the following formula.

Rhet. I 2, 1355 b²⁵⁻²⁶:

Definition
of rhetoric

Ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

657—a. There are three modes of persuasion.

Ib., 1356 a^{1-10, 14-17, 19-20}:

Three modes
of
persuasion

1356a Τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἶδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἡθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἡθους, ὅταν λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπεικίεσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἀπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα. — Διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες· πρὸς δὲ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαι φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι τοὺς νῦν 10, 14 17, 19 τεχνολογοῦντας. — Διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων πιστεύουσιν, ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον δεῖξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν.

b. These then being the means of effecting persuasion, rhetoric is necessarily related with dialectic and ethics.

Ib., a²⁰⁻²⁷:

Relation of
rhetoric with
dialectic and
ethics

20 Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσὶ, φανερόν ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ τρία ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ 25 ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται καὶ πῶς. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφύεσθαι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσ- ἀγορεύειν πολιτικὴν.

658—That rhetoric “proves opposites” (655b), might be illustrated excellently by the final chapter of this book, from which we cite the following passages.

On combat-
ing and
defending
written laws

a. *Rhet.* I 15, 1375 a²¹-b²⁶:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων 1375a
ἐπιδραμεῖν· ἴδιαι γὰρ αὐταὶ τῶν δικανικῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, νόμοι
μάρτυρες συνθῆκαι βάσανοι ὅρκος. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ νόμων εἰπώμεν, πῶς 25
χρηστέον καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογοῦ-
μενον. φανερόν γάρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναντίος ᾖ ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ
κοινῷ νόμῳ χρηστέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπεικείσιν ὡς δικαιότεροις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ γνῶμη
τῇ ἀρίστῃ τοῦτ' ἐστί, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ 30
μὲν ἐπεικὲς αἰεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ὁ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γὰρ
ἐστίν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις· ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντι-
γόῃ (ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ
τὸν ἄγραφον).

35

οὐ γὰρ τί νῦν γε κἄχθές, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ποτε.

1375b

ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός.

καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τι καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν· ὥστ' οὐ
νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ 5
ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνη τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον καὶ τὸ
ἀληθές. καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρῆσθαι
καὶ ἐμμένειν. καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμῳ εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· οἷον
ἐνίοτε ὁ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἶναι ἅττ' ἂν συνθῶνται, ὁ δ' ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συν- 10
τίθεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐφ' ὅποτέραν
τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρμόσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἴτα τοῦτω χρῆσθαι. καὶ
εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφ' οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, πειρατέον
τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἢ 15
πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, τότε γνῶμη τῇ ἀρίστῃ λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον
ἐνεκα δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιорκῇ.
καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἰρεῖται οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν δια-
φέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ 20
παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν ἱατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἢ ἁμαρτία τοῦ ἱατροῦ
ὅσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν
εἶναι, τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται. καὶ περὶ μὲν 25
τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω.

Arguments
about
witnesses

b. *Ib.*, 1376 a¹⁷-b³¹:

Πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων 1376a
δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ γνῶμη τῇ ἀρίστῃ, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι

20 τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀλίσκεται τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν.
 ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει
 μαρτυριῶν, εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι αἱ μὲν
 περὶ αὐτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ αἱ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ δὲ
 25 περὶ τοῦ ἥθους, ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἔστιν ἀπορῆσαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης·
 εἰ μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ αὐτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισβητοῦντι
 ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους ἢ αὐτοῦ εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς
 30 φαυλότητα. τὰ δ' ἄλλα περὶ μάρτυρος ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξὺ, ἢ εὐδοκίμουντος
 ἢ ἀδοξοῦντος ἢ μεταξὺ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν λεκτέον
 ἐξ οἷωνπερ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαύτη τοῦ λόγου χρῆσις ἔστιν ὅσον αὖξιν ἢ καθαιρεῖν **On contracts**
 1376b ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν ἢ ἀπίστους, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας, ἐπὶ δὲ
 τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τούναντιον. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν
 οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας πραγματείας· ὅποιοι γὰρ ἂν τινες ὦσιν οἱ
 5 ἐπιγεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες τούτοις αἱ συνθήκαι πισταὶ εἰσιν. ὁμολογουμένης
 δ' εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὔσης αὖξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἔστιν
 ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθήκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι
 10 τὰς κατὰ τὸν νόμον συνθήκας. καὶ ὅπως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἔστιν, ὥστε
 ὅστις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ
 τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύρων γιγνομένων
 ἀναιρεῖται ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ τᾶλλα δὲ ὅσα ἀρμόττει,
 15 ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν. ἂν δ' ἐναντία ἦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον μὲν,
 ἅπερ ἂν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσασαιτο, ταῦθ' ἀρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς
 μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλ' ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἴομεθα
 δεῖν πείθεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἴθ' ὅτι τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶ βρα-
 20 βευτῆς ὁ δικαστής· οὐκ οὖν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἀλλ' ὥς δικαιότερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν
 δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστι μεταστρέψαι οὔτ' ἀπάτῃ οὔτ' ἀνάγκῃ (πεφυκὸς γὰρ ἔστιν),
 συνθήκαι δὲ γίνονται καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
 σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστὶ τινι ἢ τῶν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν
 25 γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις
 ὑστέραις ἢ προτέραις· ἡ γὰρ αἱ ὑστέραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δ' αἱ πρότεραι, ἢ αἱ
 πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δ' ὑστέραι ἡπατήκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἂν ἦ χρήσιμον. ἔτι δὲ τὸ
 30 συμφέρον ὁρᾶν, εἴ πῃ ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ
 ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.

659—Since persuasion is also concerned with the state of mind of the hearers, practical psychology has its part in rhetoric. In book II, ch. 2-11, Ar. treats the various emotions, in ch. 12-14 the various types of human character in different ages.

a. The young man's character. *Rhet.* II 12, 1389 a₂-b₁₂.

[illegible]

1 The word of Pittacus is unknown to us.
2 Μῆδ' ἐγ' αἶψα.

Μηδὲν ἄλυσιν.

b. The character of elderly men. *Rhet.* II 13, 1389 b¹³-1390 a²⁸:Elderly
men

Οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις τὰ
 15 πλεῖστα ἔχουσιν ἥθη· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι καὶ πλείω ἐξηπατῆσθαι
 καὶ ἡμαρτηκέναι, καὶ τὰ πλείω φαῦλα εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὔτε διαβεβαιούν-
 ται οὐδέν, ἥττον τε ἄγαν ἅπαντα ἢ δεῖ. καὶ οἴονται, ἴσασι δ' οὐδέν. καὶ ἀμφισβη-
 τοῦντες προστιθέασιν αἰετὸν ἰσως καὶ τάχα, καὶ πάντα λέγουσιν οὕτω, παγίως
 20 δ' οὐδέν. καὶ κακοήθεις εἰσὶν· ἔστι γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβά-
 νειν πάντα. ἔτι δὲ καχύποπτοί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἀπιστοὶ δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν.
 καὶ οὔτε φιλοῦσι σφόδρα οὔτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βίαντος ὑπο-
 θήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν ὡς φιλήσοντες. καὶ μικρόψυχοι
 25 διὰ τὸ τεταπεινωθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ
 τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἐν γὰρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ
 οὐσία, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἴσασιν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ κτήσασθαι καὶ
 ῥάδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν. καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ πάντα προφορητικοί· ἐναντίως γὰρ
 30 διάκεινται τοῖς νέοις· κατεψυγμένοι γὰρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί. ὥστε προ-
 ὠδοποιήκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος κατὰψυξίς τις ἐστίν. καὶ
 φιλόζωοι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπόντος εἶναι
 τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὐ δὲ ἐνδεεῖς, τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιθυμεῖν. καὶ φίλαντοι
 35 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ· μικροψυχία γὰρ τις καὶ αὕτη. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν,
 ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαντοί εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον
 1390a αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς. καὶ ἀναίσχυντοὶ μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυντηλοί·
 διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὁμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι
 τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· τὰ γὰρ πλείω τῶν γιγνομένων
 5 φαῦλά ἐστιν· ἀποβαίνει γοῦν τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ ἔτι διὰ τὴν δειλίαν.
 καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γὰρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν ὀλίγον τὸ
 δὲ παρεληλυθὸς πολὺ, ἔστι δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐλπίς τοῦ μέλλοντος ἢ δὲ μνήμη τῶν παροι-
 10 χομένων. ὅπερ αἴτιον καὶ τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς. διατελοῦσι γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα
 λέγοντες· ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι γὰρ ἡδονταί. καὶ οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς μὲν εἰσιν ἀσθενεῖς
 δέ, καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ μὲν ἐκλελοίπασιν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσίν, ὥστε οὐτ' ἐπιθυ-
 μητικοὶ οὔτε πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ κέρδος. διὸ καὶ
 15 σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ τηλικούτοι· αἱ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκασιν, καὶ δουλεύ-
 ουσιν τῷ κέρδει. καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος τὸ δ' ἦθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν. καὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀδικοῦσιν
 εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν. ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ
 20 ταῦτο τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν· πάντα
 γὰρ οἴονται ἐγγὺς εἶναι αὐτοῖς παθεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐλεητικόν. ὅθεν ὀδυρτικοί
 εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ ὀδυρτικὸν τῷ
 φιλογέλῳ. τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἥθη τοιαῦτα· ὥστ'
 25 ἐπεὶ ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἥθει λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς

ὁμοίους, οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς χρώμενοι τοῖς λόγοις τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.

Men in
their prime

c. The character of men in their prime. II 14, 1390 a²⁹-b¹³:

Οἱ δὲ ἀκμάζοντες φανερόν ἐστι μεταξὺ τούτων τὸ ἥθος ἔσονται, ἐκατέρων ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν ὑπερβολήν, καὶ οὔτε σφόδρα θαρροῦντες (θρασύτης γὰρ τὸ 30 τοιοῦτον) οὔτε λίαν φοβούμενοι, καλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντες, οὔτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες οὔτε πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς κρίνοντες μᾶλλον. καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω. καὶ οὔτε πρὸς φειδῶ οὔτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀρμόττον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 1390b πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ σῶφρονες μετ' ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι μετὰ σωφροσύνης. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς γέρουσι διήρηται ταῦτα· εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι σῶφρονες καὶ δειλοί· ὥς δὲ 5 καθόλου εἰπεῖν, ὅσα μὲν διήρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν ὠφελίμων, ταῦτα ἄμφω ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δ' ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπουσι, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον. ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐτῶν μέχρι τῶν πέντε 10 καὶ τριάκοντα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἐνὸς δεῖν πεντήκοντα. περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων ἡθῶν ἑκαστὸν ἐστίν, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

2—POETICS

660—The different kinds of poetry defined as various modes of imitation.

General
definition
of poetry

Poet. I, 1447 a¹³⁻¹⁸:

Ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας ποιήσις, ἔτι δὲ κωμωδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβο- 1447a ποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς, πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν 15 οὔσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον. διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισὶν· ἡ γὰρ τῷ γένει ἐτέροις μιμεῖσθαι, ἡ τῷ ἑτέρα, ἡ τῷ ἐτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.

Means of
imitation

661—a. The means of imitation. *Ib.*, 1447 a¹⁸-b²⁰, b²³⁻²⁹:

Ὡςπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνται τινες ἀπεικάζοντες, οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας, ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτω καὶ 20 ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις· ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δ' ἡ χωρὶς ἡ μεμιγμένους, οἷον ἁρμονία μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῷ χρώμεναι μόνον ἢ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνωσιν οὔσαι τοιαῦτα τὴν δύναμιν, οἷον ἡ τῶν συρίγγων. αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ 25 ῥυθμῷ μιμοῦνται χωρὶς ἁρμονίας οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἥθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις. ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις, καὶ τούτοις εἴτε μιγνῦσα μετ' ἀλλήλων, εἴθ' ἐνὶ τινὶ γένει χρωμένη τῶν μέτρων τυγχάνουσα μέχρι τοῦ 1447b

- 10 οὐν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινόν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικούς λόγους, οὐδὲ εἴ τις διὰ τριμέτρων ἢ ἐλεγείων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν τοιούτων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν· πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποι γε συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοποιούς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιούς ὀνομάζουσιν,
- 15 οὐχ ὥς τοὺς κατὰ μίμησιν ποιητάς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἱατρικὸν ἢ φυσικόν¹ τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν εἰώθασιν. οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὀμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον· διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν. —
- 23 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες αἱ πᾶσι χρῶνται τοῖς εἰρημένοις, λέγω δὲ οἶον ῥυθμῷ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὥσπερ ἢ τε τῶν διθυραμβικῶν ποιήσις καὶ ἢ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἢ τε τραγωδία καὶ ἢ κωμωδία· διαφέρουσι δέ, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος. ταύτας μὲν οὖν λέγω
- 29 τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν, ἐν οἷς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

b. The objects represented. Ib., 2, 1448 a¹⁻¹⁴, 16-19:

Objects

- 1448a Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἦθη σχεδὸν αἰεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις· κακία γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ τὰ ἦθη διαφέρουσι πάντες), ἥτοι βελτίονας ἢ κατ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας
- 5 ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς· Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἰκάζεν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν λεγθεισῶν ἐκάστη μιμήσεων ἔξει ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς, καὶ ἔσται ἑτέρα τῷ ἑτέρα μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ κιθαρίσει ἔστι γενέσθαι
- 10 ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας, καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἶον Ὀμηρος μὲν βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους, Ἡγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος <ὁ> τὰς
- 14, 16 παρωδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος . . . χείρους. — Ἐν δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἢ τραγωδία πρὸς τὴν κωμωδίαν διέστηκεν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ χείρους ἢ δὲ βελτίους μιμεῖσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν.

c. The manner in which each kind of object is represented.

Poet. 3, 1448 a¹⁹⁻²⁵:

Manner of
representa-
tion

- Ἐτι δὲ τούτων τρίτῃ διαφορᾷ τὸ ὥς ἕκαστα τούτων μιμήσαιοτο ἂν τις.
- 20 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς² καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ἢ ἑτερόν τι γιγνόμενον, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὥς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὥς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους. ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις διαφοραῖς ἢ μίμησις ἐστιν, ὥς εἴπομεν κατ' ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς
- 25 τε καὶ α καὶ ὥς.

¹ An almost certain correction of Heinsius, adopted by newer editors (Bywater, Hardy). The Ms A (Bekker's A^c) has μουσικόν.

² ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς - by the same means.

Origin of
poetry in
general

662—a. The origin of poetry in general and why men take a delight in it.

Poet. 4, 1448 b⁴⁻¹⁵:

ῥεοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινές, καὶ αὗται 1448b
φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παιδων ἐστί, καὶ 5
τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις
ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τό χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας.
σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τό συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρώμεν, 10
τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων
τε μορφάς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι μαυθάνειν
οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἡδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἄλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ
κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. 15

Origin of
tragedy

b. The origin of tragedy. *Ib.*, 1449 a⁹⁻²⁹:

Γενομένης δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς ¹ (καὶ αὕτη καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία, 1449a
καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικά,
ἃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει νομιζόμενα), κατὰ μικρὸν ἠϋξήθη
προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίγνετο φανερόν αὐτῆς, καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα
ἡ τραγῳδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν. καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν 15
πλῆθος ἐξ ἐνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος Αἰσχύλος ἤγαγε, καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἡλάττωσε,
καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν· τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν
Σοφοκλῆς. ἔτι δὲ τό μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων καὶ λέξεως γελοίας, διὰ τό ἐκ
σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν, ὅψε ἀπεσεμνύνη, τό τε μέτρον ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἱαμβεῖον 20
ἐγένετο· τό μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τό σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστι-
κωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης ² αὕτη ἡ φύσις τό οἰκεῖον μέτρον
εὗρεν· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τό ἱαμβεῖόν ἐστιν. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· 25
πλεῖστα γὰρ ἱαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐξάμετρα δὲ
ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλῆθος
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὥς ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται.

Comedy

663—a. Comedy. *Poet.* 5, 1449 a³²⁻³⁷:

Ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μὲν, οὐ μέντοι
κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστί τό γελοῖον μόριον. τό γὰρ γελοῖον
ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθύς τό γελοῖον 35
πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης.

¹ "It certainly began in improvisations" (Bywater).

² "As soon as a spoken part came in" (Bywater).

b. Epic poetry. Ib., 1449 b⁹⁻²⁰:

Epic poetry

1449b Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγωδίᾳ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ <διὰ> μέτρου μεγάλου ¹ μίμησις
 10 εἶναι σπουδαίων ἡκολούθησεν· τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν
 εἶναι, ταύτῃ διαφέρουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα πειρᾶται
 ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν, ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία ἄοριστος τῷ
 15 χρόνῳ, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει. καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις
 τοῦτο ἐποιοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν. μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταυτά, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῆς
 τραγωδίας. διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγωδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ
 περὶ ἐπῶν· ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία ἔχει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγωδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα
 20 ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ.

664—a. The famous definition of tragedy. *Poet.* 6, 1449 b²⁴⁻³¹:Definition
of tragedy

Ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος
 25 ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ, χωρὶς ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρῶντων
 καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων
 παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

Λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος,
 30 τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἶδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἓν μόνον περαίνεισθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα
 διὰ μέλους.

There has been much discussion on the meaning of the *κάθαρσις* τῶν *παθημάτων* spoken of in this definition. The best interpretation has been given by F. W. Trench, *The place of κάθαρσις in Aristotle's aesthetics*, in *Hermathena*, Dublin 1938, p. 110-134. He argues that, in Aristotle's view, the *παθήματα* are not as such bad and abnormal, but should be ordered and brought to serenity, which is accomplished through melody, rhythm, art-form. Like Pythagoras and Plato before him, Ar. believed in the influence of music and rhythm on the emotions.

This paper seems not to have been known to Fr. Dirlmeier, who, in *Hermes* 1940, p. 81-92, *Κάθαρσις παθημάτων*, tries again to prove that the genitive *παθημάτων* is a *separativus*.

Further recent literature on the subject:

M. Kommerell, *Lessing und Aristoteles* (Frankfurter wissenschaftl. Beiträge. Kulturwiss. R. 2) Frankfurt a.M. 1940.

A. Tumarkin, *Die Kunsttheorie von Aristoteles im Rahmen seiner Philosophie*, in *Museum Helveticum* 1945, p. 108-122.

For editions and further literature, see Bibliography p. 302 and 303.

b. Of the formative elements of tragedy, action is the first essential.

Formative
elements:

1. action

Ib., 1450 a¹⁶⁻²⁵, a^{38-b20}:

1450a Ἡ γὰρ τραγωδία μίμησις ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίου καὶ
 εὐδαιμονίας <καὶ κακοδαιμονίας>· ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν
 πράξει ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξις τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης. εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ

¹ Text of Bywater. The codex A has μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου, B μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μετὰ λόγου. Other editors read: μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μετὰ μέτρου.

ἦθη ποιοί τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοῦναντίον. οὐκ οὖν ὅπως 20
τὰ ἦθη μιμήσονται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἦθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσι διὰ τὰς
πράξεις. ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος τῆς τραγωδίας· τὸ δὲ τέλος
μέγιστον ἀπάντων. ἔτι ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγωδία, ἄνευ δὲ 24, 25
ἦθῶν γένοιτ' ἂν. —

2. Other
elements

Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἶον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγωδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἦθη. 38
παραπλήσιον γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γραφικῆς· εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλείψει τοῖς καλλι-
στοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα. 1450b
ἔστι τε μίμησις πράξεως, καὶ διὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων. τρίτον
δὲ ἡ διάνοια. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα, 5
ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων¹ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποιοῦν λέγοντας, οἱ δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. ἔστι δὲ ἦθος μὲν
τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποια τις, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ἢ
προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει (διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἦθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μὴδ' ὅλως 10
ἔστιν ὃ τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων). διάνοια δέ, ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσι τι
ὥς ἔστιν ἢ ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται. τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν
λόγῳ² ἡ λέξις· λέγω δέ, ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται, λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς
ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν 15
αὐτὴν δύναμιν. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν [πέντε] ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων.
ἡ δὲ ὅψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μὲν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἡμιστὰ οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς·
ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγωδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ
κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τῶν ὅψεων ἢ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς 20
τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστίν.

665—a. A story or plot must be of some length.

Length of
the story

Poet. 7, 1451 a⁹⁻¹⁵:

Ὁ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος, αἰ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ 1451a
σύνδηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὥς δὲ ἀπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν,
ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει
εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς
ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ μεγέθους. 15

b. Unity of the plot.

Its unity

Poet. 8, 1451 a¹⁶⁻³⁵:

Μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἷς, οὐχ ὥσπερ τινὲς οἶονται, ἐὰν περὶ ἓνα ἦ· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ
ἄπειρα τῶ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει, ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἓν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ πράξεις
ἐνὸς πολλάι εἰσιν, ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις. διὸ πάντες εἰκόνασιν

¹ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων - in the speeches in tragedy.

² ἐν λόγῳ corr. Bywater. Mss. τῶν μὲν λόγων.

20 ἁμαρτάνειν, ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἡρακλῆϊδα καὶ Θησηΐδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιή-
ματα πεποιήκασιν· οἷονται γὰρ ἐπεὶ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, ἓνα καὶ τὸν μῦθον εἶναι
προσῆκειν. ὁ δ' Ὅμηρος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰσὶ καλῶς
25 ἰδεῖν, ἥτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν· Ὀδύσσειαν γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα
ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, οἷον πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανῆναι δὲ προσποιή-
σασθαι ἐν τῷ ἄγερμῳ, ὧν οὐδὲν θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον
γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μίαν πράξιν, οἷαν λέγομεν, τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν συνέστησεν,
30 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα. χρὴ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς ἢ
μία μίμησις ἐνός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν μῦθον, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησις ἐστι, μιᾶς
τε εἶναι καὶ ταύτης ὅλης, καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως
ὥστε μετατιθεμένου τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι
τὸ ὅλον· ὁ γὰρ προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσὸν μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπίδηλον, οὐδὲ μῶριον τοῦ
35 ὅλου ἐστίν.

666—Why poetry is more philosophical and of more serious importance than history.

Poet. 9, 1451 a³⁶-b⁷:

Φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ
ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.
1451b ὁ γὰρ ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμμετρα διαφέρουσιν·
εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία
τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων· ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενό-
5 μενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον
ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἱστορία τὰ
καθ' ἑκάστον λέγει.

Poetry
superior to
history

BOOK IV

THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL AND THE EARLY ACADEMY

EIGHTEENTH CHAPTER THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

I—THEOPHRASTUS

Life and
work

667—a. The man and his work. *Diog. L. V* 35, the end - 36, the beginning.

Τοῦ δὴ Σταγειρίτου γεγόνاسι μὲν πολλοὶ γνῶριμοι, διαφέρων δὲ μάλιστα Θεόφραστος, περὶ οὗ λεκτέον. — Θεόφραστος Μελάντα Ἑρέσιος. — Οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἤκουσεν Ἀλκίππου τοῦ πολίτου ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, εἴτ' ἀκούσας Πλάτωνος μετέστη πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην· καί κεινόν εἰς Χαλκίδα ὑποχωρήσαντος αὐτὸς διεδέξατο τὴν σχολήν Ὀλυμπιάδι τετάρτῃ καὶ δεκάτῃ καὶ ἑκατοστῇ.

b. Cp. *Simpl., Phys.* 964, ³⁰ Diels:

Τὸν κορυφαῖον τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων Θεόφραστον.

c. Prosperity of the School under Theophr. *Diog. L. V* 37:

Ἀπὴντων τ' εἰς τὴν διατριβὴν αὐτοῦ μαθηταὶ πρὸς δισχιλίους.

d. He is greatly honoured, both at Athens and abroad.

Diog. L. ib., 37 and 41:

Κάσανδρος γοῦν αὐτὸν ἀπεδέχετο καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ἐπεμψεν ἐπ' αὐτόν· τοσοῦτον δ' ἀποδοχῆς ἤξιοῦτο παρ' Ἀθηναίοις, ὥστ' Ἀγωνίδης τολμήσας ἀσεβείας αὐτὸν γράψασθαι, μικροῦ καὶ προσῶφλεν. — Καὶ αὐτόν, ὡς ὁ λόγος, Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεὶ παρέπεμψαν ποσί, τὸν ἄνδρα τιμήσαντες.

Writings

668—*Diog. L. V* 42:

Καταλέλοιπε δὲ βιβλία καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι μάλιστα πάμπλειστα.

His numerous works covered the whole field of Aristotle's studies: logic, science, metaphysics, ethics, politics, rhetoric, poetics. Preserved are his two standard works on botany, the *Περὶ φυτῶν ἱστορίας* and *Περὶ φυτῶν αἰτίων*, several small treatises

on various subjects of science, fragments of his great *History of philosophy* (Φυσικῶν δόξαι), and of other works. The treatise *Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν* was a part of the Φυσικῶν δόξαι, and the *Characters* belonged probably to a greater work on ethics.

669—Empirical basis of scientific theories.

Empirical
basis

a. *De caus. plant.* I 1, 1:

Εὐθὺ γὰρ χρὴ συμφωνεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους τοῖς εὐρημένοις.

b. Applying this principle throughout his work, he states in the same book, 17, 6:

Ἐκ δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα θεωροῦσι σύμφωνος ὁ λόγος τῶν γιγνομένων.

c. Cf. *De caus. plant.* II 3, 5:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα μᾶλλον εὐποροῦμεν· ἡ γὰρ αἰσθησις δίδωσιν ἀρχάς.

670—Sense-perception provides thought with material, either to use directly or indirectly, by solving the difficulties which perception presents to it.

a. *Metaph.* VIII 19 ed. Ross-Fobes:

Τὸ δὲ ὃν ὅτι πολλαχῶς, φανερόν· ἡ γὰρ αἰσθησις καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς θεωρεῖ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ζητεῖ· τάχα δ' ἀληθέστερον εἰπεῖν ὡς ὑποβάλλει τῇ διανοίᾳ τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ζητοῦσα, τὰ δ' ἀπορίαν ἐνεργαζομένη, δι' ἧς, καὶ μὴ δύνηται προβαίνειν, ὅμως ἐμφαίνεται τι φῶς ἐν τῷ μὴ φωτὶ ζητούντων ἐπὶ πλεόν. —

Ib. 25: Μέχρι μὲν οὖν τινὸς δυνάμεθα δι' αἰτίου θεωρεῖν, ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λαμβάνοντες.

b. Cf. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 362 D:

Θεόφραστος δὲ τὴν αἰσθησιν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πίστεώς φησιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης αἱ ἀρχαὶ πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκτείνονται.

671—The phenomenology of plants teaches him that empirical facts should not be artificially forged into a theory.

Perception
more reliable
than theory

a. *Hist. plant.* I 3, 5:

Speaking of the difficulty of the classification of plants, he says:

Διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ὥσπερ λέγομεν οὐκ ἀκριβολογητέον τῷ ὄρω ἀλλὰ τῷ τύπῳ ληπτέον τοὺς ἀφορισμούς.

b. Cf. *De caus. plant.* II 4, 8:

Ἄλλ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ ἀκριβὲς μᾶλλον ἴσως αἰσθητικῆς δεῖται συν-έσεως, λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ εὐμαρὲς ἀφορίσαι.

672—Logic.

Conversion
of proposi-
tions

a. Theophr. changes Aristotle's indirect proof of the conversion of universal negative propositions into a direct proof.

Alex. Aphrod. in Ar. *Anal. pr.* 31, 4¹⁰ Wallies:

Θεόφραστος μὲν καὶ Εὐδήμος ἀπλούστερον ἔδειξαν τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ἀντιστρέφουσιν ἑαυτῇ· τὴν γὰρ καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ὠνόμασε καθόλου στερητικὴν. Τὴν δὲ δεῖξιν οὕτω ποιοῦνται· κείσθω τὸ Α κατὰ μηδενὸς τοῦ Β· εἰ κατὰ μηδενός, ἀπέzeugεται τοῦ Β τὸ Α καὶ ἐχώρισται· τὸ δὲ ἀπεζευγμένον ἀπεζευγμένου ἀπέzeugεται· καὶ τὸ Β ἄρα παντὸς ἀπέzeugεται τοῦ Α· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κατὰ μηδενὸς αὐτοῦ. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνοι.

The same is told by Philoponus in *An. pr.* 48^{11,18} W.

b. Theophr. maintains (against Ar.) the convertibility of universal negative propositions of possibility.

Alex. in *An. pr.* 220, 9¹⁶ W.:

Θεόφραστος μέντοι καὶ Εὐδήμος, ὡς καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐμνημονεύσαμεν, ἀντιστρέφειν φασὶ καὶ τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν αὐτῇ, ὥσπερ ἀντέστρεφε καὶ ἡ ὑπάρχουσα¹ καθόλου ἀποφατικὴ καὶ ἡ ἀναγκαῖα. "Ὅτι δὲ ἀντιστρέφει, δεικνύσιν οὕτως· εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, καὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῷ Β μηδενί, ὅτε ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, τότε ἐνδέχεται ἀπεζεῦχθαι τὸ Α πάντων τῶν τοῦ Β· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ', ἔσται τότε καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Α ἀπεζευγμένον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί.

On the logic of modality in Theophr. see Bochensky, *La logique de Théophraste*, Fribourg (Suisse) 1947, ch. V.

Moods of the
syllogism

673—a. To Aristotle's four moods of the first figure of the syllogism Theophr. added five others.

Alex., *An. pr.* 69, 36-70, 1 W.:

Θεόφραστος δὲ προστίθησιν ἄλλους πέντε τοῖς τέτταρσι τούτοις οὐκέτι τελείους οὐδ' ἀναποδείκτους ὄντας, ὧν μνημονεύσει καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τῶν μὲν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ προελθόντων, τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ μετὰ τοῦτο τῷ δευτέρῳ κατ' ἀρχάς.

Bochensky, o.c., p. 56-65, in treating these new moods, states that Theophr. developed Ar.'s indications in a formalistic sense.

b. Later we find the five moods of Theophr. in Boëthius, *De syllogismo categorico*, Patrol. Lat. LXIV, 814 c:

¹ ὑπάρχον is a species of ἀναγκαῖον, what the schoolmen call the *necessarium ex suppositione*. Cp. Bochensky o.c., p. 73.

Quattuor in prima figura modos in Analyticis suis Aristoteles posuit. Ceteros vero quinque modos Theophrastus et Eudemus addiderunt, quibus Porphyrius, gravissimae vir auctoritatis, visus est consensisse, qui sunt huiusmodi.

Follows a description of the new moods.

674—According to Theophr., in syllogisms in which the premisses are of different modality, the conclusion follows the weaker premiss. Modality

a. Alex., *An. pr.* 124, ⁸⁻²¹ W.:

Οἱ δὲ γε ἑταῖροι αὐτοῦ (sc. Ἀριστοτέλους) οἱ περὶ Εὐδημόν τε καὶ Θεόφραστον οὐχ οὕτως λέγουσι, ἀλλὰ φασιν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐξ ἀναγκαίᾳς τε καὶ ὑπαρχούσης συζυγίαις, ἐὰν ὧσι συγκείμεναι συλλογιστικῶς, ὑπάρχον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα, τοῦτο λαμβάνοντες ἐκ τε τοῦ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς τὸ συμπέρασμα αἰεὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ χείρονι τῶν κειμένων ἐξομοιοῦσθαι· ἂν τε γὰρ ἐκ καταφατικῆς καὶ ἀποφατικῆς προτάσεως, συνάγεται ἀποφατικὸν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἂν τ' ἐκ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους, ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν ταῖς μίξεσιν ἔχειν· ὑπάρχον γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξ ἀναγκαίᾳς καὶ ὑπαρχούσης συμπλοκαῖς τῷ ἐλάττον εἶναι τὸ ὑπάρχον τοῦ ἀναγκαίου. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο δεικνύουσιν. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει μὲν παντί, οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐνδέχεται ποτε αὐτὸ καὶ ἀποξευχθῆναι αὐτοῦ· ὅτε δὴ τὸ Β τοῦ Γ ἀπέξευκται, τότε καὶ τὸ Α αὐτοῦ ἀποξευχθήσεται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτῷ ὑπάρξει.

b. Again, if one of the premisses is possible, the conclusion will be possible. Alex., *An. pr.* 173, ³²⁻¹⁷⁴, ³ W.:

Θεόφραστος μὲν οὖν καὶ Εὐδημος οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ ἐνδεχομένης καὶ ὑπαρχούσης μίξει φασὶν ἔσεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνδεχόμενον, ὁποτέρᾳ ἂν τῶν προτάσεων ἐνδεχομένη ληφθῇ· χεῖρον γὰρ πάλιν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος.

Cf. Philoponus, *An. pr.* 205, ¹³⁻¹⁵ W. See: Bochensky o.c., p. 79 ff. on "the rule of the *peiorem*".

675—a. According to Philoponus, Theophr. and Eudemus introduced the doctrine of hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms.

Philop., *An. pr.* 242, ¹⁴⁻²¹ W.:

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τοσοῦτον εἰπὼν περὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν ἐπαύσατο καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐδίδαξεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν περὶ τοῦ κατηγορικῶς συλλογισμοῦ ἐποιήσατο, ἅτε δὴ τούτων μὲν τελείων ὄντων καὶ μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν δεομένων, τῶν δὲ ὑποθετικῶν δεομένων τῶν κατηγορικῶν, εἴπωμεν

Hypothetical
syllogisms

ἡμεῖς βραχέα περὶ αὐτῶν. Ἰστέον γὰρ ὅτι πολυστίχους πραγματείας περὶ τούτων κατεβάλλοντο οἳ τε μαθηταὶ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον καὶ Εὐδημον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ ἔτι οἱ Στωϊκοί.

Is this statement true? Is it true that Theophr., Eudemus and other disciples of Ar. dealt explicitly with hypothetical syllogisms?—The following text of Alexander seems to contradict this communication of Philoponus.

b. Alex., *An. pr.* 389, ³² - 390, ³:

Λέγει (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης) καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως περαίνεσθαι, περὶ ὧν ὑπερτίθεται μὲν ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπιμελέστερον, οὐ μὲν φέρεται αὐτοῦ σύγγραμμα περὶ αὐτῶν· Θεόφραστος δ' αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις Ἀναλυτικοῖς μνημονεύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ Εὐδημος καὶ τινες ἄλλοι τῶν ἐταίρων αὐτοῦ.

Bochensky o.c., p. 110, concludes that, if Theophr. "mentions" these syllogisms, he did not treat them at length.

As to the frequent combination of the names of Theophr. and Eudemus, Bochensky (o.c., p. 125) suggests that Ar. discussed these questions in his School more abundantly than it is done in his written treatises, and that both Theophr. and Eud. represented the views of Ar. in the latest phase of his teaching.

676—Metaphysics.

the First
Principle

a. Theophr. admits, with Ar., one first principle of all.

Metaph. I 6 Ross-Fobes:

Μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτων οἷον ἄρτιος ὁ λόγος ἀρχὴν τε ποιῶν μίαν πάντων καὶ 5a
τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποδιδοῦς, ἔτι δὲ μὴ διαιρετὸν μηδὲ ποσὸν τι λέγων
ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἐξαίρων εἰς κρείττω τινὰ μερίδα καὶ θειοτέραν· οὕτω γὰρ μᾶλλον 10
ἀποδοτέον ἢ τὸ διαιρετὸν καὶ μεριστὸν ἀφαιρετέον. Ἀμα γὰρ ἐν ὑψηλοτέρῳ
τε καὶ ἀληθινωτέρῳ λόγῳ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡ ἀπόφασις.

b. His objections to the Aristotelian theory of the Prime Mover.

Ib., II 7-9:

Τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη λόγου δεῖται πλείονος περὶ τῆς ἐφέσεως, ποία καὶ 15
τίνων. Ἐπειδὴ πλείω τὰ κυκλικά καὶ αἱ φοραὶ τρόπον τινὰ ὑπεναντία, καὶ τὸ
ἀνήνυτον καὶ οὐ χάριν ἀφανές. Εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τὸ κινοῦν, ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ πάντα τὴν
αὐτὴν· εἴτε καθ' ἕκαστον ἕτερον αἶ τ' ἀρχαὶ πλείους, ὥστε τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῶν 20
εἰς ὄρεξιν ἰόντων τὴν ἀρίστην οὐδαμῶς φανερόν. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
σφαιρῶν τῆς αἰτίας μερίζονα ζητεῖ λόγον· οὐ γὰρ <ἀρκεῖ> ὁ γε τῶν ἀστρολόγων.
Ἀπορον δὲ καὶ πῶς ποτε φυσικὴν ὄρεξιν ἐχόντων οὐ τὴν ἡρεμίαν διώκουσιν
ἀλλὰ τὴν κίνησιν. — Εἰ δ' ἡ ἔφεσις, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου, μετὰ ψυχῆς, 25, 28
εἰ μὴ τις λέγοι καθ' ὁμοιότητα καὶ μεταφοράν, ἔμψυχ' ἂν εἴη τὰ κινούμενα.
Ψυχῇ δ' ἅμα δοκεῖ καὶ κίνησις ὑπάρχειν· ζωὴ γὰρ τοῖς ἔχουσιν, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ αἰ 5b

5 ὁρέξεις πρὸς ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ζώοις, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις καίπερ ἐν τῷ πάσχειν οὔσαι δι' ἐτέρων ὁμῶς ὡς ἐμψύχοις γίγονται. Εἰ δ' οὖν τῆς κυκλικῆς αἰτίας τὸ πρῶτον οὐ τῆς ἀρίστης ἂν εἴη· κρείττων γὰρ ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ 10 πρῶτη δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ τῆς διανοίας ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις.

677—His difficulties about the teleological explanation of nature.

a. How should we conceive the first principles? What is the reason of everything? How far does the ordering of the world reach, and why does it stop at a certain point? Difficulties
about
teleology

Ib., IV 14-15:

6b Πῶς δέ ποτε χρὴ καὶ ποίας τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑποθέσθαι τάχ' ἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις, 25 πότερον ἀμόρφους καὶ οἷον δυναμικὰς ὥσπερ ὅσοι πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἢ μεμορφωμένας ὡς μάλιστα δέον ταύτας ὀρίσθαι καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ φησὶν· τοῖς γὰρ τιμιω- 7a τάτοις οἰκειότατον ἢ τάξεις καὶ τὸ ὀρίσθαι. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς λοιπαῖς σχεδὸν ἔχειν οὕτω καθάπερ ἐν γραμματικῇ καὶ μουσικῇ καὶ ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς. Συνακολουθεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας ὁμοίως 5 αἴπερ τὴν φύσιν μιμοῦνται· καὶ τὰ ὄργανα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμόρφους πάσας, οἱ δὲ μόνον τὰς ὑλικὰς· οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρας ἐμμόρφους, καὶ τὰς τῆς ὕλης, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ τέλεον <ὄν>· οἷον γὰρ ἐξ ἀντικειμένων τὴν ἅπασαν 10 οὐσίαν. Ἄλογον δὲ κάκεῖνο δόξειεν ἂν εἰ ὁ μὲν ὅλος οὐρανὸς καὶ ἕκαστα τῶν μερῶν ἅπαντ' ἐν τάξει καὶ λόγῳ καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ δυνάμεσι καὶ περιόδοις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μὴθὲν τοιοῦτον ἄλλ' ὥσπερ σάρμα¹ ἐκτῇ κεχυμένων ὁ κάλλιστος, 15, 19 φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, [ὁ] κόσμος. — Χαλεπὸν δὲ πάλιν αὖ τὸ τοὺς λόγους ἐκά- στοις περιθεῖναι πρὸς τὸ ἐνεκά του συνάγοντας ἐν ἅπασι καὶ ἐν ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πομφόλυγι· πλὴν εἰ συμβαίνει τῇ ἀστέρων τάξει καὶ μεταβολῇ 7b μορφὰς παντοίας καὶ ποικιλίας γίνεσθαι τῶν τε περὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν γῆν. Ὡν δὴ μέγιστόν τινες παράδειγμα ποιοῦνται τὰ περὶ τὰς ὥρας τὰς ἐτείους ἐν 5 αἷς καὶ ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ καρπῶν γενέσεις οἷον γεννῶντος τοῦ ἡλίου. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνταῦθά που ζητεῖ τὴν σκέψιν, ἀφορισμὸν ἀπαιτοῦντα μέχρι πόσου τὸ τεταγμένον, καὶ διὰ τί πλέον ἀδύνατον ἢ εἰς τὸ χεῖρον μετάβασις.

b. It is sometimes difficult to decide whether a thing exists for a certain purpose or by chance. Many things do not exist for a purpose, and there is much more evil than good.

Ib., IX 28-32:

10a Ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ πάνθ' ἐνεκά του καὶ μὴθὲν μάτην, ἄλλως <θ'> ὁ ἀφορισμὸς οὐ ῥάδιος καθάπερ πλεονάκις λέγεται (πόθεν δ' ἄρξασθαι χρὴ καὶ εἰς ποῖα 25 τελευτᾶν;), καὶ δὴ ἔνια τῷ μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν συμπτωματικῶς

¹ Corr. Diels. Mss. σάρξ.

τὰ δ' ἀνάγκη τινὶ καθάπερ ἐν τε τοῖς οὐρανίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν γῆν πλείοσιν.
 Τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα αἱ ἔφοδοι καὶ ἀνάρροιαὶ θαλάττης [ἢ τίνος αἱ προχωρήσεις] ¹ ἢ 10b
 ἀναξηράνσεις καὶ ὑγρότητες καὶ ὅλως πρὸς ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο μεταβολαὶ καὶ φθοραὶ
 καὶ γενέσεις, [ἢ αἱ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ γῇ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται
 πρὸς ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο μεθισταμένων] ² καὶ ἕτερα δ' οὐκ ὀλίγα παρόμοια τούτοις; 5
 "Ἐτι δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ζώοις τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ μάταια καθάπερ τοῖς ἄρρεσιν οἱ
 μαστοὶ καὶ τοῖς θήλεσιν ἢ πρόεσις εἴπερ μὴ συμβάλλεται, καὶ πώγωνος δ'
 ἐνίοις ἢ ὅλως τριχῶν ἔκφυσις ἐν τισι τόποις. . . . καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα λάβοι 10, 16
 τις ἂν τοιαῦτα. Καὶ τὸ μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦν περὶ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ
 γενέσεις τῶν ζώων· οὐθενὸς γὰρ ταῦθ' ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ συμπτώματα καὶ δι' ἐτέρας
 ἀνάγκας. "Ἐδει γὰρ εἴπερ τούτων χάριν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσαύτως. — 20
 Ἀπλῶς μὲν ὅτι τὴν φύσιν <εἰκὸς> ἐν ἅπασιν ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ ἐφ' ὧν 11a 5
 ἐνδέχεται μεταδιδόναι τοῦ αἰεὶ καὶ τοῦ τεταγμένου· ὥς δ' αὐτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ζώων ὁμοίως· ὅπου γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ βέλτιον, ἐνταῦθα οὐδαμοῦ παραλείπει, οἶον
 τὸ ἔμπροσθεν τὴν φάρυγγα τοῦ οἰσοφάγου, τιμιώτερον γάρ. καὶ ἐν τῇ μέσῃ 10
 κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀρίστην, ὅτι τὸ μέσον τιμιώτατον. Ὡσαύτως
 δὲ καὶ ὅσα κόσμου χάριν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό γ' ἐμφαίνει
 διότι πολὺ τὸ οὐχ ὑπακοῦον οὐδὲ δεχόμενον τὸ εὔ, μᾶλλον δὲ πολλῷ πλεῖον· 15
 ὀλίγον γὰρ τι τὸ ἐμψυχον, ἄπειρον δὲ τὸ ἄψυχον· καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐμψύχων
 ἀκαριαίου ³ καὶ βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι· τὸ δ' ὅλον σπάνιόν τι καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις τὸ
 ἀγαθόν, πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος εἶναι τὸ κακόν. 20

678—Yet he accepts the Aristotelian teleology and professes its principle explicitly.

a. *De caus. plant.* I 1, 1:

ἡ γὰρ φύσις οὐδὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἥμιστα δὲ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ κυριωτάτοις.

b. Cf. *ib.* I 16, 11:

ἡ δὲ (sc. φύσις) αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ὁρμαῖ.

Theophr.'s
theology

679—a. Cicero reproached Theophr. with the same "inconsistency" in theology which he disapproved of in Aristotle.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 35:

Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia ferenda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus.

Cp. on Aristotle *ib.* § 33 (our nr. 430). The same is said by Minucius Felix, *Oct.* XIX 9.

¹ Secl. Ross.

² Secl. Usener.

³ Corr. Ross. Transl.: "of animate things themselves there is only a minute part whose existence is actually better than its non-existence would be" (Ross-Fobes).

b. He considered atheism as an abnormality and a great sin.

Simpl. in Epict. *Enchir.* 38, IV 357 Schweigh.:

Πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι . . . νομίζουσι εἶναι θεὸν πλὴν Ἀκροβοῦτων, οὓς ἰστορεῖ Θεόφραστος ἀθέους γενομένους ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀθρόως καταποθῆναι.

680—a. The divine order of the universe was to him at the same time Fate and Nature. Fate and Nature

Alex. Aphrod., *De an.*, at the end:

Φανερώτατα δὲ Θεόφραστος δείκνυσι ταῦτόν ἐν τῷ καθ' εἰμαρμένην τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἐν τῷ Καλλισθένει.

b. Like Plato, he seems to have spoken of ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ.

Julianus, *Or.* VI, 185 a Spanh.:

the contemplative life

Ἀλλὰ καὶ Πυθαγόρας οἱ τε ἀπ' ἐκείνου μέχρι Θεοφράστου τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ φασί. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ὁ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ποτέ, τοῦτο ὁ θεὸς αἰεί.

Cf. Cic. in *De fin.* V 4, 11, who says, referring to Ar. and Theophr.: Vitae autem degendae ratio maxime quidem illis placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima.

681—He corrects Ar.'s conception of movement: movement occurs in every category, not only in that of substance, quantity, quality and place. Movement

Theophr. fr. 19 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 860, 19-23 D.):

Θ. ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ Φυσικῶν καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατηγοριῶν τὴν κίνησιν θεωρεῖσθαι φησι γράφων οὕτως· περὶ δὲ κινήσεως τὸν μὲν καθόλου καὶ κοινὸν λόγον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀποδοῦναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὥς ἐνέργειά τις ἐστὶν ἀτελής τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἢ τοιοῦτον καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατηγοριῶν.

682—a. He opposes Ar.'s definition of space. Space

Fr. 21 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 604, 4-11 D.):

Θ. ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς ἀπορεῖ πρὸς τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ τόπου λόγον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ, ὅτι κινούμενος ἔσται ὁ τόπος, ὅτι οὐ πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀπλανής, ὅτι ἐὰν συναχθῶσιν αἱ σφαῖραι, καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἐν τόπῳ, ὅτι τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντα μὴδὲν αὐτὰ μετακινήθοντα, ἐὰν ἀφαιρεθῇ τὰ περιέχοντα αὐτά, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἐν τόπῳ.

b. He tries to define it himself by the order and place of the bodies in relation to each other.

Fr. 22 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 639, ¹⁵⁻²²):

Καὶ Θ. ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς φαίνεται τὴν ἔννοιαν ταύτην ἐσχηκῶς περὶ τοῦ τόπου ἐν οἷς φησὶν ὡς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ προάγων τὸν λόγον· μήποτε οὐκ ἔστι καθ' αὐτὴν οὐσία τις ὁ τόπος ἀλλὰ τῇ τάξει καὶ θέσει τῶν σωμάτων λέγεται κατὰ τὰς φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις· ὁμοίως δ' ἐπὶ ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ὅλως τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν, εἴτε ἐμψύχων εἴτε ἀψύχων, ἔμμορφον δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐχόντων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων τάξις τις καὶ θέσις τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν. Διὸ καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ λέγεται τῷ ἔχειν τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν ἕκαστον ἐπιποθήσειεν ἂν καὶ ἀπαιτήσῃε τὴν ἐαυτοῦ χώραν καὶ θέσιν.

**Eternity
of the kosmos**

683—He defends the eternity of the universe against the Stoic Zeno.

[Philo], *De aetern. mundi* 117, p. 510 Mangey:

Θεόφραστος μέντοι φησὶ τοὺς γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν τοῦ κόσμου κατηγοροῦντας ὑπὸ τεττάρων ἀπατηθῆναι τῶν μεγίστων, γῆς ἀνωμαλίας, θαλάττης ἀναχωρήσεως, ἑκάστου τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν διαλύσεως, χερσαίων φθορᾶς κατὰ γένη ζώων.

The following chapters (23-27) contain Theophr.' arguments against these four points.

**Thinking
a movement
of the soul**

684—Theophr. explains thinking as a movement of the soul.

Simpl., *Phys.* 964, ²⁹⁻⁹⁶⁵, ⁶ D.:

Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον ἀρέσκει τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων τὸν Θεόφραστον ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ κινήσεως αὐτοῦ λέγοντα ὅτι καὶ μὲν ὀρέξεις καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ὀργαὶ σωματικαὶ κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσιν, ὅσαι δὲ κρίσεις καὶ θεωρίαι, ταύτας οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ἕτερον ἀναγαγεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ τὸ τέλος, εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς κρεῖττόν τι καὶ θεϊότερον, ἅτε δὴ ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιῶν καὶ παντέλειος. — Καὶ τούτοις ἐπάγει· »Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων σκεπτέον, εἴ τινα χωρισμὸν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ὄρον, ἐπεὶ τό γε κινήσεις εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ὁμολογούμενον.

685—a. In ethics, he shares Ar.' view of eudaemonia as the final end.

Eudaemonia Cic., *De fin.* V 29, 86:

Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, consistit in beata vita comparanda; beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus.

**Definition
of the good**

b. With Ar., he defines the good as that which is praiseworthy in itself.

Cic., *De legibus* I 13, 37 f.:

Ad respublicas firmandas et ad stabiliendas vires, sanandos populos,

omnis nostra pergit oratio. Quocirca vereor committere ut non bene provisae et diligenter explorata principia ponantur: nec tamen ut omnibus probentur — nam id fieri non potest —, sed ut iis qui omnia recta atque honesta per se expetenda duxerunt, et aut nihil omnino in bonis numerandum nisi quod per seipsum laudibile esset, aut certe nullum habendum magnum bonum nisi quod vere laudari sua sponte posset, his omnibus — (and, among others, Theophr.' name is mentioned here) his omnibus haec quae dixi probantur.

686—a. He attributes some value to outward circumstances of life.

**Value of
outward
circum-
stances**

Cic., *Tusc.* V 9, 24:

(Theophrastus) cum statuisset verba, tormenta, cruciatus, patriae eversiones, exilia, orbitates magnam vim habere ad male misereque vivendum, non est ausus elate et ample loqui, cum humiliter demisseque sentiret. — Vexatur autem ab omnibus ¹ primum in eo libro quem scripsit de vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quam ob rem is qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non possit.

b. He considers marriage as an impediment to the life of a scholar. **Marriage**

Hieronymus, *Adv. Jovin.* I 47:

Fertur aureolus Theophrasti liber de nuptiis, in quo quaerit an vir sapiens ducat uxorem. Et cum definisset, si pulchra esset, si bene morata, si honestis parentibus, si ipse sanus ac dives, sic sapientem aliquando inire matrimonium, statim intulit: „Haec autem in nuptiis raro universa concordant. Non est ergo uxor ducenda sapienti. Primum enim impediri studia philosophiae, nec posse quemquam libris et uxori pariter inservire.

687—Theophr.' Characters.

a. III, 'Αδολεσχίας.

Garrulity

Ἡ δὲ ἀδολεσχία ἐστὶ μὲν διήγησις λόγων μακρῶν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτων, ὁ δὲ ἀδολέσχης τοιοῦτός τις οἶος, ὃν μὴ γινώσκει, τούτῳ παρακαθεζόμενος πλησίον πρῶτον μὲν τῆς αὐτοῦ γυναικὸς εἰπεῖν ἐγκώμιον, εἴτα, ὃ τῆς νυκτὸς εἶδεν ἐνύπνιον, τοῦτο διηγῆσασθαι, εἴθ' ὃν εἶχεν ἐπὶ τῷ δείπνῳ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα διεξελεῖν. εἴτα δὴ προχωροῦντος τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν ὡς πολὺ πονηρότεροί 5 εἰσιν οἱ νῦν ἄνθρωποι τῶν ἀρχαίων, καὶ ὡς ἄξιοι <οὐ> γεγόνασιν οἱ πυροὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, καὶ ὡς πολλοὶ ἐπιδημοῦσι ξένοι, καὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐκ Διονυσίων πλώϊμον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ ποιήσειεν ὁ Ζεὺς ὕδωρ πλεῖον, τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ βελτίω ἔσεσθαι,

¹ Doubtless, most by the Stoics; hardly by the Peripatetics.

[illegible]

The officious man
b. XIII, Περικλέους.

[illegible]

c. XVII, Μεταφυσικας.

The
grumbler

[illegible]

2—DICAEARCHUS

688—Suidas s.v. Δικαίαρχος (fr. 1 Wehrli):

Life and
work

Δικαίαρχος: Φειδίου, Σικελιώτης, ἐκ πόλεως Μεσσήνης, Ἀριστοτέλους ἀκουστής, φιλόσοφος καὶ ῥήτωρ καὶ γεωμέτρης. Καταμετρήσεις τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ὄρων, Ἑλλάδος βίον ἐν βιβλίοις γ'. οὗτος ἔγραψε τὴν πολιτείαν Σπαρτιατῶν, καὶ νόμος ἐτέθη ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καθ' ἑκάστον ἔτος ἀναγινώσκεισθαι τὸν λόγον εἰς τὸ τῶν Ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, τοὺς δὲ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν ἀκροᾶσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐκράτει μέχρι πολλοῦ.

689—Cic., *De fin.* IV 28, 79 (fr. 3 W.):

A later
judgment

...Panaetius ... semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant. quos quidem tibi studiose et diligenter tractandos magno opere censeo.

690—Naturalistic doctrine on soul.

a. Cic., *Tusc.* I 10, 21 (fr. 7 W.):

Doctrine
on soul

Dicaearchus autem in eo sermone, quem Corinthi habitum tribus libris exponit, doctorum hominum disputantium primo libro multos loquentes facit; duobus Pherecraten quendam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum, disserentem inducit, nihil esse omnino animum et hoc
5 esse nomen totum inane frustra animalia et animantes appellari, neque in homine inesse animum vel animam nec in bestia, vimque omnem eam, qua vel agamus quid vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis aequabiliter esse fusam nec separabilem a corpore esse, quippe quae
10 ut temperatione naturae vigeat et sentiat.

b. Cf. *Tusc.* I 22, 51 (fr. 8 e W.):

Dicaearchus quidem et Aristoxenus, quia difficilis erat animi quid aut qualis esset intellegentia, nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt.

c. Sextus, *Pyrrh.* II 31 (fr. 8 b W.):

Οἱ μὲν μὴ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφασαν, ὥς οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεσσήνιον Δικαίαρχον.

691—Soul a harmony of the four elements.

Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* II, Patrol. Gr. XL, p. 537 (fr. 11 W.):

Δικαίαρχος δὲ ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι) ἀντὶ τοῦ κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῶν στοιχείων. Οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἐκ τῶν φθόγγων συνισταμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ

ξηρῶν ἐναρμόνιον κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν βούλεται λέγειν. Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ 5 Δικαίαρχος ἀνούσιον.

The same doctrine is attested in a few words by Plut., *Plac.* IV 2, 5; Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 1, and Theodoretus, *Gr. aff. cur.* V 18 (fr. 12 a-c W.).

Divination 692—In spite of this naturalistic doctrine of soul D. is said to have acknowledged divination in dreams.

a. Galenus, *Hist. phil.* 105 (fr. 13 a W.):

Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Δικαίαρχος τοὺς ὀνείρους εἰσάγουσιν, ἀθάνατον μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ νομίζοντες, θείου δὲ τινος μετέχειν.

b. Cic., *De div.* I 3, 5 (fr. 14 W.):

Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit.

Human possibilities

693—The following reflexion on the polarity of human possibilities¹ is cited by Cic. from D.' work II. ἀνθρώπων φθορᾶς.

Cic. *De off.* II 5, 16 (fr. 24 W.):

Est Dicaearchi liber de interitu hominum, Peripatetici magni et copiosi, qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae, vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta, deinde comparat, quanto plures deleti sint homines hominum impetu, id est bellis aut seditionibus quam omni 5 reliqua calamitate. cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint, proprium hoc statuo virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere.

Superiority of the βίος πρακτικός

694—Against Theophr., D. defended the superiority of the βίος πρακτικός to the βίος θεωρητικός.

a. Cic., *Ep. ad Att.* II 16, 3 (fr. 25 W.):

Nunc prorsus hoc statui, ut quoniam tanta controversia est Dicaearcho familiari tuo cum Theophrasto amico meo, ut ille tuus τὸν πρακτικὸν βίον longe omnibus anteponat, hic autem τὸν θεωρητικόν, utrique a me mos gestus esse videatur.

b. Codex Vaticanus 435 (fr. 31 W.):

(The ancient Romans did not strive after cleverness in words, not even

¹ The fragment is explained by Wehrli in this sense.

in such apophthegmata as those attributed to the seven sages.)

Δικαιάρχῳ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα σοφῶν εἶναι ἀνδρῶν δοκεῖ, μὴ γὰρ δὴ γε τοὺς πάλαι λόγῳ φιλοσοφεῖν. ἀλλ' εἶναι τὴν σοφίαν τότε γοῦν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἔργων καλῶν, χρόνῳ δὲ λόγων ὀχλικῶν γενέσθαι τέχνην. καὶ νῦν μὲν τὸν πιθανῶς διαλεχθέντα μέγαν εἶναι δοκεῖν φιλόσοφον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πάλαι χρόνοις ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος ἦν 5 φιλόσοφος, εἰ καὶ μὴ περιβλέπτους καὶ ὀχλικοὺς ἀσκοῖτο λόγους. οὐ γὰρ ἐζήτουν ἐκεῖνοί γε εἰ πολιτευτέον οὐδὲ πῶς, ἀλλ' ἐπολιτεύοντο αὐτοὶ καλῶς, οὐδὲ εἰ χρὴ γαμεῖν, ἀλλὰ γήμαντες ὃν δεῖ τρόπον γαμεῖν ταῖς γυναιξὶ συνεβίουν. ταῦτα ἦν, φησὶν, ἔργα ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα σοφῶν, αἱ δὲ ἀποφθεγγεῖς αὐταὶ πρᾶγμα φορτικόν.

c. Cf. Plut., *An seni gerenda res publica*, c. 26, 796 c (fr. 29 W.).

(Philosophy does not only consist in speaking ex cathedra, like πολιτεύεσθαι does not only consist in crying in the assembly. There is a 5 συνεχῆς ἐν ἔργοις καὶ πράξεσιν ὁρωμένη καθ' ἡμέραν ὁμαλῶς πολιτεία καὶ φιλοσοφία, which escapes the notice of the people). Καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς στοαῖς ἀνακάμπτοντας περιπατεῖν φασιν, ὡς ἔλεγε Δικαίαιρχος, οὐκέτι δὲ τοὺς εἰς ἀγρὸν ἢ πρὸς φίλον βαδίζοντας. ὅμοιον δ' ἐστὶ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι. Σωκράτης γοῦν οὔτε βάθρα θεῖς οὔτε εἰς θρόνον καθίσας οὔθ' ὥραν διατριβῆς 5 ἢ περιπάτου τοῖς γνωρίμοις τεταγμένην φυλάττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ παίζων ὅτε τύχοι καὶ συμπίνων καὶ συστρατεύμενος ἐνίοις καὶ συναγοράζων, τέλος δὲ καὶ δεδεδεμένος καὶ πίνων τὸ φάρμακον ἐφιλοσόφει, πρῶτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον ἅπαντι χρόνῳ καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθει καὶ πράγμασιν ἀπλῶς ἅπασι φιλοσοφίαν δεχόμενον.

695—An important work of D. was his Βίος Ἑλλάδος, which is cited rather frequently by later writers (Wehrli, fr. 47-66).

The
development
of mankind

a. Varro, *Rerum rustic.* II 1, 3 (fr. 48 W., first part).

Igitur, inquam, et homines et pecudes cum semper fuisse sit necesse natura — sive enim aliquod fuit principium generandi animalium, ut putavit Thales Milesius et Zeno Citieus, sive contra principium horum exstitit nullum, ut credidit Pythagoras Samius et Aristoteles Stagiritis — 5 necesse est humanae vitae a summa memoria gradatim descendisse ad hanc aetatem, ut scribit Dicaearchus, et summum gradum fuisse naturalem, cum viverent homines ex his rebus, quae inviolata ultro ferret terra; ex hac vita in secundam descendisse pastoriciam e feris atque agrestibus, ut arboribus ac virgultis [ac] decarpendo glandem, arbu[s]tum, mora, 10 poma colligerent ad usum, sic ex animalibus cum propter eandem utilitatem quae possent silvestria deprenderent ac concluderent et mansues-

cerent. In quis primum non sine causa putant oves assumptas et propter utilitatem et propter <p>laciditatem. maxime enim hae natura quietae et aptissimae ad vitam hominum. ad cibum enim lacte et caseum adhibitum, ad corpus vestitum et pelles attulerunt. tertio denique gradu a 15 vita pastorali ad agri culturam descenderunt, in qua ex duobus gradibus superioribus retinuerunt multa, et quo descenderant, ibi processerunt longe, dum ad nos perveniret.

b. Porph., *De abstinencia* IV 2 (fr. 49 W., the beginning).

Τῶν τοίνυν συντόμως τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀκριβῶς τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ συναγαγόντων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ περιπατητικὸς Δικαίαρχος, ὃς τὸν ἀρχαῖον βίον τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀφηγούμενος τοὺς παλαιούς καὶ ἐγγὺς θεῶν φησὶ γεγονότας, βελτίστους τε ὄντας φύσει καὶ τὸν ἄριστον ἐξηκότας βίον, ὥς χρυσοῦν γένος νομίζεσθαι παραβαλλομένους πρὸς τοὺς νῦν, κιβδήλου καὶ φαυλοτάτης ὑπάρχοντας ὕλης, μὴδὲν φονεύειν 5 ἔμψυχον. ὃ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς παριστάντας χρυσοῦν μὲν ἐπονομάζειν γένος

«ἐσθλὰ δὲ πάντα», λέγειν,

«τοῖσιν ἔην· καρπὸν δ' ἔφερεν ζείδωρος ἄρουρα

αὐτομάτῃ πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον. οἳ δ' ἐθελήμοι

ἥσυχοι ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο σὺν ἐσθλοῦσιν πολέεσσιν»¹.

10

ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐξηγούμενος ὁ Δικαίαρχος τὸν ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίον τοιοῦτον εἶναι φησίν.

Political
writings

696—Cicero mentions D. with the greatest respect among writers on political subjects.

a. Cic., *De leg.* III 6, 14 (fr. 67 W.):

Nam veteres verbo tenus acute illi quidem, sed non ad hunc usum popularem atque civilem de re publica disserebant. ab hac familia magis ista manarunt Platone principe, post Aristoteles illustravit omnem hunc civilem in disputando locum; Heraclidesque Ponticus profectus ab eodem Platone; Theophrastus vero, institutus ab Aristotele, habitavit ut scitis 5 in eo genere rerum, ab eodemque Aristotele doctus Dicaearchus huic rationi studioque non defuit.

b. Cf. *Ep. ad Att.* II 2 (fr. 69 W.):

Πελληναίων² in manibus tenebam et hercule magnum acervum Dicaearchi mihi ante pedes exstruxeram. o magnum hominem, et unde multo plura didiceris quam de Procilio³. Κορινθίων et Ἀθηναίων puto me Romae habere. mihi credas, lege te hac doceo, mirabilis vir est.

¹ Hesiodus, *Erga* 116 ff.

² Whether this Πελληναίων πολιτεία was a work of D. or not, is uncertain. It may have belonged to Aristotle's collection of 158 πολιτεῖαι.

³ Procilius is unknown to us.

Ἡρώδης¹, si homo esset, eum potius legeret quam unam litteram scriberet.

697—D. seems to have considered a mixed constitution to be the best. **The best constitution**

Photius, *Bibl.* 37 (fr. 71 W.):

Ἦν δ' αὐτοὶ πολιτείας εἰσάγουσιν (sc. post-Platonic writers among whom D. is mentioned) ἐκ τῶν τριῶν εἰδῶν τῆς πολιτείας δέον αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι φασι, βασιλικῷ καὶ ἀριστοκρατικῷ καὶ δημοκρατικῷ, τὸ εἰλικρινές αὐτῇ ἐκάστης πολιτείας συνεισαγαγούσης, ἀμείνων τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἀποτελούσης.

As it appears from a quotation in Athen. IV 141 a ff. (fr. 72 W.), the work in which D. expounded this theory was entitled Τριπολιτικός.

698—a. Like Aristotle and Eudoxus of Cnidus, D. taught the spherical **Form of the earth** form of the earth.

Martian. Capella VI 590 f. (fr. 108 W.):

Formam totius terrae non planam, ut aestimant positioni qui eam disci diffusioris assimilant, neque concavam, ut alii qui descendere imbrem dixere telluris in gremium, sed rotundam, globosam etiam [sicut Secundus] Dicaearchus asseverat. namque ortus obitusque siderum non 5 diversus pro terrae elevatione vel inclinationibus haberetur, si per plana diffusis mundanae constitutionis operibus uno eodemque tempore supra terras et aequora nituissent, aut item si emersi solis exortus concavis subductionis terrae latebris abderetur.

Cp. Ar., *De caelo* II 297 a⁸ ff., and Eudoxi *Arv astronomica* ed. Blass 1887, p. XI, XVIII-XX.

b. On D.'s calculation of the circumference of the earth, see Wehrli, *Dikaiarchos*, p. 77 ff.

3—ARISTOXENUS

699—Suidas s.v. Ἀριστόξενος (f. 1 W.):

Life

Υἱὸς Μνησίου, τοῦ καὶ Σπινθάρου, μουσικοῦ, ἀπὸ Τάραντος τῆς Ἰταλίας. διατρίψας δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ φιλόσοφος γέγονε καὶ μουσικῇ ἐπιθέμενος οὐκ ἡστόχησεν, ἀκουστῆς τοῦ τε πατρὸς καὶ Λάμπρου τοῦ Ἐρυθραίου, εἴτα Ξενοφίλου τοῦ Πυθαγορείου καὶ τέλος Ἀριστοτέλους. εἰς δὲ ἀποθανόντα 5 ὕβρισε, διότι κατέλιπε τῆς σχολῆς διάδοχον Θεόφραστον, αὐτοῦ δόξαν μεγάλην

¹ Atticus had an administrator of this name. Probably this person is meant here.

ἐν τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλους ἔχοντος. γέγονε δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ τῶν μετέπειτα χρόνων, ὥς εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ριᾶ Ὀλυμπιάδος ¹, σύγχρονος Δικαιάρχῳ τῷ Μεσσηνίῳ. συνετάξατο δὲ μουσικά τε καὶ φιλόσοφα, καὶ ἱστορίας καὶ παντὸς εἶδους παιδείας. καὶ ἀριθμοῦνται αὐτοῦ τὰ βιβλία εἰς υγ'.

His life of
Pythag.

700—a. He wrote a *life of Pythagoras*, traces of which can be found in several later works (Wehrli, fr. 11-25).

In his work on the *Pythagorean bios* he explains the ancient taboos in a rationalistic sense. Cp. our nr. **24b, d.**

Life of Archytas and
of Socrates

b. He also wrote a *life of Archytas* (Wehrli, fr. 47-50) and another *of Socrates* (W., fr. 51-60), in which he opposes the hot temper and profligacy of the latter to Archytas' self-command.

c. Cyrillus, *Contra Julianum* VI 185 (fr. 54 a, W.) quotes Aristoxenus' *Life of Socr.* as follows:

Λέγει δὲ ὁ Ἀριστόξενος, ἀφηγούμενος τὸν βίον τοῦ Σωκράτους, ἀκηκοέναι Σπινθάρου τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃς ἦν εἷς τῶν τούτῳ ἐντυχόντων. τοῦτον λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτός γε πιθανωτέροις ἐντετυχηκῶς εἶη, τοιαύτην εἶναι τὴν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον ἦθος, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν τοῦ εἶδους ιδιότητα. γίνεσθαι δὲ που τοῦτο, ὅτε μὴ ὀργίζοιτο, ὅτε δὲ φλεχθεῖη ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους τούτου, δεινὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην. οὐδενὸς γὰρ οὔτε ὀνόματος ἀποσχέσθαι οὔτε πράγματος.

d. Ib., 186 (W., same fr.):

Γέγραφε γὰρ ὡδὶ πάλιν περὶ αὐτοῦ Πορφύριος: »ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τὸν βίον τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εὐκόλον, καὶ μικρᾶς δεόμενον παρασκευῆς εἰς τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν γεγενῆσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν σφοδρότερον μὲν εἶναι, ἀδικίαν δὲ μὴ προσεῖναι. ἡ γὰρ ταῖς γαμεταῖς ἢ ταῖς κοιναῖς χρῆσθαι μόναις. δύο δὲ σχεῖν γυναῖκας ἅμα, Ἐανθίππην μὲν πολῖτιν καὶ κοινοτέραν πῶς, Μυρτῶ δὲ Ἀριστείδου θυγατριδὴν τοῦ Λυσιμάχου. καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἐανθίππην περιπλακεῖσαν λαβεῖν, ἐξ ἧς ἑαυτῷ Λαμπροκλῆς ἐγένετο. τὴν δὲ Μυρτῶ γάμῳ, ἐξ ἧς Σωφρονίσκος καὶ Μενέξενος«.

The same is told by Theodoretus, *Gr. aff. cur.* XII 174, who used the same source.

Cp. Plut., *Aristides* c. 27: Δημήτριος δ' ὁ Φαληρεὺς καὶ Ἰερώνυμος ὁ Ῥόδιος καὶ Ἀριστόξενος ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης . . . ἱστοροῦσι Μυρτῶ θυγατριδὴν Ἀριστείδου Σωκράτει τῷ σοφῷ συνοικῆσαι, γυναῖκα μὲν ἑτέραν ἔχοντι, ταύτῃ δ' ἀνάλαβόντι χηρεύουσαν διὰ πένιαν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεομένην.

701—Plut., *De Herodoti malign.* 9, 856 c, qualifies this kind of gossip as a species of the genus *κακοήθεια*. Fr. 55 W.:

¹ 336-333 B.C.

Ἐγγὺς δὲ τούτων εἰσὶν οἱ τοῖς ψόγοις ἐπαίνους τινὰς παρατιθέντες, ὥς ἐπὶ Σωκράτους Ἀριστόξενος, ἀπαίδευτον καὶ ἀμαθῆ καὶ ἀκόλαστον εἰπὼν, ἐπήνεγκεν ἡδὺν δ' οὐ προσῆναι¹. Ὡς περ γὰρ οἱ σὺν τινι τέχνῃ καὶ δεινότητι κολακεύοντες ἔστιν ὅτε πολλοῖς καὶ μακροῖς ἐπαίνους ψόγους παραμιγνύουσιν 5 ἐλαφροῦς, οἷον ἡδυσμα τῇ κολακείᾳ τὴν παρρησίαν ἐμβάλλοντες, οὕτω τὸ κακὸν εἰς πίστιν ὧν ψέγει προαποτίθεται τὸν ἔπαινον.

702—The measure of reliability of Aristoxenus as a biographer may appear from what he tells about Plato (fragments of his *Life of Plato*, W. 61-68). Life of Plato

a. Diog. L. III 8 (fr. 61 W.):

Καὶ αὐτὸν (sc. Πλάτωνα) φησιν Ἀριστόξενος τρίς ἐστρατεῦσθαι, ἅπαζ μὲν εἰς Τάναγραν, δεῦτερον δὲ εἰς Κόρινθον, τρίτον ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ. ἔνθα καὶ ἀριστεῦσαι.

b. Lucianus, *De parasito* 34 (861). Fr. 62 W.:

Παράσιτος: . . . ὁ δὲ Πλάτων . . . ὀλίγας παρασιτήσας ἡμέρας τῷ τυράνῳ (sc. Διονυσίῳ) τοῦ παρασιτεῖν ὑπὸ ἀφύιας ἐξέπεσε, καὶ πάλιν Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος καὶ φιλοπονήσας καὶ παρασκευάσας ἑαυτὸν αὐθις δευτέρῳ στόλῳ ἐπέπλευσε τῇ Σικελίᾳ καὶ δειπνήσας πάλιν ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ὑπὸ ἀμαθίας ἐξέπεσε. καὶ αὕτη ἡ συμφορὰ Πλάτωνι περὶ Σικελίαν ὁμοία δοκεῖ γενέσθαι τῇ Νικίῳ.

c. Aristocles ap. Euseb., *Praef. evang.* XV 2 (fr. 64 W.):

Τίς δ' ἂν πεισθεῖη τοῖς ὑπ' Ἀριστοξένου τοῦ μουσικοῦ λεγομένοις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος; ἐν γὰρ τῇ πλάνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀποδημίᾳ φησὶν ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ ἀντοιχοδομεῖν αὐτῷ τινὰς Περιπάτον ξένους ὄντας. οἶονται οὖν ἔνιοι ταῦτα περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους λέγειν αὐτόν, Ἀριστοξένου διὰ παντὸς εὐφημοῦντος Ἀριστοτέλην.

d. Diog. L. III 37 (fr. 67 W.):

Ἦν Πολιτείαν (sc. Πλάτωνος) Ἀριστόξενός φησιν πᾶσαν σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Πρωταγόρου γεγράφθαι Ἀντιλογικοῖς.

703—His doctrine of the soul is cited on a level with that of Dicaearchus (our nr. 690b). Soul

a. Cicero describes Aristoxenus' doctrine of the soul in *Tusc.* I 10, 19 (fr. 120 a W.):

Aristoxenus musicus idemque philosophus ipsius corporis intentionem quandam animam esse dixit, velut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur, sic ex corporis totius natura et figura varios motus cieri tamquam in cantu sonos.

¹ Wehrli cites the text up till here.

b. Cp. Lactantius, *Inst.* VII 13 (fr. 120 c, W.):

Quid Aristoxenus, qui negavit omnino ullam esse animam, etiam cum vivit in corpore? sed sicut in fidibus ex intentione nervorum effici concordem sonum atque cantum, quem musici harmoniam vocant, ita in corporibus ex compage viscerum ac vigore membrorum vim sentiendi existere. Quo nihil dici delirius potest.

Musicology 704—In musicology, Aristox. was among the greatest authorities in Antiquity.

a. Cic., *De oratore* III 33, 132 (fr. 69a, W.):

An tu existimas, cum esset Hippocrates ille Cous, fuisse tum alios medicos qui morbis, alios qui vulneribus, alios qui oculis mederentur? num geometriam Euclide aut Archimede, num musicam Damone aut Aristoxeno, num ipsas litteras Aristophane aut Callimacho tractante tam discerptas fuisse, ut nemo genus universum complecteretur atque 5 ut alius aliam sibi partem, in qua elaboraret, seponeret?

b. Cic., *De fin.* V 18, 49 (fr. 69 b, W.):

Duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum. quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede etc. . . ., quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis?

c. Alex. Aphr., in *Ar. Top.* 105 a³⁴ (fr. 69 e, W.):

Θείη γὰρ ἂν τις ὥς ἔνδοξον τὸ ὑπὸ Ἰπποκράτους λεγόμενον ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ Ἀρχιμήδους ἐν γεωμετρίας καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ Ἀριστοξένου ἐν μουσικῇ.

4—DEMETRIUS OF PHALERON

Life 705—a. Suidas Δ 429 (fr. 3 W.):

Δημήτριος Φανοστράτου Φαληρεύς (Φάληρον δὲ λιμὴν τῆς Ἀττικῆς), ὃς τὸ πρῶτον Φανὸς ἐκαλεῖτο. φιλόσοφος Περιπατητικός· γέγραφε φιλόσοφά τε καὶ ἱστορικά καὶ ῥητορικά καὶ πολιτικά καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν (fr. 75), ἡκροάσατο δὲ Θεοφράστου καὶ δημαγωγὸς Ἀθήνησι γέγονε. συνέγραψε δὲ συχνὰ βιβλία.

b. Diog. L. V 75:

Δημήτριος Φανοστράτου Φαληρεύς. οὗτος ἤκουσε μὲν Θεοφράστου· δημηγορῶν δὲ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις τῆς πόλεως ἐξηγήσατο ἔτη δέκα, καὶ εἰκόνων ἡξιώθη χαλκῶν ἐξήκοντα πρὸς ταῖς τριακοσίαις, ὧν αἱ πλείους ἐφ' ἑπτα

ἦσαν καὶ ἀρμάτων καὶ συνωρίδων, συντελεσθεῖσαι ἐν οὐδὲ τριακοσίαις ἡμέραις·
 5 τοσοῦτον ἐσπουδάσθη. ἄρξασθαι δ' αὐτὸν τῆς πολιτείας φησὶ Δημήτριος ὁ
 Μάγνης ἐν τοῖς Ὀμωνύμοις, ὁπότε φυγὼν Ἀλέξανδρον εἰς Ἀθήνας ἦκεν
 Ἀρπαλος. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα τῇ πατρίδι ἐπολιτεύσατο. καὶ γὰρ προσόδοις
 καὶ κατασκευαῖς ἠύξησε τὴν πόλιν, καίπερ οὐκ εὐγενὴς ὢν.

c. Diodorus XVIII 74, 2 (fr. 13 W., at the end):

Οὗτος δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς πόλεως ἤρχεν εἰρηνικῶς καὶ πρὸς
 τοὺς πολίτας φιλανθρώπως.

706—D. was made absolute governor at Athens by Cassander in 318/7, and expelled ten years later by Demetrius Poliorcetes.

Governor
of Athens

a. Pausanias I 25, 6 (fr. 14 W.):

Κάσσανδρος δὲ βασιλεύσας . . . Πάνακτον τεῖχος ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ καὶ Σαλα-
 μῖνα εἶλε τύραννόν τε Ἀθηναίους ἐπραξε γενέσθαι Δημήτριον τὸν Φανοστράτου
 [τὰ πρὸς] δόξαν εἰληφότα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. τοῦτον μὲν δὴ τυραννίδος ἔπαυσε Δημήτριος
 ὁ Ἀντιγόνου.

b. Syncellus 274 d, p. 521, ¹³ Dind. (fr. 17 W.):

Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐγνωρίζετο τρίτος νομοθέτης Ἀθήνησι, οὗτος Ἀθη-
 ναῖοις ἀποδοὺς τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἦλθεν εἰς Αἴγυπτον.

Law-giver

c. Cic., *De leg.* II 25, 63 (fr. 135 W.) tells us something about D.' measures of legislation.

Limitation
of funeral
pomp

Posteaquam, ut scribit Phalereus, sumptuosa fieri funera et lamenta-
 bilia coepissent, Solonis lege sublata sunt. quam legem eisdem prope
 verbis nostri decemviri in decimam tabulam coniecerunt. —

Sed ait rursus idem Demetrius increbuisse eam funerum sepulcrorum-
 5 que magnificentiam, quae nunc fere Romae est; quam consuetudinem
 lege minuit ipse, fuit enim hic vir ut scitis non solum eruditissimus, sed
 etiam civis e re publica maxime tuendaeque civitatis peritissimus. is
 igitur sumptum minuit non solum poena sed etiam tempore, ante lucem
 enim iussit efferri. sepulcris autem novis finivit modum, nam super
 10 terrae tumulum noluit quod statui nisi columellam tribus cubitis ne
 altiore aut mensam aut labellum, et huic procurationi certum magi-
 stratum praefecerat.

Wilamowitz, *Ar. und Athen*, I p. 363, speaks of "die segensreiche Verwaltung
 des Demetrios" and states: "So über Athen zu herrschen hat D. bei Aristoteles
 gelernt: er ist der νομοθετικὸς ἀνὴρ, den die Politik erzogen hat. Gerade an Athen
 hat sie ihre praktische Probe bestanden".

Honoured by the people 707—The people of Athens showed their gratitude by honouring D. exceedingly.

a. Nepos, *Milt.* 6 (fr. 21 W.):

Idem ille populus, posteaquam maius imperium est nactus et largitione magistratum corruptus est, trecentas statuas Demetrio Phalereo decrevit.

b. Cf. Plin., *N.H.* XXXIV 12, 27 (fr. 22 W.):

Nullique arbitror pluris statuas dicatas quam Phalereo Demetrio Athenis, siquidem CCCLX statuere, nondum anno hunc numerum dierum excedente, quas mox laceravere.

Cp. also Diog. Laert. V 75, sub 705b, supra.

Later in disgrace 708—His life was a good example of those sudden changes of Fate which happened not unfrequently in those days.

a. Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* c. 27, p. 820 e (fr. 54 W.):

Τῶν δὲ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως τριακοσίων ἀνδριάντων οὐδείς ἔσχευ ἰὸν οὐδὲ πίνον, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἔτι ζῶντος προανηρέθησαν.

His own reaction

b. Diog. Laert. V 82 (fr. 122 W.):

Οὗτος ἀκούσας ὅτι τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ κατέστρεψαν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἔφη, δι' ἣν ἐκείνας ἀνέστησαν.

He meets Krates in Thebes

709—Plut., *De adulate et amico* c. 28, p. 69 c (fr. 59 W.):

Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ὅτε τῆς πατρίδος ἐξέπεσε καὶ περὶ Θήβας ἀδοξῶν καὶ ταπεινὰ πράττων διῆγεν, οὐχ ἡδέως ἰδεῖν προσιόντα Κράτητα, παρρησίαν κυνικὴν καὶ λόγους τραχεῖς προσδεχόμενος. ἐντυχόντος δὲ πρῶως αὐτῷ τοῦ Κράτητος καὶ διαλεχθέντος περὶ φυγῆς ὡς οὐδὲν ἔχει κακὸν οὐδ' ἄξιον φέρειν βαρέως πραγμάτων σφαλερῶν καὶ ἀβεβαίων ἀπηλλαγμένον, ἅμα δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διαθέσει παρακαλοῦντος, ἡδίων γενόμενος καὶ ἀναθαρρήσας πρὸς τοὺς φίλους εἶπε: φεῦ τῶν πράξεων ἐκείνων καὶ ἀσχολιῶν δι' ἃς ἄνδρα τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔγνωμεν.

D. in Alexandria

710—a. Cic., *De fin.* V 19, 53 (fr. 62 W.):

Itaque multi, cum in potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt. princeps huius civitatis Phalereus Demetrius, cum patria pulsus esset iniuria, ad Ptolemaeum se regem Alexandream contulit. qui cum in hac ipsa philosophia ad quam te hortamur excelleret Theophrastique esset 5

auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus.

b. Aristee ad Philocr. epist. 9 (fr. 66 W.):

Librarian of
Ptol. I

Κατασταθεὶς ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως βιβλιοθήκης Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐχρηματίσθη πολλὰ διάφορα πρὸς τὸ συναγαγεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν, ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην βιβλία, καὶ ποιούμενος ἀγορασμοὺς καὶ μεταγραφὰς ἐπὶ τέλος ἤγαγεν, ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως πρόθεσιν. παρόντων οὖν ἡμῶν 5 ἐρωτηθεὶς, πόσαι τινὲς μυριάδες τυγχάνουσι βιβλίων, εἶπεν: ὑπὲρ τὰς εἴκοσι, βασιλεῦ· σπουδάσω δ' ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πρὸς τὸ πληρωθῆναι πεντήκοντα μυριάδας τὰ λοιπὰ. προσήγγελται δέ μοι καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων νόμιμα μεταγραφῆς ἄξια καὶ τῆς παρὰ σοὶ βιβλιοθήκης εἶναι. τί τὸ κωλύον οὖν, εἶπεν, ἐστὶ σε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι; πάντα γὰρ ὑποτέτακταί σοι τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν. ὁ δὲ 10 Δημήτριος εἶπεν: ἐρμηνείας προσδεῖται, χαρακτῆρσι γὰρ ἰδίῳις κατὰ τὴν Ἰουδαίων χρῶνται . . . μεταλαβὼν δὲ ἕκαστα ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶπε γραφῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀρχιερέα τῶν Ἰουδαίων, ὅπως τὰ προειρημένα τελείωσιν λάβῃ.

Josephus, *Adv. Apionem* II 45 tells that Ptol. Philadelphus sent Demetrius with two other persons to translate the Jewish Law. This story is probably invented by Jewish authors.

Further testimonies in Wendland's ed. of Aristee's Epist., 1900, p. 90 ff.

711—a. Cicero mentions him as one of the very rare persons who excelled both in philosophy and in politics.

Cicero's
judgment
on D.

Cic., *De leg.* III 6, 14 (fr. 72 W.):

Post a Theophrasto (sc. doctus) Phalereus ille Demetrius, de quo feci supra mentionem, mirabiliter doctrinam ex umbraculis eruditorum[que] otioque non modo in solem atque in pulverem, sed in ipsum discrimen aciemque produxit: nam et mediocriter doctos magnos in re publica 5 viros et doctissimos homines non nimis in re publica versatos multos commemorare possumus; qui vero utraque re excelleret, ut et doctrinae studiis et regenda civitate princeps esset, quis facile praeter hunc inveniri potest?

b. Again, he praises his double ability, both in forensic eloquence and in philosophical disputation.

Cic., *De off.* I 1, 3 (fr. 73 W.):

Et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere laboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero

haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere.

In his *Brutus* 9, 37, Cicero speaks of the rhetoric style of Demetrius. "Hic primus inflexit orationem et eam mollem teneramque reddidit, et suavis sicut fuit videri maluit quam gravis" (fr. 175 W.).

His works 712—Diog. Laert. V 80 (fr. 74 W., first part):

Πλήθει δὲ βιβλίων καὶ ἀριθμῷ στίχων σχεδὸν ἅπαντας παρελήλακε τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν Περιπατητικούς, εὐπαίδευτος ὢν καὶ πολὺπειρος παρ' ὄντινούν. ὢν ἔστι τὰ μὲν ἱστορικά τὰ δὲ πολιτικά τὰ δὲ περὶ ποιητῶν τὰ δὲ ῥητορικά, δημηγοριῶν τε καὶ πρεσβειῶν ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ λόγων Αἰσωπέων συναγωγαὶ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω.

A fragm. of the 713—The following passage from his *Περὶ τύχης* is cited by Plutarch in his *Consolatio ad Apoll.* c. 6, p. 104 a (fr. 79 W.):

"Ὅθεν ὀρθῶς ὁ Φαληρεὺς Δημήτριος εἰπόντος Εὐριπίδου

ὁ δ' ἔλβος οὐ βέβαιος ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος

καὶ ὅτι

μικρὰ τὰ σφάλλοντα, καὶ μί' ἡμέρα

τὰ μὲν καθεῖλεν ὑψόθεν τὰ δ' ἦρ' ἄνω

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καλῶς ἔφη λέγειν αὐτόν, βέλτιον δ' ἂν ἔχειν εἰ μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν ἀλλὰ στιγμὴν εἶπε χρόνου.

5

5—STRATO OF LAMPSACUS

Successor of 714—Successor of Theophr. as the head of the Peripatetic School.

Theophr.

Diog. Laert. V 58 (fr 1 W.):

Διεδέξατο δ' αὐτοῦ (sc. Θεοφράστου) τὴν σχολὴν Στράτων Ἀρκεσιλάου Λαμψακηνός, οὗ καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις ἐμνημόνευσεν· ἀνὴρ ἐλλογιμώτατος καὶ φυσικὸς ἐπικληθεὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν ταύτην παρ' ὄντινούν ἐπιμελέστατα διατετριφέναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ καθηγήσατο Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου καὶ ἔλαβε, φασί, παρ' αὐτοῦ τάλαντα ὀγδοήκοντα. σχολαρχεῖν δέ, καθά φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς, ἤρξατο τῇ τρίτῃ καὶ εἰκοστῇ καὶ ἑκατοστῇ Ὀλυμπιάδι¹, τῆς σχολῆς ἀφηγησάμενος ἔτη ὀκτωκαίδεκα.

715—His succession changed the character of the School.

a. Cic., *De fin.* V 5, 13 (fr. 12 W.):

Simus igitur contenti his (sc. Aristotele, Theophrasto), namque horum posterio meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi

¹ 288-285 B.C.

disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti Strato physicum se voluit, in quo etsi est magnus, 5 tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus; huius Lyco oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior.

In this book and in the *Ac. Post.* from which the next quotation is taken, Cicero follows Antiochus of Ascalon, who finds an essential agreement between the Stoa, the Academy and the early Peripatetic School, namely Aristotle and Theophr., excluding Strato and his successors.

b. Cic., *Acad. post.* I 9, 33 (fr. 13 W.):

Theophrastus autem . . . vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae, spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore inbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea 5 disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et in moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis.

716—Diog. Laert. V 59-60 mentions several works of Str. on logic. Simplicius, in his Commentary on the *Categories*, mentions a monography Π. τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου (sub a), from which he cites an important fragment later in the same work (sub b).

Works
on logic

a. Simpl. in *Ar. Categ.*, p. 148, ²⁴ Kalbfleisch (fr. 29 W.):

Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τὴν διαίρεσιν ποιεῖται (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης), οὐ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους παραδιδούς — καὶ ἄλλους γοῦν οὐκ ὀλίγους προστίθῃσιν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ὁ Στράτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου μονοβιβλίῳ, — ἀρκοῦντας δὲ πρὸς εἰσαγωγὴν καὶ τοὺς ἐκτεθέντας οἰόμενος.

The same is told in the Scholia in *Ar.*, p. 87 a³⁷ Brandis (fr. 28 W.).

b. Simpl. in *Ar. Categ.*, p. 423, ¹ ff. Kalbfleisch (fr. 27 W.):

Καὶ Στράτων δὲ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου μονοβιβλίῳ πολλοὺς ἀπηριθμήσατο τρόπους, οὓς νομίζω δυνατὸν εἶναι ὑπὸ τοὺς πέντε τοὺς ἐνταῦθα λεγομένους ἀναγαγεῖν οἷον μερισμὸν ἐκείνων ὄντας. ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ πρότερον ταχθήσεται τὸ ἀτελὲς τοῦ τελείου λεγόμενον, 5 διότι ἔσχατον ἐν πᾶσι τὸ τέλος· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν τάξιν. ἔτι δὲ ὑπ' ἄμφω ταῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ <τὸ> τῇ ἀξίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ φύσει πρότερόν ἐστιν, οὗ ἐπιστήμη πρότερον, οἷον μονάδος ἢ δυάδος καὶ πλήθους ἢ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτῶν. πρῶτον δὲ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τῇ ἀξίᾳ, ὣν τὸ ἔργον πρότερον,

οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σωτηρίας, τὸ δὲ φθορᾶς αἷτιον, πρῶτον 10
 δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ φθείρεσθαι καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀξίᾳ. πρῶτον δὲ τῇ φύσει ὡς μὴ
 ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, ὅπερ δυνατόν εἶναι θατέρου μὴ
 ὄντος, ὡς τόπος σώματος καὶ σῶμα χρώματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ θάτερον ἐν
 θατέρῳ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, οἷον ἡ οὐσία ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ κατὰ
 φύσιν πρότερον τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ὁ νόμος τῆς παρανομίας καὶ ἡ ἕξις τῆς 15
 στερήσεως. ὑπὸ δὲ τῇ ἀξίᾳ πρότερον καὶ τὸ δυνάμει τάττοιο ἂν τὰ τῶ
 τιμιωτέρῳ συγγενέστερα, ὡς τὸ ποσὸν τοῦ ποιοῦ προτάττοιο ἂν, διότι τὸ μὲν
 ποσὸν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν οὐ. καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν μετέχει γενέσεως καὶ
 φθορᾶς, ὡς ὁ χρόνος, τὸ δὲ οὐ, ὡς ὁ τόπος, καὶ τὸ μὲν χωριστόν, τὸ δὲ οὐ·
 ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀδύνατον, ἄνευ δὲ ἐπιθυμίας εἶναι 20
 δυνατόν. καὶ τὸ ἀμερές τοῦ μεριστοῦ· ἀρχῇ γὰρ ὁμοιότερον, ὥστε καὶ κύκλου
 τὸ κέντρον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον τοῦ προτέρου μετέχον, ὡς τὸ αἰδίδιον μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
 τὸ φαρτὸν δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον дуάδος, τὸ δὲ περιττὸν τριάδος. καὶ εἰ
 τὸ μὲν μένει χρόνον τινά, τὸ δὲ οὐ μένει, οἷον σῶμα κινήσεως καὶ χρόνου. ὑπὸ
 δὲ τῇ τάξει πρότερον εἶη ἂν τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ 25
 ὕστερον. ὑπὸ δὲ <τὸ ἐν> τοῖς ἀντιστρέφουσιν ὡς αἰτιῶδες πρότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ
 στοιχεῖον· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου, ὡς τὸ πεπερασμένον τοῦ ἀπείρου,
 καὶ εἰ θάτερον ἐκ θατέρου, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος· ὕλικὸν γὰρ καὶ
 οὗτος αἷτιον. ὅτι δὲ καὶ <τὸ> αὐτὸ κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον
 εἶναι δυνατόν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Στράτων ἐνεδείξατο, τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον 30
 πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα ἀλλήλων δεικνύς.

Explanation
 of the
 universe

717—He explains the universe by purely natural causes.

a. Cic., *Ac. pr. (Lucullus)* 38, 121 (fr. 32 W.):

Negas sine deo posse quicquam: ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus
 Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem magni quidem muneris. sed cum
 sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos
 deos: negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quaecumque
 sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec ut ille, qui asperis et levibus 5
 et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse dicat interiecto
 inani: somnia censet haec esse Democriti, non docentis, sed optantis,
 ipse autem singulas mundi partes persequens quicquid aut sit aut fiat
 naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus. ne ille et
 deum opere magno liberat et me timore.

10

b. Lactantius, *De ira Dei* X 1 (fr. 34 W.):

Qui nolunt divina providentia factum esse mundum, aut principiis
 inter se temere coeuntibus dicunt esse concretum aut repente natura

exstitisse; naturam vero, ut ait Strato, habere in se vim gignendi et minuendi, sed eam nec sensum habere ullum nec figuram, ut intelligamus
5 omnia quasi sua sponte esse generata, nullo artifice nec auctore.

c. Cf. Plut. *Adv. Coloten* c. 14, p. 1115 b (fr. 35 W.):

Καὶ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων Περιπατητικῶν ὁ κορυφαίτατος Στράτων οὐτ' Ἀριστο-
τέλει κατὰ πολλὰ συμφέρεται καὶ Πλάτῳ τὰς ἐναντίας ἔσχηκε δόξας περὶ
κινήσεως περὶ νοῦ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ γενέσεως· καὶ τελευτῶν τὸν κόσμον
αὐτὸν οὐ ζῶον εἶναι φησι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην· ἀρχὴν
5 γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἴθ' οὕτω περαίνεσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν
ἕκαστον.

Strato abandons not only the Platonic and Stoic explanation of the universe, but also the Aristotelian principle of teleology.

718—a. By his theory of weight Str. comes near to Epicurus. Simpl. in Ar. *De caelo*, p. 267, ²⁹ Heiberg (fr. 52 W.):

Atomic
theory

"Οτι δὲ οὐδὲ τῇ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἐκθλίψει βιαζόμενα κινεῖται (sc. τὰ στοιχεῖα),
δείκνυσιν ἐφεξῆς (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης). ταύτης δὲ γεγόνاسι τῆς δόξης μετ'
αὐτὸν Στράτων τε καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πᾶν σῶμα βαρύτερα ἔχειν νομίζοντες καὶ
πρὸς τὸ μέσον φέρεσθαι, τῷ δὲ τὰ βαρύτερα ὑφίζανειν τὰ ἥττον βαρέα ὑπ'
5 ἐκείνων ἐκθλίβεσθαι βίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ὥστε, εἴ τις ὑφείλε τὴν γῆν, ἐλθεῖν ἂν
τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸ κέντρον, καὶ εἴ τις τὸ ὕδωρ, τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ εἰ τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ πῦρ.

b. He differs from Epicurus in his theory of first principles.

Sextus, *Pyrrh.* III 33 (fr. 43 W.):

Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς τὰς ποιότητας (sc. ἀρχὰς εἶναι εἶπεν).

Cf. Aëtius I 3, 24 (Dox., p. 288): Στράτων στοιχεῖα <θερμὸν> καὶ ψυχρόν.

719—His theory of the void.

The void

a. Theodoretus, *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 14 (fr. 54 W.):

Ὁ δὲ Στράτων ἔμπαλιν ἔξωθεν μὲν (sc. τοῦ παντός) μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν,
ἐνδοθεν δὲ δυνατόν εἶναι.

The meaning of the above statement may appear from the following passages of Simplicius.

b. Simpl., *Corollarium de loco*, in Ar. *Phys.* p. 618, ²⁰ Diels (fr. 60 W.):

Οἱ δὲ ἰσόμετρον αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ κενόν) τῷ κοσμικῷ σώματι ποιοῦσι, καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο τῇ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ φύσει κενὸν εἶναι λέγουσι, πεπληρωσθαι δὲ αὐτὸ σωμάτων
αἰεὶ, καὶ μόνῃ γε τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρεῖσθαι ὡς καθ' αὐτὸ ὑφεστώς, οἳοί τινες οἱ
πολλοὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν φιλοσόφων γεγόνاسι, καὶ Στράτωνα δὲ οἶμαι τὸν
5 Λαμφακηνὸν ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς δόξης.

c. Simpl., *Phys.* 693, ¹⁰ Diels (fr. 65 a, W.):

— 'Ο μέντοι Λαμψακηνός Στράτων δεικνύναι πειράται, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ κενὸν διαλαμβάνον τὸ πᾶν σῶμα, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι συνεχές, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἂν δι' ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος ἢ ἄλλου σώματος ἐδύνατο διεκπίπτειν τὸ φῶς οὐδὲ ἡ θερμότης οὐδὲ ἄλλη δύναμις οὐδεμία σωματική. πῶς γὰρ ἂν αἱ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀκτῖνες διεξέπιπτον εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀγγείου ἕδαφος; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν μὴ εἶχε πόρους, ἀλλὰ βία διέστελλον 5 αὐτὸ αἱ αὐγαί, συνέβαιεν ὑπερεκχεῖσθαι τὰ πλήρη τῶν ἀγγείων, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀκτίνων ἀνεκλῶντο πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον, αἱ δὲ κάτω διεξέπιπτον.

The same argument for the existence of a void is used by Hero in his *Pneumatica* (fr. 65 b, W.).

d. Cp. the following passage in Hero:

Pneum. I p. 26, ¹³ Schmidt (fr. 66 W.):

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ φανερόν ὡς ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ὑπάρχει κενά, τῷ τὸν ἐμβαλλόμενον οἶνον εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ ὁρᾶσθαι κατὰ χύσιν εἰς πάντα τόπον τοῦ ὕδατος χωροῦντα. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο μὴ ὄντων ἐν τῷ ὕδατι κενῶν. φέρεται δὲ καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἕτερον διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου· ὅταν γάρ τις πλείους ἄψῃ λύχνους ἅπαντα φωτίζεται μᾶλλον, τῶν αὐγῶν πάντῃ φερομένων δι' ἀλλήλων. [ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διὰ χαλκοῦ 5 καὶ σιδήρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων διεκπίπτει σωμαμάτων, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς νάρκης τῆς θαλασσίας γινόμενον.]

Motion 720—Straton's definition of motion.

Simpl., *Phys.* 711, ⁹ Diels (fr. 70 W.):

'Ο δὲ Λαμψακηνός Στράτων οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους μόνον συνεχῇ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι φησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτήν, ὡς εἰ διακοπεῖη, στάσει διαλαμβανόμενῃ, καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ δύο στάσεων κίνησιν οὔσαν ἀδιάκοπον. καὶ ποσὸν δὲ τι, φησίν, ἡ κίνησις καὶ διαίρετόν εἰς ἀεὶ διαίρετά.

Time 721—a. Time differs from number.

Simpl., *Phys.* 788, ³⁶ Diels (fr. 75 W.):

'Ο μέντοι Λαμψακηνός Στράτων αἰτιασάμενος τὸν ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους τε καὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ χρόνου ὅρισμόν αὐτὸς καίτοι Θεοφράστου μαθητῆς ὢν τοῦ πάντα σχεδὸν ἀκολουθήσαντος τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει καινοτέραν ἐβάδισεν ὁδόν. ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ κινήσεως εἶναι τὸν χρόνον οὐκ ἀποδέχεται, διότι ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς διωρισμένος ποσόν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις καὶ ὁ χρόνος 5 συνεχής, τὸ δὲ συνεχές οὐκ ἀριθμητόν. εἰ δέ, ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο τὸ μέρος τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, κατὰ τοῦτο ἔστι τις τῆς κινήσεως ἀριθμός, οὕτω γε ἂν καὶ τὸ μῆκος ἀριθμητόν εἴη (καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ποσὸν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἐστί) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ συνέχειαν γινομένων

10 καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ χρόνου εἶη ἂν χρόνου χρόνος·
 ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορά, καὶ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ φθείρηται, ὁ
 δὲ χρόνος καὶ γίνεται καὶ φθείρεται συνεχῶς. καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον
 εἶναι πάντα τὰ μέρη (μὴ γὰρ οὐσῶν τῶν τριῶν μονάδων οὐδ' ἂν ἡ τριάς εἶη),
 τοῦ δὲ χρόνου ἀδύνατον. ἔσται γὰρ ὁ πρότερος χρόνος καὶ ὁ ὕστερος ἅμα.
 15 ἔτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται μονὰς καὶ νῦν, εἴπερ ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος ἐκ
 τῶν νῦν σύνθετος, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ἐκ μονάδων.

Cp. Ar.'s definition of time in *Phys.* IV, 219 b¹⁻² (our nr. 510a).

b. Again, he criticizes Ar.'s definition by remarking that time is no more the measure of motion than of rest.

Simpl., ib. 789, ¹⁵ D. (fr. 77 W.):

Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἀπορεῖ (sc. Στράτων): τί μᾶλλον ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς τοῦ
 ἐν κινήσει προτέρου καὶ ὕστερου ἢ τοῦ ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ; καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ ὁμοίως ἔστί
 τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

A fact which, for the rest, did not remain unobserved by Ar. Cp. *Phys.* IV 221 b⁷, where he says: 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως, ἔσται καὶ ἡρεμίας μέτρον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πᾶσα γὰρ ἡρεμία ἐν χρόνῳ.

c. Time is the quantitative element in actions.

Simpl., ib. 789, ³³ D. (fr. 76 W.):

Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πολλὰ ἀντειπῶν πρὸς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀπόδοσιν ὁ Στράτων
 αὐτὸς τὸν χρόνον τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι ποσὸν εἶναι τίθεται: πολλὸν γάρ, φησί,
 χρόνον φαμέν ἀποδημεῖν καὶ πλεῖν καὶ στρατεύεσθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὀλίγον
 χρόνον, ὁμοίως δὲ καθῆσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν καὶ μηδὲν πράττειν καὶ πολὺν χρόνον
 5 φαμέν καὶ ὀλίγον. ὦν μὲν ἔστι τὸ ποσὸν πολὺ, πολὺν χρόνον, ὦν δὲ ὀλίγον,
 ὀλίγον. χρόνος γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἐκάστοις τούτων ποσόν. διὸ καὶ φασιν οἱ μὲν βραδέως
 ἥκειν οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὸν αὐτόν, ὥς ἂν ἐκάστοις φαίνηται τὸ ἐν τούτοις ποσόν.
 ταχὺ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι φαμεν, ἐν ᾧ τὸ μὲν ποσὸν ἄφ' οὗ ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς ὃ ἐπαύσατο
 ὀλίγον, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς ἐν αὐτῷ πολὺ· τὸ βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ὑναντίον, ὅταν ἦ τὸ μὲν
 10 ποσὸν ἐν αὐτῷ πολὺ, τὸ δὲ πεπραγμένον ὀλίγον. διὸ, φησὶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ
 τὸ ταχὺ καὶ τὸ βραδὺ· πᾶσα γὰρ ἴση ἔστί τῷ ἑαυτῆς ποσῷ καὶ οὔτε ἐν ὀλίγῳ
 τῷ ποσῷ πολλὴ οὔτε ἐν πολλῷ βραχεῖα. διὰ τοῦτο δέ, φησί, καὶ πλείω μὲν
 εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνον λέγομεν, θάττω δὲ καὶ βραδύτερον χρόνον οὐ λέγομεν.
 15 ἡ πρᾶξις μὲν γὰρ καὶ κίνησις ἔστι θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρα, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τὸ ἐν ᾧ
 ἡ πρᾶξις οὐκ ἔστι θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρον, ἀλλὰ πλεον καὶ ἔλαττον ὥσπερ
 καὶ χρόνος. ἡμέρα δὲ καὶ νύξ, φησί, καὶ μῆν καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος οὐδὲ
 χρόνου μέρος, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὁ φωτισμὸς καὶ ἡ σκίασις, τὰ δὲ ἡ τῆς σελήνης καὶ
 τοῦ ἡλίου περιόδος, ἀλλὰ χρόνος ἔστί τὸ ποσὸν ἐν ᾧ ταῦτα.

Definition

d. Sextus, *Math.* X (= *Adv. phys.* II) 177 (fr. 79a W.):

Διόπερ Στράτων ὁ φυσικὸς ἀποστὰς τῆσδε τῆς ἐννοίας ἔλεγε χρόνον ὑπάρχειν μέτρον πάσης κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς.

Unity of the soul

722—a. He rejects Ar.'s doctrine of the *noûs*.

Tertullianus, *De anima* 14 (fr. 108 W.):

Specta portentosissimam Archimedis munificentiam, organum hydraulicum dico, tot membra, tot partes, tot compagine, tot itinera vocom, tot compendia sonorum, tot commercia modorum, tot acies tibiarum, et una moles erunt omnia. sic et spiritus, qui illic de tormento aquae anhelat, non ideo separabitur in partes, quia per partes administratur, 5 substantia quidem solidus, opera vero divisus. non longe hoc exemplum est a Stratone et Aenesidemo et Heraclito, nam et ipsi unitatem animae tumentur, quae in totum corpus diffusa et ubique ipsa, velut flatus in calamo per cavernas ita per sensualia variis modis emicet, non tam concisa quam dispensata.

10

Mind identified with the senses

b. Cp. Sextus, *Math.* VII (= *Adv. log.* I) 350 (fr. 109 W.):

Καὶ οἱ μὲν διαφέρειν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν διάνοιαν) τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὥς οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διὰ τινων ὁπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσιν, ἥς στάσεως ἤρξε Στράτων τε ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ Αἰνησιδῆμος.

Rejection of an a priori

723—He explains knowledge as a movement of the soul.

Simpl., *Phys.* 965, ⁷ Diels (fr. 74 W.):

Καὶ Στράτων δὲ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς ὁ Θεοφράστου γεγωνὶς ἀκουστῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις Περιπατητικοῖς ἀριθμούμενος τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμολογεῖ κινεῖσθαι οὐ μόνον τὴν ἄλογον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν λογικὴν, κινήσεις λέγων εἶναι τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. λέγει οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ κινήσεως πρὸς ἄλλοις πολλοῖς καὶ τάδε· αἰὲ γὰρ ὁ νοῦν κινεῖται ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὄρῶν καὶ ἀκούων καὶ ὁσφραϊνόμενος· 5 ἐνέργεια γὰρ ἡ νόησις τῆς διανοίας καθάπερ καὶ ἡ ὄρασις τῆς ὀψεως. καὶ πρὸ τούτου δὲ τοῦ ῥητοῦ γέγραπεν: ἐπεὶ οὖν εἰσιν αἱ πλείεσται τῶν κινήσεων αἱ αὐταί, ἃς ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὐτὴν τε κινεῖται διανοουμένη καὶ ἃς ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐκινήθη πρότερον. δῆλον δὲ ἐστίν· ὅσα γὰρ μὴ πρότερον ἐώρακε, ταῦτα οὐ δύναται νοεῖν, οἷον τόπους ἢ λιμένας ἢ γραφὰς ἢ ἀνδριάντας ἢ ἀνθρώπους ἢ 10 τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων.

One central organ

724—His doctrine of one central organ.

a. Plut., *De libidine et aegritudine* c. 4, p. 697b (fr. III W.):

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντα συλλήβδην ταῦτα τῇ ψυχῇ φέροντες ἀνέθεσαν, ὥσπερ Στράτων ὁ φυσικὸς οὐ μόνον τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς λύπας, οὐδὲ τοὺς

φρόβους καὶ τοὺς φρόνους καὶ τὰς ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόνους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ὅλως πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συνίστασθαι φάμενος καὶ
 5 τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα εἶναι, μὴ τὸν πόδα πονούντων ἡμῶν ὅταν προσ-
 κρούσωμεν, μηδὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὅταν κατὰξωμεν, μὴ τὸν δάκτυλον ὅταν ἐκτέμω-
 μεν. ἀναίσθητα γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ πλὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τῆς πληγῆς ὀξέως
 ἀναφερομένης τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀλγηδὸνα καλοῦμεν. ὥς δὲ τὴν φωνὴν τοῖς ὡσὶν
 αὐτοῖς ἐνηχοῦσαν ἔξω δοκοῦμεν εἶναι, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν
 10 διάστημα τῇ αἰσθήσει προσλογιζόμενοι, παραπλησίως τὸν ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος
 πόνον οὐχ' ὅπου τὴν αἴσθησιν εἴληφεν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δοκοῦμεν,
 ἐλκομένης ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφ' οὗ πέπονθε. διὸ καὶ προσκόψαντες αὐτίκα
 τὰς ὀφρὺς συνάγομεν, τῷ πληγέντι μορίῳ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὀξέως
 ἀποδιδόντος, καὶ παρεγκόπτομεν ἔσθ' ὅτε τὸ πνεῦμα· καὶ τὰ μέρη δεσμοῖς
 15 διαλαμβάνηται, <ταῖς> χερσὶ σφόδρα πιέζομεν, ἰστάμενοι πρὸς τὴν διάδοσιν
 τοῦ πάθους, καὶ τὴν πληγὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις θλίβοντες, ἵνα μὴ συνάψῃ πρὸς
 τὸ φρονοῦν ἀλγηδὼν γένηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁ Στράτων ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ὡς εἰκὸς
 τοιούτοις.

b. Plut., *De sollertia anim.* 3, p. 961a (fr. 112 W.):

Καίτοι Στράτωνός γε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύων ὡς οὐδ' αἰσθά-
 νεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις
 ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν
 ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας· εἴτ' αὖθις ἐπανῆλθεν
 5 καὶ μεταθεῖ καὶ διώκει τῶν προιεμένων ἕκαστον ἀναλεγόμενος· ἥ καὶ λέλεκται·
 νοὺς ὀρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τᾶλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά¹).
 ὥς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὅμματα καὶ ὄτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ
 ποιοῦντος.

6—LYCO AND ARISTO OF CEOS

725—Strato was succeeded in the School by Lyco.

a. Diog. Laërt. V 65:

Τοῦτον (sc. Στράτωνα) διεδέξατο Λύκων Ἀστυάνακτος Τρωαδεύς.

b. Ib. 68:

Ἀφηγήσατο δὲ τῆς σχολῆς ἔτη τέτταρα πρὸς τοῖς τετταράκοντα, Στράτωνος
 αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις καταλιπόντος κατὰ τὴν ἐβδόμην καὶ εἰκοστὴν καὶ
 ἑκατοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα (270/268).

726—He is described by his contemporary Antigonos of Carystus
 as a man of the world, even of rather extravagant inclinations.

Strato
succeeded
by Lyco

¹ Epicharmus, B 12 Diels VS.

His
character

a. Athenaeus, *Deipn.* XII 69, 547d-548b (fr. 7 W.):

Καὶ Λύκων δὲ ὁ περιπατητικός, ὥς φησιν Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος¹, κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐπιδημήσας παιδείας ἕνεκα ταῖς Ἀθήναις περὶ συμβολικοῦ κώθωνος² καὶ πόσον ἐκάστη τῶν ἐταιρουσῶν ἐπράττετο μίσθωμα ἀκριβῶς ἡπίστατο. Ὑστερον δὲ καὶ τοῦ περιπάτου προστάς ἐδείπνιζε τοὺς φίλους ἀλαζονείᾳ καὶ πολυτελείᾳ πολλῇ χρώμενος. Χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν παραλαμβανομένων εἰς αὐτὰ 5 ἀκροαμάτων καὶ ἀργυρωμάτων καὶ στρωμνῆς ἢ λοιπῇ παρασκευῇ καὶ ἡ τῶν δείπνων περιεργία καὶ ὁ τῶν τραπεζοποιῶν καὶ μαγείρων ὄχλος τοσοῦτος ἦν ὥστε πολλοὺς ὀρρωδεῖν καὶ βουλομένους προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν διατριβὴν ἀνακόπτεσθαι. — Οὐ γὰρ ἵνα συρρέντες ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ἕως ὄρθρου γενομένης τραπέζης ἀπολαύσωσιν ἢ χάριν ἐξοινίας ἐποιήσαντο τὰς συνόδους ταύτας οἱ 10 περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Σπεύσιππον, ἀλλ' ἵνα φαίνωνται καὶ τὸ θεῖον τιμῶντες καὶ μουσικῶς ἀλλήλοις συμπεριφερόμενοι, καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἕνεκεν ἀνέσεως καὶ φιλολογίας. Ἄ δὴ πάντα γέγονεν δεύτερα παρὰ τοῖς ὕστερον τῶν τε χλανίδων καὶ τῆς πολυτελείας τῆς εἰρημένης· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε τοὺς λοιποὺς ὑπεξαίρουμαι. Ὁ δὲ Λύκων ὑπ' ἀλαζονείας καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπιφανεστάτῳ τῆς πόλεως τόπῳ ἐν 15 τῇ Κόνωνος οἰκίᾳ εἶχεν εἰκοσίκλινον οἶκον, ὃς ἦν ἐπιτήδειος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰς ὑποδοχάς. Ἦν δὲ ὁ Λύκων καὶ σφαιριστὴς ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐπιδέξιος.

b. Cp. Diog. Laërt. V 67 (fr. 8 W.):

Ἦν δὲ καὶ καθαρώτατος τὴν στολὴν, ὥς ἀνυπερβλήτῳ χρῆσθαι μαλακότητι ἱματίων, καθά φησιν Ἑρμιππος. ἀλλὰ καὶ γυμναστικώτατος ἐγένετο καὶ εὐέκτης τὸ σῶμα τήν τε πᾶσαν σχέσιν ἀθλητικὴν ἐπιφαίνων, ὠτοθλαδίας³ καὶ ἐμπινῆς ὦν, καθά φησιν Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ παλαῖσαι λέγεται τὰ τ' ἐν τῇ πατρίδι Ἰλίσια καὶ σφαιρίσαι.

Political
influence

727—a. He often gave political advice to the Athenians.

Diog. Laërt. V 66:

Πολλάκις τε πολλὰ συμβουλεύσας Ἀθηναίους τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοὺς ὠφέλησεν.

Liberality

b. And showed liberality towards the Athenian state as well as to the sanctuary of Delphi. The last point appears from a decree of the Delphic amphiktyones who honoured him with a laurel wreath etc. for the sake of his great εὐνοία and φιλοτιμία towards the God and the sanctuary at Delphi (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*³, nr. 461); the first from a list of

¹ Cp. Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos*, p. 78 sqq.

² Symposia on common account.

³ A boxer with cauliflower ears.

those who ἐπέδωκαν εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦ δήμου (*ib. nr. 491*).

Wehrli sees in this liberality a feature of the μεγαλόψυχος of Aristotle, an ideal which was certainly before Lyco's eyes. I think it would require a great deal of benevolence to see in L. a true representative of the μεγαλόψυχος. Certainly L. displayed a kind of μεγαλοπρέπεια; yet, as it seems, not without avoiding the extreme of χαννότης, as he was judged by his contemporaries. Whether his personality and behaviour offered a desirable antidote to the type of one-sided erudition represented by Strato, may seem to us rather problematical.

728—Lyco seems to have been more a rhetor than a philosopher. More a
rhetor than
a philosopher

a. Diog. Laert. praises him exclusively as a φραστικός ἀνὴρ and a philosopher for a certain paedagogical talent.

Diog. Laert. V 65-66:

— Λύκων Ἀστυάνακτος Τρωαδεύς, φραστικός ἀνὴρ καὶ περὶ παίδων ἀγωγὴν ἄκρως συντεταγμένος. ἔφασκε γὰρ δεῖν παρεζεύχθαι τοῖς παισὶ τὴν αἰδῶ καὶ φιλοτιμίαν ὡς τοῖς ἵπποις μύωπα καὶ χαλινόν. τὸ δ' ἐκφραστικὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ περιγεγωνὸς ἐν τῇ ἐρμηνείᾳ φαίνεται κἀνθένδε· φησὶ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον 5 ἐπὶ παρθένου πενιχρᾶς· »Βαρὺ γὰρ φορτίον πατρὶ κόρη διὰ σπάνιν προικὸς ἐκτρέχουσα τὸν ἄκμαϊον τῆς ἡλικίας καιρόν.« διὸ δὴ καὶ φασιν Ἀντίγονον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἦν ὥσπερ μήλου τὴν εὐωδίαν καὶ χάριν ἄλλοθί που μετενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δένδρου τῶν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἔδει θεωρεῖσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ λέγειν γλυκύτατος 10 ἦν· παρὸ καὶ τινες τὸ γάμμα αὐτοῦ τῷ ὀνόματι προσετίθεσαν.

We have a fragment of L. in the work of the rhetor Rutilius Lupus (II 7; Wehrli, fr. 26), which is indeed remarkable from a stylistic point of view.

b. Cf. Cic., *De fin.* V 13:

Lyco, oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieunior.

729—His view of the highest good appears from a passage in Clemens, *Strom.* II, c. 21, 129, 9 (Stählin II, p. 183), fr. 20 W.:

Λύκων ὁ Περιπατητικός τὴν ἀληθινὴν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς τέλος ἔλεγεν εἶναι, ὡς Λεύκιμος τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς.

Wehrli rightly remarks that, for Lyco, the "true joy of the soul" is surely not the Aristotelian contemplation.

730—Probably Lyco was succeeded by Aristo of Ceos, the author of a great characterological fragment preserved in Philodemus' *Περὶ κακιῶν* X.

a. He is mentioned by Cicero in the above-cited passage, *De fin.* V 13 (after Lyco):

Aristo
of Ceos

What he
called
"the end"

Concinnus deinde et elegans huius (sc. successor), Aristo, sed ea quae desideratur a magno philosopho gravitas in eo non fuit. Scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet.

b. Strabo X 6, 486, mentions him among those who came from Iulis in Ceos and calls him an emulator of Bion of Borysthenes:

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἰουλίδος ὃ τε Σιμονίδης ἦν ὁ μελοποιὸς καὶ Βαρχυλίδης — καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου φιλοσόφων Ἀρίστων, ὁ τοῦ Βορυσθενίτου Βίωνος ζηλωτής.

731—After Lyco, whose chief interest seems to have been in rhetoric, A. develops another side of Aristotle's inheritance, namely, the description of types of character. The first part of the fragment in Philodemus' Π. κακιῶν X (col. X-XXIV; first part till XVI 27) deals amply with ὑπερηφανία.

This quality is not dealt with by Ar., either in the *Eth. Nic.* or in the *Eth. Eud.* Theophr., *Char.* 24, defined it as καταφρόνησις τις πλὴν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων.

As to A., he considers ὑπερηφανία as a great fault, because it underestimates our dependence on τύχη and on our fellow-men. Thus, he protests against the Stoic idea of autarkeia of the individual.

The first part of our fragment seems to have been written in a proreptical style, as may appear from the following passages.

A fragment
from the
work "On
relieving
from
arrogance"

a. Philodemus, Π. κακιῶν X, col. X 30-XIII 8 (fr. 13 I-IV W.):

Ἐάν ποτε συναισθάνηται μετεωριζόμενος, μεταρίπτειν τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τὰς ἔμπροσθε ταπεινώσεις ὑπὸ τῆς τυχῆς, εἴποτε γέγονασιν — — καὶ λαμβάνειν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ τῆς τύχης ἑτεροκλινές¹ καὶ ὀξύστροφον· καὶ ἐπὶ πάγου πορευομένους τὸ Εὐριπίδου² λέγειν¹, ὃ καὶ Διονύσιος οὐ κακῶς ἐπιφωνεῖν ἐκέλευεν τινα δις τῆς ἡμέρας·

Col.
XI

10

ὁρᾷς τυράννους διὰ μακρῶν ηὔξημένους;
καὶ μνημονεύειν ἐναργῶς, ὃν τρόπον αὐτὸς διετέθη¹ πρὸς ὑπερηφανήσαντα, — — καθάπερ καὶ Δίων πρὸς Πτοιόδωρον τὸν Μεγαρέα, ὃς¹ πολὺν χρόνον ἐπὶ τῆς θύρας περιμένων πρὸς τὸν ἀκόλουθον· »ἦ που καὶ ἡμεῖς«, εἶπεν, »ἐκεῖ πολλὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐποιούμεν.« Καὶ ὅταν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐκληρίας ἐφιστάνη, μὴ προσεπιρητορεύειν αὐταῖς πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον, ἀλλ' ἀποσπᾶν ὅτι δύναται, κουφίζειν³ τῆς ἰσχνότητος πεφυκυίας¹. . . ὥς καὶ Περικλῆς ταπεινοῦ- μένους μὲν ἐξῆρεν Ἀθηναίους, μεγαλαυχουμένους δὲ συνέστειλε. — — καὶ παραμετρεῖν ἑαυτὸν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς πενεστέρους ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον

Col.
XII

¹ Restitution of Wehrli.

² Fr. 420 Nauck².

³ To relieve from.

εἶδος ὑπερέχοντας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἐξαίρει, τὸ δὲ συστέλλει, τοῦτο μὲν ἐπ' ἀγρῶν
 10 κτήσεως, τοῦτο δ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν· παρυπομιμνήσ-
 κεσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ συναντᾶν εἰωθότος φθόνου τοῖς ὑπερηφανοῦσιν, δς ὀφθαλμία
 τίς ἐστιν ψυχῆς, ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἡ τῶν συναντῶντων γεγανω-
 20 μένη χλανὶς ἐνοχλεῖ, κωφότερον δ' ἤπερ ἐὰν παριῶν καὶ ἀναβαλλόμενος δια-
 τινάξῃ, παραπλησίως καὶ τὸν φθονερὸν λυπεῖ μὲν τᾷλλότρια τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οὐχ
 οὕτω δ' ὥσπερ ὅταν οἷον ἀναπτερυγίζοντά τινα καταμάθῃ δι' αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς
 ὕψος ἐξαιρόμενον· τότε δὲ προσφῶς ἔδακεν. "Οσαι δ' ἀπώλεια διὰ φθόνον
 30 γίνονται, βλέπεται τοῖς ἅπασιν. — Ἐννοεῖν δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, ὅταν
 εἰς ἀτυχίαν μεταπέσῃ· λυπηρὰ γάρ, ἅτε συνεπιτιθεμένων εὐλόγως τῷ τῆς
 τύχης πταίσματι τῶν πολλῶν κατ' ἐχθρῶν ὁμολογουμένων — — ὅτι τῆς
 Col. XIII
 πρότερον ὑπερηφανίας ἀνεμίμησεν. διὸ καὶ φασιν ἀχθόμενον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῷ
 σχεδὸν πάντας ἐπιχαίρειν πρὸς Ἀρχέλαον ἀπελθεῖν¹. —

b. "Greatness of soul"² is to be separated from arrogance.

Philodemus, *ib.*, col. XV, l. 22-33 (fr. 13 VI W.):

Καὶ διαίρειν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὑπερηφανίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ συμφύρειν ὥς ἐν καὶ
 ταῦτόν· διαφέρει γὰρ ὅσον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος οἰδήσεως εὐεξία, καὶ ἔστιν
 τοῦ μὲν μεγαλοψύχου τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν τυχερῶν ὑπερέχοντα τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς
 30 ὀγκῶ, τοῦ δ' ὑπερηφάνου τὸ διὰ κουφότητα ταύτης ἐκπνευματούμενον ὑπὸ
 κτήσεως ὑπερορᾶν ἐτέρους.

c. Arrogance may turn to madness.

Philodemus, *ib.*, Col. XVI, l. 15-27 (fr. 13 VII W.):

Ἐννοεῖν δ' ὅτι καὶ εἰς μωρίαν ἐνίοτε τὸ νόσημα περιστήσιν ἢ μανίαν, εἰ μὴ
 20 τὰ Ξέρξου τῶν δυεῖν οὐκ ἔχεται ἢ θατέρου, τὸ ζευγνύειν τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον καὶ
 καθιέναι πέδας εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τᾷλλα ποιεῖν ἃ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν·
 ἢ τὸ θεοὺς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἑαυτοὺς γεγονέναι δοκεῖν καὶ τᾷλλ' ὅσα γίνεται περὶ
 τοὺς ἀνέδην ὑπερηφανοῦντας.

The fragment of Aristo's *Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας*³, preserved by Philodemus, is, as Wehrli remarked, our oldest example of Hellenistic protreptic literature.

732—The rest of Philodemus' fragment shows a very different style and character. Wehrli considers it on good grounds as being taken from another work of A.

¹ It was Euripides who, by the φθόνος of his enemies which had passed over into ἐπιχαιρεκακία, was driven to Archelaus.

² Which is often translated by "pride".

³ The title is mentioned by Philodemus in col. X, l. 10-11.

The
αὐθάδης

a. Description of the αὐθάδης.

Philodemus, Π. κακιῶν X, col. XVI l. 29-col. XVII, l. 17 (fr. 14 I-II W.):
 'Ο δ' αὐθάδης λεγόμενος ἔοικε μὲν εἶναι μεικτὸς ἐξ οἰήσεως¹ καὶ ὑπερ-
 ηφανίας καὶ ὑπεροψίας, μετέχων δὲ καὶ πολλῆς εἰκαιότητος². Τοιοῦτος γάρ
 ἔστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων, οἷος ἐν τῇ μάκ<τ>ρα³ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν αἰτεῖν μὴ
 προανακρίνας τὸν συμβεβηκότ', εἰ ἀκείνῳ συναρέσκει, καὶ — — παῖδα πριά-
 μενος μὴδὲ τοῦνομα προσερωτῆσαι μήτ' αὐτὸς θέσθαι, καλεῖν δὲ παῖδα καὶ
 μὴθὲν ἄλλο, καὶ τὸν συναλείφοντα μὴ ἀντισυναλείφειν· καὶ ξενισθεὶς μὴ
 ἀντιξενίσαι· καὶ θύραν ἀλλοτρίαν κόπτων, ἐπερωτήσαντος τίς ἐστιν, μὴδὲν
 ἀποκρίνεσθαι, μέχρι ἂν ἐξέλθῃ· καὶ ἀρρωστοῦντ' αὐτὸν ἐπισκεπτομένου φίλου¹⁰
 μὴ λέγειν πῶς ἔχει, μὴδ' αὐτὸς ἐπισκεπτόμενός τινα τοιοῦτό τι προσερωτῆσαι·
 καὶ γράφων ἐπιστολὴν τὸ χαίρειν μὴ προσγράψαι μὴδ' ἐρρῶσθαι τελευταῖον.

Col.
XVII

The
αὐθέκαστος

b. Description of the αὐθέκαστος. Ib., col. XVII 17-XVIII 11
 (fr. 14 II-III W.):

'Ο δ' αὐθέκαστος οὐ πᾶν μὲν εἰκαῖός ἐστιν οὐδ' ἄλογος ὥσπερ ὁ αὐθάδης,
 δι' οἷσιν δὲ τοῦ μόνος φρονεῖν ἰδιογνωμονῶν καὶ πειθόμενος ἐν ἅπασιν κατορθώ-
 σειν, ἀμαρτήσεσθαι δ', ἂν ἐτέρου κρίσει προσχρήσῃται, μετέχων δὲ καὶ ὑπερ-
 ηφανίας· οἷος μὴδὲν προσαναθέμενος ἀποδημεῖν, ἀγοράζειν, πωλεῖν, ἀρχὴν
 μετιέναι, τᾶλλα συντελεῖν· καὶ προσερωτῆσῃ τις, τί μέλλει ποιεῖν· »οἶδ'
 ἐγώ« λέγειν· καὶ μέρμηρταί τις, ὑπομειδιῶν· »Ἐμὲ σύ;« καὶ παρακληθεὶς ἐπὶ
 συνεδρεῖαν βουλευομένῳ μὴ βούλεσθαι τὸ δοκοῦν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο μέλλει
 πράττειν· καὶ πάντ', ἐν ὅσοις ἀποτέτευχε, — — τελεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτεθυμηκέναι
 γενέσθαι φάσκειν· καὶ μὴ δυσωπεῖσθαι τοῦνομα καλούμενος ὡς αὐθέκαστος, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ ἔτι παιδιάρια λέγειν εἶναι τοὺς ὡς παιδαγωγοὺς ἄλλοις προσανατιθεμένους·
 καὶ μόνος ἔχειν πώγωνα καὶ πολιάς· καὶ ζῆν δυνήσεσθαι γενόμενος ἐν ἐρημίᾳ.¹⁰

Col.
XVIII

The
παντειδήμων

c. Ib., col. XVIII 11-38 (fr. 14 III W.):

Τούτου δ' ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶν ὁ παντειδήμων, ἀναπεπεικῶς ἑαυτὸν ὅτι πάντα
 γινώσκει, τὰ μὲν μαθὼν παρὰ τῶν μάλιστ' ἐπισταμένων, τὰ δ' ἰδὼν ποιοῦντας
 μόνον, τὰ δ' αὐτὸς ἐπινοήσας ἀφ' αὐτοῦ. κάστι τοιοῦτος οὐ μόνον οἷον Ἰππῖαν
 τὸν Ἡλεῖον ἱστορεῖ Πλάτων, ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμ' εἶχεν, αὐτῷ πεποιηκέναι²⁰
 λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκευάζειν οἰκίαν καὶ πλοῖον δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ χωρὶς ἀρχιτέκ-
 τονος· καὶ γράφειν συνθήκας ἑαυτῷ δεομένης ἐμπειρίας νομικῆς· καὶ δούλους
 ἰδίους ἱατρεύειν, μὴ μόνον ἑαυτόν, ἐπιχειρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἄλλους· καὶ φυτεύειν καὶ³⁰
 φορτίζεσθαι τὰ μάλιστ' ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνικωτάτων κατορθούμενα· καὶ ναυαγῶν
 ἐν ἅπασιν μὴδ' οὕτω παύεσθαι τῆς ἀποπληξίας· οἷος δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων
 ἀντιποιοῦμενος πάντων ἀσχημονεῖν· καὶ τοὺς καταγελῶντας ἀπείρους λέγειν. —

¹ Presumption.

² Thoughtlessness.

³ Bathing-tub.

Wehrli remarks that the list of characters dealt with by A. was probably longer than our fragment in Philodemus, and that, in this case, the work of A. gave a complete description of human characters, which formed "ein bedeutendes Zeugnis peripatetischer Erfahrungswissenschaft auch auf ethischem Gebiete".

733—Plut., *De audiendis poetis* 14e, mentions, on a level with the *Abaris* of Heracl. Pont., the *Lyco* of A., as a writing in which τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα were treated μεμειγμένα μυθολογία. Cp. our nr. **782**.

7—ARISTO OF COS

734—While we found in *Lyco* rhetoric accepted and cultivated as a part of philosophy, Aristo of Cos, a pupil of Aristo of Ceos and his successor, probably the author of the great fragments on rhetoric preserved by Philodemus, went back to Plato's view in the *Gorgias*.

a. Strabo, XIV, 19, 658:

Οὔτος (sc. Hippocrates) τε δὴ ἐστὶ τῶν ἐνδόξων Κῶος ἀνὴρ, — καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς Νικίας ὁ καὶ τυραννήσας Κῶων, καὶ Ἀρίστων ὁ ἀκροασάμενος τοῦ περιπατητικοῦ (i.e. Aristo of Ceos) καὶ κληρονομήσας ἐκεῖνον.

Aristo
of Cos

He is probably the same who is mentioned by Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* II 61, as a γνώριμος Κριτολάου, and by Quintilianus II 15, 19 as *discipulus Critolai*.

b. Philodemus, *Volumina rhetorica* ed. Sudhaus I, p. 360, col. LXXI, l. 7-8:

τὸ βιβλίον τᾶρίστωνος.

735—a. The rhetor is not worthy to pretend to be a governor.

His rejection
of rhetoric

Philodemus, o.c. p. 361, col. LXXII l. 12-18:

Φησὶ δὴ πρῶτον ἀποτρέπων ὅτι κελευστοῦ καὶ οὐ κυβερνήτου δόξαν ἔχων ὁ ῥήτωρ οὐκ ἄξιός ἐστι προσποιεῖσθαι κυβερνήτης εἶναι.

b. Since rhetoric as a whole has to do with falsehood, the man who seeks truth has to avoid it.

Ib., col. LXXIII 1-4:

Φησὶν ὅλην τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ ψεύδους, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τῷ φιλαληθεῖ φευκτέαν.

c. In what sense rhetoric, in Aristo's opinion, does not achieve truth, may appear from the following lines, in which we are reminded of Plato's definition of rhetoric as a kind of *κολακεία* — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στο-

χάζεται ἀνευ τοῦ βελτίστου (Gorg. 464 e-465 a). Cp. 464c: οὐ γνωῖσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη¹.

Philodemus, ib., p. 362, col. LXXIV, l. 5-15:

Εἰ δὲ τὸ κατεστοχασμένον εἰκότως ἢ τἀληθεῖ συνεγγίζον πιθανὸν ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ ἀδυνατοῦν ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ ἀποβαίνειν, δ [πι]θανῶς² λέγουσιν οἱ ῥήτορες, αἰσχύνομαι περὶ τοῦ μηδ' ὁποιοοῦν ἀπόδειξιν εἰσενεγκεῖν.

d. A. denies the rhetor the right of uttering praise or blame, since he is not able to judge.

Philod., ib., p. 367 f., col. LXXXIV, l. 5-10, 12-13:

Ἡ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν ἐροῦσιν (sc. τὸ ἐγκωμιάσαι καὶ ψέξαι δυνατὸν εἶναι³), ἢ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦντες πῶς οὐ δεδείχασιν ἕτερον ὄντα τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων ἐμπειρίας; — "Ὡστ' οὐδ' ἐγκωμιάζειν καὶ ψέγειν — —

As Plato did in the above-cited passage of the *Gorgias*, he speaks of ἐμπειρία of the rhetores, as opposed to the knowledge of the πολιτικοί.

e. The Socratic-Platonic distinction between those who know their subject and the mass of ignorant people is seen in the following lines: the author speaks of ἀτεχνοὶ and ἐντεχνοὶ πίστει, the first of which are the common property of everybody, while the latter are proper only to those who have some special knowledge.

Philod., o.c. p. 369 f., col. LXXXVII, l. 3-19:

Ἀξίον δ' ἐπιστάσεως⁴ τὰς μὲν ἀτέχνους (sc. πίστει) κοινὰς ἀπάντων ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δ' ἐντέχνων⁵ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς προσήκειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ παρηκολουθηκότος⁶ ἴδιον, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἐν νόσοις ἱατρῶν, τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὸ πλεῖν χειμῶσιν κυβερνήτου, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων · τὸ δ' εἶδος τοῦ παραθεωρήσαντος⁶ πῶς — —

f. The rhetor, by his lack of knowledge, might even be harmful to the state.

Philod., o.c. p. 375 f., col. XCVIII, l. 4-16:

— τῷ δὲ μήτε ποῦ μήτε πῶς μήτε πότε πλευστέον εἰδέναι προσβλαβὴς ἂν γένοιτο μᾶλλον οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ. Περὶ γὰρ ὠφελίμων τε καὶ βλαβερῶν

¹ Our nr. 198c.

² Text of Wehrli.

³ Col. LXXXIII, l. 8-10.

⁴ Attention.

⁵ Ar., *Rhet.* 1355 b³⁵ makes the distinction between ἐντεχνοὶ and ἀτεχνοὶ πίστει (our nr. 657a), and deals with εἶδος, σημεῖον and τεκμήριον as means of proof.

⁶ The man who knows his subject is here indicated by the terms ὁ παρηκολουθηκώς and ὁ παραθεωρήσας.

ὥς τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο παρακολουθεῖν, εἰ καί τις αὐτὸν ἐνάγκησε ¹ νοεῖν παντάπασι διδακτὴν τὴν πάντων δύναμιν. —

g. The art of persuasion is perfectly useless if knowledge is lacking.

Philod., o.c., p. 379 f., col. CIV, l. 6-16:

Καὶ πρὸς τὸ τρίτον δὲ λεγέσθω τὸ καὶ πάνυ πειστικὸς ὁ λόγος ἦ, ὁ μὴ τὸ πῶς καὶ τίνας δεῖ πείθειν καὶ πότε κατέχων πάντων ἂν ἀχρηστότατος εἴη καθάπερ καὶ πηδάλιον· ὃ συμβέβηκε καὶ τῷ τοῦ ῥήτορος, ὅτι λόγος μὲν, οὐ ῥήτορος δ' εἶναι λέγοιτ' ἄν.

7A—NOTE ON THE MAGNA MORALIA

736—To the remains of the early Peripatetic School doubtless belong the *Magna moralia*, attributed to Ar. by tradition. See our nrs. **561**, **565b**, *supra*. **The Magna
Moralia**

⁴ "hypnotized".

NINETEENTH CHAPTER THE EARLY ACADEMY

I—SPEUSIPPUS

List of
members of
the Academy

737—Diog. Laert. III 46 gives the following list of disciples of Plato.

Μαθηταὶ δ' αὐτοῦ Σπεύσιππος Ἀθηναῖος, Ξενοκράτης Χαλκηδόνιος, Ἀριστοτέλης Σταγειρίτης, Φίλιππος Ὀπούντιος, Ἑστιάιος Περίνθιος, Δίων Συρακόσιος, Ἀμυκλὸς Ἡρακλεώτης, Ἐραστος καὶ Κορίσκος Σκήψιοι, Τιμόλαος Κυζικηνός, Εὐαίων Λαμψακηνός, Πύθων καὶ Ἡρακλείδης Αἴνιοι, Ἴπποθάλης καὶ Κάλλιππος Ἀθηναῖοι, Δημήτριος Ἀμφιπολίτης, Ἡρακλείδης Ποντικὸς καὶ ἄλλοι πλείους, σὺν οἷς καὶ γυναῖκες δύο, Λασθένεια Μαντινικὴ καὶ Ἀξιοθέα Φλειασία, ἣ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα ἡμπίσχετο, ὥς φησι Δικαίάρχος.

Cf. Index Herculanensis col. VI, Mekler p. 33-37.

Organisation
of the School

738—The Academy seems to have been organized as a θίασος for the cult of the Muses.

Diog. L. III 25:

Ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων Φαβωρίνου φέρεται ὅτι Μιθραδάτης ὁ Πέρσης ἀνδριάντα Πλάτωνος ἀνέθετο εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδήμειαν καὶ ἐπέγραψε· »Μιθραδάτης Ὀροντοβάτου Πέρσης Μούσαις εἰκόνα ἀνέθετο Πλάτωνος, ἣν Σιλανίων ἐποίησε.«

Cp. Wilamowitz, *Philol. Unters.* IV 263 ff., and our next nr.

Speusippus

739—**a.** Speusippus, successor of Plato. Diog. L. IV 1:

Διεδέξατο δ' αὐτὸν Σπεύσιππος Εὐρυμέδοντος Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν μὲν δῆμων Μυρρινούσιος, υἱὸς δὲ τῆς ἀδελφῆς αὐτοῦ Πωτῶνης. Καὶ ἐσχολάρχησεν ἔτη ὀκτώ, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ὁγδόης καὶ ἐκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος¹. Χαρίτων τ' ἀγάλματ' ἀνέθηκεν ἐν τῷ μουσεῖῳ τῷ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ ἰδρυθέντι. καὶ ἔμεινε μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν Πλάτωνι δογμάτων.

Zeller remarks rightly that the last sentence might prove something too much.

b. When struck by an incurable disease, he gave up the direction of the School voluntarily. Diog. L. IV 2:

¹ 348-345 B.C.

"Ὡς δὲ ὑπὸ παρακλάνων αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ τὴν σφαλὴν διαδέξασθαι.

c. His reply to Diogenes, who told him that life was not worth living in such a bad state of health.

Stob., *Ecl.* IV, c. 52^a, 17:

Σπευσίππῳ παρακλυνθέντι τὰ σέλην Διογένης ἐξαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς παρῆγες, ὁ δὲ «οὐ τοὺς σέληνας», ἔφη, «ζῶμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ψῶν».

740—a. Speus. believed in the unity of science. Diog. L. IV 2:

The unity
of science

Ὅτιος πρῶτος, καθά φησι Διόδωρος ἐν ἀπομνημονεύματων πρῶτῳ, ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικῇς ἐθεάσατο τὸ κοινὸν καὶ συνεκείωσε καθόσον ἦν δυνατόν ἀλλήλοισι. The method here referred to was applied by Speus. in his *Hómota* and had the purpose of dividing things into genera and species.

b. *Speus.*, "Ὅμοια were, as it appears from fragments in Athenaeus, The "Ὅμοια a survey of the different kinds of plants and animals, in which similar phenomena were combined and dissimilar separated. Lang, fr. 5-26.

741—a. In the following passage of the *Anal. post.* Ar. is polemizing against Speus. Definition and division impossible

Ar., *Anal. post.* II 13, 97 a⁶⁻¹¹ (fr. 31a Lang):

Ὁὐδὲν δὲ δεῖ τὸν ὀρίζόμενον καὶ διαπομπέμενον ἄπαντα εἰδέναι τὰ ὄντα. καίτοι ἀδύνατον φασὶ τίνας τὰς διαφορὰς εἰδέναι τὰς πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ εἰδὸτα ἕκαστον. ἀνευ δὲ τῶν διαφορῶν οὐκ εἶναι ἕκαστον εἰδέναι. οὐ γὰρ μὴ διαφέρει, ταύτῳ εἶναι τοῦτῳ, οὐ δὲ διαφέρει, ἕτερον τοῦτῳ.

b. Cf. Philoponus in *Anal. post.*, p. 405, ²⁷, Wallies (fr. 31c Lang):

Τούτο λέγει ἀναγών τοὺς λόγους δι' ὧν ἐπεχειρεῖ ὁ Σπευσίππτος ἀναγρῆσαι καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τοὺς ὁρισμούς. ἐπεχειρεῖ γὰρ οὕτως δεῖκνυσθαι, ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδοῦναι ὁρισμὸν τινος, λέγων ὡς ὁ θεῶν δι' ὁρισμοῦ παραστῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἢ ἀλλοῦ τινὸς ὁρᾶσαι γινώσκειν πᾶντα τὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν καθ' ἃς διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. οὕτως γὰρ παρὶ-
σταται ἢ φύσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἢ ἀλλοῦ τινὸς ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ εἶναι τῶν ἀλλῶν πᾶντων. τὸ δὲ χωρίον ὁρᾶμενον διὰ τινων διαφορῶν δεῖ χωρίζεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον πᾶντα τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν ἢ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν, λοιπὸν δι' ὁρισμοῦ παραστῆσαι τι ἀδύνατον.

742—He attributed more to sense-perception than Plato did.

Theory of
knowledge

Sextus, *Math.* VII (Adv. Log. I) 145 (fr. 29 Lang):

Ὡς μὲν καὶ Πλάτων. Σπευσίππτος δὲ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητά,

τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν. ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπέιληφε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ ἢ τοῦ ψάλτου δάκτυλοι τεχνικὴν μὲν εἶχον ἐνέργειαν, 5 οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ προηγουμένως τελειουμένην ἀλλ' <ἐκ> τῆς πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν συνασκήσεως ἀπαρτιζομένην, καὶ ὡς ἡ τοῦ μουσικοῦ αἴσθησις ἐνέργειαν μὲν εἶχεν ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ τε ἡρμοσμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀναρμόστου, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ αὐτοφυῆ, ἀλλ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ περιγεγονυῖαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις φυσικῶς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς μεταλαμβάνει τριβῆς πρὸς ἀπλανῆ 10 τῶν ὑποκειμένων διάγνωσιν.

Doctrine
of the first
principles

743—**a.** He separated the One from the Good and took the evolutionary point of view: the Good can, according to his teaching, not be at the beginning but only at the end of being, as its perfection, reached by a process of development.

Ar., *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b³⁰-1073 a³ (Fr. 34a, Lang):

“Ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰτία μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐστὶν προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον· οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα.

b. The One itself is not even being.

Ar. opposes again this view of Speus. in *Metaph.* N 5, 1092 a¹¹⁻¹⁵ (Fr. 34 e Lang):

Οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴ τις παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν, ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν δὲ αἰεὶ τὰ τελειότερα, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὕτως ἔχειν φησὶν, ὥστε μῆδὲ ὅν τι εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὐτό.

c. A reason why he denied that the One is the Good, was that, in this case, multiplicity would be the bad.

Ar., *Metaph.* N 4, 1091 b³⁰⁻³⁵ (fr. 35 a Lang):

Ταῦτά τε δὴ συμβαίνει ἄτοπα, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον στοιχεῖον, εἴτε πλῆθος ὃν εἴτε τὸ ἄνισον καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ κακὸν αὐτό. διόπερ δὲ μὲν ἔφευγε τὸ ἀγαθὸν προσάπτειν τῷ ἐνὶ ὧς ἀναγκαῖον ὄν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξ ἐναντιῶν ἢ γένεσις, τὸ κακὸν τὴν τοῦ πλῆθους φύσιν εἶναι.

d. Meanwhile, he seems to have placed the One on the side of the good things in his scale of values.

Ar., *Eth. Nic.* I 4, 1096 b⁵⁻⁷ (fr. 37 a, Lang):

Πιθανώτερον δ' εοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἐν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.

744—He seems to have identified Plato's principle of the infinite Dyad or the Great and Small with multiplicity.

Ar., *Metaph.* N 1, 1087 b⁴⁻⁹ (fr. 48 b Lang):

Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντιῶν ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τῷ ἐνὶ τῷ ἴσῳ τὸ ἄνισον, ὥς τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ πλήθους οὖσαν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ πλήθους. γεννῶνται γὰρ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνίσου δυάδος τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τῷ δ' ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς δὲ οὐσίας ἀμφοῖν.

745—a. From the One and Multiplicity he derives mathematical ^{Mathematical numbers instead of Plato's Ideas} numbers, which in his system take the place of the Ideas in Plato.

Ar., *Metaph.* M 9, 1086 a²⁻⁵ (Fr. 42 e Lang):

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον ποιοῦντες παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ὁρῶντες τὴν περὶ τὰ εἶδη δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν.

b. Ar. criticized this explanation of the universe at the end of his book Λ of the *Metaph.*, 1075 b³⁷-1076 a⁴ (Fr. 33 e Lang):

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλὰς· τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. »οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίῃ· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω«.

c. In *Metaph.* M 6, 1080 b¹¹⁻¹⁸ Ar. states the difference between Speus. and Plato on the one hand, and between Speus. and Pythagoreanism on the other. From the latter Speus. differs in this way, that Pythagoreans did not separate their numbers from sensible things, while Speus. did (Fr. 42 c Lang).

Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ἰδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ χωριστοὺς ἀμφοτέρους τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οἱ δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων κεχωρισμένον τῶν αἰσθητῶν. καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δ' ἓνα, τὸν μαθηματικόν, πλὴν οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτου τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας συνεστάναι φασίν.

Next geom. magnitudes, next soul 746—a. In his hierarchy of being, then, there followed after the One the numbers, then geometrical magnitudes, and next soul.

Ar., *Metaph.* Z 2, 1028 b¹⁸⁻²⁴ (Fr. 33 a Lang):

Ἔτι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ οἱ μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα αἰδία, ὥσπερ Πλάτων τὰ τ' εἶδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά δύο οὐσίας, τρίτην δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων οὐσίαν. Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης οὐσίας ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας.

b. Asclepius in *Metaph.* 377, ³⁵ and 379, ¹² Hayduck (Fr. 33 d Lang) adds to this:

Noūs καὶ πάλιν ἄλλην οὐσίαν νοῦ καὶ ἄλλην ψυχῆς.

Noūs called God 747—a. Aëtius, *Plac.* ap. Stob. I 1, 29^b, p. 35, ³ W. (fr. 38 Lang):

Σπεύσιππος (θεὸν ἀπεφῆνατο) τὸν νοῦν οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτόν, ἰδιοφυῆ δέ.

b. He seems to have localized this Mind or ruling power of the universe in the centre of the earth, as it appears from a rather obscure text of Theophr. ¹

Theophr., *Metaph.* IX 32 ed. Ross-Fobes (fr. 41 Lang):

Τὸ δ' ὅλον σπάνιον τι καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις τὸ ἀγαθόν, πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος εἶναι τὸ κακόν, οὐκ ἐν ἀοριστίᾳ δὲ μόνον καὶ οἷον ὕλης εἶδει, καθάπερ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἀμαθεστάτου. Εἰκῇ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας λέγοντες ὥσπερ Σπεύσιππος σπάνιον τι τὸ τίμιον ποιεῖ τὸ περὶ τὴν τοῦ μέσου χώραν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἐκατέρωθεν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄντα καλῶς ἔτυχεν ὄντα.

5

c. In Cicero, and later by Minucius Felix, he is charged with atheism, in that he qualified this ruling Force of the universe as an animal power.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 32 (Fr. 39 a Lang):

Nec multo secus Speusippus Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim quandam dicens, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem, evellere ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum.

Cf. Minuc. Felix 19, 7.

Immortality of the soul 748—He considers the soul as immortal, even its irrational part. Olympiodorus in Plat. *Phaed.* p. 124, ¹³ Norvin (Fr. 55 Lang):

¹ I give the text as it is read by Ross-Fobes. Several corrections have been made in it.

“Οτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἄχρι τῆς ἐμψύχου ¹ ἕξεως ἀπαθανατίζουσιν, ὡς Νουμήνιος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς φύσεως, ὡς Πλωτῖνος † ἐνι ὅπου ²· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Πλούταρχος.

749—Speus. wrote several works on ethics. A few traces of them have remained in later writers. Ethics

a. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 22, 133; p. 186, ¹⁹ Stählin (Fr. 57 Lang): *eudaimonia*

Σπεύσιππος τε ὁ Πλάτωνος ἀδελφιδοῦς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἕξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν ἢ ἕξιν ἀγαθῶν, ἧς δὴ καταστάσεως ἅπαντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὁρεξίν ἔχειν, στοχάζεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀοχλησίας. εἶεν δ' ἂν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀπεργαστικάι.

b. Like Aristotle and other Academics, Speus. did not consider outward goods as indifferent things, though he held that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness. its relation to virtue

Cic., *Tusc.* V 10, 30 (fr. 58 a Lang):

Non igitur facile concedo neque Bruto meo neque communibus magistris nec veteribus illis, Aristoteli, Speusippo, Xenocrati, Polemoni, ut, cum ea quae supra enumeravi (paupertas, ignobilitas, humilitas, solitudo, amissio suorum, graves dolores corporis, perdita valetudo alia similia) in malis numerent, iidem dicant semper beatum esse sapientem.

c. Cp. Cic., *Tusc.* V 13, 39 (fr. 58 b Lang):

Hic (humanus animus) igitur si est excultus, etsi eius acies ita curata est, ut ne caecaretur erroribus, fit perfecta mens, id est absoluta ratio, quod est idem virtus. Et, si omne beatum est cui nihil deest et quod in suo genere expletum atque cumulatam est, idque virtutis est proprium, certe omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt. Et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto convenit, id est cum Aristotele, Xenocrate, Speusippo, Polemone. Sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi.

d. Seneca summarizes Speus.' doctrine shortly in the following sentence. *Epist.* 85, 18 (fr. 58 c, Lang):

Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.

Cp. also Plut., *De comm. not.* c. 13, p. 1065a (fr. 59 Lang).

¹ Lang reads ἐμψύχου (a conjecture of Bernays).

² The meaning of these words is uncertain.

pleasure
not a good

750—Speus. denied that, because pain is an evil, pleasure must be a good.

a. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* VII 14, 1153 b¹⁻⁷ (fr. 60 a Lang):

Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὅτι ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πᾶσι ἐμποδιστική· τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττω καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν¹.

b. How Speus. meant his thesis, appears in the following passage of Gellius, *N.A.* IX 5, 4 (fr. 60 i Lang):

Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese, bonum tamen esse, quod utriusque medium foret.

2—XENOCRATES

The man
and his
character

751—a. Diog. L. IV 6; 7-8:

Ξενοκράτης Ἀγαθήνορος Χαλκηδόνιος· οὗτος ἐκ νέου Πλάτωνος ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς Σικελίαν αὐτῷ συναπεδήμησεν. Ἦν δὲ τὴν φύσιν νωθρός, ὥστε λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα συγκρίνοντα αὐτὸν Ἀριστοτέλει, »τῷ μὲν μύωπος δεῖ, τῷ δὲ χαλινῷ.« — »Σεμνὸς δὲ τὰ τ' ἄλλα Ξενοκράτης καὶ σκυθρωπὸς αἰεὶ, ὥστε αὐτῷ λέγειν συνεχῆς τὸν Πλάτωνα, »Ξενοκράτες, θῦε ταῖς Χάρισι.« — 5

Ἦν δὲ καὶ ἀξιόπιστος σφόδρα, ὥστε μὴ ἐξὸν ἀνώμοτον μαρτυρεῖν, τοῦτω μόνῳ συνεχώρουν Ἀθηναῖοι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐταρκέστατος ἦν. Ἀλεξάνδρου γοῦν ποτὲ συγχὸν ἀργύριον ἀποστείλαντος αὐτῷ, τρισχιλίας Ἀττικὰς ἀφελὼν τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπέπεμψεν, εἰπὼν ἐκείνῳ πλείονων δεῖν πλείονας τρέφοντι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑπ' Ἀντιπάτρου πεμφθὲν μὴ προσέσθαι, ὥς φησι Μυρωνιανὸς ἐν Ὀμοίοις.

b. Cp. *Index Acad.* col. VI, Mekler p. 39:

Οἱ δ' ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ λέγονται προκρίναι τὸν Ξενοκράτην ἀγασθέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν σωφροσύνην.

His works

c. Diog. Laërt. IV 11:

Καὶ πλεῖστα ὅσα καταλέλοιπε συγγράμματα καὶ ἔπη καὶ παραινέσεις.

Follows a long list, in which are mentioned: a work *περὶ φύσεως*, several works on logic, theory of knowledge (such titles as *π. ἐπιστήμης*, *π. τοῦ ψεύδους*, *π. τὴν διάνοιαν*), metaphysics (*π. τοῦ ὄντος*, *π. εἰμαρμένης*, *π. ἰδεῶν*), on geometry, on numbers, on astronomy, and rather numerous works on ethical subjects.

Head of the
School during
25 years.

d. Ib., 14:

Διεδέξατο δὲ Σπεύσιππον καὶ ἀφηγήσατο τῆς σχολῆς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη.

¹ "that pleasure is essentially evil".

752—a. With Speusippus he shared a predilection for Pythagoreanism. Iambl., *Theol. arithm.* p. 61 g.E.:

Παρά Ξενοκράτους ἐξαιρέτως σπουδασθειςὼν αἰὲ Πυθαγορικῶν ἀκροάσεων, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν Φιλολάου συγγραμμάτων.

b. Diog. L. IV 10 (fr. 2 Heinze):

Πρὸς δὲ τὸν μήτε μουσικὴν μήτε γεωμετρίαν μήτε ἀστρονομίαν μεμαθηκότα, βουλόμενον δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν φοιτᾶν· πορεύου, ἔφη (ὁ Ξενοκράτης)· λαβὰς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις φιλοσοφίας. οἱ δὲ τοῦτό φασιν εἰπεῖν· παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ πόκος οὐ κνάπτεται.

Mathematical studies a necessary propaedeusis

753—a. Tripartition of philosophy.

Sextus, *Math.* VII (= Adv. Log. I) 16; (fr. 1 H.):

Πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν (οἱ διμερῆ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὑποστησάμενοι) ἐλλιπῶς ἀνεστράφθαι δοκοῦσιν, ἐντελέστερον δὲ παρὰ τούτους οἱ εἰπόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἡθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· ὧν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν πολλῶν δὲ ἡθικῶν οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν 5 διαλεχθεῖς· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτη καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔχονται τῆσδε τῆς διαιρέσεως.

Division of phil.

b. Practical purpose of philosophy.

[Galenus], *Hist. phil.* 8, p. 605, ⁷ Diels; (fr. 4 H.):

Αἰτία δὲ φιλοσοφίας εὐρέσεώς ἐστι κατὰ Ξενοκράτη τὸ ταραχῶδες ἐν τῷ βίῳ καταπαῦσαι τῶν πραγμάτων.

Practical purpose

754—Tripartition of knowledge.

Sextus, *Math.* VII 147 (fr. 5 H.):

Ξενοκράτης δὲ τρεῖς φησιν οὐσίας εἶναι, τὴν μὲν αἰσθητὴν τὴν δὲ νοητὴν τὴν δὲ σύνθετον καὶ δοξαστὴν, ὧν αἰσθητὴν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, νοητὴν δὲ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ, δοξαστὴν δὲ καὶ σύνθετον τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. ὁρατὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει, νοητὴ δὲ δι' ἀστρολογίας. τούτων μέντοι 5 τοῦτον ἐχόντων τὸν τρόπον, τῆς μὲν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ νοητῆς οὐσίας κριτήριον ἀπεφαίνετο τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τῆς δὲ ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ αἰσθητῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν, τῆς δὲ μικτῆς τὴν δόξαν· καὶ τούτων κοινῶς τὸ μὲν διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου κριτήριον βέβαιόν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθές μὲν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον 10 κοινὸν ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ ψευδοῦς ὑπάρχειν. τῆς γὰρ δόξης τὴν μὲν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ. ὅθεν καὶ τρεῖς Μοῖρας παραδεδόσθαι, Ἄτροπον μὲν τὴν τῶν νοητῶν, ἀμετάθετον οὖσαν, Κλωθὴ δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, Λάχεσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν δοξαστῶν.

three kinds of Knowledge

Cp. Ar., *Metaph.* E 1, our nr. 432b.

the cat-
egories

755—He reduced the categories to two, namely the καθ' αὐτό and the πρὸς τι.

Simpl., in *Ar. Categ.* γ 6 b; Schol. in *Ar.* 47 b²⁵ Brandis (fr. 12 H.):

Οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον πάντα τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ὥστε περιττὸν εἶναι κατ' αὐτοὺς τοσοῦτον τῶν γενῶν πλῆθος.

the First
Principles

756—His doctrine of First Principles.

a. Aetius, *Plac.* I 7, 30; *Dox.* p. 304 b¹ (fr. 15 H., first part):

Ξενοκράτης Ἀγαθήνορος Καλχηδόνιος τὴν μονάδα καὶ δυάδα θεούς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατρὸς ἔχουσιν τάξιν ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύουσιν, ἡντινα προσ-
αγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ περιττὸν καὶ νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ ὡς θήλειαν, μητρὸς θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός.

b. Aetius, *Plac.* I 3, 23; *Dox.* p. 288 b¹⁵ (fr. 28 H.):

Ξενοκράτης συνεστάναι τὸ πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τοῦ ἀενάου, ἀέναον τὴν ὕλην αἰνιττόμενος διὰ τοῦ πλήθους.

The same doctrine of Xenocr. is mentioned by Theodoretus, *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 12, p. 158 Gaisford.

His
hierarchy
of being

757—From these two principles proceed first Numbers, not ideal but mathematical Numbers, identified by Xenocr. with the Ideas; next geometrical, finally physical bodies.

a. *Ar., Metaph.* Z 2, 1028 b²⁴ (fr. 34 H.):

Ἐνιοι δὲ τὰ μὲν εἶδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά.

b. Asclepius, p. 379, ¹⁷ Hayduck, explains this passage in the following lines:

Ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὸν Ξενοκράτην ἀποτείνεται, καὶ φησιν ὅτι τὰ εἶδη τῶν πραγμάτων τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς προσηγόρευεν, ἐπειδὴ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ περιοριστικοὶ εἰσιν ὧν εἰσιν ἀριθμοί, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ εἶδη περιοριστικὰ τῆς ὕλης ὑπάρχουσιν· εἶτα μετὰ τὰς ιδέας δευτέρας οὐσίας ὑποτίθεται τὰς διανοητάς, τουτέστι τὰ μαθήματα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα· τελευταῖα δὲ τὰ φυσικά.

Between geometrical and physical bodies, doubtless the celestial bodies were interposed (τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν, *Ar.* I.c.; cp. our nr. 743, supra).

Xenocr.' identification of mathematical numbers and Ideas is referred to in several other places of *Ar.*'s *Metaphysics*, namely: Δ 1, 1069 a³³; Μ 1, 1076 a¹⁹;

M 6, 1080 b²¹; M 8, 1083 b²; M 9, 1086 a⁵; his doctrine of geometrical magnitudes in M 6, 1080 b²⁸ and N 3, 1090 b²¹.

On the place of Soul in this hierarchy, see nr. 748.

758—a. His doctrine of indivisible lines.

**Theory of
indivisible
lines**

Ar., *Metaph.* M 8, 1084 a³⁷-b² (fr. 41 H.):

Ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μέχρι πόσου (γεννώσι), οἷον ἡ πρώτη γραμμὴ ἄτομος, εἴτα δυάς, εἴτα καὶ ταῦτα μέχρι δεκάδος.

The meaning of this doctrine is, that all geometrical bodies should be finally reduced to very small and indivisible lines. Thus, Simplicius says, commenting on Ar.'s *Phys.* I 3, p. 142 Diels:

Ὡς οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἐπίπεδα εἶπεν εἶναι τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐλάχιστα σώματα, οὕτως ὁ Ξενοκράτης τὰς γραμμάς, ἀδιαιρέτους μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα, διαιρετάς δὲ καὶ αὐτὰς οὕσας τῇ φύσει.

b. Ar. opposes this theory in several places, e.g. *De caelo* III 1, 299 a⁶ (fr. 41 H.):

Ἐπειτα δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ στερεὰ μὲν ἐξ ἐπιπέδων συγκεῖσθαι, ἐπίπεδα δ' ἐκ γραμμῶν, ταύτας δ' ἐκ στιγμῶν. οὕτω δ' ἐχόντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ τῆς γραμμῆς μέρος γραμμὴν εἶναι. περὶ δὲ τούτων ἐπέσκεπται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγοις, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετα μήκη.

Cp. [Ar.], *De lin. insec.* 968 a¹-b²¹ (fr. 42 H.).

c. Philoponus in Ar. *Phys.* I 3, p. 84, ¹⁵ Vit., says that Xenocr. admitted his hypothesis of indivisible lines in order to avoid Zeno's consequences of indefinite division (Fr. 44 H.):

Ὅτι καὶ τῇ Ζήνωνος ἀπορίᾳ δι' ἧς κατεσκευάζε καὶ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ὄν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' ἄπειρον τομῆς τῶν μεγεθῶν, κακῶς ἐνέδοσαν ψευδῶς ὑποθέμενοι μὴ εἶναι ἐπ' ἄπειρον τὰ μεγέθη διαιρετά. ἐνδεδῶκασιν γὰρ ὅτι εἰ ἐπ' ἄπειρον τὰ μεγέθη διαιρετά εἴη, μήτε κίνησιν εἶναι μήτε εἶναι τι κυρίως ἔν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲ πολλά, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πλῆθος ἐκ πολλῶν μονάδων. ἔνθεν ὁ Ξενοκράτης ἀνήρει τὴν ἐπ' ἄπειρον τῶν μεγεθῶν τομήν.

759—Soul is defined by Xenocr. as a self-moving number.

**Definition
of Soul**

a. Ar., *De an.* I 2, 404 b²⁷ (fr. 60 H.):

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικόν, οὕτως ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμοφῶν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινουῖνθ' ἑαυτὸν.

b. The commentators are unanimous in attributing this definition to Xenocr. E.g. Alex. Aphr. in Ar. *Top.* II 4, p. 162, ⁴ Wallies:

εἰ δὲ κατὰ Ξενοκράτην ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς ἑαυτὸν κινῶν, —

c. Cp. Philoponus in Ar. *De an.* I 1 (402 a²²) A 15:

Οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ τὸ ποσόν (sc. ἀνάγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν) · ὦν ἐστὶ καὶ Ξενοκράτης · ἀριθμὸς γὰρ φησι κινῶν ἑαυτὸν ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ.

This
definition
explained

760—a. This definition is first explained as indicating that soul takes an intermediate place between the Ideas (Numbers) and sensible things.

Simpl., in Ar. *De an.* I 2 (404 b²⁷) p. 30, ⁴ Hayduck (fr. 64 H., the beginning):

Ξενοκράτους ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς οὗτος λόγος βουλομένου τὴν μεσότητά αὐτῆς τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδοποιουμένων ἅμα καὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς ἐνδείξασθαι · ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ κινητὸν τοῖς εἰδοποιουμένοις προσήκει. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄκρων μόνον δηλοῖ ὅτι οὔτε ἀριθμὸς ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ οὔτε κινητόν · τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὑφεῖται, ἥ τοῦ ἀμερίστου ἐκβέβληται, τοῦ δὲ ἐστὶ κρείττων, ἥ τοῦ 5 μεριστοῦ ὑπερέχει · τὸ συναμφοτέρον οὖν ἂν πως εἴη ὡς ἀμφοτέροις κοινωνοῦσα, ἀριθμὸς κινητός.

b. A similar explanation is given by Philoponus, in Ar. *De an.* I 4, (408 b³²) E 11 (fr. 65 H., l. 24-29):

Ἐλεγεν οὖν ἀριθμὸν μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὸ πλήρωμα εἰδῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λόγου · ἐκ τῶν λόγων πάντων γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοὺς λόγους ἔχει ὡς εἴπομεν · ἀριθμοὺς δὲ τὰ εἶδη ἐκάλουν ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ αὐτὸς γοῦν ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς φησιν »καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν τόπον εἰδῶν«. ἀριθμὸν μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦτο · κινουῦντα δὲ αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ αὐτοζῶν αὐτῆς · οὐ γὰρ ὑφ' ἐτέρου αὐτῇ τὸ ζῆν, 5 αὐτοζῶν γὰρ ἐστίν.

c. Plutarch (*De animi procr.* I, p. 1012 d) derives the two elements of soul in the definition of Xenocr. from the composing elements in Plato's *Tim.*, 35 a (Fr. 68 H., l. 11-16, 18-23).

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ (sc. those who follow Xenocr.) οὐδὲν ἢ γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τῇ μίξει τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας · ἀμέριστον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἓν, μεριστὸν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γενέσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐνὸς ὀρίζοντος τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐντιθέντος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον. — Τοῦτον δὲ μήπω ψυχὴν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι · τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν 5 καὶ τὸ κινητὸν ἐνδεῖν αὐτῷ · τοῦ δὲ ταύτου καὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου συμμιγόντων, ὦν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κινήσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ μεταβολῆς, τὸ δὲ μονῆς, ψυχὴν γεγόνέναι, μηδὲν ἔττον τοῦ ἰστάναι καὶ ἴστασθαι δύναμιν ἢ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινεῖν οὔσαν.

761—a. The soul's immateriality was proved by Xenocr. by the following argument.

Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* 30, p. 72 Matth. (fr. 66 H.):

Ἔτι, ἡ ψυχὴ, εἰ μὲν τρέφεται, ὑπὸ ἁσωμάτου τρέφεται· τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα τρέφει αὐτήν· οὐδὲν δὲ σῶμα ὑπὸ ἁσωμάτου τρέφεται· οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ· Ξενοκράτης οὕτω συνῆγεν.

We find the argument back in Tertull., *De anima* c. 6: "De insignioribus argumentationibus erit etiam illa, quod omne corpus corporalibus ali iudicant, animam vero ut incorporealem incorporealibus, sapientiae scilicet studiis."

b. Xenocr. held the immortality of the soul, not only of its logical part, but of the whole. Ar. opposes X. in the following lines of his *De anima* (Fr. 73 H.):

Ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἶόν τε χωρίζεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, εἴ γε μὴ διαιροῦνται αἱ γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμάς;

Philoponus comments on these lines (E 14; Heinze ib.):

Ξενοκράτης ἅτε δὴ Πλάτωνος ὡν μαθητὴς χωριστὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος.

Cp. our nr. 737 on Speus.

762—Xenocr. seems to have held that Soul penetrates the universe, descending from the higher regions of being to the inferior ones, so that not only the heavenly bodies are ensouled, and therefore divine beings, but also the elements of the sensible world. Moreover, he admitted the existence of half-divine beings (daemons) in the lower world, which take an intermediate place between the gods and men.

Gods and
daemons

Aetius, *Plac.* I 7; *Dox.* 304 b (fr. 15 H., second half ¹):

Θεὸν δ' εἶναι καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας πυρώδεις Ὀλυμπίους θεούς, καὶ ἑτέρους ὑποσελήνους δαίμονας ἀοράτους. ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ <θείας τινὰς δυνάμεις> ² καὶ ἐνδιήκειν τοῖς ὑλικοῖς στοιχείοις. τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν <διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος "Αἰδὴν ὡς"> ἀειδῆ προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ διὰ τοῦ ὕγροῦ Ποσειδῶνα, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς φυτοσπύρον Δήμητρα. ταῦτα δὲ χορηγῆσας τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὰ πρότερα παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος μεταπέφρακεν.

763—Molecular theory.

The elements
composed of
molecules

Aetius, *Plac.* I 17, 3; *Dox.* 315 b²³ (Fr. 50 H.):

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα καὶ οἰοῖται στοιχεῖα στοιχείων.

764—**a.** Xenocr. held the eternity of the kosmos, and, accordingly, defends a non-literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*.

Eternity of
the kosmos

¹ The first part of this fragment has been cited supra, under nr. 756a.

² Better: <θείας τινὰς εἶναι δυνάμεις>.

Ar. *De caelo* I 9, 279 b³² (fr. 54 H.):

“Ἦν δέ τινες βοήθειαν ἐπιχειροῦσι φέρειν ἑαυτοῖς τῶν λεγόντων ἀφθαρτον μὲν εἶναι γενόμενον δὲ (τὸν κόσμον), οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής· ὁμοίως γάρ φασι τοῖς τὰ διαγράμματα γράφουσι καὶ σφᾶς εἰρηκέναι περὶ τῆς γενέσεως, οὐχ ὡς γενομένου ποτέ, ἀλλὰ διδασκαλίας χάριν ὡς μᾶλλον γνωριζόντων, ὥσπερ τὸ διάγραμμα γιγνόμενον θεασαμένους· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐξ ἀτάκτων γάρ ποτε τεταγμένα γενέσθαι φασίν, ἅμα δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄτακτον εἶναι καὶ τεταγμένον ἀδύνατον.

The commentators explain the passage as referring to Xenocr.

b. One of the scholia mentions Xenocr. and Speus.:

Schol. cod. Reg. 1853, p. 489 a⁹ Brandis (Heinze, p. 180, l. 12-15):

‘Ὁ Ξενοκράτης καὶ ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἐπιχειροῦντες βοηθῆσαι τῷ Πλάτῳ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐ γενητὸν τὸν κόσμον ὁ Πλάτων ἐδόξαζεν ἀλλὰ ἀγένητον, χάριν δὲ διδασκαλίας καὶ τοῦ γνωρίσαι καὶ παραστῆσαι αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον ἔλεγε τοῦτον γενητὸν.

Plut., *De an. procr.* 3, p. 1013 a mentions Xenocr. and Crantor.

Ethics

765—Xenocr. wrote a considerable number of works on ethics. Cp. our nr. 742b. He was known in Antiquity as a severe moralist, though he taught, with the whole Academy, that virtue is not the only good.

Virtue and the other goods

a. Cic., *De fin.* IV 18, 49 (fr. 90 H.):

Aristoteles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia non dabit (bonum omne esse laudabile), quippe qui valetudinem, vires, divitias, gloriam, multa alia bona esse dicant, laudabilia non dicant. et hi quidem ita non sola virtute finem bonorum contineri putant, ut rebus tamen omnibus virtutem anteponant.

b. Cp. Seneca, *Epist.* 85, 18 (fr. 91 H.):

Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.

c. Cic., *Tusc.* V 18, 51 (fr. 86 H.):

Quid ergo aut hunc (Critolaum) prohibet aut etiam Xenocratem illum gravissimum philosophorum, exaggerantem tantopere virtutem, extenuantem cetera et abicientem, in virtute non beatam modo vitam, sed etiam beatissimam ponere?

Plutarchus, *Comp. Cim. c. Luc.* 1, opposes Xenocr. together with the Stoa to Epicureanism.

766—In what Xenocr., and the Academy in general, differed from Stoicism, may appear from the following passages of Cicero.

a. Cic., *De leg.* I 21, 55 (fr. 89 H.):

Si ut Chius Aristo dixit solum bonum esse quod honestum esset, malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnis plane paris ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse, valde a Xenocrate et Aristotele et ab illa Platonis familia discreparet (Antiochus), essetque
5 inter eos de re maxima et de omni vivendi ratione dissensio; nunc vero, cum decus, quod antiqui summum bonum esse dixerant, hic solum bonum dicat, itemque illi summum malum, hic solum, divitias, valetudinem, pulchritudinem commodas res appellet, non bonas, paupertatem, debilitatem, dolorem incommodas, non malas, sentit idem quod Xenocrates,
10 quod Aristoteles, loquitur alio modo.

b. Cic., *Ac. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 44, 136 (fr. 93 H.):

Atrocitas quidem ista tua (Antioche) quo modo in veterem Academiam inruperit nescio; illa vero (παράδοξα de sapiente) ferre non possum, non quo mihi displiceant — sunt enim Socratica pleraque — mirabilia Stoicorum, quae παράδοξα nominantur: sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles
5 ista tetigit? hos enim quasi eosdem esse vultis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientes solos reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo solum civem, solum liberum? insipientes omnes peregrinos, exules,
10 servos, furiosos? denique scripta Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbes quidem aut civitates, nisi quae essent sapientium?

767—He declared that the virtuous life is always happy, keeping to Plato's view in the *Gorgias*, the *Republic* and the *Laws* (cp. our nrs. **275a, b** and **374a**).

a. Ar., *Top.* VII 1, 152 a⁷⁻¹⁰ (fr. 82 H., l. 19-22):

Ξενοκράτης τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀποδείκνυσι τὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τῶν βίων αἰρετώτατος ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐδαίμων· ἐν γὰρ τὸ αἰρετώτατον καὶ μέγιστον.

The virtuous
life is happy

b. Alex. Aphrod. in Ar. *Top.* II 6, 112 a³² (fr. 81 H., l. 11-13):

Εἰ δὴ δαίμων ἐκαστοῦ ἡ ψυχὴ, καθ' ἃ Ξενοκράτει δοκεῖ, εἴη ἂν εὐδαίμων ὁ εὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων· εὖ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος· ὁ σπουδαῖος ἄρα εὐδαίμων.

768—Virtue not only in actions, but in the intention of the heart.

Interior
character of
virtue

Ael., *Var. hist.* XIV 42 (fr. 95 H.):

Ξενοκράτης ὁ Πλάτωνος ἐταῖρος ἔλεγε μηδὲν διαφέρειν, ἢ τοὺς πόδας ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς ἄλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι. ἐν ταῦτῳ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνειν τὸν τε ἐς ἃ μὴ δεῖ χωρία βλέποντα, καὶ ἐς οὓς μὴ δεῖ τόπους παριόντα.

769—Xenocr. a friend of animals.

Stories
about X.

Ael., *Var. hist.* XIII 31 (fr. 101 H.):

Ξενοκράτης ὁ Καλχηδόνιος ὁ ἐταῖρος Πλάτωνος τά τε ἄλλα ἦν φιλοικτίρμων καὶ οὐ μόνον φιλάνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἡλέει· καὶ οὖν ποτε καθημένου ἐν υπαίθρῳ διωκόμενος βιαίως στρουθὸς ὑπὸ ἱέρακος ἐς τοὺς κόλπους αὐτοῦ κατέπτη· ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως ἐδέξατο τὸν ὄρνιν καὶ διεφύλαξεν ἀποκρύψας, ἔσπετο ὁ διώκων ἀπῆλθεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡλευθέρωσεν αὐτὸν τοῦ φόβου, ἀπλώσας 5 τὸν κόλπον ἀφῆκε τὸν ὄρνιν ἐπειπὼν ὅτι μὴ ἐξέδωκε τὸν ἱκέτην.

770—Xenocr. as an ambassador.

Diog. L. IV 9 (fr. 109 H.):

Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρεσβεύων πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον περὶ αἰχμαλώτων Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὸν Λαμιακὸν πόλεμον καὶ κληθεὶς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον πρὸς αὐτὸν προηγέγκατο ταυτί¹.

ὦ Κίρκη, τίς γάρ κεν ἀνὴρ ὃς ἐναίσιμος εἶη

πρὶν τλαίῃ πάσασθαι ἐδητύος ἡδὲ ποτῆτος,

πρὶν λύσασθ' ἐτάρους καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδέσθαι;

καὶ τὸν ἀποδεξάμενον τὴν εὐστοχίαν εὐθὺς ἀφεῖναι.

5

3—HERACLIDES PONTICUS

A disciple
of Plato

771—a. He is mentioned among Plato's disciples in Diog. Laert. III 46 (our nr. 726), in the *Index Acad.* col. VI, p. 33 Mekler, and by Strabo XII 541.

b. He edited, as others did, Plato's lecture π. τάγαθοῦ.

Simpl., in Ar. *Phys.*, p. 453 D., l. 25-30 (fr. 42 W.):

Ἀρχὰς γὰρ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστόν φασι δυάδα λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα, τὴν δὲ ἀόριστον δυάδα καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τιθεὶς ἄπειρον εἶναι ἔλεγεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τάγαθοῦ λόγοις, οἷς Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἑστιάδης καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐταῖροι παραγενόμενοι ἀνεγράψαντο τὰ ῥηθέντα αἰνιγματωδῶς, ὥς ἐρρήθη.

5

Head of the
Academy
in 361

c. Suidas says that Plato left him as head of the School during his third stay in Sicily (fr. 2 W.):

¹ *Od.* X 383-385.

Ἡρακλείδης, Εὐφρωνος, φιλόσοφος, Ἡρακλείας τῆς Πόντου, — Πλάτωνος γνῶριμος· ἐκδημήσαντος δὲ Πλάτωνος εἰς Σικελίαν, προσεσθάναι τῆς σχολῆς κατελείφθη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

Speus. and Xenocr. accompanied the Master to Sicily (Plut., *Dio* 22; Diog. L. IV 11).

d. In this light we have to read the account of Diog. L., V 86 (fr. 3 W.):

Ἡρακλείδης Εὐθύφρονος Ἡρακλεώτης τοῦ Πόντου, ἀνὴρ πλούσιος. Ἀθήνησι δὲ παρέβαλε πρῶτον μὲν Σπευσίππῳ· ἄλλὰ καὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων διήκουσε καὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐξηλώκει· καὶ ὕστερον ἤκουσεν Ἀριστοτέλους, ὥς φησι Σωτίων ἐν διαδοχαῖς.

Supposed that the statement is true, the meeting with Speusippus here mentioned must have taken place during Plato's second stay in Sicily (367-364), while the τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐξηλώκει certainly implies that he knew Plato and heard him lecturing. That he heard Aristotle too, refers doubtless to Aristotle's lectures in the Academy. Cp. Strabo XIII 610, who says of Hermeias: γενόμενος δ' Ἀθήνησιν ἠκροάσατο καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους.

772—a. When, after the death of Speusippus, Xenocrates was chosen as the head of the Academy (338), Heracl. returned to Pontus.

Index Acad., col. VI, p. 38-39 Mekler (fr. 9 W.):

Οἱ δὲ νεανίσκοι ψηφοφορήσαντες ὅστις αὐτῶν ἡγήσεται (sc. after the death of Speusippus) Ξενοκράτην εἵλοντο τὸν Καλχηδόνιον, Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν ἀποδεδημηκότος εἰς Μακεδονίαν, Μενεδήμου δὲ τοῦ Πυρραίου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους ἡττηθέντων. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἡρακλείδης ἀπῆρεν εἰς τὸν Πόντον, ὁ δὲ Μενέδημος ἕτερον περίπατον καὶ διατριβὴν κατεσκευάσατο.

Probably, after his return to Pontus, Heracl. held a school there, as may appear from Diog. Laert. VII 166, where it is said of a certain Dionysius, called ὁ Μεταθέμενος:

ἤκουσε δὲ, καθά φησι Διοκλῆς, πρῶτον μὲν Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ πολίτου, ἔπειτ' Ἀλεξίνου καὶ Μενεδήμου, τελευταῖον δὲ Ζήνωνος (fr. 12 W.).

b. Later doxographi treat him sometimes as a Peripatetic, as by Diog. L. his bios is placed at the end of the 5th book, after that of Demetrius of Phaleron. Thus, among modern scholars, Wehrli treats him in Heft 7 of his *Schule des Aristoteles*, and Heath in ch. XVIII of his *Aristarchus of Samos*.

Proclus in *Tim.* 281 E (fr. 106 W.) does not deny that H. was in fact a disciple of Plato. What he denies is, that he was *legitimately* called a Platonist, since he held the rotation of the earth round its axis, while Plato made it unmoved (see our nr. 352 and note 2 to εἰλλομένην):

Ἡρακλείδης μὲν οὖν ὁ Ποντικός, οὐ Πλάτωνος ὢν ἀκουστής, ταύτην ἐχέτω τὴν δόξαν, κινῶν κύκλῳ τὴν γῆν· Πλάτων δὲ ἀκίνητον αὐτὴν ἵστησιν.

Instead of the οὐ in the first line of this text Fabricius conjectured ὁ, Taylor τοῦ. Schneider, in his edition of Proclus' Commentary of 1847, notes: "Fortasse Proclus non auditum esse Platonem, sed intellectum ab Heraclide negat".

Character 773—a. H.' character and writings. Diog. L. V 86 (fr. 3 W.):

Οὗτος ἐσθῆτί τε μαλακῇ ἐχρῆτο καὶ ὑπέρογκος ἦν τὸ σῶμα, ὥστ' αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν μὴ Ποντικὸν ἀλλὰ Πομπικὸν καλεῖσθαι. πρῶτος τ' ἦν τὸ βλέμμα καὶ σεμνός. Φέρεται δ' αὐτοῦ συγγράμματα κάλλιστα τε καὶ ἄριστα.

Follows a long list of his works, among which many dialogues on ethical subjects are mentioned.

Ethical dialogues b. Diog. describes these dialogues in the following lines.

Ib., 88-89 (fr. 22 W.):

Τούτων τὰ μὲν κωμικῶς πέπλακεν, ὡς τὸ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ περὶ σωφροσύνης· τὰ δὲ τραγικῶς, ὡς τὸ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἄδην καὶ τὸ περὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ τὸ περὶ ἐξουσίας. ἔστι δ' αὐτῷ καὶ μεσότης τις ὁμιλητικῇ φιλοσόφων τε καὶ στρατη-

Other works γικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαλεγομένων. ἀλλὰ καὶ γεωμετρικά ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ καὶ διαλεκτικά. ἄλλως τ' ἐν ἅπασιν ποικίλος τε καὶ διηρμένος 5 τὴν λέξιν ἐστὶ καὶ ψυχαραγωγεῖν ἱκανῶς δυνάμενος.

Soul 774—Soul is defined by Heracl. as an aetheric body, shining, something like light.

a. Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 6 (Dox. 388) = fr. 99a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης φωτοειδῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ὥρισατο.

We find this doctrine mentioned in Tertull., *De anima* 9, and in Macrobius, *Somn. Sc.* I 14.

b. Philoponus, *De an.* A 4 (Dox. 214) = fr. 100 W.:

Οἱ μὲν εἰρήκασιν αἰθέριον εἶναι σῶμα (ταῦτόν δὲ ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν οὐράνιον) ὥσπερ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός.

775—a. Before entering bodies, souls abide in the milky way.

Iambl. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 39 (I, 378 Wachsmuth) = fr. 98 W.:

Καὶ τούτους (sc. the places whence the soul comes when it is incarnated in a στερεὸν σῶμα) Ἡρακλείδην μὲν τὸν Ποντικὸν ἀφορίζειν περὶ τὸν γαλαξίαν, ἄλλους δὲ καθ' ὅλας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰς σφαίρας, ἅφ' ὧν δὴ δεῦρο κατιέναι τὰς ψυχάς· τοὺς δὲ περὶ σελήνην ἢ ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ σελήνην ἀέρι λέγειν αὐτάς κατοικεῖν καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν κάτω χωρεῖν εἰς τὴν περίγειον γένεσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ σωμάτων ἀεὶ στερεῶν πίπτειν εἰς ἕτερα σώματα διυσιζέσθαι.

Cp. Pl., *Tim.* 41 d e (our nr. 354a).

b. He shares Plato's view that the universe, the planets, the earth and the heaven are gods.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 34 (fr. 112 W.):

Ex eadem Platonis schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis refersit libros, et tamen modo mundum tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit sensuque deum privat et eius formam mutabilem esse vult, eodemque in libro rursus terram et caelum refert in deos.

776—a. The universe is infinite.

Cosmology

Stob., *Ecl.* I 21, 5 (*Dox.* 328, b 4) = fr. 113 W.:

Σέλευκος ὁ Ἐρυθραῖος ¹ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ἀπειρον τὸν κόσμον.

b. Each star is also a universe or world, suspended in the infinite aether and comprising an earth, an atmosphere and an aether.

Aët., *Plac.* II 13, 15 (*Dox.* 343, a⁷) = fr. 114a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον ὑπάρχειν γῆν περιέχοντα ἀέρα τε καὶ αἰθέρα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ αἰθέρι. Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δόγματα ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς φέρεται· κοσμοποιοῦσι γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων.

c. The moon is earth surrounded with mist.

Stob., *Ecl.* I 26 (*Dox.* 356, b²⁵) = fr. 115a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης [καὶ Ὀκελλος] γῆν ὁμίχλῃ περιεχομένην.

777—Heracl. held the rotation of the earth round its own axis.

Rotation
of the earth

a. Aët. III 13, 3 (*Dox.* 378 a¹⁰) = fr. 105 W.:

Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἐκφαντος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος κινοῦσι μὲν τὴν γῆν, οὐ μὲν γε μεταβατικῶς, ἀλλὰ τρεπτικῶς, τροχοῦ δίκην ἐνηξονισμένην, ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπ' ἀνατολὰς περὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς κέντρον.

The text has been reproduced under **44b**, and is cited here again for the sake of its utmost interest.

Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos* p. 252, suggests that the views attributed by the *Doxographi* to Ecphantus the Pythagorean (who is, for the rest, unknown to us) were expressed in a dialogue of Heracl. and put into the mouth of Ecph., represented as a Pythagorean.

b. Cp. *Simpl.* in Ar. *De caelo*, p. 444 l. 31 - 445, 2 Heiberg (fr. 109 W.):

Ar. admitted the possibility that both the heaven of the fixed stars and the fixed stars themselves are at rest διὰ τὸ γεγονέναι τινάς, ὧν Ἡρακλείδης τε ὁ Ποντικὸς ἦν καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος, νομίζοντας σώζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα τοῦ μὲν

¹ The astronomer Seleucus of Babylon.

οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄστρον ἡρεμούντων, τῆς δὲ γῆς περὶ τοὺς τοῦ ἰσημερινοῦ πόλους ἀπὸ δυσμῶν κινουμένης ἐκάστης ἡμέρας μίαν ἔγγιστα περιστροφήν.

Also ib. p. 519, ⁹⁻¹¹; 541, ²⁸⁻²⁹; schol. in Ar. p. 505 b⁴⁶⁻⁴⁷ Brandis. Cp. Simpl. in *Phys.*, p. 292, ²⁰, infra, sub 768.

Copernicus refers to Heracl. in his dedicatory epistle to Paul III and in I 5 of his work *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium*.

Rotation of
Mercury and
Mars

778—Heracl. seems to have held also the theory that Mercury and Mars rotate round the sun, a theory which occurs later combined with that of the epicycles, as it may be seen in Theon of Smyrna, p. 186, 17-187, 13 Hiller.

The passage is explained by Heath, *Aristarchus* p. 257 f. The same theory is mentioned by Chalcidius, *Tim.* c. 110, pp. 176-7 Wrobel. It occurs again in Macrobius, *Somm. Sc.* I 19; Vitruvius, *Architect.* IX 1 (4), 6; Martianus Capella VIII 854, 880, 882.

779—That he held the Copernican system, was defended by Schiaparelli¹, and again by Staigmüller, on the ground of Simpl., *De caelo* 444 and 452 Heiberg, and chiefly of *Phys.* 292 Diels. It is not accepted by Heath, who follows Tannery in rejecting the name Ἡρακλ. ὁ Ποντικός in l. 21 of the last mentioned passage of Simplicius, as a gloss².

The text of Simpl., *Phys.* 292, ¹⁵⁻²³ (fr. 111 W.), runs:

Διὰ τί ἀνωμάλως ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ οἱ πλάνητες φαίνονται κινούμενοι; 15
"Οτι, εἰ ὑποθώμεθα ἐκκέντρους αὐτῶν τοὺς κύκλους ἢ κατ' ἐπίκυκλον πολού-
μενα τὰ ἄστρα, σωθήσεται ἡ φαινόμενη ἀνωμαλία αὐτῶν, δεήσει τε ἐπεξελεῖν,
καθ' ὅσους δυνατὸν τρόπους ταῦτα ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα, ὥστε εἰκέναι
τῇ κατὰ τὸν ἐνδεχόμενον τρόπον αἰτιολογίᾳ τὴν περὶ τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρον 20
πραγματεῖαν. Διὸ καὶ παρελθὼν τίς φησιν Ἡρακλείδης Ποντικός, ὅτι καὶ
κινουμένης πῶς τῆς γῆς, τοῦ δὲ ἡλίου μένοντός πῶς δύναται ἡ περὶ τὸν ἥλιον
φαινόμενη ἀνωμαλία σφίζεσθαι.

By the τις in l. 21, according to Tannery and Heath, Aristarchus of Samos is meant.

Atomic
theory

780—His atomic theory differed from that of Democritus in that Heracl. makes his ὄγκοι παθητοί, i.e. capable of being worked on by each other.

a. Dionys. ap. Euseb., *Praef. ev.* XIV 23, 3 (Dox. 252) = fr. 119 W.:

Ταύτης δὲ τῆς δόξης (sc. atomism) Ἐπίκουρος γεγόνασι καὶ Δημόκριτος. Τοσοῦτον δὲ διεφώνησαν ὅσον ὁ μὲν ἐλαχίστας πάσας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνεπαισθή-

¹ *I precursori di Copernico nell' Antiquità*, Milano 1873.

² Heath, *Aristarchus*, pp. 276-283.

τους, ὁ δὲ καὶ μεγίστας εἶναι τινὰς ἀτόμους ὁ Δημόκριτος ὑπέλαβεν. Ἀτόμους δὲ εἶναι φασιν ἀμφοτέροι καὶ λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὴν ἄλυτον στερρότητα. Οἱ δὲ τὰς
 5 ἀτόμους μετονομάσαντες ἀμερῇ φασιν εἶναι σώματα τοῦ παντός μέρη, ἐξ ὧν
 ἀδιαιρέτων ὄντων συντίθεται τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς ἃ διαλύεται. καὶ τούτων φασι
 τῶν ἀμερῶν ὀνοματοποιὸν Διόδωρον γεγονέναι. Ὀνομα δέ, φασίν, αὐτοῖς
 ἄλλο Ἡρακλείδης θέμενος ἐκάλεσεν ὄγκους.

On Diodorus, cf. our nr. 232 (Diodorus Cronus).

b. Sextus, *Math.* X (= *Adv. Phys.* II) 318 = fr. 121 W.:

Ἐξ ἀπειρῶν δ' ἐδόξασαν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γένεσιν οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν
 τὸν Κλαζομένιον καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ ἄλλοι παμπληθεῖς, ἀλλ'
 ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας ἐξ ὁμοίων τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον καὶ
 Ἐπίκουρον ἐξ ἀνομοίων τε καὶ ἀπαθῶν, τουτέστι τῶν ἀτόμων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν
 5 Ποντικὸν Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην ἐξ ἀνομοίων μὲν, παθητῶν δέ,
 καθάπερ τῶν ἀνάρμων ὄγκων.

Asclepiades of Prusa was a medical man, who lived at Rome in the first century B.C. He was influenced by Epicurus and Heracl. Pont., and is mentioned by later authors as an adherent of the atomic theory.

c. Heracl. held that the atoms are joined together to a universe by divine Reason. See our nr. 775b (Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 34).

781—One of the chief works of Heracl. was his books Π. μουσικῆς. **Musicology**
 An important fragment of these is preserved in Plut., *De mus.* § 25-103. Another passage is cited in Athenaeus XIV 624 C-626 A. For the rest, Philodemus, *De mus.* col. XXIII 30-XXIV 4 may give us some idea of the contents of Heracl.' work (fr. 163 W.). The text runs:

Ἄ μέντοι Διογένης φησίν, κατανόησαντας ἡμᾶς <τ>ἀναγεγραμμένα παρ'
 Ἡρακλείδῃ περὶ πρέποντος μέλους καὶ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ ἀρρένων καὶ μαλακῶν
 ἡθῶν καὶ πράξεων ἀρμοττουσῶν καὶ ἀναρμόστων τοῖς ὑποκείμενοις προσώποις,
 οὐ μακρὰν ἀπηρτημένην τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἡγήσεσθαι τῷ πρὸς πλείστα ἐπὶ
 5 τοῦ βίου χρησιμεῦειν τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν φιλοτεχνίαν οἰκείως
 διατιθέναι πρὸς πλείους ἀρετάς, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πάσας, ἐκθέντες ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ
 τρίτῳ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἄλλοις δὲ συγγενῶς εἰρημένα παρ-
 εδείξαμεν ὅσης ἐστὶν γέμοντα ληρείας.

H., like Plato and Aristotle before him, held apparently that music should have a moral value and influence on men, a thesis which was violently opposed by the Epicurean Philodemus.

782—Heracl.' *Abaris* was a kind of life of a saint, which became the **The Abaris**
 prototype of later lives of Pythagoras. It was adorned with spiritistic stories, which made it very popular in Antiquity.

Plut., *De audiendis poetis* 1, p. 14 E (fr. 74 W.):

Ὅτι δὲ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λεγομένων οἱ σφόδρα νέοι τοῖς μὴ δοκοῦσι φιλοσόφως, μηδὲ ἀπὸ σπουδῆς λέγεσθαι χαίρουσι μᾶλλον καὶ παρέχουσιν ὑπηκόους ἑαυτοῦς καὶ χειροήθεις, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ Αἰσώπεια μυθάρια καὶ τὰς ποιητικὰς ὑποθέσεις, καὶ τὸν Ἄβαραν τὸν Ἡρακλείδου, καὶ τὸν Λύκωνα τὸν Ἀρίστωνος διερχόμενοι, [ἀλλὰ καὶ] τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα μεμιγμένα 5 μυθολογία μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιῶσι.

H.' name
in Antiquity

783—On the whole, Heracl. was a celebrated and much read author in later Antiquity, up to the Christian era. Varro was greatly influenced by his dialogues; Cicero and Atticus admired him.

a. Cic., *Tusc.* V 3, 8 praises his erudition (fr. 89 W.):
auditor Platonis Ponticus Heraclides, vir doctus in primis.

Cp. also *Div.* I 23, 46.

b. Timaeus rebuked him for his mysticism. Diog. L. VIII 72 (fr. 85 W.):

Timaeus opposes the stories of the miraculous disappearance of Empedocles. Τοιαῦτά τινα εἰπὼν ὁ Τίμαιος ἐπιφέρει· »Ἀλλὰ διὰ παντός ἐστιν Ἡρακλείδης τοιοῦτος παραδοξολόγος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς σελήνης πεπτωκέναι ἄνθρωπον λέγων.

Cp. Plut., *Cam.* 22; *De aud. poet.* 1.

c. Epicurus and his disciples covered him with invectives.

Plut., *Contra Epicuri beatitudinem* 2, p. 1086 E (fr. 20 W.):

Compared with Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes was very moderate in his language. Τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἰσχιστα ῥήματα βωμολοχίας, ληκυθισμούς, ἀλαζονείας, ἐταιρήσεις, ἀνδροφονίας, βαρυστόνους, πολυφθόρους, βαρυεγκεφάλους συναγαγόντες Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἰππάρχου καὶ τίνος γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν κατεσκεδάσαν.

4—EUDOXUS, PHILIPPUS OF OPOUS AND THE EPINOMIS

784—Another famous disciple of Plato and teacher in the Academy was Eudoxus of Cnidus, philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, medical man and lawgiver.

Eudoxus
of Cnidus

a. Diog. L. VIII 86-88:

Εὐδοξὸς Αἰσχίνου Κνίδιος, ἀστρολόγος, γεωμέτρης, ἱατρός, νομοθέτης. οὗτος τὰ μὲν γεωμετρικὰ Ἀρχύτα διήκουσε, τὰ δ' ἱατρικὰ Φιλιστίωνος τοῦ Σικελιώτου, καθὰ Καλλιμάχος ἐν τοῖς πίναξί φησι. Σωτίων δ' ἐν ταῖς διαδοχαῖς

λέγει καὶ Πλάτωνος αὐτὸν ἀκοῦσαι. γενόμενον γὰρ ἐτῶν τριῶν πού καὶ εἴκοσι
 5 καὶ στενῶς διακείμενον κατὰ κλέος τῶν Σωκρατικῶν εἰς Ἀθήνας ἀπαῖραι
 σὺν Θεομέδοντι τῷ ἱατρῷ, τρεφόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ· οἱ δέ, καὶ παιδικὰ ὄντα·
 καταχθέντα δ' εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ὁσημέραι ἀνιέναι Ἀθήναζε καὶ ἀκούσαντα τῶν
 σοφιστῶν αὐτόθι ὑποστρέφειν. δύο δὴ μῆνας διατρίψαντα οἴκαδ' ἐπανελθεῖν
 καὶ πρὸς τῶν φίλων ἐρανισθέντα εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἀπαῖραι μετὰ Χρυσίππου τοῦ
 10 ἱατροῦ, συστατικᾶς φέροντα παρ' Ἀγησιλάου πρὸς Νεκτάναβιν· τὸν δὲ τοῖς
 ἱερεῦσιν αὐτὸν συστήσαι. — Ἐντεῦθεν τε γενέσθαι ἐν Κυζίκῳ καὶ τῇ Προπον-
 τίδι σοφιστεύοντα· ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ Μαυσωλὸν ἀφικέσθαι. ἐπειθ' οὕτως ἐπανελ-
 θεῖν Ἀθήναζε, πάνυ πολλοὺς περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔχοντα μαθητάς. — Ἀπεδέχθη δὲ
 ἐν τῇ πατρίδι μεγαλοτίμως, ὥς τό γε περὶ αὐτοῦ ψήφισμα γενόμενον δηλοῖ.
 15 ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐπιφανέστατος ἐγένετο, γράψας τοῖς ἰδίοις
 πολίταις νόμους, ὥς φησιν Ἑρμιππος ἐν τετάρτῃ περὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν, καὶ
 ἀστρολογούμενα καὶ γεωμετρούμενα καὶ ἕτερ' ἅττα ἀξιόλογα.

b. He died at the age of 53, before Plato. Diog. L., ib., 90:
 Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ τρίτον ἄγων καὶ πεντηκοστὸν ἔτος.

c. His celebrity. Diog., ib. 91:
 Τοῦτον ἀντὶ Εὐδόξου Ἐνδοξὸν ἐκάλουν διὰ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῆς φήμης.

785—He rejected the theory of the Ideas in its Platonic form.

Interpreta-
 tion of the
 theory of
 the Ideas

a. Ar., *Metaph.* A 9, 991 a⁸⁻¹⁸ (our nr. 529a).

b. Alex. explains the passage as follows:

Εὐδόξος τῶν Πλάτωνος γνωρίμων μίξει τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς αὐτάς τὸ
 εἶναι ἔχουσιν ἡγεῖτο ἕκαστον εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλοι δέ τινες, ὥς ἔλεγε . . . μίξει τῶν
 ἰδεῶν τὰ ἄλλα.

786—In ethics, too, he held a view very different from Plato's, namely
 that pleasure is the supreme good. We found it in Aristotle's *Ethics*
 (our nrs. 594-596) and shall find it again in Epicurus.

Pleasure
 the supreme
 good

a. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* X 2, 1172 b⁹⁻¹⁸ 1:

Εὐδόξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθὸν ᾧετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα
 10 αὐτῆς, καὶ ἕλλογα καὶ ἄλλογα, ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ
 μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτό φέρεσθαι μνησκειν ὥς πᾶσι τοῦτο
 ἄριστον (ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν), τὸ
 15 δὴ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τάγαθὸν εἶναι· ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι

¹ The passage referred to sub 596c.

διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς. Διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν.

b. Plato himself was brought by this theory to write his *Philebus* and to revise his own view of the best life (our nr. 348).

Theory of
the celestial
spheres

787—As to astronomy, Eudoxus' theory of concentric celestial spheres preceded that of Callippus and Aristotle's theory of a plurality of unmoved Movers, expounded in *Metaph.* A 8.

Our nr. 517.

See on Eudoxus' hypothesis: Heath, *Aristarchus*, p. 193-211.

Geometry
1. His theory
of proportion

788—a. An important part of Euclides' *Elementa* has been taken from Eudoxus. It was Eud. who invented and elaborated the theory of proportion expounded in *Elem.* V. The essence of this theory is its applicability to incommensurable as well as commensurable quantities.

Eud.' conception of equal ratios is embodied in Eucl. V, def. 5:

Ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ μεγέθη λέγεται εἶναι πρῶτον πρὸς δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον πρὸς τέταρτον, ὅταν τὰ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τρίτου ἰσάκεις πολλαπλάσια τῶν τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τετάρτου ἰσάκεις πολλαπλασίων καθ' ὅποιον οὖν πολλαπλασιασμὸν ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου ἢ ἅμα ὑπερέχη ἢ ἅμα ἴσα ᾗ ἢ ἅμα ἐλλείπη ληφθέντα κατάλληλα.

On the importance of this definition see Heath, *Aristarchus* p. 191.

2. His
method of
exhaustion

b. Secondly, he discovered the method of exhaustion, which is at the root of all Archimedes' further developments in the mensuration of plain and solid figures. The fundamental thesis has come down to us by Eucl., *Elem.* X 1.

The method is explained in Cantor's *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Mathematik* I² 229, 254, 257 f.; Heath, *Works of Archimedes* p. XLVIII ff.; Zeuthen, *Hist. des math.*, 136 ff.

3. His curve
for doubling
a cube

c. He solved, by means of a complicated curve, the problem of doubling the cube.

Eutocius in Archim. *Sphaer. et cyl.* 66, 12 Heiberg:

(Εὐδόξος) φησὶν ἐν προοιμίῳ διὰ καμπύλων γραμμῶν αὐτὴν (τὴν εὕρεσιν) ἠύρηκέναι.

Cf. Proclus' account of the problem, in *Eucl. Elem.* I 213, 3-7. A reconstruction of Eud.' method has been ventured by Tannery, *Mém. de la Société des Sciences de Bordeaux*, 2e série, II (1878), 282 f., and by Künssberg, *Eud. von Knidos* II, 55 f.

Heath treats the question shortly in his *Aristarchus*, p. 190 f., and again, in his *Apollonius of Perga*, p. XXII f.

789—A less dissentient Platonist and member of the Academy was **Philippus of Opous** **Philippus of Opous**

a. He is mentioned among Plato's disciples in the list of Diog. L. III 46 (our nr. **726**).

b. He is said to have transcribed the *Laws* and to be the author **Author of the *Epinomis*?**
of the *Epinomis*.

Diog. L. III 37:

Ἐνιοί τέ φασι ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ Ὀπούντιος τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῦ μετέγραψεν ὄντας ἐν κηρῷ. Τούτου δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐπινομίδα φασὶν εἶναι.

Cp. *Index Acad.* 13, where he is called ὁ ἀστρολόγος and ἀναγραφεὺς τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ ἀκουστής.

Suidas says: ὁς τοὺς Πλάτωνος Νόμους διεῖλεν εἰς βιβλία ιβ'· τὸ γὰρ ιγ' αὐτὸς προσθεῖναι λέγεται.

The authenticity of the *Epinomis* has been lately defended by J. Harward (*The Epinomis of Plato*, Oxford 1928), by

A. E. Taylor (*Proceedings of the Brit. Acad.* XV, 235), by

H. Raeder (*Kgl. Danske Vidensk. Selskab, Hist. filol. Medd.* XXVI 1, Kopenhagen 1938), and by

E. des Places (*Revue des Et. grecques* XLIV, 153 ff.), while many others reject it.

I personally think the authorship of Philippus probable, though there is no decisive evidence for it.

c. The list of his works presented by Suidas contains chiefly **Works**
mathematical and astronomical treatises, but also ethical writings.

790—Doubtless, certain features in the *Epinomis* may be mentioned as being characteristic of the first generation of the Academy, during Plato's old age and after his death. **Wisdom in the *Epinomis***

First, Wisdom is in the *Epinomis* essentially conditioned by the knowledge of number.

Epin. 976 c-977 d:

976 Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ φανῆναι γέ τινα ἐπιστήμην ἣν ἔχων σοφὸς γίγνεται· ἂν ὁ σοφὸς ὄντως ὦν καὶ μὴ μόνον δοξαζόμενος. ἴδωμεν δὴ. χαλεπῷ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ παντά-
d πασιν ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ἑτέραν πάρεξ τῶν εἰρημένων εὐρεῖν, ἢ σοφία μὲν λέγεται· ἂν ὄντως τε καὶ εἰκότως, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν οὔτε βάνυστος οὔτ' ἡλίθιος ἔσται, σοφὸς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸς δι' αὐτὴν πολίτης τε καὶ ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐνδίκως ἔσται
5 πόλεως ἅμα καὶ ἐμμελής. κατίδωμεν δὴ ταύτην πρώτην, τίς ποτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐπιστήμη μία διεξελθοῦσα ἢ μὴ παραγενομένη τῶν νῦν παρουσῶν ἀνοητότατον ἂν καὶ ἀφρονέστατον παράσχοιτο ζῶον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώ-
e πων. οὐ δὴ τοῦτό γε πάνυ χαλεπὸν τὸ κατιδεῖν. μία γὰρ ὥς εἰπεῖν πρὸς μίαν ἢ τὸν ἀριθμὸν δοῦσα παντὶ τῷ θνητῷ γένει τοῦτ' ἂν δράσειεν· θεὸν δ' αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τινα τύχην ἡγοῦμαι δόντα ἡμῖν σφίσειν ἡμᾶς. ὃν δὲ θεὸν ἡγοῦμαι,

φράζειν χρή, καίπερ ἄτοπον ὄντα, καὶ πως οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ· πῶς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον ἡμῖν συμπάντων οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολὺ μεγίστου, τῆς φρονήσεως, αἴτιον 977 ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ γεγονέναι; τίνα δὴ καὶ σεμνύνων ποτὲ λέγω θεόν, ὦ Μέγилλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία; σχεδὸν Οὐρανόν, ὃν καὶ δικαιοτάτον, ὡς σύμπαντες ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἅμα καὶ θεοί, τιμᾶν τε καὶ εὐχεσθαι διαφερόντως αὐτῷ. τὸ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 5 αἴτιον ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἡμῖν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογοῖμεν· δοῦναι δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως αὐτόν φαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ δώσειν, ἔάν τις θέλῃ συνακολουθεῖν. ἔάν γάρ ἕη τις ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ὀρθὴν τὴν τοῦδε, εἴτε κόσμον ἢ εἴτε Ὀλυμπον εἴτε οὐρανὸν ἐν ἡδονῇ τῷ λέγειν, λεγέτω μὲν, ἀκολουθεῖτω δὲ ὅπῃ ποικίλλων αὐτόν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ στρέφων ἄστρα πάσας διεξόδους ὥρας τε καὶ τροφὴν πᾶσιν παρέχεται. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὲ οὖν φρόνησιν, ὡς φαῖμεν ἂν, 5 σὺν ἀριθμῷ παντί, καὶ τᾶλλ' ἀγαθὰ· τοῦτο δὲ μέγιστον, ἔάν τις τὴν ἀριθμῶν αὐτοῦ δόσιν δεξάμενος ἐπεξέλθῃ πᾶσαν τὴν περίοδον.

Ἔτι δὲ σμικρὸν ἐπανελθόντες πως τοῖς λόγοις ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὅτι καὶ μάλ' ὀρθῶς ἐνόησαμεν ὡς, εἴπερ ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐξέλοιμεν, c οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ τι φρόνιμοι γενοίμεθα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ποτὲ ψυχὴ τούτου τοῦ ζῶου πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν λάβοι σχεδόν, οὗτος λόγος ἀπείη· ζῶον δὲ ὅτι μὴ γινώσκοι δύο καὶ τρία μὴδὲ περιττὸν μὴδὲ ἄρτιον, ἀγνοοῖ δὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀριθμόν, οὐκ ἂν 5 ποτε διδόναι λόγον ἔχοι περὶ ὧν αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας [ἔχοι] μόνον εἴη κεκτημένον, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἀρετὴν, ἀνδρείαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει. d στερόμενος δὲ ἀληθοῦς λόγου σοφὸς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, ὅτῃ δὲ σοφία μὴ προσείη, πάσης ἀρετῆς τὸ μέγιστον μέρος, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τελέως ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος εὐδαίμων ποτὲ γένοιτο.

Moral
purpose of
astronomical
studies

791—Second, the greatest virtue is, according to our author, piety,—and it is learned by learning astronomy. To this purpose mathematical studies are necessary.

a. *Epin.* 989 b¹-990 b²; 990 c⁵-991 a¹:

Μεῖζον μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτε πείσῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας εἶναι τῷ 989 θνητῷ γένει· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι δι' ἀμαθίαν τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ταῖς ἀρίστοις φύσεσιν οὐ γέγονεν, λεκτέον. ἄρισται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ χαλεπώτατα μὲν ἂν γενόμεναι, μέγιστον δὲ ὄφελος, ἂν γίγνωνται· τά τε γὰρ τῆς βραδείας τε καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας φύσεως 5 μετρίως ἀποδεχομένη ψυχὴ καὶ πρῶως, εὐκόλος ἂν εἴη, τὴν τε ἀνδρείαν ἀγαμένη, καὶ πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν εὐπειθής, καὶ τό γε μέγιστον, ἐν ταύταις ταῖς φύσεσιν δυναμένη μανθάνειν καὶ μνήμων οὖσα, εὖ μάλα χαίρειν τούτοις αὐτοῖς δύναται c ἂν φιλομαθῆς ὥστ' εἶναι. ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε ῥάδια φύεσθαι, γενόμενά τε, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας τυχόντα ἥς δεῖ, τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ χεῖρους κατέχειν ὀρθότατα δύναται d ἂν τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ ἕκαστα ὡς 5 δεῖ τε καὶ ὅτε δεῖ, περὶ θυσίας τε καὶ καθαρμῶν τῶν περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώ-

πους, οὐ σχήμασι τεχνάζοντας, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντας ἀρετήν, ὃ δὴ καὶ μέ-
 d γιστόν ἐστι συμπάντων πάσῃ τῇ πόλει. τοῦτο δὴ οὖν τὸ μέρος εἶναι φαμεν
 φύσει κυριώτατον καὶ δυνατὸν ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα μαθεῖν, εἰ
 διδάσκοι τις. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν διδάξειεν, εἰ μὴ θεὸς ὑφηγοῖτο· εἰ τ' οὖν διδάσκοι,
 5 κατὰ τρόπον δὲ μὴ δρῶ τὸ τοιοῦτον, κρεῖττον μὴ μανθάνειν. ὅμως δ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν
 λεγομένων ἀνάγκη μαθεῖν ταῦτα καὶ ἐμὲ λέγειν τὴν τοιαύτην τε καὶ ἀρίστην
 e φύσιν. πειρώμεθα δὴ τῷ τε λόγῳ διεξιελθεῖν ἃ τ' ἐστὶν καὶ οἷα καὶ ὡς δεῖ μανθά-
 νειν, κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τ' ἐμὴν τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὴν τῶν δυναμένων εἰσακοῦσαι,
 990 θεοσεβείας ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τις τίνα μαθήσεται. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον
 ἀκούσαντι, τὸ δ' ὄνομα αὐτοῦ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς γε, ὃ τις οὐκ ἂν ποτε δόξειεν δι'
 ἀπειρίαν τοῦ πράγματος — ἀστρονομίαν — ἀγνοεῖ τε ὅτι σφοδρώτατον ἀνάγκη
 5 τὸν ἀληθῶς ἀστρονόμον εἶναι, μὴ τὸν καθ' Ἡσίοδον ἀστρονομοῦντα καὶ πάντας
 τοὺς τοιούτους, οἷον δυσμάς τε καὶ ἀνατολὰς ἐπεσκεμμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν
 ὀκτώ περιόδων τὰς ἐπτὰ περιόδους, διεξιούσης τὸν αὐτῶν κύκλον ἐκάστης
 b οὕτως ὡς οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως ποτὲ πᾶσα φύσις ἱκανὴ γένοιτο θεωρῆσαι, μὴ θαυ-
 c 5 μαστῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως. — Διὸ μαθημάτων δέον ἂν εἶη· τὸ δὲ μέγιστόν
 τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἀριθμῶν αὐτῶν ἄλλ' οὐ σώματα ἐχόντων, ἀλλὰ ὅλης τῆς τοῦ
 περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου γενέσεώς τε καὶ δυνάμεως, ὅσῃν παρέχεται πρὸς τὴν
 d τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. ταῦτα δὲ μαθόντι τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἐστὶν ὃ καλοῦσι μὲν σφόδρα
 γελοῖον ὄνομα γεωμετρίαν, τῶν οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ὁμοίων ἀλλήλοις φύσει ἀριθμῶν
 ὁμοιώσεις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐπιπέδων μοῖραν γεγонуῖα ἐστὶν διαφανής· ὃ δὴ θαῦμα
 5 οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ γεγονὸς θεῖον φανερόν ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ δυναμένῳ συννοεῖν.
 μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τοὺς τρεῖς ὑψιζήμενους καὶ τῇ στερεᾷ φύσει ὁμοίους· τοὺς δὲ
 ἀνομοίους αὖ γεγονότας ἑτέρα τέχνη ὁμοιοῦ, ταύτῃ ἣν δὴ στερεομετρίαν ἐκά-
 e λεσαν οἱ προστυχεῖς αὐτῇ γεγονότες· ὃ δὲ θεῖόν τ' ἐστὶν καὶ θαυμαστόν τοις
 ἐγκαθορώσι τε καὶ διανοουμένοις ὡς περὶ τὸ διπλάσιον αἰετρεφομένης τῆς
 δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτῃ καθ' ἐκάστην ἀναλογίαν εἶδος καὶ γένος
 991 ἀποτυποῦται πᾶσα ἡ φύσις.

b. Knowledge of the heavenly bodies is at the top, for its object is divine. Ib., 991 b⁵-c¹:

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γιγνέσθω τε καὶ ἐχέτω σύμπαντα· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τέλος, εἰς θεῖαν γένεσιν ἅμα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὁρατῶν καλλίστην τε καὶ θειοτάτην φύσιν ἱτέον, ὅσῃν ἀνθρώποις θεὸς ἔδωκεν κατιδεῖν, ἣν οὔποτε ἄνευ τῶν νῦν διειρημένων μὴ κατιδὼν ἐπεύξεταί τις ῥαστώνῃ παραλαβεῖν.

792—These things are certainly not against the spirit of Plato's philosophy, at least in his later years. Cp. the following passages:

a. *Epin.* 981 e³⁻⁶:

Νομίσαι δὲ δὴ δεῖ πάλιν τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν ζῶων γένη, ὃ δὴ πᾶν χρὴ φάναι

The souls of
the celestial
bodies

θεῖον γένος ἄστρον γεγονέναι, σώματος μὲν τυχὸν καλλίστου, ψυχῆς δ' εὐδαιμονεστάτης τε καὶ ἀρίστης.

Cp. Plato, *Nom.* 898 d-899 c (our nr. 391).

Evil
overcome by
good

b. *Epin.* 988 d⁴-e⁴:

Διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιούντων, ψυχῆς οὐσης αἰτίας τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ πάντων μὲν d 5
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τοιούτων, τῶν δὲ αὖ φλαύρων τοιούτων ἄλλων, τῆς μὲν
φορᾶς πάσης καὶ κινήσεως ψυχὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι θαῦμα οὐδέν, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τὰγαθὸν e
φορὰν καὶ κίνησιν τῆς ἀρίστης ψυχῆς εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἐναντίαν,
νενικηκέναι δεῖ καὶ νικᾶν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα.

Cp. Plato, *Nom.* 904 a b (our nr. 392a).

Gods and
daemons

c. *Epin.* 984 d³-e³:

Θεοὺς μὲν δὴ, Δία τε καὶ Ἥραν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας, ὅπη τις ἐθέλει, d
ταύτη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τιθέσθω νόμον καὶ πάγιον ἐχέτω τοῦτον τὸν λόγον·
θεοὺς δὲ δὴ τοὺς ὁρατοὺς, μεγίστους καὶ τιμιωτάτους καὶ ὀξύτατον ὀρῶντας 5
πάντη, τοὺς πρῶτους τὴν τῶν ἄστρον φύσιν λεκτέον καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τούτων
αἰσθανόμεθα γεγονότα, μετὰ δὲ τούτους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἐξῆς δαίμονας, ἀέριον e
δὲ γένος, ἔχον ἔδραν τρίτην καὶ μέσην, τῆς ἐρμηνείας αἵτιον, εὐχαῖς τιμαῖν
μάλᾳ χρεῶν χάριν τῆς εὐφήμου διαπορείας.

This, too, can be placed quite well in the Platonic view of the universe. And yet, there is a *nescioquid* in these things which does give us the impression that they are rather the work of the next generation than that of the Master himself. Indeed, they fit in excellently with what we know of the character of Philippos of Opous. Cp. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* II 1⁵, 1044 f.

5—POLEMO, CRATES AND CRANTOR

Polemo 793—The next generation of the School turned from mathematics to ethics.

Conversion
to philosophy

a. Polemo and his conversion to philosophy by Xenocrates.

Diog. L. IV 16:

Πολέμων Φιλοστράτου μὲν ἦν υἱός, Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν δῆμων Οἰηθεν. νέος δ'
ὢν ἀκόλαστός τε καὶ διακεχυμένος ἦν οὕτως, ὥστε καὶ περιφέρειν ἀργύριον
πρὸς τὰς ἐτοιμοὺς λύσεις τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στενωποῖς διέκρυπτεν.
καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ πρὸς κίονι τινι τριώβολον εὐρέθη προσπεπλασμένον αὐτοῦ
διὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν τῇ προειρημένην πρόφασιν. καὶ ποτε συνθέμενος τοῖς νέοις 5
μεθύων καὶ ἐστεφανωμένος εἰς τὴν Ξενοκράτους ἤξε σχολήν· ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν διατρα-
πεῖς εἶρε τὸν λόγον ὁμοίως· ἦν δὲ περὶ σωφροσύνης. ἀκοῦον δὴ τὸ μειράκιον
κατ' ὀλίγον ἐθηράθη καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο φιλόπονος, ὥς ὑπερβάλλεσθαι τοὺς

ἄλλους καὶ αὐτὸς διαδέξασθαι τὴν σχολήν, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκτῆς καὶ δεκάτης
10 καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος ¹.

b. His further life and behaviour. Diog., ib. 17-18:

His ἀπάθεια

Τοσοῦτον δὲ ἐπιτεῖναι τὸ ἥθος ἀρξάμενον φιλοσοφεῖν, ὥστ' ἐπὶ ταυτοῦ
σχήματος τῆς μορφῆς πάντοτε μένειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἀναλλοίωτος ἦν·
διὸ καὶ θηραθῆναι Κράντορα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. κυνὸς γοῦν λυττῶντος καὶ τὴν ἰγνύαν ²
διασπάσαντος μόνον μὴ ὠχρίᾶσαι· καὶ ταραχῆς γενομένης ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως
5 πυθομένων τὸ γεγονός ἀτρεπτον μεῖναι. ἐν τε τοῖς θεάτροις ἀσυμπαθέστατος
ἦν. Νικοστράτου γοῦν ποτε τοῦ ἐπικαλουμένου Κλυταιμνήστρα ἀναγινώσκοντός
τι τοῦ ποιητοῦ αὐτῷ τε καὶ Κράτητι, τὸν μὲν συνδιατίθεσθαι ³, τὸν δ' ἴσα καὶ
μὴ ἀκοῦσαι. καὶ ὅλως ἦν τοιοῦτος οἷόν φησι Μελάνθιος ὁ ζωγράφος ἐν τοῖς
περὶ ζωγραφικῆς· φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν αὐθάδειάν τινα καὶ σκληρότητα τοῖς ἔργοις
10 ἐπιτρέχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν.

c. His main interest was more turned to practical life than to theory.

Diog. L. IV 18:

Ἐφασκε δὲ ὁ Πολέμων δεῖν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς
διαλεκτικοῖς θεωρήμασι.

794—His ruling principle in ethics was: living according to nature.

a. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* VII 6, 32, 9 (Stählin III p. 25, l. 2):

Living
according to
nature

Πολέμων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου συντάγμασι.

b. Cic., *Acad.* II 42, 131:

Honestum autem vivere fruentem rebus iis quas primas homini natura
conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit (sc. finem bonorum), ut indicant
scripta Polemonis.

c. Plut., *Comm. not.* c. 23, p. 1069:

Τίνας δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Πολέμων λαμβάνουσιν ἀρχάς; Οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων
τούτοις ἡκολούθησεν, ὑποτιθέμενος στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ
τὸ κατὰ φύσιν;

795—The doctrine of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν is expounded more fully
by Cicero in *De finibus* II 11, 33 f., with reference to Polemo:

The theory
of the
πρῶτα κατὰ
φύσιν

Omne enim animal, simul et ortum est, et se ipsum et omnes partes
suas diligit duasque, quae maximae sunt, in primis amplectitur, animum et

¹ 316-313 B.C.

² The hollow of the knee.

³ Came under the impression.

corpus, deinde utriusque partes. Nam sunt et in animo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae cum leviter agnovit, tunc discernere incipit, ut ea, quae prima data sint natura, appetat asperneturque contraria. In his primis 5 naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est. Nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valetudinem, summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt quae 10 paulo ante dixi. Ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis.

Cp. also *De fin.* IV 6, 14 f.

Virtue the first condition to happiness

796—Virtue was, according to Polemo, the first and absolute condition to happiness, while exterior goods were considered by him as being not absolute conditions.

Clem., *Strom.* II 22, 133, 7 (St. II, p. 186, 28-187, 2):

‘Ο γὰρ Ξενοκράτους γινώριμος Πολέμων φαίνεται τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτάρκειαν εἶναι βουλόμενος ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων. Δογματίζει γοῦν, χωρὶς μὲν ἀρετῆς μηδέποτε ἂν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπάρχειν, δίχα δὲ καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι.

Crates

797—Of Crates, Polemo's successor in the School, we know very little for certain. Diog. speaks about his intimate friendship with Polemo and his relations with Crantor.

Diog. L. IV 21-22:

Κράτης πατὴρ μὲν ἦν Ἀντιγένης <Ἀθηναῖος>, Θριάσιος δὲ τῶν δῆμων, ἀκροατὴς ἄμα καὶ ἐρώμενος Πολέμωνος· ἀλλὰ καὶ διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν αὐτοῦ. Καὶ οὕτως ἀλλήλῳ ἐφιλείτην ὥστε καὶ ζῶντε οὐ μόνον τῶν αὐτῶν ἡστέτην ἐπιτηδεύματων, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι σχεδὸν ἀναπνοῆς ἐξωμοιώσθη ἀλλήλοις καὶ θανόντε τῆς αὐτῆς ταφῆς ἐκοινωνεῖτην. ὅθεν Ἀνταγόρας εἰς ἄμφω τοῦτον ἐποίησε 5 τὸν τρόπον·

Μνήματι τῷδε Κράτητα θεοῦδᾶ καὶ Πολέμωνα
 ἐννεπε κρύπτεσθαι, ξεῖνε, παρερχόμενος,
 ἄνδρας ὁμοφροσύνη μεγάλητορας, ὧν ἅπο μῦθος
 ἱερὸς ἦϊσεν δαιμονίου στόματος,
 καὶ βίοςτος καθαρὸς σοφίας ἐπὶ θεῖον ἐκόσμει
 αἰῶν' ἀστρέπτοις δόγμασι πειθόμενος.

ἔνθεν καὶ Ἀρκεσίλαον μετελθόντα παρὰ Θεοφράστου πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγειν ὡς εἶεν θεοὶ τινες ἢ λείψανα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους. — Συσσίτιον δὲ φησιν
 15 αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀντίγονος εἶναι παρὰ Κράντορι, ὁμονόως συμβιούντων τούτων τε καὶ Ἀρκεσιλάου. τὴν δὲ οἴκησιν Ἀρκεσίλαον μὲν ἔχειν μετὰ Κράντορος, Πολέμωνα δὲ σὺν Κράτῃ μετὰ Λυσικλέους τινὸς τῶν πολιτῶν.

798—Something more is known to us about Crantor.

Crantor

a. Diog. L. IV 24:

Κράντωρ Σολεὺς θαυμαζόμενος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδι ἀπῆρεν εἰς Ἀθήνας καὶ Ξενοκράτους διήκουσε Πολέμωνι συσχολάζων. Καὶ κατέλιπεν ὑπομνήματα εἰς μυριάδας στίχων τρεῖς, ὧν τινά τινες Ἀρκεσιλάῳ προσάπτουσι.

b. As we saw before, he lived together with Arcesilas. He died before Polemo and Crates.

Diog. IV 27:

Καὶ κατέστρεψε πρὸ Πολέμωνος καὶ Κράτητος.

799—a. Proclus in *Tim.* 24 A mentions him as the first to write commentaries on Plato, at least on the *Timaeus*:

His commentary on the *Timaeus*

(Κρ.) ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητής.

b. Plutarch cites this commentary in his *De an. procr.* 2, p. 1012 f.: The creation of the soul

Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κράντορα μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἔργον εἶναι τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τε νοητὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, τὰς τε τούτων ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα γινομένας διαφορὰς καὶ ὁμοιότητας, ἐκ πάντων φασίν, ἵνα πάντα γινώσκη, συγκεκρᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι τέτταρα, τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν αἰεὶ κατὰ
 5 τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα παθητικὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν· ἔτι δὲ τὴν ταυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου, διὰ τὸ ἀκείνων ἑκατέραν μετέχειν ἑτερότητος καὶ ταυτότητος.

800—He cites it again in the same work, a few lines further, on the eternity of the world and the non-literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*.

The eternity of the world

Plut., *De an. procr.* 3, p. 1013 A:

Τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου διανοούμενον, ἐπίστασθαι μὲν αἰδῖον ὄντα καὶ ἀγέννητον· τὸ δὲ ᾧ τρόπῳ συντέτακται καὶ διοικεῖται καταμαθεῖν οὐ ῥᾶδιον ὁρῶντα τοῖς μήτε γένεσιν αὐτοῦ μήτε τῶν γεννητικῶν σύνοδον ἐξ ἀρχῆς προϋποθεμένοις, ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν τραπεῖσθαι.

801—A fragment of his ethics is preserved in Sextus, *Math.* XI (= *Adv. Eth.*) 51-58: Ethics

Some authors have been cited who call health the highest good. S. continues:

Ἀγαθὸν δ' εἶπαι ἀντὶν ὑπαρχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ πρῶτον, οὐ τε ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκα-
δημείας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περικλέους. ἐν βίῃ γὰρ ὑπελάβον ἐκδαστώ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὴν
οἰκίαν τάξιν τε καὶ ἀξίαν ἀποθέμεν. ἐν βίῃ καὶ ὁ Κράνους εἰς εὐφροσύνην τοῦ
ἀποθέμεν βουλόμενος ἡμᾶς ἀγειν πάλιν χαίρειν συνερχόμενον παραδελγίαντι.
εἰ γὰρ νοσήσκειν, φησί, κοινὸν τι τῶν Πανελληνίων θέατρον, εἰς τοῦτο τε ἐκα-
στον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παρίεν καὶ τῶν πρῶτων ἀντιστοιχούντων ἡμῶν, εὐθύς καὶ
εἰς ἐννοίαν ἀνακαθίσταται τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διαφοράς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ
πᾶσι ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰς ἐσθλότητας καὶ τὰς ὑποδείξεις καὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων
χρησίμωτον εἶναι νομίζουσιν καὶ ὑγιαινούσιν, καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ παρῆχον τὰ
ἐν δὲ πολέμοις νεύον τῶν πράξεων γίνονται. τοῦτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν ἀδύων ἀκοῦ-
σάντες οἱ Πανελλήνιοι ὁμοθυμαδὸν κελεύουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τὰ πρῶτα τῶ
παιδείᾳ. ἀλλ' ἐάν τούτων ἡδὴ ἀνακηρύσσοντο μὲν οὐκ ἐπιστάσας ἡ ἡδονή,

τῇ ἐν μὲν φιλοδότης, ἐν δ' ἡμέρας, ἐν δ' ὁρατοίς,
παρφοφωαίς, ἡ τ' ἐκλεψέων ὧν πάλιν περ φοροῦντων,¹

λέγει δὲ εἰς μέσον καταστάσας, ὅτι ἀντὶν δίκαιον ἔστιν ἀναγορεύειν

(ὁ δ' ὁ βίος οὐ βέλαιος, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἡμέρας

ἐξέπται οἰκίαν, μικρὸν ἀνθρώπων ἡρόνον²,

διδέκεται τε πόρῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ δὲ ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ περιγίνο-
μένην ἀπολαύσιν καὶ ἡδονήν), πάλιν οἱ Πανελλήνιοι, οὐκ ἀλλὰς ἔχειν τὸ
πράγμα ἡ οὐτως ὑποαβδόντες, κεκράζονταί τιν τὴν ἡδονὴν στεφανοῦν. ἀλλὰ
καὶ ταύτης τὸ βραβεῖον φέρεσθαι μελλόντων, ἐπὶ τὴν εἰσιελάτῃ ἡ ὑπερῶν μετὰ τῶν
συνδράμων ἀντὶ θεῶν, καὶ διδιδάσκον, ὧς οὐτε ἡδονῆς οὐτε παύσεως ὅφρα δὲ
ἔστιν ἀποδοῦναι αὐτῇς

(τί γὰρ με παύσεως, > . . . > ὥφρα εἴ νῶσον;
μικρὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατ' ἡμέραν ἔχων
ἀναπνέον οἰκίαν βίον ἡ παύσεως νοσῶν)³,

ἀκούσαντες πάλιν οἱ Πανελλήνιοι καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ὄντες, ὧς οὐκ ἐνερτι κλινόμενῃ⁵⁷
καὶ νοσούντων ὑποστῆναι τὴν εὐδαίμονιν, φησὺσι νικᾶν τὴν ὑπερίαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ
τῆς ὑπερίας ἡδὴ νικῶσας, ἐπὶ τὴν εἰσιελάτῃ ἡ ἀνδρείαν πολὺν οὐκ ὀφείδων καὶ
ἡρώων ἔχουσα περὶ ἑαυτὴν, καταστάσας τε λέγει. »εἴμω μὴ παρῶσας, ἀνδρείας⁵⁸

¹ *Ilias* XIV 216.

² Eur., *Phoen.* 558 and *Electra* 944.

³ Eur., fr. 714 Nauck.



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Ἑλληνες, ἀλλοτρία γίνεται ἢ κτῆσις τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν, εὐξαιντό τ' ἂν οἱ πολέμιοι περιουσιάζειν ὑμᾶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὥς μελλήσοντες ὑμῶν κρατεῖν, καὶ τούτων οὖν ἀκούσαντες οἱ Ἑλληνες τὰ μὲν πρωτεῖα τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀποδώσουσι, τὰ δὲ δευτερεῖα τῇ ὑγείᾳ, τὰ δὲ τρίτα τῇ ἡδονῇ, τελευταῖον δὲ τάξουσι τὸν πλοῦτον.

802—a. Cr. was the author of a *Περὶ πένθους*, which became the pattern of many later *Consolationes*. Plutarchus quotes it in the following passage of his *Consol. ad Apollonium*, 3, p. 102:

The
πς πένθους

Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε συμφέρομαι τοῖς τὴν ἄγριον ὑμνοῦσι καὶ σκληρὰν ἀπάθειαν, ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὖσαν· ἀφαιρήσεται γὰρ ἡμῶν αὕτη τὴν ἐκ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν εὐνοίαν, ἣν παντὸς μᾶλλον διασώζειν ἀναγκαῖον. Τὸ δὲ πέρα τοῦ μέτρου παρεκφέρεσθαι καὶ συναύξειν τὰ πένθη παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι φημι, καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν φαύλης γίνεσθαι δόξης. Διὸ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἑατέον ὥς βλαβερόν καὶ φαῦλον, καὶ σπουδαίοις ἀνδράσιν ἥκιστα πρέπον· τὴν δὲ μετριοπάθειαν οὐκ ἀποδοκιμαστέον. Μὴ γὰρ νοσοῦμεν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀκαδημαῖκός Κράντωρ, νοσήσασι δὲ παρείη τις αἴσθησις, εἴτ' οὖν τέμνοιτό τι τῶν ἡμετέρων, εἴτ' ἀποσπῶτο· τὸ γὰρ ἀνώδυνον τοῦτο οὐκ ἄνευ μεγάλων ἐγγίνεται μισθῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τεθριῶσθαι γὰρ εἰκὸς, ἐκεῖ μὲν σῶμα τοιοῦτον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ψυχὴν.

How far the quotation goes, may be seen in Cicero, *Tusc.* III 6, 12:

Nec absurde Crantor ille, qui in nostra Academia vel in primis fuit nobilis, 'minime', inquit, 'adsentior iis, qui istam nescio quam indolentiam magno opere laudant, quae nec potest ulla esse nec debet. ne aegrotus sim; si' inquit 'fuero, sensus adsit, sive secetur quid sive avellatur a corpore. nam istuc nihil dolere non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore'.

b. Again, Cicero quotes the same work of Crantor in the following passage.

Acad. pr. (= Lucullus) 44, 135-136:

Sed quaero quando ista fuerint Academia vetere decreta, ut animam sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent: mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse quendam modum. legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu; est enim non magnus verum aureolus et ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit ad verbum ediscendus libellus, atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas, metum cavendi causa, misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae; ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse dicebant — recte secusne alias viderimus; atrocitas quidem ista tua quomodo in veterem Academiam intruperit nescio.

Cr.'s name as a moralist **803**—Horatius, *Epist.* I 2, 4 mentions him as a moralist on a level with Chrysippus:

qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
planus ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit.

His view of life **804**—Crantor's view of life, as it appears in Plutarch's *Consol. ad Apoll.* 27:

Πολλοῖς γὰρ καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὥς φησι Κράντωρ, οὐ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι
κέκλαυσται τὰνθρώπινα, τιμωρίαν ἡγουμένοις εἶναι τὸν βίον, καὶ ἀρχὴν τὸ
γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον συμφορὰν τὴν μεγίστην.

Plut. quotes it together with the young Aristotle's tale of Midas and Silenus in the dialogue *Eudemus* (see our nr. 417a).

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ERRATA

419 b, l. 8: τί οὖν ὑμῖν ὄφελος — read: ἡμῖν

424 b, fourth al.: See also *Metaph.* Λ 8 — read: Λ 8.

Sub **429 b**: the final passage of *Metaph.* Λ 8 — read: Λ 10.